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

Emery Walker Ph. sc

Andrew Martin, Fairbairn

From the portrait by Sir George Reid P.R.S.A.

MANSFIELD COLLEGE ESSAYS

PRESENTED TO THE REVEREND

ANDREW MARTIN FAIRBAIRN, D.D.

ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY

NOVEMBER 4, 1908

WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
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TO THE REVEREND
ANDREW MARTIN FAIRBAIRN,
D.D., D.LITT., LL.D.

DEAR DR. FAIRBAIRN,

Some of us who have studied or taught in Mansfield College during the twenty-two years that have passed since you became its first Principal desire to mark the occasion of your seventieth birthday by a series of essays which we would gladly associate with your name and the name of the College. Other unity we have not aimed at than this, that the essays and studies should fall within that broad and generous conception of Theology and Religion for which you have always stood. We have not sought to secure for the series any kind of completeness, or attempted to deal with all the chief branches of theological study; but we have each of us written upon some subject that was at the time engaging his special attention, giving the preference, so far as might be, to subjects in which it seemed possible to make some contribution to theological scholarship, without at the same time limiting interest in the essays to a few only of the

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many who have long turned to your own works as to those of a theologian and religious leader. Within the time that has elapsed since the volume was projected it has not been possible for all those to co-operate who would willingly have done so. In spite of these limitations we trust that the essays, which will be found arranged in the order in which the several writers first became personally connected with you, may form some not altogether inadequate memorial of the range of theological scholarship represented in our College life during your tenure of the Principalship.

Trusting that many years of fruitful study may still lie before you, we remain, in grateful remembrance of the past,

Ever yours,

THE WRITERS.

TO DR. FAIRBAIRN

Master ! if we, who call thee so, should fling
  The faith away, amid the faithless cast,
  That doubts not seekers find, and at the last
The single-hearted needs must see the King ;
If through the mist God's challenge faintly ring,
  The merest echo of that glorious blast
  He sounded through thy lips ; if, visions past,
We waken to the peace the world can bring,—
Then may thy face which tells of battles won
  Rebuke our craven hearts. For it were shame
    That we who call thee master, and have trod
With thee awhile, should leave the task undone
  Which thou from youth hast loved, with soul aflame
    To trace for man the footprints of his God.

EDWARD SHILLITO.

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JOHN CALVIN IN HIS LETTERS

C. SILVESTER HORNE

JOHN CALVIN IN HIS LETTERS

THERE are some signs that a gradual revision if not reversal of the general verdict upon John Calvin is in progress; and that we shall witness a determined attempt to do some belated justice to his memory. The material is ready to hand whenever the adventurous historian is forthcoming to do for Calvin what Carlyle did for Cromwell. It is not probable that researches will bring to light many new documents. The archives of Geneva have been explored with thoroughness; and the difficulties of any biographer will lie not in the poverty of his material, but in an embarrassment of riches. Any one who undertakes that formidable task will have need of all his piety; for a whole library of exegetical and theological volumes frowns down at him from shelves where innumerable books repose bearing the quaint legend, "Johannes Calvinus, prompie et sincere in opere Domini." It is difficult to realise, as one's eye runs along the array of folio volumes, that one is regarding the life-work of a man who died at fifty-five, and yet left behind him so portentous a progeny of his brain. We may think what we will of the value of Calvin's theological and political experiments, but it certainly is not open to us to deny the strenuous character of his intellect, nor to depreciate either his industry or his scholarship.

Exactly fifty years ago Mr. Mark Pattison contributed to the *Westminster Review* an article on "Calvin at Geneva." It was based on the collection of his letters first made in 1854, and afterwards translated into

English in 1855. It contains much noble appreciation, and some rather sweeping denunciations. Mr. Pattison made at least an effort to separate the chaff from the wheat in the accusations of which Calvin was the victim. Whether he took the trouble to read through the whole of Calvin's correspondence is more than doubtful; otherwise he could hardly have failed to qualify some of his judgments. He had before him M. Saberel's "Histoire de l'église de Genève;" and he drew his illustrations freely from the latter publication, but there is little evidence that he had supplemented the facts of the "history" out of the two huge volumes of letters. Nevertheless his reading of Calvin's Life enabled him to strike a vigorous blow at certain popular misconceptions. He gave us a brilliant and, on the whole, convincing exposition of the fallacy that Calvin the theologian, and not Calvin the reformer, was the more formidable factor in the Reformation. We feel as if we are living in the world of Chestertonian paradox as we read Mark Pattison's verdict on Calvin in these words, "His great merit lies *in his comparative neglect of dogma.*" We gaze at the fifty-three octavo volumes of the Edinburgh edition of his collected theological works, and vaguely wonder, if these represent the "comparative neglect of dogma," by what Calvin would have been represented if he had not neglected it? However we see what "the sometime Rector of Lincoln" means when he explains that Calvin "seized the idea of reformation as a real renovation of human character. While the German Reformers were scholastically engaged in remodelling abstract metaphysical statements, Calvin had embraced the lofty idea of the Church of Christ as a society of regenerate men. The moral purification of humanity as the original idea of Christianity is the guiding idea of his system. The Communion of Saints is held together by a moral, not by a metaphysical, still less by a sacramental bond."

That this judgment derives much support from

Calvin's letters we shall see as we proceed. For the present we merely take note that it was possible for a writer like Mr. Mark Pattison to lay stress, in no mere paradoxical humour, on Calvin's "comparative neglect of dogma." He does not deem it necessary to ask whether Calvin would have felt himself injured and insulted by such a criticism. The only question of interest for us is whether, when Calvin's achievements are summarised, his contributions to theological dogma were not altogether of inferior importance in comparison with the notable chapter which he contributed to the history of organised liberty. We may think it not only possible, but easy to prove, that behind Calvin's discipline lay Calvin's doctrine, and that without the doctrine of the elect he could not have built up those disciplined communities against which the fiercest waves of persecution broke in vain. What is certain is that, in Mr. Pattison's eloquent words, "it was the Calvinistic Discipline that reformed Scotland, emancipated Holland, attained a brief but brilliant reign in England, and maintained a struggle of sixty years against the royal authority in France."

The first popular misconception, then, which needs to be exposed is the one which Mr. Mark Pattison combated as far back as 1858. There remains, however, the further question whether Mr. Pattison himself was not guilty of saddling Calvin with a responsibility which only very partially belonged to him. Calvin has had to carry on his broad shoulders the whole odium for the austere, intolerant, and meddlesome discipline of Geneva. Yet it is perfectly clear, from his correspondence, that much went on in that city which he unsuccessfully resisted; that he was never the omnipotent autocrat he has been painted, and that in the sharp contentions between parties his was almost invariably a moderating voice. But apart altogether from these facts, which one may hope to establish from his letters beyond question, the accepted verdict on Calvin's Genevan legislation has been arrived at in

entire ignorance of the general history of European cities in the Middle Ages. In this respect Professor Lindsay, in his new "History of the Reformation," has gone some little way to set matters right. He reminds us that "the citizens of every mediæval town lived under a municipal discipline which we should pronounce to be vexatious and despotic." Every instance quoted by modern historians to prove, as they think, Calvin's despotic interference with the details of private life, can be paralleled by references to the police-books of mediæval towns in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In other words, Calvin's Geneva is not an isolated municipal phenomenon, nor were its sumptuary laws and the regulations of its morals the evidence of Calvin's intolerant Puritanism. There were always many in Geneva who voted him a strait-laced fanatic; but it is only just to remember that he was also constantly in conflict with the fiercer spirits among the administrators who would have reduced personal liberty in Geneva to the vanishing point. It is more unfair to hold Calvin responsible for the excesses of these latter than to saddle Cromwell with the responsibility for all the stern doings of his major-generals.

We now turn to the letters of Calvin themselves in search of evidence on these two main points, and may be allowed a few words of introduction to this astonishing mass of correspondence. Altogether some six hundred letters of Calvin have been preserved, most of which are lengthy and all of which, with scarcely an exception, are important either historically or theologically. That he himself attached great value to these letters, we know from the fact that he gave orders on his deathbed that a selection from them was to be made for the benefit of the Reformed Churches. The pious fulfilment of Calvin's dying wish was the publication eleven years later of some two hundred and fifty of his Latin letters; but nearly three hundred years passed before a complete collection of all his correspondence both in French and Latin was made and published. It

is not too much to say that these letters form an enduring monument of Calvin's fame. No other man has left behind him such a memorial of his own greatness. Scores of these letters are State documents of the highest value. Hundreds of them are intimate chapters of the Reformation. We see Calvin, never physically strong, worn out with the cares of administration in Geneva, yet nevertheless bearing the burdens of all the Reformed Churches, heartening the hard-pressed, pleading with emperors and statesmen for persecuted Protestants, guiding and counselling perplexed and discouraged pastors. Nowhere is the fascinating drama of the Reformation more vividly portrayed than in Calvin's letters. We watch him as he handles Martin Luther delicately and courteously, argues the sacramental position with Melanchthon, pens a vigorous despatch to John Knox, trenchantly discusses the spiritual usurpation of Henry VIII., exhorts the Duke of Somerset, fires the zeal of Cranmer, encourages the Queen of Navarre, and deals faithfully with Francis I. Of the superlative courage of many of these letters it is unnecessary to speak.

Geneva was a little town of 12,000 people, and almost the only haven of refuge in Europe for persecuted Protestants. She was surrounded by powerful foes; and all through Calvin's administration she carried her life in her hands. Silence would have been a far more prudent policy. To denounce the cruelties of the papal Powers was to seek a quarrel with those who asked nothing more than a pretext for destroying the independence of Geneva. But Calvin never hesitated; and, to do them justice, the men who composed "the Seigneury of Geneva" seldom failed, in an emergency, to lend him their support.

But if the political interest of these letters is unique, their literary quality cannot be overlooked. Calvin was not only a master of the art of writing mediæval Latin; he is universally recognised as one of the creators of modern French. One of the school histories

in use to-day in France lies before me as I write, and the criticism of Calvin is worth transcribing: "Calvin, le fondateur du protestantisme en France, traduisit en français son livre de l'Institution Chrétienne, qu'il avait d'abord écrit en latin, et *il créa, pour ainsi dire, sa langue*, langue précise, sobre, logique, un peu sèche et decharnée, admirable instrument de la discussion et des affaires." His biographer says, in effect, that while to praise his Latin style is to praise Cicero or Seneca, on whom he consciously modelled himself, to praise his French style is to praise what was original to Calvin, for it is bare justice to say that the French language had never been proved capable of so much dignity and subtlety before Calvin's advent. Those who are interested in working out theories of compensation will doubtless like to balance the account of what French literature owed to the two men of genius who deserve to be associated as its "creators"—Calvin and Rabelais—representatives of the two schools of manners and morals which contend for the supremacy in all countries, and which together produce the literary wealth which is the enduring treasure of mankind.

Of the dignified style of Calvin's letters much might be written; and we cannot doubt that in this respect they are an invaluable piece of self-revelation. He was essentially a dignified person, an aristocrat to the finger-tips. He could, on occasion, equal Milton in the art of vituperation; but, unlike Milton, he seldom or never resorted to that epistolary style in his more official and public documents. When he is treating his friend Gaspar Grossmann, of Zurich, to a spirited narrative as to how the erratic Caroli accused him and others of Arianism because they would not subscribe to the creed of Athanasius, he writes, "I replied that it was not my practice to approve anything as the words of God unless upon due consideration. Here observe *the rabid fury of the little ass.* He cried out that it was an expression unbecoming a Christian man." Calvin, however, might descend to personalities in private

letters, but he had too severe a sense of decorum, and, we will add, was too genuine an artist in feeling, to disfigure his writings with mere abuse. You may read a hundred pages at a time without coming across a sentence that offends against our modern canons of good taste; while at the same time the style is masculine, terse, and strong, and the reader feels himself throughout in the grip of a forceful and virile intellect. The light which his letters throw on Calvin's personal idiosyncrasies is not, perhaps, very great, but such as it is we welcome it. There is an engaging frankness in his confessions of occasional moral failure. If he is austere in his dealings with others, it should be counted unto him for righteousness that he is equally stern with himself. We may take one example which must suffice. The fortieth letter contains a long account of well-meant attempts, in which Martin Bucer was a principal, to reconcile Calvin to the notorious Caroli, whom he thoroughly and, as events proved, properly distrusted. A conference was held for this purpose, and Calvin's description is not lacking in forcibleness. "There I sinned grievously in not having been able to keep within bounds; for so had the bile taken entire possession of my mind that I poured out bitterness on all sides. There was of a certainty some cause for indignation, if moderation had only been observed in the expression of it. . . . I could not have been more rude to Caroli himself if he had been present. . . . When I got home I was seized with an extraordinary paroxysm, nor did I find any other solace than in sighs and tears." That Calvin was a man of extreme sensitiveness there is no question. The personal affronts and indignities to which he was subjected during his first sojourn in Geneva, and before he was driven forth into exile, left marks upon him from which he can scarcely be said to have recovered. The memory of that time was easily dismissed by the vivacious and pugnacious Farel, but the pain and the stain of it were with Calvin to the last as a personal

anguish. Farel roundly accused him of being "too nice and delicate," and liking "to be daubed with flatteries, and not to hear any harsher sound." This was when Calvin was being urged to come back to Geneva, and was vehemently protesting that his "very soul must shudder" whenever it was proposed that he should return. Yet, at the same time, his will is victorious. "Whenever I feel disposed to turn away with abhorrence from that province of labour, on that very account I am the more inclined to suspect myself. . . . Certainly it is my desire that the Church of Geneva may not be left destitute; therefore I would rather venture my life a hundred times over than betray her by my desertion." When the fateful conference was held with the deputies from Geneva that was to draw Calvin back to the city and the work he dreaded, his account to Farel is quite characteristic; "I besought them in every way I could think of, not to make any account of me in their determination. Whether I was in earnest in making that declaration they understood from what happened, when tears flowed faster than words; so that even twice my tears so interrupted my discourse that I was compelled for a season to withdraw." Tested by these confidential pages, in which he allows himself to break through the natural reserve of his character, the harsh and implacable Calvin stands revealed as a sensitive, tender, high-spirited, imaginative, and even emotional, man, who joined to these qualities a massive intellect, an inflexible will, and a singularly keen and refined conscience. His portrait as painted by his own hand is to be found in the letter to a Genevan pastor in which he announces his decision to return to that city. "You may in turn securely depend on me; for of a truth I promise you whatever may be expected from an individual who is a lover of peace and averse from contention, who is moreover your friend, very desirous indeed of your salvation, and lastly neither difficult nor implacable in forgiving offences."

The last phrase in this quotation starts us on a new line of inquiry. It has always been assumed that the easiest point of attack on John Calvin is his extreme intolerance alike in the sphere of faith and of morals. History, we are assured, will not agree to his own claim, that he was "neither difficult nor implacable." Even those who are prepared to make the most generous allowance for the circumstances in which he found himself, holding the one fortress in Europe for Protestant freedom against external and internal foes, deplore his grim and implacable rule, and the shadow which Geneva cast across the humanities of Europe. John Calvin has now become so much of a legend and a byeword, and conjures up so forbidding a countenance to the unhistorical imagination of the man in the street, that to break up this tradition will require a deal of education. We simply set the fact on record therefore, that the Calvin of the letters contradicts the Calvin of tradition in nearly every particular. The Calvin of the letters is a Calvin whose services are being sought for by representative Reformers everywhere as a peacemaker, not because, to use our favourite phrase, he does not know his own mind, but because he does know it, and because with very clear notions as to where the truth lies, he combines great courtesy, chivalry, and kindliness of spirit. There could, of course, be no more convincing illustration of this than the action of Calvin in the great sacramentarian controversy which so successfully set many of the leading reformers by the ears. Let us dip into the correspondence, and see for ourselves what was Calvin's attitude throughout. Only one letter from Calvin to Luther survives; and it is doubtful whether this one ever came into Luther's hands, as Melanchthon, to whom it was entrusted, feared that Luther had too much impatience with those who did not exactly agree with him to receive it in a friendly spirit. The letter itself is chiefly remarkable for the almost excessive respect paid to the German reformer

by Calvin, who calls him "most renowned sir, most distinguished minister of Christ, and my ever-honoured father." The letter is dated January, 1545, and some three months previously Calvin had declined to be persuaded to go to Zurich to pour oil on the troubled waters. The difficulty, he maintained, was with Luther rather than with the Zwinglians, and Luther "must be pacifical." Luther was even then at work on a tract called "Short Confession concerning the Supper," which was violently abusive of all associated with Zwingli. Calvin, therefore, writes to Bullinger one of the calmest and wisest of letters, of which the following extracts are a fair sample. After claiming full freedom for the Zwinglians to bear their testimony, he continues, "But of this I do earnestly desire to put you in mind; in the first place, that you would consider how eminent a man Luther is, and the excellent endowments wherewith he is gifted, with what strength of mind and resolute constancy, with how great skill, with what efficiency and power of doctrinal statement he hath hitherto devoted his whole energy to overthrow the reign of Antichrist, and at the same time to diffuse far and near the doctrine of salvation. Often have I been wont to declare that even although he were to call me a devil, I should still not the less hold him in such honour that I must acknowledge him to be an illustrious servant of God." Then after describing Luther's natural vehemence of temper, he expresses the wish that he "had not flashed his lightning sometimes upon the servants of the Lord." But he goes on, "You will do yourselves no good by quarrelling, except that you may afford some sport to the wicked, so that they may triumph not so much over us as over the Evangel. . . . Even should he (Luther) have provoked us, we ought rather to decline the contest than to increase the wound by the general shipwreck of the Church." The last sentence will serve, not only as an incomparable example of mixed metaphors, but as a supreme instance of Calvin's moderation. Feeling as strongly as he did on

this subject he is nevertheless fully prepared "to decline the contest" rather than continue it to the injury of the Reformed Churches. Throughout the whole painful controversy we see Calvin tenaciously advocating the *via media*, and consistently adopting the attitude expressed in a singularly fine letter to Melanchthon, "Neither, truly, do I ask you to agree with me in all things, which would certainly be impertinent; or that on my account you should turn aside from the free and simple statement of your own opinion, but merely that you would not refuse the trouble of a perusal of my opinions. To you it rather belongs to lead the way than to have respect to what may be pleasing to me."

The space at my disposal does not permit of further extracts from the large number of letters which deal with the sacramentarian controversy, and Calvin's positive opinion on the subject of the Real Presence in the Supper. Another admirable example of the utter absence of personal resentment, even when difference of judgment became acute, is to be found in his letters to Louis du Tillet. This friend of Calvin had forsaken an ecclesiastical career to embrace the doctrines of the Reformed Church, and had shared Calvin's perils when he had to fly from Paris. Du Tillet, however, was a gentle and contemplative person who gradually became alarmed for himself as he realised his isolation, and so drifted back within the seemingly more secure shelter of Rome. Calvin's letters to him after his secession breathe the very spirit of magnanimity. "May God grant that your change of opinion may be as benignly construed by others as I endeavour to take it." Not that he did not feel it acutely—"I would choose rather to be taken out of the world by a bitter death than approve your deed"—but he has never denied that "there always remains some remnant of the blessing of God," even in the Church that he regards as Antichrist. When Calvin was driven forth from Geneva, Louis du Tillet wrote what must have been a difficult letter to read with patience, sug-

gesting, as it did, that it was for the sin of schism the Protestant leader was being thus chastised. Calvin replied in a letter of singular moderation and dignity, in which he defends the legitimacy of his ministry, with as much firmness as Paul to the Galatians. He especially wishes Du Tillet to understand that his sufferings have involved him in no perplexities; "I have been greatly afflicted, it is true, but never to such a degree as to have to say, "Nescio ubi sint viæ Domini." Then follows a passage that is so nobly sincere and eloquent that it would be criminal to omit it. "One of my companions is now before God to render account of the cause which has been common to him and to me. When we come thither it will be known on which side the rashness and desertion have been. It is thither that I appeal from the judgments of all the worldly-wise sages who think their simple word has weight enough for our condemnation. There the angels of God will have witness who are the schismatics." The letter closes with the prayer that "the Lord would uphold and keep you in His holy protection, so directing you that you decline not from His way." A more perfect example of how to speak the truth in love is not to be found in all the history of religious controversy.

We will take, in the next place, the alleged intolerance of Calvin in the administration of "discipline" in Geneva. It will be well to decline firmly all temptation to work out a parallel between the Geneva of the sixteenth century, and the socialist ideal of the twentieth; but nobody ever held more definitely than Calvin the fundamental socialist principle that the individual has no rights against the State. We have taken note, however, that Geneva did not differ in kind, but only in degree from the mediæval cities where individual rights and liberties were meagre. State regulations would have seemed to us meddlesome and impertinent. Calvin was, speaking generally, averse to the policy of too tight a bridle, either in regard to the discipline of the Church or of the State.

Let us take some illustrations. Here is one that is of special interest to us in England, for it proves with how sane a mind Calvin watched the Reformation struggle in this country. The news reached him of the imprisonment of good old Bishop Hooper, who had elected to fight his battle largely on the legitimacy of certain vestments. Calvin's comment, in a letter to Bullinger, is as follows, "While I admire his firmness in refusing the anointing, I had rather he had not carried his opposition so far with respect to the cap and the linen vestment, even although I do not approve of these: I recently recommended this." In other words, as against the Protestant extremists, Calvin is for any reasonable accommodation that does not involve a compromise with principle.

But we must remember that Calvin's true attitude and temper were frequently misrepresented by those who shared his religious convictions without sharing his statesmanlike mind. For instance, much commotion was caused in the year 1551 by the action of Geneva in abolishing the four great feasts of the Catholic year. This action isolated Geneva from her Protestant sisters among the Swiss cities, and earned Calvin much ill-will. The real state of the case, however, is revealed in a private letter to John Haller, minister at Berne. "The abolition of the feast-days here has given grievous offence to some of your people, and it is likely enough that much unpleasant talk has been circulating among you. I am pretty certain also that I get the credit of being the author of the whole matter, both among the malevolent and the ignorant. But as I can solemnly testify that it was accomplished without my knowledge, *and without my desire*, so I resolved from the first rather to weaken malice by silence than to be over-solicitous about my defence. . . . If I had got my choice I should not have decided in favour of what has now been agreed upon." We may add that as it is usually believed that the non-celebration of Christmas in Scotland is due to the Calvin

tradition, it is a little surprising to read in this same letter, "Since my recall I have pursued the moderate course of keeping Christ's birthday as you are wont to do."

The evidence of the letters in regard to the state regulation of public and private habits and recreations is very interesting. The Consistory, undoubtedly with Calvin's approval, set itself to suppress dances in private houses. Our modern sympathies would be entirely with the victims whose houses were raided were it not for the revelations contained in the letters. The people arrested were among the richest and most powerful in Geneva. The house where the fateful ball was held belonged to a certain Francis Favre, a wealthy sensualist, who was twice convicted of adultery. His daughter was the wife of Amy Perrin, the Captain-General of Geneva, who had been a notable instrument in the Reformation of doctrine. It was characteristic of Calvin that when he did believe any habit to be vicious he attacked it in high places and in the persons of the most influential citizens. In an impassioned sentence he writes to Farel, "Were there as many diadems in the house of the Favres as frenzied heads, that would be no barrier to the Lord being superior." "Two things," he reports later, "are already matter of public talk, that there is no hope of impunity since even the first people of the city are not spared, and that I show no more favour to friends than to those opposed to me." To Amy Perrin himself he states the same principle with equal emphasis, "I wish you to consider that we cannot enjoy weight for weight with an unequal balance; and if impartiality must be observed in the administration of human law, any departure from it cannot be tolerated in the Church of God." The principle that all men are equal in the sight of God may be liable to misconstruction; but in Calvin's fearless impartiality we can see how plainly he realised where the essential liberties lie in Church and State.

If, however, his authority can justly be quoted for the suppression of these private dances, we must turn again to the letters to see how he refused to prohibit public plays. For this the reader is referred to Letter 168. It appears that the magistrates had given permission for the acting of a morality play called "The Acts of the Apostles." One of the Genevan ministers, Michael Cop, preached a fiery discourse against the proposal, and especially against women being allowed to act. Calvin's view was that the plays were "inexpedient," but he had no objection to them in principle. So he gave his judgment that "we did not wish to oppose them if the Senate held out for them." Michael Cop became more and more violent. "His extravagance was the more displeasing since I could by no means approve of what he had said." The people, it appears, would have dealt hardly with Michael, but for the respect in which they held Calvin. The latter "prevailed with the actors"; the Senate supported him and them; and "the result is the games are now going on." Booths were erected for the seigneurs that "they might comfortably witness the representation of 'The Acts of the Apostles.'" Apparently there were several representations, after which the entry is made in the Registers, "Upon the remonstrances of the ministers resolved to delay the representations of the theatre to a less calamitous time." It is remarkable that no objection was urged either by Calvin, or the majority of ministers, impugning in principle "the representations of the theatre."

The famous controversy with the young men of Geneva on the piquant subject of "slashed breeches" is expounded with much spirit in the letters. It would be sufficient to treat the interdict on "slashed breeches" as an example of the mediæval sumptuary laws. But to Calvin there was more in it than that. Alike by reason and instinct he knew that the enemy of republics is corruption; and that extravagance and profligacy go hand in hand. When he was attacked on this subject,

he writes, "I discoursed about sources of corruption in general, premising that I was not speaking against these trumperies." He is for simplicity and purity against all-intruding habits of extravagance and corruption; as for "the slashing of their breeches," it was but "a mere piece of foppery, not worth speaking about." The Reformer who thought Hooper wrong to make a fuss about ecclesiastical vestments, would not risk schism in the state over a mere question of juvenile costume.

We must conclude by setting forth the evidence of the letters on the crucial question of Servetus. That ill-fated man is referred to with some mystery in Letter 153. He has written to Calvin in "a proud spirit," and Calvin has accordingly replied, "speaking more harshly to him than is my wont, but I could scarcely do otherwise." If Servetus does not learn more humility "you will lose time in asking me to bestow labour upon him." There is nothing here to prepare us for the appalling threat which seems to flow so lightly from his pen in the next letter to Farel. Servetus "takes it upon him to come hither," but Calvin will not only give no pledge for his safety, but adds that if he do come, and his (Calvin's) authority be of any avail, "vivum exire non patiar." There is no room for doubt about that terrible phrase. What, one may well ask, lay behind it? The answer would seem to be that the days were evil. "The Parliament of Paris wages war with fire and faggot against Christ." "A great multitude of the godly are everywhere held in bonds." The one haven of refuge for the persecuted was Geneva; and the security of Geneva depended on the maintenance of its discipline. Relax these bonds and Geneva would no longer be the City of Refuge, and the one fortress of Liberty in all Europe. Calvin felt that if Servetus came and preached his doctrine in Geneva, the result would be a kingdom divided against itself, which could not stand; and as the bare thought terrified him, the threat against Servetus leapt to his lips. This was in Feb-

ruary, 1546. Seven years passed before the arrest of Servetus. But the year 1553 found Calvin still interceding for the sufferers from the cruelties of Rome. The "five students" of Lyons have just been sent to the flames. Calvin's letter of exhortation had been their comfort at the last. Geneva is still the joy of the faithful, and the last hope of the refugee. The one peril of Protestantism is lest any mischief-maker should break up the faith and discipline of Geneva. Calvin's mind was not intolerant, nor his principles implacable. He was a moderating influence in all great theological and ecclesiastical controversies. But it is clear that he believed that the teachings of Servetus would destroy the foundations of his commonwealth. What he feared, others feared more strongly. Servetus came to Geneva in spite of many warnings, and was forthwith arrested. His exposition of his beliefs must have been radical enough, for, according to Letter 320, "he did not hesitate to say that devils possessed divinity." The letter closes with this sentence, "I hope that sentence of death will at least be passed upon him; but *I desire that the severity of the punishment may be mitigated.*" From this it would appear that Calvin favoured a formal sentence of death, to be followed by some less severe punishment. The inference is felt to be the more probable when we find in the following letters that Calvin's authority is being defied by the Council of State even in respect of the excommunication of a prominent citizen from the Lord's Supper "for irregular habits." The extraordinary doctrines of Servetus had angered and alarmed less balanced minds than Calvin's, and his fate was passing into other hands. That Calvin felt acutely the difficulty of dealing with Servetus is clear from Letter 325. He himself has fought all his life against the Papal persecutions for conscience' sake. "I certainly confess that nothing would be less becoming than for us to imitate their furious intemperance. But there is some ground for restraining the impious from uttering whatever blasphemies they please with

impunity." No doubt it was some satisfaction to Calvin to call in the other Protestant cities so as to divide the responsibility. If he either hoped or expected that they would agree in recommending that the punishment should "be mitigated," he was disappointed. They were unanimous in asking that the Church be rid of Servetus. It was impossible for the Geneva magistrates to resist further even had they wished. But they did not wish. Calvin was alone in making one further effort for a mitigation. He pleaded that Servetus should be beheaded and not burned. "We endeavoured to alter the mode of his death, but in vain." This is not written to excuse Calvin. Of this sin against liberty and humanity Calvin must take his share; but when a true distribution of the blame is made it will be remembered in justice to one of the greatest of men, and truest friends of freedom, that he made some efforts on behalf of mercy, and could write with all sincerity, "We endeavoured . . . but in vain."

To sum up in a sentence. These letters, if they do not bear out Mr. Mark Pattison's saying that Calvin's merit lay in his comparative neglect of dogma, go far to confirm his view that Calvin's main energies were devoted to building up a disciplined Protestant community strong enough to resist all the attacks of crowns and mitres. That he did this in such stern times while preserving a sense of moderation and perspective far in advance of his contemporaries, is the reason why Protestants of to-day, in partial discharge of an incalculable debt, should endeavour to relieve his memory of some of the unwarrantable accusations with which the prejudice of centuries has marred his fame.

THE RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE OF CONGREGATIONALISM

W. B. SELBIE

THE RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE OF CONGREGATIONALISM

IT was an old saying in Israel that "where there is no vision the people perish." In the lives of individuals, churches, and nations the devotion to an ideal is one of the first conditions of progress. Men live by the unseen and the eternal as well as by the bread and water of material things. All history is, in a measure, the history of ideas; to these actions are secondary and stand in the relation of product to source. It is often said that the history of ecclesiastical institutions is a continual disappointment. They begin well, but they soon and easily deteriorate. They set before men high aims, and they engender unbounded hope and enthusiasm. But under the heat and burden of the daily task these things are apt to fade away and be forgotten, with the result that the Church remains a body which has lost its soul, in perpetual illustration of the truth "corruptio optimi pessima." When, therefore, the ecclesiastical system which we know as Congregationalism is criticised as being an ideal system which too often breaks down in practice and needs perfect men and women to carry it out, the criticism must be accepted with some reserve. It may indeed explain certain facts which are only too sadly familiar in the history of Congregational Churches. But so far from being a condemnation of their polity, it is the highest compliment that can be paid to it. So long as this remains true Congregationalism will live, but the moment it loses its ideal character and becomes a mere

work-a-day system, easily adapted to our fallible human nature, it will cease to be in any true or effective sense. To judge of a Church by principles of expediency, by its adaptability to the needs of the moment, and to the average character of the men of whom it is composed, is to forget that the Church is a spiritual institution, existing for spiritual ends. Only as the real nature and purpose of the Church are kept steadily in view can the meaning and value of the Congregational polity both in history and in the life of to-day be clearly understood.

That the order and government of the primitive Christian Church was Congregational may now be regarded as beyond controversy. The greatest Anglican authorities on the subject—Lightfoot, Hatch, Hort, Gwatkin, and Sanday—are agreed on the point, and their evidence may be accepted as being at least without prejudice. That the Church passed through a Congregational phase before becoming either Presbyterian or Episcopalian may be taken for granted. But it should also be understood that primitive Congregationalism was not a mere temporary expedient, still less a condition beyond which the Church was soon bound to develop. Dr. Bartlet has recently pointed out that justice has not been done to the length of time "during which the Congregational stage in its essential features really lasted." He is himself of opinion that it did not cease to prevail until the time of Cyprian—*i.e.*, until at least the middle of the third century. During all this period the Congregational principle was of the *esse* of the Christian Church. That it ceased to be of its *bene esse* was due to external circumstances and conditions, and not due to any inherent failure in the principle itself. It becomes important, therefore, to realise what this principle stood for in the early days of the Christian era.

It is now generally recognised that the first followers of Jesus Christ were content—in externals, at least—to

conform to the usages of the Roman Imperial system. Their gatherings for prayer and worship were known from the beginning by the term "*ecclesia*," and the name itself was significant. To the superficial observer there would be little to distinguish these Christian *ecclesiæ* from others which, under the club law of the Empire, were legitimate and common. But the student of Christian history is bound to note not only these external resemblances, but also the *differentia* which made these Christian assemblies what they were and caused them to develop as they did. In all *ecclesiæ* there was a tie binding the members together and constituting their union. In the Christian *ecclesiæ* this tie was a common devotion to Jesus Christ as Lord and a common experience of His saving power. And it is the difference between a tie of this nature and one of material interests or aims which distinguishes a Christian *ecclesia* from a political, social, or mutual benefit club. It was of the essence of the Christian *ecclesia* that its members should be Christians. They met in the name of Jesus Christ—*i.e.*, for His ends and purposes, and under the guidance of His Presence. Their relation to Him regulated their relation to one another. Their action was His action in and through them. The most distinctive feature in Christianity was the new value assigned to the individual soul in the sight of God. The coming of His Son into the world to seek and to save lost men was in itself enough to restore them. It set a price upon them at which they would never have dared to estimate themselves. That God should love men is a wonderful tribute to His grace, pity, and magnanimity, but it is no less a tribute to man's worth. This new estimate of the individual soul was the basis of all early Christian teaching, both theological and ecclesiastical. Henceforth salvation was no longer a question of machinery and ordinances, but rested on a living relationship between man and God. The charter of Christian liberty was the new-found fact that man could enter into God's presence for

and by himself independently of any authorised intermediary. Under the apostolic conception of the grace of God this right or privilege was the same for every Christian man. The fact has its ecclesiastical implicates. It is on this religious foundation that the democratic ideal of Church life and government which we call Congregational was built. The Church was regarded as a living organism of which Christ was the Head and in which each member had his function to perform.

This is the position that meets us in the *Didaché*—the most important witness for the condition of the Christian Church in the age immediately succeeding that of the Apostles. There each Church stands by itself and is autonomous. It has the right of ordering its own worship, and electing its own officers, and maintaining its own discipline. Each Church is regarded as being in living and organic fellowship with the Head of the Church, under His direction and at the disposition of His will. As Dr. Hort says, "Nothing has been more prominent in our examination of the *ecclesiæ* of the Apostolic age than the fact that the *ecclesia* itself—*i.e.*, apparently the sum of all its male adult members—is the primary body, and, it would seem, even the primary authority. It may be that this state of things was in some ways a mark of immaturity, and that a better and riper organisation must of necessity involve the creation of more special organs of the community. Still, the very origin and fundamental nature of the *ecclesia* as a community of disciples renders it impossible that the principle should rightly become obsolete. In a word, we cannot properly speak of an organisation of a community from which the greater part of its members are excluded. The true way, the apostolic way, of regarding offices or officers in the *ecclesia* is to regard them as organs of its corporate life for special purposes."

It would probably be useless to argue that the full implications of this position were recognised by the

members of the first Christian Churches, or were appreciated at their real worth. There is, however, evidence that the early Christians were tenacious of their liberty in Christ Jesus, and that they were jealous of their right to maintain the purity of the Christian fellowship. The principles underlying the primitive forms were understood, but no special value was attached to the forms themselves. These, therefore, easily became modified under the stress of circumstances. It is needless to trace the process which this modification followed. It was as much a process of corruption as of development, and in the course of it some of those features which were fundamental in the life of the early Church were inevitably lost. It had, however, this advantage, that in the absence of these features their true meaning and value came to be understood. The necessity of reasserting them became in later days the chief watchword of Church reform. Men returned with longing to the primitive ideals and methods of the Church, not merely because they were primitive, but because they stood for a position the recovery of which was essential to Christian life and liberty. With the effort after this recovery the history of English Congregationalism is closely bound up.

It is important to recognise that the motives of the founders of the first Congregational Churches were essentially spiritual in character. They represented the religious side of the Reformation; the problems which most deeply concerned them were moral and spiritual rather than ecclesiastical. As Dr. Dale says: "The fervour, the tenacity, the endurance of the men who first founded Congregational Churches in England, came from the conviction that the controversy involved great spiritual issues." The beginnings of the movement go back as far as the days of Wiclif and the Lollards. As the result of the teaching of the "poor priests," many Christian congregations were formed on the model of the primitive churches, throughout the eastern counties. These were entirely separate from

the parish churches, and were spoken of as "sects" and "congregations." From this time onward traces are to be found of similar gatherings in London and the provinces. They represent no organised movement, but they well illustrate the tendency to follow the Congregational way, which always appears when Christian men and women come together for mutual help and for worship. It was not until the days of Elizabeth, and under stress of the discovery that no real reformation of the Church was intended by the Queen and her advisers, that Congregational Churches in the full sense of the term began to exist. Among the earliest and most notable of these was the Church in the prisons, "whereof Mr. Fitz was pastor," and whose charter is to be found in the well-known words of their petition to the Queen: "According to the saying of the Almighty our God (Matt. xviii. 20), 'Wherever two or three are gathered together in My name there am I,' so we, a poor congregation whom God hath separated from the Churches of England and from the mingled and false worshipping therein used, out of the which assemblies the Lord our only Saviour hath called us, and still calleth, saying, Come out from among them, and separate yourselves from them, and touch no unclean thing, then will I receive you, and I will be your God, and you shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord (2 Cor. vi. 17, 18). So as God giveth us strength at this day, we do serve the Lord every Sabbath day in houses, and on the fourth day in the week we meet and come together weekly to use prayer and exercise discipline on them which do deserve it, by the strength and sure warrant of the Lord's good word, as in Matt. xviii. 15–18 (1 Cor. v.)." In this noble and simple appeal we have the germs of the whole Congregational position as it was then understood and maintained. It involved, on the negative side, the duty of separation from a Church obviously idolatrous and corrupt. It was their conscientious insistence on this duty which gave to the early Congregationalists the name of Separatists, a

name which distinguished them from the Puritans of the period, but which was neither of their choosing nor to their liking. The thing it signified, however, was in their eyes essential. They became Separatists not from any wanton vagary, or from naughty independence of spirit, but because the protest was forced upon them as a matter of conscience, a plain and obvious duty. This involved further, on the positive side, the duty of forming "gathered churches," churches whose members were all Christians meeting together that they might have the word freely preached, the sacraments purely administered, and discipline duly enforced.

These points are carefully elaborated and defended in the writings of Browne and Barrow. In 1582 Robert Browne published "A Treatise of Reformation without tarrying for anie, and of the wickednesse of those Preachers which will not reforme themselves and their charge, because they will tarie till the Magistrate commaunde and compell them;" and in 1590 Henry Barrow published his "Briefe Discoverie of the False Church." In both of these works the leading motive is a profound and spiritual dissatisfaction with the condition of the Church in these realms, and the attempt to state this leads directly to the formulation of a theory of the true Church. This inevitably follows primitive, and therefore Congregational, lines. It presupposes that the members of a Christian Church shall be Christian people, and that to such are entrusted the rights and privileges both of Church government and Church discipline. Robert Browne was by no means an admirable character, but he was a clear thinker and a close student of the New Testament, and he wrought out for himself a doctrine of the Church which became determinative of Congregational thought and practice for all future time. Barrow wrote with equal knowledge and with even greater trenchancy of style. His indictment of the National Church in his day was complete and overwhelming. "All, without exception or respect of person, are received into and nourished in

the bosom of this Church with the Word and Sacraments. None are here refused, none kept out. This Church (as the prophet saith) openeth her knees to every passenger, furnisheth a table to the multitude, and drink offerings to the numbers; she keepeth open house to all comers—bread and wine and welcome. Neither is she more dainty of her stolen waters than of her hid bread, of her adulterate baptism than of her Sheshak supper, not denying baptism to the seed even of whores and witches; she receiveth them all into her covenant (which is not with God but with death and hell) giving them her peace, selling them her wares." In contrast with this he describes in another place the true members of a Church as "a chosen, redeemed, faithful, free, holy people as are called unto and walk in the faith of Jesus Christ."

Here, then, we meet again the fundamental principle of the Separatists, viz., that the members of a Christian Church must be Christians. This purity of fellowship they sought to maintain by insisting on personal character as a qualification for Church membership, holding it to be quite as important as soundness in the faith. In this they were in opposition to the general body of Puritan sentiment. They did not accept the distinction between the visible and invisible Church of which the Puritans made much. They were absolutely at variance with those imprisoned Presbyterians who confessed, "We are not for an unspotted Church on earth; and, therefore, though the Church of England has many faults, we would not willingly leave it." At first this strictness as to Church fellowship led to no little intolerance. Discipline was even exercised upon those who joined in the worship of the Establishment, and it was assumed that the corruption of the Church extended to all its members. This extreme attitude was modified in time, and the Separatists, while insisting that all members of the Church must be saints in the New Testament sense of the word, recognised that there were saints in all the Churches—even in Cæsar's

household. In making the protest they did in favour of purity of fellowship the early Congregationalists did more than lay down the lines of a new or revived Church polity. They builded better than they knew in that they suggested the only real and solid ground for a union of Christian people of divers Churches and creeds. That their system was an ideal goes without saying. That they failed to realise it themselves is equally obvious. But the testimony they gave in its favour is one of the lasting heritages of the Church, and their descendants in these days will do well to remember it.

The natural consequence of this insistence upon purity of fellowship was, as we have seen, a democratic system of Church government. Henry Jacob, a typical leader among the Separatists, describes the Church as a democracy, and this in spite of his contention that it is also a spiritual monarchy, Christ being its only King, and an aristocracy of character. In the controversies of the time we see that the idea of popular government of the Church was strongly opposed and deeply hated. It was believed to be a sure road to antinomianism, and there was some ground for the belief. But in spite of this the movement in its favour grew, and it was a wise instinct which fostered it. The fact is that the strength of these early Separatist Churches lay not so much in their leaders as in the rank and file. In the persecutions, it was the common and unknown people who remained staunch; and so long as the fear of persecution continued the members of the gathered Churches showed themselves worthy of their high vocation. There is ample testimony to the fact that their meetings reached the standard of a true Christian communion, and that the people showed themselves thoroughly able to perform their self-imposed task of Church government and discipline. There can be no doubt that the experience thus gained proved a very important factor in the political education of the English people. Then, as now, the Church meeting and

the work of Church government prepared many a humble citizen to play his part in politics, and to carry out what he believed to be the laws of God in State as well as in Church. The democratic spirit of the time was fostered and found its first expression in the life of these Separatist Churches, and gave rise to that Independency which was afterwards so potent a force. Cromwell's principle in forming his New Model Army with men "who have some conscience in what they do," was but the expression in another sphere of the fundamental principle of Congregational Church fellowship. With Milton as its intellectual, and Cromwell as its practical, exponent Independency bit deep into the history of the time, and the spirit of it has never been quite lost from English political life. It was indigenous to the English soil, as Presbyterianism was to the soil of Scotland, and it modified all the ecclesiastical opinion of this country in its own direction.

It should also be remembered that this claim on the part of Christian men to exercise their right of government within the Church was not the outcome of mere arrogance or impatience of control, but was due to their deeply spiritual conception of the Church itself. The only possible ruler in Christ's Church was Christ Himself. His people were the mouthpieces of His will. It was His presence among them that constituted them a Christian Church, and gave them the right to speak in His name. The defence of what was called "the Crown rights of Jesus Christ," became an important part of the work of the English Reformers, and the principle on which they acted emerged in the very earliest days. It was not merely that they objected to the rule of the State or the magistrate in religious matters; they objected equally to any others who sought to lord it over the Church of God. Thus Barrow writes in his "Briefe Discoverie": "The people, upon a superstitious reverence and preposterous estimation unto their teachers and elders, resigned up al thinges, even their

dutie, interest, libertie, prerogative, into their handes, suffering them to alter and dispose of all thinges after their owne lustes, without inquirie or controlment; whereupon the true patterne of Christes Testament so highly and with so great charge incommended by the Apostles unto the fidelitie of the whole Church was soone neglected and cast aside, especially by these evil workmen, these governours, who some of them, affecting the pre-eminence, sought to draw an absolute power into their owne hands, perverting those offices of mere labour and care into swelling titles of fleshly pompe and worldly dignitie." Here, again, we must recognise the purely religious character of the protest made by the Separatists against State domination in Church affairs. They were not concerned about the rights of individuals within the Church; so far as the individual was affected they laid more stress on his duties and responsibilities than on his rights. What did concern them was the fact that the honour and prerogatives of Jesus Christ were threatened by every power which claimed to rule over men in spiritual things. It is, perhaps, difficult for us in these days to understand such a position. But there can be no question that our fathers in the faith were intensely serious in maintaining it, and that to them it meant something very real. They had what Dr. Dale has called a certain "spiritual audacity," which must be taken into account by any one who would understand their position.

It was not until a later day that the antagonism of Congregationalists to a State Church and its rulers assumed the political hue which too often distinguishes it now. It was then, and it ought to be still, primarily religious in character. The passing of the Act of Uniformity in 1662 drove Congregationalists and Presbyterians alike into open revolt against the Establishment, and started the movement for the liberation of the Church from State control. The struggle for religious liberty has taken this particular form in

consequence of the conditions prevailing in this country, but it will easily be seen that at bottom it has always been a far deeper and broader thing than an objection to one particular method of Church government. The liberty at which the Congregationalists aimed was not a mere license, but liberty to seek and to express the will of Jesus Christ in all Church affairs. As Dr. Powicke has said, "Such freedom is legitimate, because its root is the belief that a congregation of faithful men, large or small, is possessed of the living Spirit of Christ, a spirit that does not limit itself to one here or there, but imparts its influence ungrudgingly to all humble hearts and open minds. We may call this the elemental creed of Congregationalism, and therefore it is not strange that with the gradual apprehension of what it implies, which has come through long experience, there has come a growing conviction of the fact that our Churches, by their very being, are pledged to demand and give the widest tolerance. On the one hand, they are pledged to demand from the State not merely that it shall be tolerant of themselves —a degree of tolerance that contented the early Separatists, and even the Independents of the Commonwealth period, though not a thorough-going one like John Goodwin—but also that it shall be neutral with respect to all Churches, inasmuch as the establishment of any Church by the State is inconsistent with the true Church idea, is an indirect assault upon other Churches, and is an obstacle to that 'free and open encounter' whereby alone the truth can come to its own."

At the present time the task of maintaining the principle of religious liberty still rests largely with the Churches of the Congregational order. There is some danger lest it should come to be neglected. The Free Churches, as they are now called, are suffering from their very prosperity. With the removal of serious disabilities, the advance in social status, and the triumph of their principles in many directions, has come a certain

slackening in their hold on the great fundamentals of their ecclesiastical faith. They are even a little afraid of the old enthusiasms, and are in danger of drifting into a mere opportunism. It is sometimes said in excuse for this that the Churches to-day feel the religious aspect of their position to be so much more important than once they did. This is an excuse and nothing more. As a matter of fact the more they realise the tremendous nature of the spiritual issues involved, the more eager will they be to advocate them, and to carry them out in practice—always remembering the obligations of Christian charity. Congregationalists have their own doctrine of the Church, a doctrine so high, so scriptural, and so inspiring, that beside it the idea of a State Church is like an evil dream. They have realised in history—and the liberties they have helped to win for England bear witness to the fact—how grandly it can work for the broadening and uplifting of men. They know that it requires a high standard of Christian life and thought to carry it out, and they count that among its glories. But it may be questioned whether they regard it as a sacred charge and responsibility quite in the way that their fathers did. Nothing but a supreme religious conviction can justify the fight for one form of ecclesiastical polity over against another. In such a matter motives of expediency are an impertinence.

On the question of liberty of thought and utterance within the Church the Congregational position is well defined historically, and still needs to be asserted. One of the chief causes of difference between the early Separatists and the Puritans was on the question of creeds and confessions. While the Puritans accepted these, the Separatists regarded them as only partial and temporary expressions of eternal truths. They looked for more light and truth to break forth from God's Word, and they held it to be a duty to keep eyes and mind open to receive it. Naturally, therefore, the Independents became the most tolerant of

the sects. Their toleration was, it is true, a limited one, but even so it was in advance of their age, and it has borne ample fruit. As times and circumstances have changed the principle has found for itself new forms of expression, and on critical occasions it has never been appealed to in vain. The position of the Congregationalists of the Commonwealth may be gathered from the following well-known passage in the preface to the Savoy Declaration of Faith and Order (1658): "Confessions when made by a company of professors of Christianity jointly meeting to that end—the most genuine and natural use of such is, that under the same form of words they express the substance of the same common salvation, or unity of their faith, whereby speaking the same things they show themselves 'perfectly joined in the same mind and in the same judgment.' And accordingly such a transaction is to be looked upon but as a meet or fit medium or means whereby to express that 'their common faith and salvation': and no way to be made use of as an imposition upon any. Whatever is of force or constraint in matters of this nature causes them to degenerate from the name and nature of Confessions, and turns them from being Confessions of Faith into exactions and impositions of Faith." Nothing has happened since these words were written to alter the opinion of Congregationalists on this great question. They believe in leaving men and Churches free to think for themselves, and to give expression to the truth as God reveals it under the new forms of every age. They believe also in the working of the Spirit of God in illuminating the human mind and leading it into all the truth. They do not regard the expression given to Christian truth in any age as final, but are ever watchful for new light. They believe in a "deposit" of the Gospel, in a Christian life and experience which are the same for all men, and are prior to any intellectual expression which can be given to them. But they believe also that this intellectual expression must

necessarily vary with the varying forms of human thought. Milton's magnificent defence of this position in his prose writings is well known. Less familiar but equally fine is the passage in "Paradise Lost," where he pleads for the Copernican as over against the Ptolemaic astronomy:—

> "This to attain whether heaven move or earth
> Imports not. . . . He his fabric of the heavens
> Hath left to their disputes."

In other words, the heavens remain and the planetary system abides, whatever theories concerning it men may devise. So "God's in His heaven," and His will is done, whatever human theologies may say about Him.

The same position, *mutatis mutandis*, was re-asserted during the famous Rivulet controversy, when Edward Miall reminded the Uzzahs of his day that progressive scholarship had formed "an undergrowth of conviction impatient of, if not positively hostile to, many of those metaphysical forms in which the teachings of Christianity have been distorted and stereotyped by the dogmatism of theological schools," and pleaded afresh for freedom of thought and for the removal of all penalties for heterodoxy. No doubt it is easy to pervert this doctrine of liberty and turn it into an excuse for individual license and eccentricity. The only safeguard against this is to insist on the full Congregational doctrine, which makes the Church the abode of the Real Presence of Christ and the vehicle for His will. To the loyal Congregationalist the test and standard of Christian truth is not any statement by a Church or Council of Churches in the past, but the mind of Christ as revealed to His people in the present time. They believe that God fulfils Himself in many ways, through science, history, and criticism, as well as through theology, and that it is the duty of the Church and of Christian people generally to keep free to hear and to accept every new indication of His mind and will.

Whatever knowledge they may obtain of Him can only be in part, and no man or Church can have a monopoly of His word. But, according to His promise, those who meet in the name of Christ have His presence among them, and what they determine in His name will bring them as near as may be to the Truth as it is in Him. This is high doctrine. It involves immense assumptions. But if its premises are granted, and men and women are truly united in the faith and fear of Christ, and seek to act in His name, recognising all that that implies, it stands to reason that what they do will have far more force than any individual action, and that they may humbly, but very really, claim that to and through them the word of the Lord comes. A great deal of trouble, theological and otherwise, would have been saved if Congregationalists had always believed in their own doctrine of the Church, and had been willing to press it to its logical conclusions. The objections to the doctrine, no doubt, are obvious, but Dr. Dale answered them once for all when he said, "We take the New Testament seriously. We believe that those whom Christ redeems from 'this present evil world' and translates into His kingdom receive a divine life and a divine light, and are taught of God. Congregationalism attributes to every Christian man amazing prerogatives and powers, insists that these are the ground of grave duties, and requires the polity of the Church to be so constructed that every Christian man shall be charged with the responsibility of taking part in the maintenance and defence of the truth of Christ, and in the assertion of His authority."

To recapitulate. The members of a Christian Church must be Christians. This root principle of Congregationalism points back, as we have seen, to a definite religious faith. The grace of God in the forgiveness and regeneration of the individual, and the justifying power of faith give to the Christian privileges and a status which he cannot set aside without great and certain loss. And this enhanced estimate of the

individual involves the true estimate of the Church. The Church becomes a living organism in which each member has his function. Only as this function is exercised by all in a normal and healthy fashion will the Church continue to live and to make progress. From these religious and theological foundations springs the democratic ideal of Church life and government for which Congregationalism stands. When, therefore, it is suggested that the time has come to exchange this democratic ideal for one more or less oligarchic, and to restrain and limit the autonomy of the individual Church, it becomes necessary to ask, not only what there is in the changed conditions that makes such a proposition even thinkable, but also in what respect the Churches have so far fallen from their old ideals as to require measures so drastic.

By common consent the Congregational system of Church polity is regarded as ideal. It requires a very high standard of life and character on the part of those who compose the Churches to carry it out in practice. Failure to attain to this standard means failure all round. Any effective reform in Congregationalism must therefore involve, not merely improvement in Church organisation, but a raising of the general level of the spiritual life among the people. As the strength of a chain is in its weakest link, so the life of a Congregational Church is profoundly affected by the life and conduct of the least spiritual among its members. The duty of the Church, therefore, to safeguard itself by great care in the admission of members is paramount. If this care has in any sensible degree been relaxed, then it is not surprising if the Congregational Churches are not doing their work well. As the old distinction between the members of the Churches and those outside—or, as it used to be stated, between the Church and the world—becomes obliterated, the effect on the Church must be disastrous. It will mean a lowering of the standard of its life, a contamination of its aims, and a sure loss

of power. The spectacle of Churches which are more intent on keeping up a happy and pleasant social life for their members than on supporting missionary and philanthropic work is too sadly common, and is a sign of degeneration that has to be taken into account. It is in such directions as are here indicated that the growing enthusiasm for reform ought to expend itself. A spiritual revival in the Churches is a thing often talked about, and sometimes earnestly prayed for. But the necessity for it is by no means universally recognised, and the talk too often savours of cant. Nevertheless the need expressed in the familiar phrase is really the need of the hour, and the sooner it is made a matter of "concern" by Christian people the nearer shall we be to a real measure of reform.

It is in the same direction also that we must look for the establishment of a Christian unity that shall be one of life and sentiment, and that shall be a deeper thing than uniformity of organisation or creed. On the Congregational basis alone is a true Catholicism possible. The early Independents were before their day in recognising this, and it is for their sons to put into practice the precepts to which they fearlessly gave utterance. In the famous words of John Owen, "Whilst I have any comfortable persuasion on grounds infallible, that I hold the head, and that I am by faith a member of the mystical body of Christ; whilst I make profession of all the necessary saving truths of the gospel; whilst I disturb not the peace of that particular Church whereof by my own consent I am a member, nor do raise up nor continue in any causeless differences with them, or any of them with whom I walk in the fellowship and order of the gospel; whilst I labour to exercise faith towards the Lord Jesus Christ and love towards all the saints—I do keep the unity which is of the appointment of Christ." And again: "Would Christians of all parties make it their business to retrieve its reputation, wherein also their own bliss and happiness is involved, by a universal

obedience to the precepts of it, it would insensibly sink a thousand of their differences under ground. Were this attended to the world would quickly say with admiration—

> 'Magnus ab integro seclorum nascitur ordo
> Jam nova progenies coelo demittitur alto.'

The old, glorious, beautiful face of Christianity would be restored to it again."

THE EUCHARIST IN THE EARLY CHURCH

J. V. BARTLET

THE EUCHARIST IN THE EARLY CHURCH

IT has been said that a man's religion is never so truly known as when he is overheard in prayer. If this be the case with an individual, much more is it so with the collective Christian consciousness. But the Church's devotions, involving its deepest and most vital thoughts about its own salvation, centred in its early days, as during most of its long history, about its Eucharistic worship. Hence a study of this during the first two centuries should throw light upon the very heart of early Christian experience and upon the theology which sprang most directly therefrom. If we should find that it did not on the whole enter fully into its Master's profound yet simple thought, in terms of personal relationship, as expressed in word and symbol in the Last Supper, this need not surprise us. It would be but according to analogy. In any case we shall find already in existence some of the types of Eucharistic thought, and of corresponding religious experience, which have divided, and still divide, Christendom.

Throughout we must distinguish three things under three terms:—

I. The Last Supper, as recorded in the Gospels.

II. The Lord's Supper, or Breaking of Bread in the early Church.

III. The Eucharist, as a part of Christian worship.

Our problem largely is to define the relations between these and the ideas connected with each.

I

That the Last Supper was a Paschal meal is not really open to doubt. The clear witness of our first

three Gospels, which is the more conclusive that these were written in various regions and at somewhat different times, should settle the matter, even did the Fourth Gospel point the other way. But this is, in fact, very doubtful. Edersheim, an expert in Jewish customs, has shown in his "Life of Jesus" that its special data do not prove that Jesus suffered on the day when the Paschal Lamb was slain, though it is the Evangelist's obvious aim to show that He fulfilled this type; quite the reverse.* As to the fact that the "breaking of bread" among the first Christians shows no trace of Paschal associations, this will receive ample explanation as our discussion proceeds.

In order to define the meaning of the specifically Christian part of the Last Supper, we must take as basis the most purely historical of our Gospels, that by Mark, supplementing it by Luke's narrative where it is independent of Mark. The spiritual context of the Supper is given by the situation itself amid which it occurs in Mark's Gospel. Jesus had come up to Jerusalem full of the idea† that the Messianic kingdom was to be established only by the pouring forth of His own life, in sacrificial obedience and love, "on behalf of the many." It is, then, as the final and most impressive lesson in this truth, so perplexing even to the inner circle of disciples, that the Last Supper is to be viewed. For such a lesson in symbol the associations of the Paschal meal afforded a unique opportunity; and it was during its later stages,‡ after the Lamb had been

* His argument as to xviii. 15 may be strengthened from *Jubilees*, xlix. 22 f., where eating the unleavened bread is treated as part of "eating the Passover."

† See Mark viii. 27 ff.; ix. 11 ff.; x. 32–45; xiv. 6 ff.

‡ "And *as they were eating*, he took bread," &c., Mark xiv. 22, cf. 18, and Matt. xxvi. 26. This tells against the view that the Last Supper was not part of a Paschal meal, but rather the *Kiddush* or "hallowing" prelude to the Paschal Festival, which began the evening previous, as argued by Rev. G. H. Box in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, III. 357 ff. Besides, Jesus would not have ventured *into Jerusalem* at that time merely to eat such a meal. Mr. Box is, however, right in seeing in

eaten and while it still preoccupied all minds, that the words and acts took place which we usually denote by the term "the Last Supper." A desire of Jesus' heart had been granted (Luke xxii. 15), and He now used its suggestions to prepare His disciples for the shock of separation by instilling into their souls, in the most striking and solemn way possible, the *redemptive* meaning of His coming death. He took bread, blessed and brake, and said, "Take ye, this is My body." His meaning, in keeping with the Paschal eating just over, could not but be: "I am the true Paschal Lamb. Partake of this bread as representing Me,* with the thought that a Divine deliverance, like that of Israel's deliverance from Egypt, is virtually achieved, and you may already eat of its fruits with thanksgiving to God and festal joy, like that of the meal just ended." Then, in strict sequence of thought, He passes back from the Lamb as basis of sacred communion with one another —as an Israel in miniature—to the blood of the Lamb, as symbolising God's covenant with His people. He took a cup and threw upon the dark mystery of His death the light of its saving efficacy: "This is My blood of the Covenant, which is being poured forth on behalf of many." Could anything be more reassuring than this simple yet moving parable,† presented to all their senses at once?

Having said so much with a directly Paschal bearing, Jesus now added, "Verily, I say unto you, I will no more

Luke's account, xxii. 17–19*a* (as distinct from Mark's), a *Kiddush*—though one relative to the festal fellowship of "the Kingdom of God" in v. 16. But this is due to a transformation of the tradition of the Last Supper by the Church's Eucharistic practice (see below, p. 52 f.), which already coloured the document here used by Luke.

* "Body" here represents, by part for whole, Christ Himself—His "personality," as we should say—just as "flesh and blood" was a common synonym for a human nature (Matt. xvi. 17).

† The symbolism of the Last Supper belongs to Jesus as *in His methods* the Prophet of the Messianic Age, after the manner of those object-lessons which the prophets of the Old Testament were wont to use on the most solemn occasions.

drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God." Here emerges the new setting, that of the coming Messianic kingdom, in which the Paschal associations of the Last Supper as a whole stood to His own mind and that of His table companions. This comes out yet more clearly by the aid of Luke's fuller narrative. "But ye," said Jesus, a little later, "are they that have stood by Me in my trials; and I, on my part, appoint unto you, as my Father appointed unto Me, a kingdom—that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and may sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel" (xxii. 28–30). Not only were they to "eat bread in the kingdom of God," like others in the Messianic Age (Luke xiv. 15), but they were also to be near Messiah's own person in that festal joy. In this light the *distinctive part of the Last Supper* was meant as a sort of *Paschal prelude to the coming Feast of the Messianic Kingdom.*

II

The Last Supper was a unique occasion, in some respects as peculiar to those partaking in it as the position assigned to them in the future kingdom. There is nothing in Mark's story—or in the parallel form found in the later Gospel according to Matthew*—to suggest that Jesus was "instituting" a religious rite for repetition in His Society, the Messianic Church (*Ecclesia*), any more than by the feet-washing in the Fourth Gospel. But, it will be said, this may be accidental; and have we not in Luke as well as in Paul explicit evidence that Jesus meant His followers to break bread and drink the Cup in memory of Him and His example on this occasion? On the other hand, it is pointed out that the earliest references to the Lord's Supper among Christians show a minimum of continuity with the Last Supper in its distinctive features.

* Although it adds words defining the purpose of the shedding of Christ's blood as "for remission of sins."

Thus the Cup is sometimes not alluded to at all, and in other cases it appears in a new order, before the Bread; while in general the Paschal associations are lacking, along with all sign of the "words of institution." Taken together, these things present a real problem; and it is natural to ask, in the first instance, whether the witness of Paul, which is earlier in date than that of our Gospels, will help towards a solution.

Paul's evidence in the First Epistle to the Corinthians points in two different directions, according as he is dealing with the Last Supper or with the Church's common meal of sacred fellowship, the Lord's Supper. The former is the case in ch. xi., the latter in ch. x.; and in the two cases he is arguing from opposite starting-points. In ch. xi. he is concerned to show that the absence of brotherly love makes a "Lord's Supper" impossible; and in order to shame his readers for abuses inconsistent with recollection that the meal is one between members of Christ's mystical Body, the Church, he solemnly narrates the Last Supper as he had received it "from the Lord" through the older apostles. But the fact that he does it in detail rather than allusively, as in the other passage we are to consider, proves that its forms did not enter into the ritual of the Christian meal at Corinth. That is, Paul took them simply as part of "the mind of Christ," and as meant to rule in spirit rather than letter. In this he was true not only to his own principles, but also to the whole genius of primitive Christianity. It is hard to believe that, had all the words which he puts into Jesus's lips been part of the Eucharistic tradition passed on from the first by the original Apostles, they could have failed to mould even the form of the Church's "breaking of bread" more than is implied by all our evidence.

Probably, then, the words enjoining recurrent remembrance of Christ in the Christian meal were Paul's own expression of the spirit of the Last Supper, as read in the light of his personal knowledge of the Lord in the Spirit. They are part of Paul's explanatory paraphrase,

meant to bring out the full sense of the historical Last Supper in its bearing upon the Church's practice, and showing in its emphasis traces of Paul's own mind, like *the other features* in which *his wording deviates from* Mark and Matthew. (See Comparative Table on p. 51.) But comparison of Luke xxii. 19*b*–20 with Mark shows so close a parallelism with Paul, where he deviates most from Mark—*e.g.*, "Likewise also the (*not* a) cup after supping"—that Luke's dependence on Paul's wording of "the Institution" is almost certain. Thus the notion of Christ's *formal* institution of the Lord's Supper on the model of the Last Supper falls to the ground, as due to Paul—possibly to a misreading of him, first by Luke and afterwards by Christians generally.

This being the case, lack of formal continuity in the Lord's Supper with the historical Last Supper presents little ground for surprise: yet its form still needs clearing up. That form, as implied in 1 Cor. x. 16 f., was first the Cup of Blessing and then the Breaking of Bread (cf. the Table of the Lord in v. 21). Here, too, Paul not only implies that the Cup preceded the breaking of Bread, but assumes that what his readers were wont to see in the symbolism of the latter was the unity of the Church rather than union with Christ as Head of the Church, the inference which, along with its correlative idea as to the Cup, Paul is anxious to press upon their consciousness. No doubt Paul's ideas of union between Christ and His Church were in their actual forms * largely peculiar to his own religious experience. That the bread did *not* symbolise the human body of Christ (much less His "flesh") as food for believers, nor the Cup His human blood as their

* *E.g.*, the mystic Christ, inclusive both of Head and members, as in 1 Cor. vi. 15, xii. 12; and even his idea of "the blood of Christ" as medium of vital union between the Head and members, viz., "the Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus" (Rom. v. 9 f., viii. 2) of which all Christians have been "made to drink" (1 Cor. xii. 13). Hence "he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit" with Him (1 Cor. vi. 17). This corresponds to "the *new* Covenant" as a living experience, which Paul emphasises by his special wording in 1 Cor. xi. 25.

Mark xiv. 17 f., 22–25.	Luke xxii. 14–21.	1 Corinthians xi. 23–26.
And . . . as they sat and were eating, Jesus said, Verily I say, One of you . . . [cf. Luke vv. 21–23].	And when the hour was come, He sat down, and the disciples with Him. And He said unto them,	The Lord Jesus, in the night in which He was betrayed,
And as they were eating,	With desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer: for I say unto you, I will not eat it, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.	
	And He received a cup, and when He had given thanks He said, Take this and divide it among yourselves: for I say unto you, I will not drink from henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come [cf. Mark v. 25].	
He took bread, and when He had blessed, He brake it, and gave to them, and said, Take ye [and eat, Matt.]: this is My body.	And He took bread, and when He had given thanks, He brake it, and gave to them, saying, This is My body, *which is* (being) given *for you:* *this do in remembrance of Me.*	took bread; and when He had given thanks, He brake it, and said, This is My body, which is for you: this do in remembrance of Me.
And He took a cup, and when He had given thanks, He gave to them; and they all drank of it.* And He said unto them,	And the Cup *in like manner, after supping, saying,*	In like manner also the cup, after supping, saying,
This is My blood of the Covenant —that which is (being) poured out for many [unto forgiveness of sins, Matt.].	This *cup* is the *new* Covenant *in* My blood —that which is (being) poured out for you.	This cup is the new Covenant in My blood;
Verily, I say unto you, I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God [cf. Luke v. 18].	But behold the hand of him that betrayeth Me is with Me on the table [cf. Mark vv. 18–20].	this do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of Me. For as often as ye eat this bread and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death, till He come.

* Matt., "Saying, Drink ye all of it, for this," &c.

drink,* is the concordant witness of Paul and all our earliest authorities.

We can now attack our problem afresh with the help of Paul's witness, so far as it is not special to himself. That witness furnishes several results for the earliest period of the Church's life: (*a*) The form of the Last Supper was not apparently followed as regards the order of the Bread and Cup; (*b*) while its Paschal associations were not lost sight of (1 Cor. v. 8), its spirit rather than its letter entered into "the breaking of bread" in remembrance of the Lord; (*c*) a symbolism which saw in the Bread a parable of the Church's unity rather than of the Messiah's human body in any aspect, already obtained. All this need mean no more than that the Paschal lesson of the Last Supper was now taken for granted as the basis of the Church's very standing as the redeemed Israel of God, and was not felt to need constant emphasis in the symbolism of the communion meal of "the Saints"—the foretaste of that feast in the Diviner order of things when the Bridegroom should return and the Bridal Feast of the Messianic Age should begin. Such a change of perspective from that of the Last Supper was altogether natural after Pentecost; for therewith *the Kingdom of God*, still future in Luke xxii. 16, *had virtually come.* The Cup of Christian fellowship might well change its symbolism, and become "the Cup of Salvation" or the Cup of Blessing taken into believers' hands in order to invoke the Name of the Lord in exultant Thanksgiving (cf. Psalm cxvi. 13). This is exactly the spirit of the picture given us in Acts ii. 42 ff. Only there the Cup is not named at all: "the fellowship" of new-born brotherhood appears simply as "the Breaking of Bread and the prayers." This does not mean that the Cup did not enter into the common meals of love and overflowing sympathy, to which Acts refers as daily taking place in many a home,

* 1 Cor. x. 4, 16, refers to the spiritual Christ, or the Spirit of Christ.

as well as on a more collective * scale at certain seasons, probably as Sabbath even verged towards the opening of the Day of Resurrection, "the Lord's Day." What it does mean is that the Cup was but a subordinate feature in the Church's meal of fellowship, "the breaking of bread," and had another place and function from that which belonged to it in the Last Supper as symbol of the Paschal shedding of Messiah's blood.

But how did this change come about so naturally as to need no special explanation? What were its antecedents, if any? Here recent research, bringing to light facts familiar to Jews, but unrealised by Christians, has cast a flood of light upon the Lord's Supper in the early Church. Israel being a people "holy to the Lord," every occasion which reminded its members of the bonds between them and God, both as Creator and as in Covenant relations with them as an elect people, was hallowed by the spiritual sacrifice of Blessing or Thanksgiving to His holy Name. It was particularly so with all occasions of partaking of food in common. Moreover, the sanctity of such common domestic worship (in contrast to that in the Synagogue) and the solemnity of its forms, both in word and symbolic act, were in proportion to the numbers partaking, as well as to the special associations of the day. Thus Sabbath meals and those on other feast days, including the Paschal meal, were but special forms of the fundamental common meal of a domestic type, where the house-father was priest. Into its details we will enter in connection with our fullest early account of its Christian equivalent. What we have now to observe is that Jesus had Himself consecrated to the special uses of His society this very institution, familiar to Him from childhood in all its

* *E.g.*, in the house of Mary, the mother of Mark (Acts xii. 12; cf. the "house churches" in Paul's Epistles). It is out of the question, because physically impossible, that the whole Church in Jerusalem, even in its early days, can have been wont to meet for one Eucharistic meal.

simple and natural sanctity. He had used its formula for blessing and breaking bread in His public ministry (*e.g.*, Mark vi. 41, Matt. xiv. 15); but the episode at Emmaus in Luke xxiv. 30, 35 gives us our best idea of how He had, as house-father at the habitual meals of the disciple-circle, utilised and put His own stamp upon the breaking of bread and the prayer * that hallowed it.

Here, then, we have *the prime antecedent for the Lord's Supper in the early Church*, viz., the meals eaten by Jesus and His followers before ever the Last Supper, one historic member of the series, had come to be. This gave the general type both for the disciples and for the body of believers after Pentecost, already accustomed to such meals. Jewish Christians needed only to receive from "the Apostles' teaching" the added Christian associations (including those emphasised at the Last Supper), and they would naturally, *as is implied by the silence of Acts as to any institution* † of the Lord's Supper by the Apostles, settle down to a Christian "breaking of bread" differing from the Jewish only in the greater cause for thanksgiving and joy which its associations afforded. What the kind and degree of transformation may actually have been we are also in a position to imagine, since the recovery some twenty-five years ago of certain typical forms of Eucharistic prayer current in Syria during the Apostolic age, and believed in the early sub-Apostolic age to represent the very forms of Apostolic usage itself.‡ Premising that what this document, the *Didache* or "Teaching of the Apostles," professes to give, is only the prayers of

* Compare the reference to daily bread in the Lord's Prayer, which itself affords hints as to the sort of "Eucharist" He would use.

† Any more than in the case of the analogous adaptation of Baptism for incorporation into the new Community.

‡ This is a perfectly sober description of these prayers (compare Prof. H. B. Swete in *Journal of Theological Studies*, iii. 168), apart from any question as to the date of the *Didăchē* as a whole, though Lightfoot's dating c. 80–100 A.D. seems none too early, if we allow for a few later accretions, *e.g.* vii. 2 f.

Thanksgiving (*Eucharistia*) and not a complete account of the usages connected with the meal, we may place its account side by side with a description of table-fellowship as existing to-day among Jews, but going back in its main features to the time of Christ Himself.* (See Table on page 56.)

Comparison of these shows striking similarity. Both are meals of religious fellowship, with Thanksgiving before and after partaking, and ending with an outlook towards the future consummation of all that in the present is realised but in part. As regards the form of the Christian meal we observe:—

(1) The symbolic part precedes the meal proper and does not come after it. It is a Hallowing (cf. 1 Tim. iv. 4) of the whole meal as one of sacred communion, quite on Jewish lines.

(2) The Cup precedes the Bread, as in the *Kiddush* of the Sabbath and other festivals. Perhaps the *Didache*, and the source of Luke xxii. 16–19*a*, saw the Christian Eucharist in some such light. Otherwise this may have been the usual Hellenistic order, whereas the Palestinian may have been the opposite, as is suggested by the very term for the Christian common meal as a whole, viz., the Breaking of Bread (Acts ii. 42, xx. 7, 11; cf. Did. xiv. 1).† Indeed, it is the *only order* of which we have explicit evidence in the Apostolic age.‡ It was apparently only after the Last Supper itself, as given in the Gospels of Mark and Matthew, and also in 1 Cor. xi., began to tell as a model, that the familiar order came to prevail.

* This is proved by references in the Talmudic tract *Berachoth* ("Blessings") and in other early sources, both Jewish and Christian. See *Tischgebete und Abendmahlsgebete* ("Table Prayers," &c.), by E. von der Goltz, Leipzig, 1905.

† Compare the Jewish-Christian *Clementine Homilies*, xi. 36, xiv. 1, where we have the expressions "to break a Eucharist" and "break bread with Eucharist." So in the (Syrian) *Acts of Thomas* and in the kindred *Acts of John* only bread is mentioned at the Eucharist.

‡ *E.g.* in 1 Cor. x. 16 f. the Cup of Blessing precedes the Breaking of Bread.

Jewish Table Communion.

The house-father takes a loaf and blesses, saying, "Blessed be Thou, Lord our God, King of the world, who bringest forth bread from the earth."

He breaks the bread and shares it with his table-fellows.

If wine be used, he now takes a Cup of wine and utters the Benediction, "Blessed be Thou, Lord our God, King of the world, who hast created the fruit of the vine." The Cup is passed round.

The Meal follows, with every sign of gladness (and with thought of the poor).

The solemn Thanksgiving after food. (Aliens,* women, slaves, and minors are excluded—so sacred an act is it, as a sacrifice, cf. Did. xiv. 1 f.)

(*a*) A preface; the house-father and his fellows reminding one another that blessing and praise are due to God for His gifts and goodness, by which men live.

(*b*) A fourfold Prayer of Thanksgiving (cf. "the prayers," Acts ii. 42) with responses.

(1) For God's favour to all flesh, and to Israel for His Name's sake, *in giving food.*

(2) *For the life in the goodly land of Israel*, after bondage in Egypt, for God's covenant-pledge in their flesh, for His Law and its teachings, for the life bestowed by His grace and mercy, and for His daily nourishment of it.

(3) For God's grace to His *Jerusalem* (which He will yet build again and gather Israel).

(4) That the Good and Merciful One may in the future yet more fully show grace and mercy as King of the world and Israel's fatherly King [the ejaculatory nature of this section is marked].

The Amen.

Table Communion in the *Didache*.

"As touching the Giving of Thanks, thus give thanks:—First, as touching the Cup, 'We thank Thee, our Father, for the holy Vine of David, thy Servant, which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus Thy Servant. . . .'

"But as touching the Broken-bread, 'We thank Thee, our Father, for the life and knowledge which Thou hast made known to us through Jesus Thy Servant. . . .'

"'Just as this broken bread was once lying scattered upon the mountains, and being gathered together became one; so let Thy Church be gathered from the ends of the earth into Thy Kingdom, for Thine is the power and the glory for ever.'"

Only the baptized Christian is to partake of "the Eucharist" as being a "holy" thing.†

"But after being filled, thus give thanks:—

"'We thank Thee, holy Father, for Thy holy Name, which Thou hast enshrined in our hearts,‡ and for the knowledge and faith and immortality which Thou hast made known through Jesus, etc.'

"'Thou, Sovereign Almighty, didst create all things for Thy Name's sake. Both food and drink didst Thou give to mankind to enjoy, that they might give thanks to Thee; but to us didst Thou graciously give food and drink and eternal life through Jesus Thy Servant. Above all, we thank Thee that Thou art powerful. . . . Remember, Lord, Thy Church to rescue it from all evil. . . . Let grace come, and this world pass away. Hosanna to the God of David. If any be a saint, let him come (to meet the Lord): if any is not, let him repent. Maranatha. Amen.'"

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* Hence the gravity of the issue in Gal. ii. 12 ff., Acts xv. 20, 28 f. † Comp. the feeling among the Essene sect of the Jews as to their common food. ‡ Perhaps replacing "Thy covenant which Thou hast sealed on our flesh." See opposite (*b*) (2).

(3) The symbolism of the Cup is like that of the first cup in Luke; indeed, the source here lying behind Luke may reflect the same line of tradition as these prayers. To Jewish Christians, unlike Paul, the Cup did not actually suggest * the blood of Messiah's sacrifice. Their thought dwelt rather on the *present* and *future* of God's Kingdom or the Church, "the holy Vine † of David." For this, then, as a revealed reality through Jesus, they gave thanks over the Cup.

(4) Similarly, the symbolism as to the Bread differs from that of the Last Supper. Its more mystical suggestion is of the Church itself, as yet to be unified in the coming Kingdom, even as the many grains of corn were united in the one loaf of bread. This secondary ‡ symbolism appears already in 1 Cor. x. 17; and doubtless it prevailed in the early Church at large. Possibly indeed in immediately Apostolic circles the thought of Christ's personal presence among them (Matt. xviii. 20, cf. John xiv. 18) may have blended with the other. But for average Jewish-Christian circles, at any rate of the Hellenistic type, we may take these prayers as representative. Thus as regards their order, the Cup after the Bread was actually removed from Luke's Gospel in a group of early MSS. (represented to-day by the Codex Bezæ and the Old Latin adff²il, cf. be), proving that the other order (Cup, Bread) lasted on in certain churches.

The prayers given in Did. ix.–x. were perhaps meant for partial Eucharistic gatherings,§ as well as for the

* Yet the argument from the *Didache's* silence as to the atoning death of Jesus, is precarious. If the Church met for communion as "saints," it was in virtue of the death which Jesus, as God's Servant (παῖς), had suffered (Isa. liii. 12; cf. 1 Peter ii. 24).

† The idea is that of John xv. 1 ff., but less profoundly conceived, because Paul's mystical idea of Christ as Head or Root, from which the Life radiated, was not grasped.

‡ Similarly in the *Book of Jubilees*, xlix. 13, the Paschal Lamb is taken as a type of Israel itself.

§ Such as the "Table" appointed by a "prophet" in xi. 9.

weekly united Lord's Supper. The latter is clearly alluded to in chap. xiv. as follows:—

"And on the Lord's Day of the Lord assemble and break bread and give thanks, after confessing your transgressions, that your sacrifice may be pure; but let no one that hath a dispute with his fellow assemble with you until they be reconciled, lest your sacrifice be profaned. For this is that (sacrifice) which was spoken of by the Lord (Mal. i. 11, 14): In every place and time offer to Me a pure sacrifice; for I am a great King, saith the Lord, and My Name is wonderful among the Gentiles."

Several points deserve attention. (1) We have here the first use of "sacrifice" in connection with the Breaking of Bread, but plainly in a purely spiritual sense, for the collective prayer* of Thanksgiving offered by the united Church. It is the idea found in Hebrews xiii. 15, of the continual "sacrifice of praise, that is, the fruit of lips which make acknowledgment to His name" (cf. "My Name," in Mal. i. 14). Genuine homage to God for His Divine Nature and Goodness was then,† in a degree which we hardly realise to-day, felt to be an act most holy in the eyes of God and man. It was the sole form of sacrifice left under the New Covenant, since the one atoning Sacrifice by which this was sealed gave all Christians perfect access as priests to the Holy Father (so Epistle to Hebrews *passim*). Even certain Rabbis felt it would be so in the Messianic age‡: "One day all offerings will cease, only the Thank-offering will not cease: all prayers will cease, only the Thanksgiving will not cease." Later on we shall see the instinct to give Thanksgiving an outward expression in "gifts" in kind for God's uses—especially for the poor and needy—coming into play, in the Church's "oblations" over which the Eucharis-

* An early Latin writer (*De Aleatoribus*) actually substitutes "prayer" for "sacrifice" in quoting from this chapter. Cf. also Rev. v. 8.

† Comp. Raphael's address in Tobit xii. 6 f., and Philo, *Quis rerum divin. hær.*, i. 504, *Quæst. in Exod.*, ii. 72, for bread as the type of God's creature gifts.

‡ See Westcott's note on Heb. xiii. 15.

tic prayer was said. But as yet the holy people's common prayer, the most spiritual expression of the worshippers themselves*—the real Christian sacrifice,† after the example of Christ Himself—alone was the Eucharistic sacrifice in return for all God's gifts.

(2) It was the purity of the worshippers which made the sacrifice pure, and not *vice versâ*. As Irenæus said nearly a century later, "Sacrifices do not sanctify a man; but the conscience, if pure, of him who offers sanctifies the sacrifice,‡ and causes God to accept it as from a friend." This in itself disproves any notion of propitiation or forgiveness of sins as effected by the Eucharistic sacrifice. On the contrary, it was only after full confession of sins, shortcomings in the Christian life, that any was fitted to join in the Church's sacrifice of prayer. In particular, and most impressive of all as bearing on the Communion of Saints as of the essence of the Eucharistic meal, a breach of love between two members was felt to mar the Eucharistic prayer of all. Here we have the *differentia* of primitive Christianity, its new thoughts of Love and its value before God. Until we grasp this—that Christian Love, in its specific newness§ of pure devotion to others' good, is pre-eminently the gift of Christ—we miss the key to much, including the Lord's Supper and that part of it which came to be known as Love (*Agăpē*).

We may now sum up what has emerged so far as

* Who are, when in the act of prayer, to Ignatius "the altar of God."

† Rom. xii. 1: "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, well-pleasing to God, your rational (spiritual) service."

‡ So in Mal. i. 11, 14, even Gentile sacrifices have value when "pure" in their reverence and devotion to the true God.

§ Even the term *Agăpē* is not known to us apart from Biblical Greek; while the Christian notion, as defined, *e.g.*, in 1 Cor. xiii., has about it a quite special sense of *self-devotion*. See the striking passage on Love as the mother of all goodness, in the Letter of Clement to James (c. ix.), prefixed to the *Clementine Homilies*.

to the form of the Lord's Supper in the first two Christian generations. It included—

The kiss of Love, sealing the union of the Saints.

Blessing and passing round of the Cup.

Blessing, breaking, and distribution of the Bread.

Meal of fellowship (with psalms, hymns, and "edifying" talk).*

Thanksgiving after food, with eschatological climax.

It was fundamentally on the lines of Jewish table-communion, but with one important difference, in addition to its distinctive Christian spirit. Whereas the "Great Thanksgiving" at Jewish meals came after the satisfaction of bodily wants, the chief Christian Thanksgiving usually came before, over the Cup and Breaking of Bread. This seems to have been the case with Jesus' own practice, since we never read of His thanks after food; and we may well take it to have passed over from the Master to His society. This is of importance in relation to the development of the "Eucharist" † when it came to be separated from the accompanying meal, though no doubt some of the later Church's *Anaphora*, or Eucharistic prayer, originally formed part of the Thanksgiving after the meal, including the Preface itself.

But already, by the closing years of the first century, a change was taking place in certain large churches—though not yet in Syria generally, nor in some parts of Asia Minor, nor in Egypt outside Alexandria—by which the common meal was ceasing to be held in connection with the Church's corporate Eucharist. The latter became associated instead with the meeting for worship answering to that of the Synagogue, which fell early in the morning of the Lord's Day. Thereby it largely changed its significance. "Thoughts

* Col. iii. 14–16, Eph. v. 18 f.

† Did. ix. 5, in which the Eucharistic food is itself called "your Eucharist," is (unless added later, like certain details of baptism in vii. 2 f.) the first case of this concrete use, which prevails in the second century and onwards.

of Thanksgiving for bodily and spiritual gifts received no longer ruled, but the ideas of sacrificial cults more and more prevailed. Still common meals for Christians were not wholly superseded. For, first, Eucharistic feasts in small household groups still obtained as felt wants. . . . Next care for the poor, originally associated with the Church's common meal, furthered maintenance of the Agape," or Lord's Supper (as it was often called), for this special object. Further, as we gather from Socrates, *Eccl. Hist.* v. 22, and other sources,* the Eucharist was still joined with the joyous Sabbath feast; yet so as to come directly after it and not before it. Lastly, as a final proof of the original organic connection between the prayers of the Eucharist proper and the Church's common meals, we have the traces of table-origin persisting in certain phrases of the later Eucharist prayers, and the corresponding traces of solemn Eucharistic origin in Christian table-prayers, especially among those devoted to the ascetic or "religious" life.†

III

The Christian common meal was at first called simply Breaking of Bread, after Jewish usage; but gradually there arose another descriptive term, the "Love" (*Agape* ‡) feast, first found in Jude 12, and possibly used for a time of the twofold feast of communion. As the institution passed beyond Jewish circles, and was naturalised on soil already occupied by the meals of

* *E.g.*, the account of "the bringing in of the Lamps at the Church's Supper" in the Æthiopic Church Order, probably based on the Syrian usage of which there are still traces in E. Hauler's Latin version of early Canons.

† See E. von der Goltz's *Tischgebete*, u.s.w., as already cited, from whom (p. 17 f.) come also the words quoted above.

‡ Perhaps originally used of the kiss of love (1 Pet. v. 14). A Jewish origin is suggested by the analogy of a similar title given to a prayer in use among Jews to-day (the *'Ahăbāh*).

Greek and Roman religious fraternities, it must have undergone modification both in form and conception. Thus in Corinth it seems at once to have been styled "the Lord's Supper" (1 Cor. xi. 20, cf. x. 20 f.). As regards the persistence of the feeling that communion between all the members of the Body of Christ, in and through Love, was of the essence of the Lord's Supper, it appears strikingly in Ignatius of Antioch about 110 A.D., in whom already we find the Communion meal styled the "Eucharist." If he does not use *Agape* as synonym for the Eucharist (*Smyrn.* viii. 1, 2), he at least regards the absence of brotherly love as the main reason why some absent themselves from the Church's corporate observance of it. Such love Ignatius regards as the vital principle of the new humanity of which Christ, the "new" or "perfect" man, is the archetype. As the energising element (cf. Gal. v. 6 fin.) in Christian experience, Love answers to the "blood" of Christ, of which "the Cup unto union of His blood" is symbol; while the substance of the Gospel, or Christian Faith, corresponds to the "flesh" or objective expression of Christ, and this again has as its symbol the one Bread broken among the many. In this deeply mystic, or Pauline and Johannine sense, the Breaking of the one Bread is in Christian experience "medicine of incorruption, an antidote that one die not but live continually." In Ignatius we find, in fact, the elements both of the old order and of that which was soon to replace it. The change was due externally to the separation of the *Agape* proper, the meal of brotherly fellowship, from the more symbolic part, henceforth regularly styled the *Eucharist.* But there were also internal factors of change, making for fresh theories as to the nature of Eucharistic grace.

We pass, then, to consider the Eucharist as a mirror of the idea of salvation characteristic of various types of Christians in the sub-Apostolic age.

A typically Greek way of conceiving the grace of the Lord's Supper appears in preoccupation with the idea of the "flesh" (significantly* substituted for the original word "body") and "blood" (now viewed as co-ordinate with "flesh" as the other constituent of man's material nature) in which their saving Lord and God† had died and risen, in order to bestow on those united to Him sacramentally—according to the conception of the prevalent mystic cults‡—the boon of incorruptibility. This was the special aspect in which Gentiles were apt to view the Christian salvation; and it colours Greek Eucharistic theory from the moment we can trace it apart from the action of Jewish thought. To those possessed by the biblical idea of God, it was enough that the All-sovereign Creator (cf. Did. x. 3 f.), who had raised Jesus the Messiah, was pledged thereby to raise all whom His Spirit indwelt and sanctified. But the Greek hankered after a theory as to *how* this corruptible flesh could be made to share immortality (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 35 ff.). Those of a mystical tendency saw in the Eucharistic food, construed as a Mystery, proof within the new revelation itself that the body was capable of being *divinised*, so to speak, by sharing in the glorified flesh and blood of the Redeemer. The relation of this to the natural bread and wine was no doubt conceived vaguely or emotionally by the mass of such believers, and expressed in crude language.§ But in a Justin this conception, of mystic origin, itself undergoes a rationalising process in terms of the Logos philosophy, now entering Christian reflexion in a form more purely

* *Cf.* the addition to Eph. v. 30, known already to Irenæus (V. ii. 2), "members of His body, *of His flesh and of His bones.*"

† Such language was in use in current Greek religion.

‡ See the essay in this volume on the Greek idea of salvation.

§ It was probably such crude realism which evoked the full treatment of the subject in the Fourth Gospel, chap. vi., which, while showing that "the flesh profiteth nothing," at the same time refutes those (Docetists?) who in recoil rejected the Lord's Supper altogether.

philosophic than the religious and semi-Hebraic form in which it appears in the Fourth Gospel. Here in Justin, about 150 A.D., and for the first time,* we get the theory of a parallel *dynamic reality* operating through the bread, along with its natural potency, the former feeding the higher capacity of the body for incorruptible life as really as the latter fed its lower and corruptible life by natural metabolism. A like metaphysical rather than experimental view of the nature of Eucharistic communion with Christ appears yet more plainly in Irenæus (c. 180). In it, says he, "we proclaim communion and union of flesh and spirit. For as bread from the earth, in receiving the invocation † of God is no longer common bread but Eucharist, consisting of two things, both an earthly and a heavenly; so also our bodies, in partaking of the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible but have the hope of the resurrection to eternity." This is not consubstantiation, since it is the Divine

* Though his confident tone implies that similar views were already current in certain circles known to him. It is doubtful, however, whether the mystical and Pauline Ignatius meant to attribute any realistic effect to the bread, as distinct from the act of united communion, in his description of the grace received by "breaking the loaf" as "medicine of immortality, an antidote that one die not but live in Jesus Christ continually." Justin's realism was probably influenced by both the Fourth Gospel and Ignatius misunderstood; and it is noteworthy, as suggesting its purely Greek origin, that it is in a Gnostic contemporary of his, Theodotus the Valentinian, that we get the clearest notion of this theory. "The bread," says he, "is hallowed by the power of the Name, not being the same—though it so appears—as it was (when) appropriated, but by power it hath been transformed into (a) spiritual power" (Clem. Alex., "Exc. Theod.," § 82).

† Into the subject of this Invocation (*epiklesis*) in relation to the "words of consecration," this is hardly the place to go. But it is of interest to observe, as illustrating the way in which the Eucharist reflects the distinctive ideas of different circles, that the form in Sarapion's Prayer Book (c. 350 A.D.) runs: "O God of truth, let Thy holy Word descend upon this bread, that the bread may become body of the Word [as being a likeness (ὁμοίωμα) of the body of Christ]," —exactly on the lines of Justin and Irenæus, with their Logos theology. See the Essay in this volume on "The Holy Spirit as Wisdom."

Logos or His energy, not Christ's glorified body* or blood, that becomes present in the elements (His "body" and "blood" only as being outer forms in which the Logos incarnates Himself afresh). Much less is it transubstantiation, for the substance of each element remains, with the addition of a Divine potency which enters also into the "substance of our flesh" (Iren. V. ii. 2–3). But whatever it be, it is quite alien to the Hebraic symbolism of the New Testament, the purely experimental interest of which is satisfied by the consciousness of mystical union or spiritual interpenetration of the believer's personality by Christ, the Bread of the soul.

If, however, early Eucharistic realism, at once Gnostic and Catholic, represented deviation from the line of Apostolic experimental religion, the second century remained true to its idea of the Christian Eucharistic "sacrifice." One of several changes due to the cessation of the *Agape* in connection with the united Eucharist of a local church, was the appearance of material "offerings" or "gifts" in connection with the sacrifice of Thanksgiving, which had hitherto consisted simply of the Church's corporate prayer (as in *Did.* xiv.). This meets us first in the Epistle of Clement, written from Rome (c. 96), where numbers and the imperial police soon made one common *Agape* a practical impossibility, if indeed it ever existed there.† In any case, once charity to poorer brethren could not be shown in the corporate Love-feast, gifts in kind were brought to the Church's Sunday Eucharistic service (as it now was), and solemnly offered to God as visible thank-offerings. This and its *rationale* Irenæus describes at length. It was in order "that a man, being counted grateful in the things whereby he has shown himself so, may

* As seemingly in the Anglican liturgy, "the *body* of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . preserve thy *body* and soul unto everlasting life."

† It is in Rome that we hear most of "house-churches" (Rom. xvi.), while even the Jews had there no unified organisation.

receive that honour (viz., of his gift being accepted) which is of God" (*Adv. Hær.* IV. xviii. 1). "But we do not see that S. Irenæus, or any of his predecessors, teaches that the Eucharist is a sacrifice or oblation of the Body and Blood of Christ, nor that it is a repetition of the Sacrifice of the Cross" in any sense. Man offers his "gifts" or "oblations" to God from His gifts in creation: "but the Divine Gifts are received, not offered."*

Such a notion of Christian sacrifice was only a form of the original idea of the "reasonable and bloodless offering"—an idea later transferred to the Body of Christ, assumed to become present in the Bread after the words of consecration. We see this idea clearly in the description of the ministry of angels in high heaven, in the *Testament of Levi* (ch. iii. 6), "offering to the Lord a sweet-smelling savour, a reasonable and bloodless offering"—*i.e.*, the prayers of godly souls, their "memorial" before God.† In the same sense the Martyrdom of Apollonius, in Rome about 180 A.D., alludes to a daily sending up of prayers as a "sacrifice bloodless and pure to God" (c. 44). This is the very idea of the "Salutation" with which the ancient Eucharistic oblation (*Anaphora*) began: "Up with your hearts." "We have them towards the Lord"—and thereafter all is conceived as enacted spiritually in heaven.

The link between these two aspects of the Eucharist in the second century and onwards, man's "sacrifice" of loyal homage and the Divine gift of grace in response, enjoyed in partaking of the symbols of Christ's passion, was the *Anamnesis* or remembrance of Christ's example, as the perfect type of self-devotion to God's service. This is what underlies the structure of the oldest liturgies, both Eastern and Western. If we study the earliest extant forms of consecration

* So W. B. Frankland, in his careful summary of Irenæus's teaching in "The Early Eucharist," 1902, pp. 81, 111.

† Cf. Tobit xii. 12, 15, Acts x. 4, and Charles' note on *Test. Levi*, iii. 5 ff.

prayer—*e.g.*, those printed in Bishop J. Wordsworth's "Ministry of Grace" (pp. 27, 82 f.)—we feel that we have in their common element something simpler than the Logos theory of Christ's real, though not bodily presence. The probability is that it goes back behind the age of the Apologists, to which such a theory can be traced. The bread and wine are offered in memory of Christ's example in giving thanks over the bread and cup, but in memory also of His passion and resurrection and ascension, wherein His supreme sacrifice was achieved.

Of any notion that Christ was the sacrifice offered in the Eucharist there is no trace during the first two centuries. Reverential gratitude and loving devotion, these constituted the sacrifice of the early Christian Eucharist. It was evoked by God's holy Love, bounteous to the limit of self-sacrifice in the gift of His beloved Son, whose willing death was the perfect type of a "living sacrifice," the ground both of man's redemption and of the Church's assurance that its Thank-offering in prayer and oblation was accepted before the Most High. True, the bread and wine through which the Church of the second century came in its own realistic way, as set forth above, to conceive fresh Divine self-communication to descend in response to its accepted sacrifice, was itself part of its own sacrificial oblations. But this did not serve to identify them, even after special consecration, with the body and blood once offered on the Cross and thereafter glorified. Such a fusion and confusion of ideas—to the obscuring of the finality of Christ's redemptive sacrifice and of His sole effective, mediatorial priesthood — came only with later Catholicism, from the third century onwards, when already average religious experience had fallen below the normal Christian consciousness. On this followed also loss of the full primitive idea of the essentially social nature of the Eucharistic Communion, as heart-

fellowship between the members of Christ. A later proof of this is the rise of private communion, a contradiction in terms to early Christian thought.

The revival of a more biblical or normal Christian experience has ever meant a revival in the original type of Eucharistic thought and practice. A signal instance of this is afforded by the sixteenth-century fathers of British Congregationalism. In particular its social nature was deeply realised, under the limiting conditions of their lot. Robert Browne's setting forth * of how "all Christians are made Priestes under Christ," in that "they present and offer up prayers unto God for themselves and for others," and of "the spiritual use of the body and blood of Christ Jesus, by a spiritual feeding thereon and growing into it by one holy communion," was no mere personal theory of his own. It expresses the actual experience of many in his own day, and of still more down to our own day, meeting in companies small enough and in homely enough conditions to realise the very spirit of the primitive Lord's Supper. And "truly" such "fellowship," with brothers and sisters in Christ, is also "fellowship with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ."

* *Booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians* (1582), largely printed in Williston Walker's "Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism," pp. 18–27.

THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THE HISTORICO-CRITICAL METHOD

H. T. ANDREWS

THE NEW TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THE HISTORICO-CRITICAL METHOD

THERE can be little doubt that the science of Biblical Theology has been completely revolutionised during the last twenty years, though it cannot be said that the extent of the revolution has as yet been fully appreciated by the majority of the exponents of Christian doctrine. It is impossible for us any longer to follow the methods of the older theologians, who regarded the statements of scripture exactly as they stand, as their final and authoritative data, and confined themselves to the task of interpretation and systematic construction. The abandonment of the doctrine of plenary inspiration and the modern recognition of the human element in the Bible have made this position absolutely untenable. We are bound to examine the different statements which were once, theoretically at any rate, all regarded as being above criticism, on their own merits, and form our own estimate of their value and validity for modern thought. We have to sift out the temporary and local elements in order to discover the permanent and universal truth; and unfortunately at present we have no sure criterion by means of which the differentiation can be scientifically effected. It is to the absence of this criterion that our present divisions of opinion are very largely due, and no satisfactory issue is likely to be reached until the criterion has been found.

There is no short route to the solution of the problem

which confronts us. The way of hope, however, seems to lie in the direction of what is known as the Historico-critical method. Mansfield men of the earlier generation will always remember with pride and gratitude that the principles of the new method were first laid down in their hearing by Dr. Hatch in his famous Hibbert lectures. Since that time rapid advances have been made. Dr. Hatch confined himself in the main to the work of demonstrating the influence of Greek thought on the development of Christian theology after the close of the Apostolic age. The method has now been pushed back into the Apostolic age itself, and rightly so. Environment counted for as much with the Apostle Paul as it did with Justin Martyr or Origen; and in his case, as in that of the later writers, we are bound to ask, How much of his theology is the transcript of his own religious experience, and how much is due to the influence of the *Zeitgeist*? The Historico-critical method, by defining and analysing the "psychological climate" of the age, offers us a scientific means of determining the influence of current ideas upon the development of New Testament theology. The object of the present essay is to examine in outline the effect of the application of the method to the New Testament doctrine of Atonement.

I

It will be necessary to commence by briefly summarising the New Testament facts. It is impossible, of course, to enter into detail, but the position obtained by the Doctrine of the Atonement in the Apostolic age may be indicated thus :—

(1) Leaving the historical books out of account and ignoring certain minor documents of later date, we may say that there are six types of theology in the New Testament, viz., the Pauline, the Johannine, the Petrine, and the types represented respectively by the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, and the Apocalypse.

These six types may, with one exception, be regarded as independent of each other. There is no clear proof, except in the case of 1 Peter, which shows undoubted traces of Paulinism, that any one of these types is derived from any of the others.

(2) In five out of these six types of theology, we find the utmost stress laid upon the atoning value of the death of Christ. The writers differ in the formulæ which they use and the metaphors which they employ, to describe the Atonement. The author of Hebrews, for instance, derives his categories from the Jewish sacrificial system, while the author of 1 Peter presses into service the great prophecy of the suffering servant in Isaiah. But though the terminology varies in the different writers, they all agree in maintaining that the death of Christ is the central fact of Christianity, and that it was through the death of Christ that the barrier of sin was broken down and the gift of Divine forgiveness secured.

(3) The exception of course is the Epistle of James, which never once alludes to the Doctrine of the Atonement. Now if the Epistle of James stood alone, we might afford to ignore it. We might argue that the omission was purely accidental, and due to the fact that the doctrine was not germane to the subject with which the writer was dealing. The *argumentum e silentio* is always precarious and never yields absolutely certain results. The Epistle of James, however, does not stand alone. The earlier speeches in Acts (whether authentic or not) prove that there was a time when a different interpretation was placed upon the death of Christ. Equally important is the evidence of the Eucharistic prayers in the *Didache*, which show no trace at all of any belief in a doctrine of atonement. It is difficult therefore to resist the conclusion that a certain section of the Church—comparatively unimportant perhaps—dissented from the generally accepted view which made the Atonement a cardinal article of Christian belief.

The significant fact, therefore, which we have to take

into account is that at the close of the Apostolic age the bulk of the Church accepted, in one form or another, the doctrine of the Atonement as the basis, or one of the bases of the Christian religion.

II

The problem naturally arises, Was this belief, which was so widely accepted by the Church, an organic and essential element of the Christian Faith, or was it an alien addition imposed upon primitive Christianity *ab extra?* Did it originate in the heart of Christian experience, or was it a corruption derived from the psychological environment? Is it possible that the Epistle of James may after all be the most faithful representation of the spirit of the religion founded by Jesus, and that the other types are elaborations of His simple teaching?

Now if we were certain that we possessed an infallible record of the teaching of Jesus, the problem would be easily solved by an appeal to His own words. When we remember, however, the length of time which elapsed between the Crucifixion and the writing of the Gospels, we are bound to make allowance for the possibility that the presence in the narrative of the two passages in which Jesus speaks of the import of His death, may be due to the reflex influence of the doctrine of Atonement which had already obtained currency. We may be convinced in our own minds that such a theory is highly improbable and that the passages in question will stand all the critical tests that may be applied to them; yet in view of our inability to demonstrate the accuracy and authenticity of the words attributed to Jesus, it is impossible to regard them as a final court of appeal which can authoritatively settle the matter in dispute.

It is necessary therefore to find some other method of answering the question which has been raised; and the only other line that seems open to us is to make an analysis of the religious atmosphere of the age, in order

to find out whether there was anything in it which offers a sufficient explanation of the origin of the doctrine.

III

Before we proceed to this analysis, there are some preliminary considerations which ought to be taken into account.

(1) The Christian doctrine of Atonement is unique and has no parallel in any other historical religion. It cannot therefore be explained as a result of the normal activity of the religious consciousness. One of the chief difficulties which the doctrine of the Virgin Birth has to meet is that we find an almost exact parallel to it in the legends of Buddhism. There seems to have been a tendency amongst different peoples to adopt some such explanation to account for the origin of religious genius. But this difficulty does not exist in the case of the Atonement. In none of the historical religions do we find anything which at all resembles it; the analogies to be found elsewhere are of so different a character that they do not throw any light upon the problem. We must look for a solution not to the circumstances and conditions which were common to Christianity and other religions, but to those which were peculiar to it alone. This, of course, narrows our inquiry to the particular environment in which Christianity was cradled, *i.e.*, to Judaism. The main issue, therefore, clearly is this, Was Christianity, in the exposition of its faith, forced into this channel by the current of Judaism?

(2) At first sight it appears perhaps that the question has only to be asked in order to be answered in the affirmative at once. There can be no doubt at all that the language which the writer of Hebrews uses to describe the efficacy of the death of Christ is borrowed from the Jewish sacrificial system. The indebtedness of 1 Peter to the prophecy of the suffering servant is equally obvious. Is not this final? The argument, however, is not necessarily conclusive. If we found

that the five types of theology, which embody the doctrine, used the same language and employed the same metaphors in describing the work of Christ, there would be a strong presumption in support of the view that they drew their ideas from the same source. If all five had made use of Isaiah liii., we should be justified in drawing the conclusion that that prophecy was the *fons et origo* of the doctrine. In the same way, if all five had employed the terminology of the sacrificial system, we should almost inevitably decide that that system was the most potent factor in transforming the martydom of Jesus into an act of Atonement. But examination proves that these ideas are not common to the five. Paul, for instance, never refers to Isaiah's prophecy in connection with the Atonement. He makes, moreover, very little use of sacrificial language, and when he does make use of it, it is often quite uncertain whether he intends his words to be taken literally. These differences within the types seem to suggest that it was not the language of sacrifice and prophecy that created the belief in the Atonement, but it was rather the belief in the Atonement wrought by Christ that sought to express and interpret itself in the common categories of Jewish thought. The facts seem to be most easily explained if we suppose that the primitive belief which underlies the various types was the simple conviction which according to Paul was among the truths which he had received, that "Christ died for our sins," and that this simple conviction was subsequently elaborated in different ways by the use of the terminology of ritual and prophecy.

(3) Another point of the highest importance is the question of time. We are bound to consider whether there was a sufficient interval of time between the Crucifixion and the emergence of the doctrine of the Atonement to allow for the creation of the latter by the impact of external forces. The only data which we possess for determining the length of the interval are twofold: (*a*) The early speeches in Acts (if they preserve elements

of genuine tradition) imply that at first the death of Christ was not explained as an act of Atonement. (*b*) The statement of Paul already alluded to, that a belief in the Atonement was among the truths which he had received. He does not tell us the time at which he received the doctrine, but we need not hesitate in supposing that it goes back to the very beginning of his Christian experience. The autobiographical passage in Romans vii. seems to imply that this conviction was closely connected with the conversion. Unfortunately we cannot date with precision the year of Paul's conversion. The common view places it about five years after the Crucifixion. Harnack, however, holds (and there is a great deal to be said in favour of his chronology) that little more than a year elapsed between the two events. If the speeches in Acts are genuine they can only represent a passing phase of thought. Within five years at the most, possibly within a single year, the doctrine of the Atonement had been so firmly established that it had come to be recognised as one of the fundamental facts of Christianity.

IV

Christianity within the first five years of its existence reached the position that "Christ died for our sins." Was this belief derived from the teaching of its Founder, or was it an accretion superimposed upon Christianity by the impact of Jewish ideas? This is the real problem that confronts us.

In order to answer this question, it will be necessary to investigate the character of contemporary Jewish belief on the subject of Divine forgiveness. The issue turns upon the answer which we give to the question, Was the atmosphere of Jewish thought so strongly charged with sacrificial ideas that it was capable of transforming the martyrdom of Jesus into an act of Atonement within so short a space of time?

Unfortunately the bulk of our information with

regard to the character of Jewish thought in the time of Jesus, is derived from the Apocryphal and Apocalyptic literature, much of which was originally written in Greek. It is quite conceivable that there was a type of Jewish thought, not represented in this literature, which may have exercised a considerable influence on Christianity. This, however, seems scarcely probable, because the literature appears to represent all the highest phases of Judaism, and it is not likely that so potent a religious truth as the doctrine of Atonement could have been derived from an inferior type. At any rate, if the atmosphere had been sufficiently charged with the idea of Atonement to revolutionise the character of primitive Christianity, we must inevitably have found this idea writ large upon, at any rate, some of the types of Jewish thought represented in the different Apocryphal books.

It will not be possible, of course, to do more than give the briefest summary of the main conclusions which may be derived from the study of this literature. One of its most remarkable features is the relatively unimportant place which is assigned to the doctrine of forgiveness. The main interest for the most part is bound up with the problem of the future destiny of the race and of the individual. Very little space is given to the consideration of the problem, "How can a man be just with God?" Hence the references to the subject are incidental and do not show that it was ever regarded as one of supreme importance. There is nothing to suggest that Judaism during this period endured travail of soul in its effort to escape from sin. It is only in 4 Ezra, which is of too late a date to have influenced primitive Christianity, that we find the sense of sin weighing heavily upon the Jewish conscience.

Roughly speaking, we may divide the conceptions of forgiveness into two classes: (1) Those which find the ground of forgiveness in some action on the part of the man who needed to be forgiven; (2) Those which find the ground in some external agency, *e.g.*, sacrifice, the

merits of the saints, the intercession of angels. These two classes are not of course mutually exclusive and are sometimes found conjoined in the same writer.

I. Of the first class of conceptions there are several forms. Repentance, prayer, fasting, the acquisition of wisdom, good works are all regarded in different writers as a sufficient reason for forgiveness.

(*a*) The most prevalent view seems to be the theory that repentance of itself is sufficient to secure salvation. "My son, hast thou sinned?" writes Sirach, "Do so no more, but ask pardon for thy former sins" (xxi. 1). Perhaps the two clearest statements of this type of view are to be found in the Psalms of Solomon and the Book of Jubilees. The former runs: "He will cleanse the soul that hath sinned, if it make confession and acknowledgment . . . Thy kindness is toward them that sin, if so be that they repent" (ix. 12–15). The Book of Jubilees states, "If ye turn to Him, He will forgive your transgressions and pardon your sins. It is written and ordained, He will be merciful toward all who turn from their sins once a year" (xi. 23–26).

(*b*) Another view which seems to have prevailed, especially in Pharisaic circles, connected salvation with works. The clearest statements of this particular form of doctrine are found in certain sections of the Apocalypses of Baruch and 4 Ezra. The former speaks of those "who have been saved by their works and to whom the law has been a hope, and understanding an expectation, and wisdom a confidence" (li. 7). In another passage it is said that "the just have good hopes about the end, and set out from this home without fear, since they have a power of good works laid up in the treasure-house with Thee" (xiv. 12). 4 Ezra describes the righteous as "those who have many works laid up with Thee" (viii. 33); and in another passage the angel comforts the prophet with the words "a treasury of works is laid up for thee with the Most High" (vii. 77). In Sirach there is a specific reference to a particular class of works which secure

forgiveness. "He that honoureth his father maketh atonement for his sins" (iii. 3); "Almsgiving maketh atonement for sin" (iii. 31). It is noteworthy that in both these passages the technical term for Atonement is used (ἐξιλάσεται ἁμαρτίας). In a further passage, the effect of kindness rendered to parents in removing sin is compared to the effect produced by "warm weather upon ice" (iii. 15).

(*c*) In some sections of 4 Ezra faith is linked with works as a means of obtaining salvation. In one passage Ezra speaks of every one "who shall be saved . . . by his works and by the faith whereby ye have believed" (ix. 8). In another he describes the righteous as "they that have works and faith towards the Most High" (xiii. 23). We must not, however, too hastily assume that faith is used in 4 Ezra in its Pauline sense. Dr. Charles maintains that the writer uses the term as the equivalent of loyalty or stedfastness, and thinks that in these passages faith and works are really synonymous in meaning.

(*d*) Another type of view finds the ground of justification in wisdom or the knowledge of God. In later days Justin Martyr mentions certain Jews who argued that "even if they were sinners and knew God, the Lord would not impute sin unto them" (*Dial. c. Tryph.* 370 D). This theory is found in our period, as we should naturally expect, in the Book of Wisdom. "Even if we sin we are Thine, since we know Thy power; . . . for to know Thee is perfect righteousness" (xv. 2). The same idea, linked with other conceptions already mentioned, appears also in the Apocalypse of Baruch. Speaking of those who will inherit the future time, the writer says: "These are they who have acquired for themselves treasures of wisdom, and with them are found stores of understanding, and from mercy have they not withdrawn, and the truth of the law have they preserved" (xliv. 14).

(*e*) The patient endurance of suffering is also regarded as a means of securing forgiveness. One of the best

illustrations of this conception is to be found in the Psalms of Solomon. "Blessed is the man whom the Lord remembereth with reproving. . . . He that prepareth his back for the stripes shall be purified, for the Lord is gracious to such as patiently abide chastening" (x. 2). The principle which lies at the basis of this conception is the theory that all suffering is a punishment for sin. If a man bears his punishment meekly in this life, it will not be necessary for him to pay the penalty over again in the life to come.

(*f*) Prayer and fasting were also held to be efficacious in removing sin. Many illustrations of this fact might be given from the Testaments of the Patriarchs, but one will suffice for our purpose. "After this I repented with set purpose of my soul for seven years before the Lord. And wine and strong drink I drank not, and flesh entered not into my mouth, and I did eat no pleasant food, but I mourned over my sin, for it was great" (*T. Reuben* i. 9).

II. We come now to the second class of theories which sought the ground of salvation in some agency external to the individual himself. We find in Jewish literature undoubted traces of a widespread feeling that the action of the individual needed to be supplemented by some outside assistance, but there is no general agreement with regard to the character of the assistance available. In its effort to discover this external agency, Jewish thought proceeded upon diverse lines.

(*a*) We should naturally have expected that, in its attempt to find an external ground for salvation, Jewish thought would have resorted to its sacrificial system. Nothing is more striking, however, than the insignificant place which the sacrificial system seems to have held in the religious conceptions of the time. The temple sacrifices are of course alluded to, though comparatively infrequently; but they are rarely brought into connection with the doctrine of justification. I have only been able to discover in the whole of the

literature two definite cases where the sacrifices are regarded as possessing any efficacy in securing salvation, and even these are by no means indubitable. The first occurs in the Psalms of Solomon. "The righteous man searcheth his house continually to put away iniquity; with his trespass-offering he maketh atonement for that wherein he sinneth unwittingly" (x. 2). This passage, however, can hardly be regarded as clear evidence. The translation given above is based upon an emendation introduced into the text by Ryle and James. If the ordinary reading were followed, the sense of the passage would be quite altered and the allusion to the trespass-offering obliterated. The second is an obscure passage in the Slavonic Enoch, "For a man offers clean animals and makes his sacrifice that he may preserve his soul . . . that is an atonement" (lix. 2). Elsewhere, however, the writer seems to regard the sacrifices as valueless. "God doth not require bread, nor an animal, nor any other sacrifice; for it is as nothing. But God requires a pure heart" (xlv. 1). Sirach, too, while "admitting that the sacrifice of a just man is acceptable," says quite distinctly that it is the "forsaking of unrighteousness" that constitutes propitiation (xxxii. 1–5), and utters many warnings against placing reliance upon the sacrifices as a means of obtaining pardon (vii. 9, v. 6). If, therefore, this literature represents the true spirit of Judaism, the evidence compels us to say that the sacrificial system had degenerated into a mere ceremonial which exercised practically no influence at all upon the religious life of the nation. The significance which the Epistle to the Hebrews attaches to the Jewish sacrifices, does not seem to reflect the general opinion of the day. If the evidence of contemporary literature is to be trusted, the only conclusion that we can deduce is that the picture in Hebrews is ideal and not drawn from current life at all.

(*b*) In some circles of Judaism the merits of the righteous were supposed to possess a vicarious efficacy

in securing pardon. It was not till later times that the doctrine secured general recognition, but traces of it are found in Apocalyptic literature, more especially in the Apocalypse of Baruch. Two illustrations may be given. "Pray diligently that the Mighty One may be reconciled to you and that He may . . . remember the rectitude of your fathers" (lxxxiv. 10). "It was due to Zion that on account of the works of those that wrought good works she should be forgiven" (xiv. 7).

(*c*) Another idea which plays an important part in the Jewish conception of salvation is the belief which secured wide acceptance among the Pharisees from the second century B.C. onwards, that the attitude of God towards the sinner could be influenced by the intercession of saints or angels. Moses is several times described in the *Assumption* as a mediator, and it is stated that "in the compassion of God" he was specially appointed to "pray and make intercession" for the sins of the people (xii. 6, 7). The same function is ascribed elsewhere to Enoch, Jeremiah, and the saints in general. The references to the mediatorial work of angels are equally indubitable. In the Book of Tobit Raphael describes himself thus: "I am one of the seven holy angels which present the prayers of the saints" (xii. 5). There are many allusions to the intercession of angels in the Book of Enoch; but the most significant passage of all occurs in the Testaments of the Patriarchs. In one of the heavens dwell "the archangels who minister and make propitiation to the Lord for all the sins of ignorance of the righteous, and offer to the Lord a sweet-smelling savour, a reasonable and bloodless offering" (T. Levi, iii. 5–7).* This remarkable statement indicates very clearly the need which was felt in certain circles for some kind of propitiation or atonement, and the

* Though this passage, in the form given above, probably does not belong to the original groundwork of the Testaments, it is almost certainly a pre-Christian addition to the text. See G. B. Gray, *Expositor*, June, 1908, p. 543.

conviction that this atonement could not be effected by man, but must be the work of superhuman beings. The need of atonement, however, only extends to sins of ignorance, and the sacrifices are heavenly and bloodless. This doctrine of intercession, moreover, was not universally accepted. It is expressly challenged and denied by the Slavonic Enoch: "There is no person there (*i.e.*, in heaven), to help any man who has sinned" (liii. 1); and also in 4 Ezra, "No one shall make supplication for another: for all shall bear, in that day, each for himself, their own unrighteousness" (vii. 102).

(*d*) A few traces are found of a belief in the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice. They all occur in books which represent the remarkable movement—to which too little attention has been given in the past—known as Jewish Quietism. Like their later representatives, the Jewish Quietists adopted a policy of non-resistance, or rather passive resistance, towards the political opponents of Israel. They had no sympathy with militant Pharisaism. The hope of the nation lay in its martyrs, and not in its warriors. A man's supreme religious duty was the forgiveness of his enemies. In order to support their theory, the Quietists rewrote the history of the Maccabæan age. The ordinary version gives all the credit for the emancipation of Israel to the heroism of Judas Maccabæus. The Quietists attribute the deliverance to Eleazar and the other martyrs who quietly laid down their lives rather than submit to the demands of Antiochus, and so won the favour of God. The two great manifestoes of the movement are found in the Assumption of Moses and 4 Maccabees, while the ethical (as distinct from the political) side of Quietism finds expression in the Testaments of the Patriarchs. There are several passages in 4 Maccabees where the doctrine of vicarious suffering is enunciated. Two may be quoted. In vi. 28 Eleazar, just before his martyrdom, is represented as interceding for the people. "Be satisfied with my

punishment," he pleads; "make my blood a purification for them, and take my life in recompense for theirs." Again, at the end of the book, the author sums up the moral of the story by describing the effect of the martyrdoms thus: "These men became a recompense for the sin of the nation, and by the blood of these pious ones and by their propitiatory death (τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου θανάτου) the Divine Providence saved Israel, which was aforetime afflicted" (xvii. 22). In 4 Maccabees the value of the vicarious sacrifice of the martyrs accrues only to the nation. In the Testaments, however, the idea is extended and applied to the salvation of the individual. "In thee shall be fulfilled the prophecy of heaven, that a blameless one shall be delivered up for lawless men, and a sinless one shall die for ungodly men" (T. Benj. iii. 8).

Here, at length, we reach what seems to be a clear point of contact—and it is the only one that can be found—between Jewish thought as represented in the Apocryphal literature and the earliest form of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. But even here we are bound to hesitate before we regard the evidence as decisive. It is by no means clear that the passage in the Testaments is not one of the Christian interpolations which are so numerous in the book. The words seem quite irrelevant to the context. They are absolutely unlike anything else which we find in the Testaments, and the allusion to prophecies, with which they are prefaced, has no other parallel in the book. And even if we follow Dr. Charles in regarding the passage as genuine, the question at issue is by no means settled. A single point of contact is not sufficient to explain the origin of the Christian doctrine. Besides, if the ideas of Jewish Quietism influenced Christianity at all, the influence is more likely to have come through Jesus Himself than through the first Apostles. There are many resemblances between certain elements in His teaching and the ethical ideas in the Testaments, and it is quite within the bounds of possibility that He may

have been influenced also by its conception of vicarious sacrifice. But if Jesus Himself set the seal of His approval upon the conception, and made it part of His teaching, whatever its origin, it has been raised to the rank of an eternal truth.

V

The conclusions which we have reached may be summarised as follows:—

(1) The doctrine of the Atonement in the simplest form goes back to a very early stage in the development of Christian theology. Paul says that it belonged to the original stock of truths which he inherited from his predecessors, and his statement is borne out by a comparison of the five types of theology in which the doctrine appears. The differences of detail are best accounted for by supposing that these five types started from a simple conception which they worked out in different ways.

(2) A careful examination of contemporary Jewish theology fails to show the presence of any similar idea of sufficient influence to explain the origin of the doctrine. There is nothing in the literature to show that the atmosphere was sufficiently charged with sacrificial ideas to transform the martyrdom of Jesus into an act of atonement. The main stream of Jewish thought at the time was running in quite a different direction. Comparatively little interest was taken in the problem of justification and forgiveness. The ideas which prevailed are vague and indefinite. The majority of religious men seem to have based their claim to pardon on something which they themselves had done, *i.e.*, their repentance, their works, their sufferings, their enlightened knowledge of God. Those who felt the need for some extraneous help turned for the most part to the doctrine of imputed merit or the belief in the mediatorship of angels. The sacrificial system seems to have counted for next to

nothing in the religious life of Israel. The only passage which at all represents an approximation to the Christian conception of Atonement is of dubious authenticity, and, if genuine, is more likely to have influenced Jesus than the earliest circle of believers.

(3) Since we find nothing in Jewish thought to account for the origin of the doctrine, the only alternative that remains is to acknowledge that the impulse which created it must have come from Jesus Himself. This hypothesis might be considerably strengthened by making an analysis of the elements which are common to the five New Testament types. Such an analysis would prove that the common contents bear a remarkable resemblance to the passages in which Jesus speaks of the import of His death.

(4) But though it is clear that Jewish thought cannot explain the origin of the doctrine, it is quite certain that Jewish thought influenced its subsequent interpretation. The use of sacrificial terminology is patent. There can be little doubt that the doctrine of merit suggested the Pauline conception of imputation. The doctrines of the intercession of the ascended Lord and the offering of the heavenly sacrifice are clearly derived from analogous conceptions in Jewish theology. The term propitiation is a common category found in most types of Jewish literature.

(5) What is to be our attitude towards these Jewish elements which are used in the interpretation of the doctrine? Are they valid for modern thought or not? There are two courses open to us: (*a*) We may argue that Jewish terminology is part of the *Preparatio Evangelica*, and that it was the function of Judaism in the providence of God to create these categories for Christian use. It cannot be too emphatically stated that to trace the origin of an idea is not to appraise its value. A conception is not necessarily false because it passed into Christianity from Jewish or Græco-Roman thought. But, on the other hand, not everything that is of Jewish origin is necessarily valid. There are

some elements which we are bound to reject. A criterion, therefore, must be discovered which will provide reason for accepting the Jewish ideas employed in the interpretation of the Atonement, while we reject others, *e.g.*, the doctrine of the Parousia in the Jewish sense of the term. (*b*) The second possible course is to take up the position that the essential element for us is the simple fact which formed the starting-point of the five types, viz., "Christ died for our sins." The New Testament writers asked, as they were bound to ask, What does this statement imply? In what way does Christ's death avail for our forgiveness? And they answered these questions in their own way, using, of course, the categories of their own age. We are not necessarily bound by their explanations or the terms they used. We can take the same fact and work out its philosophy for ourselves. If we prefer to use the terminology of Kant instead of the language of ancient sacrifices, there is nothing to prevent us. Two provisos must, however, be firmly insisted upon. Firstly, the surrender of the particular interpretation must not involve the surrender of the basal fact. And, secondly, the alternative for us is not between the interpretation of Paul and something lower and inferior. The only alternative open to us is between the interpretation of Paul and something of equivalent value in the language of modern thought.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN THE REVELATION OF JOHN

A. S. PEAKE

THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN THE REVELATION OF JOHN

IN his "History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age," Reuss expressed a view of the Apocalypse which would have been shared by many scholars at the time. He said: "We boldly affirm that the study of this book would present absolutely no possibility of error if the inconceivable, often ridiculous, prejudices of theologians in all ages, had not so trammelled it, and made it bristle with difficulties, that most readers shrink from it in alarm. Apart from these preconceptions, the Revelation would be the most simple, most transparent book that prophet ever penned." Unfortunately, such optimism has for more than a score of years ceased to be possible, and many of the positions which were then thought to be securely won have now been abandoned. The student has to thread a tangled maze in the pursuit of his goal, misled by false lights and mistaking blind alleys for the true path to the centre. It would, of course, be impossible within the limits of the present essay to pursue the numerous problems of criticism and interpretation which the book presents, problems of which the older scholars did not even dream. Yet while our attention must be concentrated on our restricted theme, it would not be satisfactory to discuss this without some indication of the general conclusions which our special investigation presupposes.

In its present form the Apocalypse of John dates from the reign of Domitian, having been issued possibly

about the year A.D. 93. In a sense we may speak of it as a unity; in other words, it is the work of an author and not of a mere compiler. Yet it incorporates a good deal of earlier work, some of it not later than the destruction of Jerusalem, and some of it non-Christian in its character. It reflects different historical situations and various points of view. But the book in its present form, and the earlier sections which have been embodied in it, were strictly relevant to the time when they originated and were called forth by the urgent necessities of the readers. In its final form the book is designed to steady the Churches against the terrible persecution which the fanaticism of the authorities set in motion against those who refused to worship the Roman Emperor. It is a typical apocalypse in this, that its background is a time of terrible trouble, and that it dazzles its readers with brilliant hopes that the trouble, though sharp and bitter, will soon be at an end. In our interpretation of the book we must bear in mind its apocalyptic character, and read it in the light of the cognate literature both canonical and uncanonical. While it contains unquestionable allusions to contemporary history, and is occasioned by the historical situation from which it springs, we must allow for the employment of earlier sources and for the use of very ancient apocalyptic tradition, to which, rather than to contemporary conditions, many details must be referred. With these principles and results in mind, we approach the specific problem of the Christology of the book.

The New Testament doctrine touching the Person of Jesus is naturally a development of Jewish Messianic theology, as we find it in the Old Testament and in the later pre-Christian period. But it was not merely such. It may be seriously questioned whether the Jewish doctrine had developed in the direction of the Christian to anything like the extent which is sometimes asserted. But, in any case, the Christology of the Church had been decisively influenced by the career of Jesus of Nazareth. I do not mean merely in the way of enrichment and

precision. The Christology of the New Testament is not simply a development of pre-Christian Messianic dogma. The development has not gone in a straight line; it has been violently deflected by the personality and the career of Jesus, and by the relations which Christians felt to subsist between themselves and their exalted Lord. The impact of His personality was not all at once realised or correctly measured, but the rate of advance was rapid, and within a brief period a very high doctrine of Christ's Person was formulated.

The Christology of the Apocalypse presents a curious combination of a very exalted doctrine of the Person of Christ side by side with views which could not have been originated by a Christian author. This exalted view of Jesus alongside of Jewish dogma untouched by Christian influence has been one of the chief factors in eliciting the more recent theories as to the origin and literary structure of the book. It may perhaps be best to begin our discussion with the Messianic conception in the narrower sense. That Jesus is the true Messiah is the undoubted conviction of the writer. The term is used of Him again and again. He is the Lion of the tribe of Judah, He is the root and the offspring of David, He is the Ruler of the kingdoms of the earth, the sovereignty of the world is to become that of our Lord and of His Messiah. In Him is to be fulfilled the promise of God in the second Psalm, that He should rule the nations with a rod of iron. In the opening vision He is described as "one like unto the Son of Man," with direct reference to Daniel vii. 13.* So far we are

* I do not wish to imply that the author of Daniel meant the Messiah, but that the author of Revelation understood the passage to have this reference. Whether we should interpret the figure seated on the cloud (xiv. 14) as the Messiah is questionable. The parallel with i. 13, as well as the phrase itself, strongly suggests this identification. On the other hand, the fact that he receives his orders from "another angel" makes the identification dubious. Not that "another angel" necessarily implies that the figure on the cloud is an angel; he is simply one in the succession of angels mentioned in xiv. 6, 8, 9. But it is for the Messiah to give orders to the angels, not to take them from the angels. Moreover, we

on ground common to the Old Testament and to the New. But there is one section which neither Old nor New Testament avails to explain, and which cannot be fully accounted for by reference to the Messianic dogma of the contemporary Judaism. It is the famous vision, in the twelfth chapter, of the heavenly woman, the dragon, and the man-child, who is definitely identified with the Messiah. Whether we should connect with this the story of the war in heaven and the expulsion of the dragon by Michael, which occurs in the same chapter may be left undetermined, since we are little concerned with this. It will, I think, in spite of the denials of eminent scholars, be more and more recognised that no Christian could have originated the representation of the career of the Messiah given in this chapter. The impression which any one would gain from it is, that immediately after His birth the Messiah was snatched up to the throne of God and there kept in safety from the assaults of the dragon. It is incredible that any Christian for whom the identification of the Messiah with Jesus was the fixed point of departure, should have created such a false impression, and have ignored not simply His life and ministry, but His death and His resurrection. He could never have left the impression that the Messiah had not been exposed to the assaults of the devil when He knew that the Passion history was the climax of the Gospel story. We are compelled, therefore, to move backward from Christianity to Judaism. The difficulties in the way of a Jewish origin are much less serious than those in the way of a Christian. A Christian writer was fettered by the Christian facts. He was not free to play fast and loose with history and bring the ascension into immediate connexion with the birth. But a Jewish writer

expect the Messiah at the final judgment, which comes at a later point. The truth is, perhaps, that in its original setting this passage described the Messiah's advent to judgment, but in the present form of the book its significance has been changed. If so, the figure on the cloud is no longer that of the Messiah.

had much more fluid material to deal with, and was not compelled to run it into such definite moulds. He could give free rein to his speculation, and therefore he could, without any disloyalty to his fundamental convictions, represent the child as born of a heavenly mother, and as caught up to the throne of God immediately after His birth to escape the dragon's hostility. Nevertheless, the theory of a purely Jewish origin is inadequate. The figure of the woman herself as in heaven, arrayed with the sun, with the moon under her feet and a crown of twelve stars on her head, suggests a mythical origin. The same is true of the figure of the dragon, and the statement that his tail cast a third of the stars of heaven to the earth.* The concluding episode that the serpent cast out of his mouth water as a river to carry away the woman by its flood, while the earth opened its mouth and swallowed up the river and thus saved the woman, is not much more at home in a Jewish than in a Christian writing. We have accordingly to accept the conclusion that here a mythological origin for the story is to be assumed. This was pointed out by Dieterich, who compared the story of Leto and the dragon, and the birth of Apollo. It is hardly likely, however, as Gunkel urged, that a monotheistic writer would take over a piece of mythology of this kind straight from heathenism. His own suggestion that the original was a story of the birth of Marduk may well be correct, though at present no evidence has been discovered to substantiate this. But the fact that Bousset has been

* Perhaps originally an ætiological myth to account for the comparative fewness of the stars in a certain part of heaven. The stars are heavenly powers, therefore not the dragon's followers as some think. Milton adopts this interpretation :—

> " His count'nance, as the Morning Starr that guides
> The starrie flock, allur'd them, and with lyes
> Drew after him the third part of Heaven's Host."
>
> (*Paradise Lost:* Book v.)

But Milton regarded the dragon as originally a heavenly being.

able to point to a similar Egyptian myth where Hathor is substituted for Leto, and Horus for Apollo, suggests that we have here to do with a very widespread myth, which was told in substantially the same form in several countries. In its original form this myth ran somewhat as follows. The dragon of chaos and darkness, having been warned that a child is to be born who will slay him, seeks to destroy the mother before the child is born. To secure the child's birth in safety, she flees away and eludes the dragon's pursuit. The child is born and subsequently slays the dragon. He is the radiant sun-god who destroys the power of darkness. This myth was probably not consciously adopted from paganism into Judaism, but by a process of gradual transformation became acceptable to Jewish feeling. The dragon was identified with the devil, the sun-god with the Messiah. One important point of difference is very curious. In the heathen myth, the flight of the woman is placed before the birth of the child, and this is obviously its proper position. In the Apocalypse the dragon is in the woman's presence before the child is born, but instead of attacking the woman he waits till the child is born and then is baulked of his intention to devour it by the child's rapture to the right hand of God. The woman's flight is not suppressed, but it has now lost its main significance, since it does not contribute to the child's safety. The reason for the change perhaps lies in this, that the author's concern is mainly with the situation in which the Church is placed. His chief interest is not in the birth of the Messiah but in the fact that He is in heaven. His hour, it is true, has not yet come. The dragon rages and persecutes the brethren of the Messiah. But it is only a brief period that is at his disposal. The Messiah is already in heaven, and He is to come from His retreat when the hour of destiny has struck and overthrow the dragon. Therefore the Church may take courage, knowing that the Messiah is only biding His time. It is possible that two Jewish views touching the origin of the Messiah

are here combined. One view would be that He was to be born of a woman, the other was that He was of heavenly origin. The two are reconciled by the representation of His birth, followed by that of His immediate translation to heaven.*

Even in its present form the story is so removed from Christian ideas, especially in the figure of the heavenly woman and the episode of the river which the serpent sent out of his mouth to swallow up the woman, that we can hardly understand what could have led the author to adopt it. It would lighten the difficulty if we could suppose that it not only lay before him in written form but that it formed part of a larger literary whole which the author may have wished to incorporate. He might more readily have taken in a larger connexion what he would have been unwilling to take for its own sake. Another point which deserves attention is that, though the author represents the Messiah as coming forth to do battle with his foes, and the beast and the false prophet are taken and cast alive into the lake of fire, while the rest are killed with the sword of the Messiah that comes forth out of His mouth, the dragon is taken by an angel and sealed in the abyss for a thousand years. When the millennium is ended he is loosed from his prison and beguiles the nations into an attack on the saints. The nations are destroyed by fire from heaven and the devil is cast into the

* Some think that the story of Herod's attack on the infant Jesus, who is in this instance saved by the flight into Egypt, is another version of the same myth. The question is too large to discuss here; the problem is similar to that presented by Matthew's story of the virgin conception. It is unlikely, in view of the general character of Matthew's Messianic proof-texts, that Hosea xi. 1 suggested the story, just as it is unlikely that the story of the virgin conception was suggested by Isaiah vii. 14. Both stories have been accordingly referred to pagan mythology, but for the Gospels this is improbable. The Apocalypse is quite another matter. (The writer may refer to what he has said in the article "Immanuel" in the "Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels," and to "Christianity: its Nature and its Truth," pp. 186–190.)

lake of fire and brimstone to join the beast and the false prophet and be tormented with them day and night for ever. It is an interesting fact that in neither instance is the Messiah represented as actually fighting with the devil. We have thus a variation from the myths on which the story of the Messiah and the dragon is based.

From the Messianic representation of Jesus I turn to the favourite conception of Him in the Apocalypse as the Lamb. The scene in which He is introduced is one of singular interest. It is noteworthy that in the fourth chapter, where we have a description of heaven, the Lamb is not present. John falls into an ecstasy. He sees the four and twenty elders sitting upon their thrones about the central throne. Originally these were probably gods, perhaps astral deities. In Judaism they have been degraded to angels, but their old dignity shines through the description. The seven spirits of God who are co-ordinated with God and Jesus Christ in the salutation at the beginning of the book are also seen before the throne as seven lamps of fire. Supporting the throne are the four living creatures—that is to say, the cherubim, depicted here with more simplicity and probably more originality than in the very complex description of Ezekiel, but with traits borrowed from Isaiah's description of the seraphim. And as these incessantly chant the praise of His holiness, the four and twenty elders fall down and worship the Eternal, ascribing to Him glory and honour and power which He is worthy to receive because He has created the universe. Lying free on the hand of God John sees a book filled with writing and sealed with seven seals. The character and the form of the book are alike obscure. Zahn and J. Weiss follow Huschke in the view that the book is a will, but the more usual view is that it is the scroll of destiny. In the former case, since the will could not be read and executed till the seals were broken, the thought is that only with the breaking of the seals could the kingdom of God

be ushered in and the saints enter on the enjoyment of the heavenly inheritance. In the other case the idea is that the breaking of the seals discloses the secrets of the future. The former seems at first to give a worthier meaning to the seer's grief when he learns that none has been found worthy to open the book. For the disaster that is then threatened is that the Kingdom of God will not come at all. On the other interpretation the suggestion is rather that the seer is disappointed that his desire to know the future is not to be gratified. But it is not a mere private grief, since knowledge of the future is not given to him for himself alone, but as a sacred trust from which the whole Church is to benefit. With some hesitation I adopt the usual view. Two qualifications are required to fit any who would venture to take the book. He must have overcome in conflict, and he must possess not only the strength of vision to look with undazzled eyes on the book but insight to read its mysterious characters. Accordingly, when the seer is comforted by the assurance that one has overcome to break the seals and open the book, the description that He is the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, is quite what we should expect. He is the lion-like hero of that lion-like tribe in whom its qualities of strength and courage are concentrated. He is the Messianic warrior whose victory over all the forces of heathenism had been foretold by the prophets. Moreover, His tribe is pre-eminently the tribe of revelation; there rests upon Him not only the spirit of might but the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and of knowledge. To a Prophet so endowed, the secret of the Lord might be naturally revealed. With such strength and wisdom it was natural that He should have won the right to take and open the book. But the significance of the scene lies in the dramatic surprise that follows. For when the seer looks again he sees a new figure which he has not beheld before—a new figure, but not the figure we

should expect him to see. For when he looks to see the victorious lion standing triumphant over His prey, his foot crushing his prostrate victim and His mouth ruddy with its blood, what he sees is a Lamb standing as if it had been slain. It would hardly be possible to put the contrast between the Old Testament and the New in a more incisive and striking form. For there the Messiah was represented as one who would crush his enemies into submission by sheer power. Here victory is won through suffering and death. To elaborate this further would take us into a general discussion of Christian theology which would be inappropriate. It must be enough to call attention at this point to the deep insight displayed by the author into the essence of Christianity, and to mark how, with all the Judaism which characterises the book, he rises here clear above its limitations. The Lamb, however, has not triumphed in right of conquest alone, but in virtue of insight. That, indeed, is clear from the fact that He has chosen this path to victory. While all others have sought to win their victories by force and violence and aggression, He has gone beneath their superficial view and grasped the deep paradox that victory comes through suffering, submission, and self-surrender. And therefore,

> "He was oppressed, yet He humbled Himself,
> And opened not His mouth,
> As a lamb that is led to the slaughter,
> And as a sheep before its shearers is dumb."

And thus He is able to divine the future because He has discovered the principle which controls it. He has made Himself one with the stream of the Divine purpose and the method of the Divine government. Therefore, He can not only break the seals, but decipher and reveal the contents of the scroll.

Before we leave this scene there is another point worthy of observation. We are struck by the contrast between this chapter and the preceding. In the former

we have the incessant song of the four living creatures chanting the praise of God's holiness, while the four and twenty elders cast their crowns at the feet of God and prostrate themselves before Him, ascribing glory and honour and power to Him. Such is the song of creation addressed to God. But how different is the song of redemption! It is a new song, and a wholly new enthusiasm pervades it. And when the four living creatures and elders have sung their song the strain is taken up by the innumerable multitude of angels, ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands with their seven-fold Doxology to the Lamb that hath been slain. And then in the fourfold Doxology to Him that sitteth on the throne and to the Lamb, not cherubim and elders and angels alone, but all created things throughout the vast spaces of the universe unite. The first scene is sublime, but it leaves us cold; the second throbs with the passionate love of one who knows that he owes his redemption to the sacrifice of the Lamb, and from whose own lips springs the irrepressible praise, the thrilling and rapturous expression of devotion, which interrupt the development of his theme (i. 5).

It is, of course, possible that here also a mythological background may be detected. It is, indeed, no ordinary Lamb, who is depicted "with seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven spirits of God." Perhaps there may be a suggestion of a ram as well as of a Lamb, and the writer may think of the sun—weak as it passes through the sign of the ram and strong as it reaches the sign of the lion. But, even if this were the case it makes no difference to the real significance of the scene, and for my own part I see no reason at all at this point for invoking a mythological origin where a much less remote combination lay ready to the author's hand.

In the present text of the Apocalypse the figure of the Lamb occurs twenty-nine times. It is possible that in some of these instances it may be a later insertion.

It is, in fact, quite probable that this has happened in sections of Jewish origin. But it is, in my judgment, quite a mistake to give as large a scope to this principle as some scholars do. For example, it betrays very little religious insight to raise any objection to the conception of the wrath of the Lamb. Rather, we should say that there can be no wrath like the wrath of the Lamb, just as there can be no severity like the severity of love.

The high dignity which is assigned to the Lamb prepares us for the lofty doctrine of the Person of Christ which we find in the book. He is represented as Divine in the strict sense of the term. He is the Alpha and Omega, the First and the Last and the Living One, that is the Living One in the absolute sense. He searches the reins and the heart as God does, and gives to each according to his works. He is the Amen, the Faithful and True, He is the Son of God and God is His Father in a unique sense. The language of the Old Testament about God is freely applied to Him. He is described in words borrowed from the description of the Ancient of Days in Daniel. When He appears in His glory John falls at His feet as dead. He is constantly co-ordinated with God. The angels are His messengers who do His bidding and receive from Him praise or rebuke. He is the Lord of Lords and King of Kings. He is also the object of worship not from men only but from the highest ranks of created being, and this is the more significant when we observe how the angel sternly rebukes the prophet for offering him worship, since this must be reserved for God alone. In view of this reiterated, this unambiguous statement, there ought to be no hesitation in asserting that for the writer, Christ belongs to a sphere altogether above the order of created being. It does not conflict with this that He receives the revelation from God which He communicates to the angel, that the author should speak of his God and Father or that He Himself should speak of Him as "My God." These phrases are perfectly compatible with what the author says elsewhere.

And we must read in the light of the clearer passages those which seem to express a lower view. We must not infer from the words "The beginning of the creation of God," that the writer numbered the Son among the creatures. Nor are we to infer that He was regarded as an angel. We read, it is true, in xiv. 10, that the worshippers of the beast will be tormented in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb. Bousset thinks that "in the presence of the angels" may be a late Jewish form of saying "before God." He compares Luke xii. 8, and xv. 10, but in the latter passage I think that the joy in the presence of the angels is not joy felt by those who stand in God's presence, but the joy in God's own heart for the sinner that repents. The co-ordination in Rev. xiv. 10 is not very close, and it involves no assimilation of the Lamb to the angels.* More might be said with reference to the rather strange greeting in i. 4, where the seven spirits which are before the throne are interpolated between God and Christ. But no importance can be attached to the strange order. Jesus Christ is placed last because the writer wishes to speak more fully of Him, and avoids the awkwardness of interpolating his description into the middle of his Trinitarian formula. How little importance can be attached to order may be seen from the fact that in Paul's Trinitarian benediction, 2 Cor. xiii. 14, "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ" is mentioned first. It is, of course, very curious that in the present formula, we should have the seven spirits spoken of. Here again it is thought by some that the seven spirits are angels, and that Christ is included among them. It is quite likely that the mode of reference has been determined by the Jewish idea of seven angels, which in turn, it is not improbable, goes back to mythology.† But in view of what the author

* Cf. Luke ix. 26, "of him shall the Son of man be ashamed, when He cometh to His own glory, and the glory of the Father, and of the holy angels."

† We may compare the seven archangels of Judaism, the Persian

says elsewhere, it is the most plausible view that he thinks of one Spirit, with seven modes of manifestation.

Whether the description of Him as the Word of God, in Rev. xix. 14, is an interpolation or not, is disputed. It is quite true that the writer has only just said, "He has a name written which no one knoweth but Himself." If the name indicated is the Word of God, then we must infer that the clause in question is an interpolation. But it is more probable that His secret ineffable name is not to be identified with "the Word of God." This is the name by which He is *known to others*, but the inmost mystery of His being, as expressed in a name, was something known to Himself alone. The description of the "sharp sword which goeth out of His mouth" confirms the view that the writer thought of Him as the Word of God.* The identification of Christ with the Logos had already been substantially made by Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, though they had refrained from using the term. It is, therefore, not surprising to have this familiar Johannine description though in a somewhat different form in this passage.

It has often been said that the absence of personal reminiscence in the portrait of Christ necessitates the view that the Apocalypse cannot have been written by one of the twelve Apostles. The verdict on authorship may quite well be correct, but hardly upon this ground. It is wholesome for us to remember that neither in the absence of such reminiscence nor in the exalted Christology did the Tübingen School find any difficulty in regarding the work as written by John, the son of Zebedee. And it is surely a question how far we may reasonably expect such reminiscences in a work of this kind. An Apocalypse is not to be judged as we should

Amesha-spentas, the seven main astral deities (sun, moon, and five planets) of Babylonia.

* Cf. Heb. iv. 12; Isa. xi. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 3.

judge a Gospel. Moreover, not a little depends on the view we take of the visions. If they are purely literary creations we might expect them to exhibit the influence of Christ's earthly life, had the author himself witnessed it. And this is particularly the case with the Christophany at the opening of the book. Now in the description of that Christophany there are details which are probably of a literary origin. If the scene were translated from a literary into a pictorial form, we should at once realise the difficulty of supposing that the appearance took place exactly as described. But it is not, I believe, with a purely imaginative construction that we have to deal. There is a psychical basis, a real experience lies behind it, whether objective or subjective it does not concern us to inquire. John was "in the spirit," that is to say, he was in an ecstasy. Hence we may allow, as in dreams, for a larger margin of the bizarre and the incongruous, and not insist overmuch on the literary elements in the description. It is too much to ask that the relations between the disciple and the manifested Lord should be taken up at the point where they had been dropped. Overwhelming terror is not an uncommon accompaniment of ordinary psychical experiences. People have fainted at what they have taken to be the appearance of their dearest friend. It is not, of course, true that the apostles were so absorbed in the thought of the exalted Lord that they never remembered the earthly Jesus, but the fact of His exaltation, the constant longing for His return in glory were dominant in their thought of Him. Had the figure been a purely literary creation we should have expected the marks of the Passion to have been mentioned, as in the scene of the book with seven seals. But there is no reference to these. The death is in the author's mind, it has been mentioned shortly before, and Christ Himself refers to it immediately after. And it is to the Passion history that reference is generally made. The mode of death is indicated in v. 11, and we have a reference to those who pierced Him, in i. 7. It

is sometimes said that the vision of the woman and the man-child proves how far the writer was from having any personal acquaintance with Jesus. What it proves is rather, as has been pointed out already, that the section could not have been written by a Christian at all.

A word may finally be added on the sources of the writer's Christology. That some of his conceptions are mythological in origin, it is unnecessary to repeat. That much goes back to the Old Testament and Jewish Messianic theology is, of course, also clear. It is held by many scholars that much is to be put down to Paul's account. There are several things, it is true, which make such a suggestion plausible, but it is very doubtful whether we should accept it. I am disposed rather to agree with Professor Porter's judgment: "It is not certain that Paul's influence is to be recognised. It is as probable that the book represents a late development of Primitive Christianity in which a very high Christology and a broad universality, that is an entire freedom from Jewish particularism, had been gained largely or altogether apart from Paul."*

* "The Messages of the Apocalyptical Writers," p. 194.

ENGLISH VERSIONS AND THE TEXT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

G. B. GRAY

ENGLISH VERSIONS AND THE TEXT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

WHEN the Revised Version of the New Testament appeared in 1881, the Revisers were much criticised for having adopted a text that involved an unnecessarily large number of alterations. The Revision of the Old Testament published four years later was certainly not open to the same criticism; for the text which was followed did not differ materially from that rendered by the translators of 1611. The radical but substantially sound method of the New Testament Revisers has been vindicated; not every individual reading adopted by them, it is true, would command the verdict of scholars to-day, but it is inconceivable that any representative body of Revisers could return to the text underlying the A.V. On the other hand scholarship moves further and further away from the exceedingly conservative textual standpoint of the Old Testament Revisers. The R.V. is, indeed, more faithful than the A.V. in its rendering of the text followed, and on this ground the Revisers have strong claims to the gratitude of all those who prefer fidelity even at the cost of some of the associations and familiar rhythm of the older version. But it is becoming generally recognised that the text followed by A.V. and R.V. alike is bad, and that evidence exists by which it may be corrected. This text, too, is in many passages inferior to the text underlying some earlier English versions. It is to the explanation and illustration of this last statement in particular that the present essay is mainly directed.

The R.V. was also widely criticised on the ground that its English style was inferior to the A.V. With the important question raised by this criticism the present essay has no direct concern; and yet in so far as it is a plea for renewed attention to the earlier English versions it is not wholly without bearing on it. There is an interesting and significant difference between the titles of the versions of 1611 and 1885. The A.V. is described as "The Holy Bible, containing the Old Testament and the New: newly translated out of the original tongues: and with the former translations diligently compared and revised." This allusion to the former translations does not appear in the title of the R.V., which is "the version set forth A.D. 1611 compared with the most ancient authorities and revised." The versions used by the A.V., in addition to the Bishops' Bible, which formed its basis, were Tyndale's, Matthew's, Coverdale's, Whitchurch's, and the Genevan; these, as the rule laid down for the translators directed, were to be used when they agree better with the text than the Bishops' Bible. The nearest, and yet a remote, parallel to this among the rules for the Revisers is the direction "to limit, as far as possible, the expression" of renderings differing from the A.V. "to the language of the Authorised and earlier English versions." It will be possible, so far as that course seems well, for future revisers not merely to accommodate alterations to an earlier style, but in certain passages to replace renderings of A.V. and R.V. derived from an erroneous text by the actual words of earlier versions derived from a more correct text.

To the closer consideration of these earlier versions, of the text on which they were based, and of the attitude of earlier translators towards the original text, we may now turn.

The first systematic attempt to render the Bible into English was due to the initiative of Wycliffe, and resulted in the version which has borne his name, and which was complete before 1384. It shared the

not uncommon and almost necessary fate of initial versions — that its defects were quickly discerned. The first English version, therefore, was quickly followed by the first revised English version, in the production of which the leading spirit was John Purvey. These versions circulated widely, and held the field till with the Reformation came the great age of Bible translation in England.

It is unnecessary to sketch here the history of translation in the sixteenth century, or even to name all the important versions. It will suffice to keep in view some of the chief landmarks. In 1530 Tyndale published his translation of the Pentateuch, and in 1534 of Jonah. Coverdale's Bible appeared in 1535, and in 1537 Matthew's. The Old Testament in the last-named Bible consisted of Tyndale's Pentateuch and Jonah, and of his translation, never published in his lifetime, of the historical books, together with Coverdale's translation of the poetical and prophetical books. The first edition of the Great Bible, for which Matthew's served as a basis, appeared in 1539, and the last, known as Whitchurch's, in 1553. A portion of this version, substantially unaltered, still continues in common use as the Prayer Book Psalter.* In 1560 there was published at Geneva the first edition of another version which, measured by the depth of its influence and the length of the period during which it was widely used, ranks among English Bibles second only to the A.V. The Genevan called forth as its far less successful rival the Bishops' Bible (1568), the chief channel through which the work of Tyndale and Coverdale, largely perpetuated in Matthew's Bible and the Great Bible, passed on into the A.V. (1611). The A.V., as even these statements may serve to recall, was a revised version in which the labours of the previous century culminated.

Two years before the A.V. there appeared a version of the Old Testament, as the complement to a New

* S. R. Driver, " The Parallel Psalter," pp. xv, ff.

Testament published twenty-seven years earlier, which in some respects deservedly, in others undeservedly, has commonly received the disapprobation and, even more, the neglect of Protestant students. This is the version prepared by English Roman Catholics of the college at Douai. For our present discussion this version is particularly interesting and important. It is the last great historic version that possesses important readings that have found no place in the A.V. or R.V.

It would be possible to classify English versions in more ways than one. Some of these versions have owed their origin or even their entire production to a single man, and of this class are Wycliffe's, Tyndale's, and Coverdale's works. Others, such as the Great Bible, the Genevan, the Douai, the A.V., and the R.V., have been the work of companies; and it might prove a fascinating study to compare the virtues and defects which flow from such difference in origin. Of English Bibles, it is those that have been prepared by companies that have enjoyed the greater and the longer general authority; but the versions of individuals preceded and largely moulded the character of the versions prepared by companies of translators.

But it is another classification that must be made the starting-point of our further discussion.

English versions are primary or secondary: they have been translated direct from the Hebrew or from a translation of the Hebrew text. In some English versions, indeed, there is even an appreciable tertiary element—translation from a translation of a translation of the Hebrew. And, again, even the primary versions are not entirely free from secondary influences; the very fact that successive English versions have been so often acknowledged or unacknowledged revisions of earlier versions has perpetuated readings or renderings that the later translator would in all probability have avoided had he been working quite freely. The translators of the A.V. were required to follow the Bishops Bible, altering it "as little as the truth of the original

will admit"; and similarly the rule laid down for the R.V. was "to introduce as few alterations as possible into the text of the A.V. consistently with faithfulness." Such rules must and do lead in practice to the retention of renderings and readings which maturer scholarship pronounces to be, if not impossible, yet less probable than others.

Among the primary English versions are Tyndale's, the Genevan, the A.V., and the R.V.; among the secondary are Wycliffe's, Coverdale's, and the Douai Bible.

Other things being equal, a primary version must be superior to a secondary version; for, owing to the essential qualities of language, every translation inevitably loses something that is expressed, or conveyed by association, in the original and introduces something that is not so expressed or conveyed; in the case of a secondary version this process of addition and subtraction is repeated, and only by the merest and most infrequent accident does it happen that in the second process precisely what was added in the first is omitted and precisely what was first lost is recovered. In principle the Protestant scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who translated from the Hebrew were right and the Roman Catholic scholars who translated from the Vulgate were wrong; and in general the Protestant versions are more adequate versions of the original meaning of the Old Testament. It follows, then, that if other things were equal the A.V. and the R.V. would be throughout superior to Wycliffe's, or Coverdale's, or the Douai Old Testament. But other things are not equal: and the actual fact is that in not a few passages the latest revision of the Old Testament is inferior to the Roman Catholic version of Douai, that A.V. and R.V. alike are inferior to the earliest English version—Wycliffe's.

This state of things finds its explanation in certain leading facts in the history of the text of the Old Testament. The Old Testament consists of literature written or composed at various times from the second century

B.C. to upwards of 1000 B.C. The earliest existing Hebrew MSS. date from the tenth century A.D. Thus between the date of the autographs of the Hebrew writers and the earliest existing MSS. there lies a minimum of 1,000, a maximum interval of 2,000 years. Since there is no ground for believing that Hebrew MSS. were more fortunate in the earlier period of their transmission (before c. 100 A.D.) in escaping corruption than the Greek MSS. of the New Testament, we must conclude that, if in respect of available evidence the Old Testament were as favourably situated as the New Testament textual critic, a revision of the Old Testament proceeding from revisers as faithful as those of the New Testament would differ at least as widely from the Old Testament of the A.V. or R.V. as the New Testament in the R.V. differs from the New Testament in the A.V.

Unfortunately, the criticism of the Old Testament text has to proceed under less favourable conditions than the criticism of the New. It is not difficult, indeed, to point out passages in the current Hebrew text that are as certainly not original as many of the readings of the Textus Receptus of the New Testament which were rightly abandoned by the Revisers. But what was the original reading must generally remain far more a matter of conjecture than is the case with the New Testament. Still, there are passages in the current Hebrew text where the original readings can be restored with as much probability as any of the best established readings in the New Testament.

Hebrew MSS. are 1,000 to 2,000 years later than the autographs. But existing Greek MSS. are earlier by six centuries than the earliest Hebrew MSS.; and the Greek version itself from five to seven centuries earlier than the Greek MSS. The Greek version thus witnesses to a text eleven or twelve centuries earlier than the Hebrew MSS., and some two or three centuries earlier than that form of the text which was fixed by Hebrew scholars in the first or second century A.D., and has

been perpetuated substantially intact in all existing Hebrew MSS. It is unnecessary to minimise the corruption either of the Hebrew text which the Greek translators rendered, the frequent inadequacy or misleading character of their translation, or the corruption of the Greek text itself. But when every allowance has been made there remains a very large number of passages in which the Hebrew text has suffered corruption since the second or third century B.C., but in which the Greek version has unquestionably preserved for us an earlier and more accurate form of the text.

At an early period in the history of the Church the need for a Latin version was felt. But just as Wycliffe translated from the Vulgate, so this version for early Latin Christians was translated from the Greek version —the form of the Bible familiar to early as was the Vulgate to mediæval Christianity.

At the close of the fourth century the revision of this Old Latin version, or rather of these Old Latin versions, was undertaken by Jerome; but his final and ultimately most influential work was a fresh Latin translation made direct from the Hebrew. Now, if the Vulgate of the Middle Ages had been a pure text of Jerome's version from the Hebrew, it would have stood in nearly the same relation to the original text as our A.V. or R.V.; for by the age of Jerome the Hebrew text had reached that fixed form which is found in the Hebrew MSS., except that the vowels had not yet been added to the consonants. But the Vulgate was not a pure text of Jerome's translation from the Hebrew; the Book of Psalms throughout was his revision of the Old Latin version from the Greek; and in other books many passages were infected by Old Latin readings. In some cases these Old Latin readings incorporated in the Vulgate are superior to those of the current Hebrew text. The result is that *in many passages the English versions made from the Vulgate are nearer to the original words of Scripture than any of the versions made direct and exclusively from the Hebrew*, in spite of the fact

that such passages are removed from the original by three processes of translation instead of one.

Before proceeding to give illustrations of the purer text preserved in the secondary English versions, it will be convenient to review briefly the relation of certain translations to the original text and the attitude of certain translators towards it.

Wycliffe's is a plain and simple and very literal version of the Vulgate, without reference to the Hebrew text. Not so Purvey's revision of his work. Purvey, indeed, still follows the Vulgate, but not without reference, at second hand it is true, to the Hebrew. In his own most interesting prologue he describes his method and standpoint as follows :—

"At the beginning I purposed with God's help to make the sentence as true and open in English as it is in Latin, either more true and more open than it is in Latin : and I pray, for charity and for common profit of Christian souls, that if any wise man find any default of the truth of translation, let him set in the true sentence and open of Holy Writ, but look that he examine truly his Latin Bible, for no doubt he shall find full many Bibles in Latin full false . . . And the common Latin Bibles have more need to be corrected, so many as I have seen in my life, than hath the English Bible late translated; and where the Hebrew by witness of Jerome, of Lyra, and other expositors discordeth fro our Latin Bibles I have set in the margin, by manner of a gloss, what the Hebrew hath . . . and I did this most in the Psalter,* that of all our books discordeth most fro Hebrew; for the Church readeth not the Psalter by the last translation of Jerome out of Hebrew into Latin, but another translation of other men that hadden much less cunning and holiness than Jerome had." †

In a word, then, Purvey recognises the necessity

* See note at the end of this Essay.

† Forshall and Madden, "The Wycliffite Versions," pp. i. 57 f. In this and other quotations the spelling has been modernised.

for a critical element in the translation of Scripture. That the state of scholarship in his day led him at times to miss the real significance of a discordance between the Vulgate and the Hebrew, or the divergence of the common Bibles from Jerome's text, is of small moment. What is of importance is that Purvey perceived clearly that a translated Bible cannot afford to dispense entirely with note or comment; and that it ought not to be unwholesome or disturbing for unlearned readers of a Bible in the vernacular to know that the text of Scripture is in places uncertain and obscure.

Purvey's revision remained a version of the Vulgate; the text of his work followed the Vulgate variants from the Hebrew, whether good or bad; he merely marked them in his margin indiscriminately as suspect. Coverdale's, the next in time of the secondary English versions, is not a simple version of the Vulgate; it was, according to the description on its title-page, "fully and truly translated out of Dutch and Latin into English." The "Dutch," *i.e.* German, versions used by Coverdale were primary versions from the Hebrew; and inasmuch as these had great weight with him, many good readings of the Vulgate which passed over into Wycliffe's, and at a later date into the Douai Bible, yield place in his version to inferior readings of the Hebrew. Still, as some of the illustrations to be given below will prove, Coverdale, especially in the Psalter, retains several good Vulgate readings.

Many of the Reformation versions were accompanied by doctrinal notes and comments, but they also followed the excellent example of Purvey's glosses and noted textual variants. Conspicuous in this respect was the Great Bible. "We follow," the translators write, "not only a standing text of the Hebrews, with the interpretation of the Chaldee and the Greek: but we set also in a private table the diversity of readings of all texts . . . this mark ס* betokeneth that upon the same text there is diversity of reading among the Hebrews, Chaldees, and Greeks,

and Latinists; as in a table at the end of the book shall be declared. This mark * sheweth that the sentence written in small letters is not in the Hebrew or Chaldee, but in the Latin, and seldom in the Greek, and that we nevertheless would not have it extinct, but highly accept it for the more explanation of the text." The table referred to was unfortunately never published, and no later version achieved the generous scheme of the Great Bible. Nor, again unfortunately, did any later version come as near as the Great Bible to retaining in its text the excellences of both the Hebrew and the Greco-Latin tradition.

Later versions were more one-sided, following either the late and corrupt Hebrew tradition to a great or total neglect of the versions, or the Vulgate to the neglect of the Hebrew. Thus, not to refer to intervening versions, the translators of the A.V. followed the Hebrew text with little consistent regard to other authorities. They claim indeed that they did not neglect to consult "the translators or commentators, Chaldee, Hebrew, Syrian, Greek, or Latin"; but an examination of their work proves that they fall far behind the Great Bible in drawing attention to important variants, and that in some crucial instances they failed where the Great Bible had succeeded in getting behind the modern Hebrew to the original text. Thus their use of the ancient versions corresponds to the use which the Douai translators claim to have made of the Hebrew text, for this, too, on examination, proves to have been slight.

It is greatly to be regretted that the R.V. is equally one-sided in its treatment of the question of the original text. Had the Revisers been able to take as broad and correct a view of this question as the projectors of the Great Bible, they would not have been able to claim, as they do in their preface, that "the task of the Revisers has been much simpler than that which the New Testament Company had before them." Their task would have been in many ways

far more complicated and difficult; but it would have been worth attempting. They might have included in their version the chief merits of previous versions, instead of allowing it in this important respect to fall behind the great version of 1539. They preferred another course, which at once left their work in need of revision. "As the state of knowledge," so they plead, "is not at present such as to justify any attempt at an entire reconstruction of the text on the authority of the versions, the Revisers have thought it most prudent to adopt the Massoretic text as the basis of their work, and to depart from it, as the Authorised translators had done, only in exceptional cases." As a matter of fact, they not only abstained from an "entire" reconstruction of the text, but their prudence has allowed them to prefer, again and again, conjectural and improbable translations of the Hebrew text to obviously correct readings preserved in the Greek, and to reject from their text, and even from their margins, important sentences that belonged to the original text and have stood in some of the great English versions. On the other hand, their prudence did not restrain them from one extraordinary excursion into wildly conjectural emendation. In 1 Sam. xiii. 1 there stands a sentence which has always caused commentators and translators great difficulty, and must do so as long as they practically assume the complete immunity of the Massoretic text from corruption. The Hebrew words are perfectly clear, and admit of only one meaning: "Saul was a year old when he began to reign." The meaning is obviously impossible and the text corrupt; the number before the word "year" has disappeared from the text; what that number was can only be guessed, and was guessed by some late scribes of the Greek version. The R.V., adopting this guess, inserts the word "thirty"—in square brackets, it is true, and with a note; but the note, instead of stating that the word "thirty" is a guess, makes a misleading reference to the Greek version.

It now remains to give some typical illustrations of superior or important readings contained in the earlier English versions. Any exhaustive discussion lies, of course, beyond the limits of this essay.

In the narrative of the sequel to the battle of Michmash (1 Sam. xiv.), we read that Saul failing, when he consulted Yahweh, to obtain an answer, inferred that some one had sinned, and proceeded to discover who it was. He assembled the people and addressing them said: "Be ye on one side, and I and Jonathan my son will be on the other side. And the people said unto Saul, Do what seemeth good unto thee" (v. 40). Saul's reply consists in the Hebrew text of two words only, and these *as pointed* scarcely admit of clear and intelligible rendering. Among the attempts to translate them have been these:—

Coverdale: "Do that right is."

Matthew's: "Give perfect knowledge."

Bishops' Bible and A.V., R.V. margin: "Give a perfect lot."

A.V. margin: "Shew the innocent."

R.V.: "Shew the right."

These renderings proceed from a reasonable sense of what the context requires, but from a very imperfect regard for the actual meaning, or rather lack of meaning, of the Hebrew text. As a matter of fact, and as scholars, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic,* have now perceived, the Hebrew text has suffered a considerable loss at this point owing to that common source of error *homoioteleuton;* from the first occurrence (in the original text) of the words "Lord God of Israel" (verse 41) the eye of the scribe passed at once to their second occurrence. The second occurrence of the phrase and the intervening words thus lost in the later Hebrew text were fortunately preserved in the

* See, for example, S. R. Driver, "Text of the Books of Samuel," on 1 Sam. xiv. 41, and the Rev. Father Lagrange in the "Revue Biblique," 1908, p. 107 f.—a valuable discussion of the principles which should govern the contemplated revision of the Vulgate.

Greek translation; and through it passed into the Old Latin versions; finally, the influence of the Old Latin secured their re-insertion in Jerome's translation from the Hebrew. Hence they passed into Wycliffe, the Great Bible, and later * editions of the Douai Bible.

Instead, then, of the meagre sentence, "Therefore Saul said unto the Lord, the God of Israel, Shew the right" (R.V.), in which the last three words are a mistranslation, the original text of Scripture had the fuller sentence which reappears nearly intact, but slightly obscured in sense through three processes of translation, in Wycliffe:

"Lord God of Israel, give doom what it is that Thou answerest not to Thy servant to-day. If in me or in Jonathan my son is this wickedness, give shewing: and if this wickedness is in Thy people, give holiness."

In the Great Bible (1539) the incorrect reading of the Hebrew text is first translated and then the words which have been omitted from the Hebrew text, but retained in the Greek and Latin versions, are given in smaller type in brackets, thus:—

"Therefore Saul said unto the Lord God of Israel: Give a perfect lot ס* (Lord God, give Thou the judgment. How happeneth it, that Thou givest Thy servant no answer to-day? If this sin be in me or in Jonathan my son, shew it; or if this iniquity be in Thy people). And Saul and Jonathan were caught," &c.

The Douai version (ed. 1750) renders thus: "And Saul said to the Lord, O Lord God of Israel, give a sign, by *which we may know*, what the meaning is, that Thou answerest not Thy servant to-day: if this iniquity be in me, or in my son Jonathan, give a proof: or if this iniquity be in Thy people, give holiness. And Jonathan and Saul were taken."

Unfortunately none of these versions, though they retain the original words, quite expresses the original sense. The translation of the technical terms obscures

* The first edition and the edition of 1635 omit them—an unfortunate instance, presumably, of the influence of the Hebrew over the translators. The words appear in the edition of 1750.

the fact that this passage is describing the use of the sacred lots, Urim and Thummim. The crucial sentence should be rendered: "If this iniquity be in me, or in Jonathan my son, give Urim: or if this iniquity be in Thy people Israel, give Thummim."

This may be the most striking, but it is by no means the only case of the preservation in earlier English versions of words of Scripture omitted from both A.V. and R.V. Two other passages may be cited in which modern scholarship approves as original the longer form of text found in the Greek version and handed on through the Vulgate to Wycliffe, the Great Bible, and the Douai version, as against the shorter and mutilated text of the Hebrew Bible which has been followed, directly or indirectly, by Coverdale, Matthew, the Bishops' Bible, the Genevan, A.V., and R.V. The R.V. in 1 Sam. iv. 1 renders the Hebrew text thus:— "Now Israel went out against the Philistines to battle." Instead of "against" the R.V. should, if it had adhered to the general principle of translating words by the same equivalents in different passages, have rendered "to meet"; "now," also, is scarcely correct. Here, as often, the Revisers are reduced to questionable translation by their neglect of the materials existing for a sounder text. The correct rendering is at once seen to be natural when we turn to the fuller text of versions dependent on the Vulgate, thus:—

Great Bible (1539): ס״א "(And it fortuned that in those days the Philistines came together to fight.) And Israel went out against the Philistines to battle."

Douai (1639): "And it came to pass in those days the Philistims assembled together to fight: and Israel went forth to meet the Philistims into battle."

In 1 Samuel x. 1 (original text), Samuel gives Saul a sign; the sign is described in verse 2. Owing to the loss of several words the point has been obscured in the Hebrew text and versions of it such as the R.V. Again the versions dependent on the Vulgate approxi-

mate much more nearly to the original and preserve the point of the passage:—

R.V.: "Then Samuel took the vial of oil, and poured it upon his head, and kissed him, and said, Is it not that the Lord hath anointed thee to be prince over His inheritance? When thou art departed from me to-day, then thou shalt find two men by Rachel's sepulchre."

Great Bible (1539): "And then Samuel took a vessel of oil and poured it upon his head and kissed him and said: Hath not the Lord anointed thee to be captain over His inheritance σ* (and thou shalt deliver His people out of the hands of their enemies, which are round about him. And this token thou shalt have, that the Lord hath anointed thee to be prince). When thou art departed from me this day, thou shalt find two men by Rachel's sepulchre."

Douai (1609): "And Samuel took a little vessel of oil and poured it upon his head and kissed him and said: Behold, our Lord hath anointed thee upon His inheritance to be prince, and thou shalt deliver His people out of the hands of their enemies, that are round about them. And this shall be a sign unto thee that God hath anointed thee to be prince. When thou shalt be departed from me this day, thou shalt find two men beside the sepulchre of Rachel."

We may pass now to a few illustrations of cases where the Hebrew text has suffered, not, as in the foregoing instances, by the loss of words, but by the corruption of one or more letters; and the illustrations may be drawn from the Psalter, in which for reasons already given the influence of the earlier text of the Greek version over certain English versions is strongest. In these cases the versions which most perpetuate these better readings are Wycliffe's and the Douai translation; but a number of these good readings survive also in Coverdale's version, some too in the text of the Great Bible (whence they passed into the Prayer Book version). Others were to have been noted in the unpublished critical appendix to that work.

In Psa. xxxvii. 35 f. there are two errors in the Hebrew text, the second of which is particularly disturbing. The words specially affected by the variant readings are here italicised. As examples of versions following the incorrect Hebrew text in both variants R.V. and Geneva may serve:—

R.V.: "I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like *a green tree in its native soil.* But *one* passed by [marg. and A.V. "Yet *he* passed away"], and, lo, he was not: yea, I sought him, but he could not be found."

Geneva: "I have seen the wicked strong and spreading himself like *a green bay-tree.* Yet *he* passed away, and lo, he was gone," &c.

Coverdale's and the Great Bible represent a mixed text, following in one point the Hebrew and in the other the Vulgate:—

Coverdale: "I myself have seen the ungodly in great power and flourishing like *a green bay-tree:* but when *I* went by, lo, he was gone; I sought him, but he could nowhere be found."

The Douai Bible and Purvey-Wycliffe follow in both variants the correct text preserved in the Vulgate:—

Douai (1609): "I have seen the impious highly exalted and advanced as *the cedars of Lebanon.* And *I* passed by and behold he was not: and I sought him, and his place was not found."

Purvey: "I saw a wicked man enhaunced above; and raised up as *the cedars of Liban.* And *I* passed and lo! he was not; I sought him, and his place is not founden."

It would be no small matter to restore to a future revised version the comparison with the majestic cedars of Lebanon. The "green bay-tree" of most versions since Coverdale, however poetical, is not the meaning of the present Hebrew text, and the "luxuriant native," cumbrously and still questionably paraphrased by "a green tree in its native soil" (R.V.), was assuredly never in the mind of the Psalmist.

In Psa. xxxiii. 7 Wycliffe, with whom Coverdale and the Douai Bible agree, preserves for us the original figure, "Gathering as in a *bottle* the waters of the sea." The Hebrew punctuated text substitutes "heap" for bottle, and is followed by the Great Bible and subsequent versions (except that of Douai).

In certain passages, as, for example, in Psa. xx. 9, xxviii. 8, xlii. 5, the R.V. inserts the correct reading in the margin, but retains in the text a false reading which in some cases necessarily involves questionable translation; here the versions which depend on the Vulgate express the correct sense in the text, and so secure for it the primary attention of the reader.

The case of Psa. xix. 4 is interesting as being one of those cases in which the reading of the Vulgate has perpetuated itself through the Great Bible into the Prayer Book version; it is also a case in which the A.V. (followed by the R.V.) abandoned the Bishops' Bible in favour of the Genevan version. The exact form of the original text is really uncertain, but the Hebrew text is almost certainly wrong and the sense of the Vulgate nearer to the original. Thus the Douai rendering—

> "Their sound hath gone forth into all the earth
> And unto the ends of the round world the words of them"

is preferable to the rendering of the Genevan version (cp. A.V., R.V.):—

> "Their line is gone forth through all the earth," &c.

The Genevan translators perceived the obscurity of the text which they felt compelled to follow and added the interpretative gloss: "The heavens are as a line of great capital letters to shew unto us God's glory." The A.V. also adds a note; the R.V. leaves the unintelligible statement unexplained. All three versions might have done better to give, at least in the margin, the variant of the Vulgate.

Another particularly interesting variant is preserved in several English versions of Psa. xxxiv. 10. The Hebrew text which has been followed here by the Protestant English versions since the Great Bible is not so generally condemned by modern scholars as in the passages already cited; but it certainly is not to be lightly preferred to the actual words of the Greek or Latin versions, or a sense more nearly approximating to them than to that of the Hebrew text. R.V. renders :—

"The *young lions* do lack, and suffer hunger:
But they that seek the Lord shall not want any good thing."

If this is correct the author of Psa. xxxiv. had much less sympathy with the animal world, and much less appreciation of the Divine care for it, than the Psalmist who wrote, "The young lions roar after their prey and seek their meat from God" (Psa. civ. 21). But the context strongly favours the view that the poet was not making use of starving animals as a foil to enhance God's care of the pious, but that he was drawing out a favourite contrast between the self-assertive, God-forgetful rich and the humble, God-fearing poor. Consequently, it is probable that the original thought of the poet is obscured in the R.V., but is expressed by Wycliffe, Coverdale, and the Douai Bible. Coverdale renders :—

"The *rich* shall want and suffer hunger, but they which seek the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good."

The foregoing illustrations may serve to suggest that the older English versions preserve not a little of the truth of Scripture which both A.V. and R.V., through fidelity to a mistaken textual method, have lost. Something, and, indeed, not a little, would be gained if in a future revision what is found in those earlier versions and is approved by modern scholarship were restored. But even the brief sketch of the history of the Old

Testament text and of the relation of the English versions to it which was given at the beginning of this essay should suffice to show that such restoration would be inadequate. It is only by an accident that, through the Vulgate, the Greek version has influenced early English versions of the Psalter, and occasionally other parts of the Old Testament. A direct and systematic use of the Septuagint, which should indeed be cautious, is obviously called for. But more is needed. The Greek version was not made before the third century B.C.; not a little of the Old Testament was written several centuries earlier. It would be unreasonable to suppose that texts were transmitted during those centuries without any errors, and as a matter of observation it is obvious that they were not. Yet for the detection of such errors we are obviously reduced to critical conjecture, unless those passages, not a few in number, in which the text had become corrupt before the Greek version was made are to be left untranslated. We are thus brought to the last question arising out of the relation of the English versions to the original text that can be even briefly considered here.

Ought a translation to be more intelligible than the original text which the translators claim to translate? On this point authors of English versions have differed. Purvey aimed at making his translation in case of need "more true and more open than it is in Latin." The Douai translators laid down the opposite principle:—"Moreover, we presume not to mollify the speeches or phrases, but religiously keep them word for word and point for point, for fear of missing and restraining the sense of the Holy Ghost to our fancy." Accordingly, to cite a single famous example,* they render certain unintelligible words in the Hebrew text of Psa. lvii. by this unintelligible equivalent: "Before your thorns did understand the old briar: as living so in wrath he swalloweth them up." On the whole the A.V. and R.V. have followed the principle of Purvey

* Other examples will be found in the note appended.

and not that of the Douai translators; and yet truth lies in the correspondence between text and version. Owing to the conditions under and the state in which our Old Testament has come down, *conjecture is inevitable*, if a complete translation is made. In certain cases conjectural emendation of the text can only be avoided by conjectural translation of the existing text. It is certain that in some cases the English versions (such as the R.V.) which have completely renounced textual criticism have been reduced to the most improbable conjectural translation.* The general feeling against conjectural emendation is so strong, the feeling against conjectural translation so relatively weak, that there is little prospect of any extravagant use of the former by any representative body of English scholars called upon to translate the Old Testament. But it is much to be desired that a matured and instructed general opinion may prevent future translators from deeming it prudent to resort to conjectural translation when they ought to follow the evidence of the versions, or from preferring improbable conjectural translation where less improbable conjectural emendation would preserve the meaning of entire passages from being obscured or distorted.

Note on Purvey's Textual Glosses in the Psalter.

The glosses to which Purvey refers in the passage quoted in this essay are preserved in one MS. only (Bodleian MS. 554). This MS. was discovered too late to be used by Forshall and Madden in their text of the Psalter, and is but briefly referred to in their Preface (i. p. xxx. note *a* and p. xlviii.). Consequently these glosses have not yet been published. They refer in part to the text, in part to interpretation. As an illustration of the fulness with which the textual variations were noticed by Purvey, the textual notes on Psa. lvi (lv.) are here given. The relevant words of the version from the text of this MS. are given in each instance first, and then the marginal glosses referring to them.

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* Instances will be found in Hastings' "Smaller Dictionary of the Bible" in the article "Text, Versions, and Language of the Old Testament," § 40.

Vv. 3, 4. Myn enemyes defouliden me al dai; for manye fiȝteris weren aȝens me. Of the hiȝnesse of dai I shal drede; but God I shal hope in thee.

Gloss.—In ebreu and in ieroms translacioun thus | *manye fiȝteris aȝens me thou hiȝeste* | that is thou hiȝest delyvere me, delyvere me fro this multitude; fro which y mai not defende me | the seconde vers bigynneth thus | *in whatevere dai y shal drede for sothe y shal hope in thee* | li he | .

Vv. 8–10. As thei abideden my lijf, for nouȝt shalt thou make hem saaf; in ire thou shalt breke togidere puplis. God I shewide my lijf to thee: thou hast set my teeris in thi siȝt. As in thi biheest lord, thanne myn enemyes shulen be turned abak.

Gloss.—In ebreu and in ieroms translacioun thus | *abidynge my soule*, that is hopyng to take awei my soule fro the bodi | and the vers suynge bigynneth thus | *for nouȝt shalt thou make hem saaf*, as if he seie nay | *in ire, God, thou shalt breke togidere puplis* it is of Filisteis [*i.e.*, Philistines] | *thou hast noumbrid my stiryng eth my priuyere thingus; sette thou my teer in thi bowge* | *as in thi biheest lord.* In ebreu thus | *wher not in thi noumbre* | in ieroms translacioun thus | *but not in thi tellyng* | lire here | .

V. 13. For thou hast delyverid my lijf fro deth, and my feet fro slidyng: that I plese bifor God in the liȝt of hem that lyven.

Gloss.—In ebreu and in ieroms translacioun thus | *that y go bifor God* | li he | .

In this Psalm both Hebrew and Greek texts are in places corrupt, and no translation based entirely on either can be satisfactory. It may be of interest to compare with the text of Purvey's translations the Douai version (1610) of the same verses:—

Vv. 3, 4. Myne enemies have troden upon me al the day: because they are manie that warre against me. From the height of the day I shal feare: but I will trust in thee.

Vv. 8–10. As they have expected my soule, for nothing shalt thou save them: in wrath thou wilt break peoples. O God, I have shewed my life to thee: thou hast set my teares in thy sight. As also in thy promise: then shal mine enemies be turned backward.

V. 13. Because thou hast delivered my soule from death, and my feete from falling: that I may please before God, in the light of the living.

THE CONSTANT AND THE CONTINGENT IN ECONOMICS

W. REASON

THE CONSTANT AND THE CONTINGENT IN ECONOMICS

IN a footnote to his "Principles of Economics," Prof. Marshall thinks it "not superfluous" to call attention to the fact that when we speak of the action of a scientific law we are using an elliptical expression. The law does not act; the forces to which the law refers act, and the law sets forth the mode of their action. For absolute accuracy we should further distinguish between the necessary mode of action and the statement which expresses it; but for Prof. Marshall's purpose, and for our present theme, it will be sufficient to assume that the expression of the law corresponds with the law itself.

One could wish that this distinction had been given a more prominent position than that which a footnote affords, for it is far from being merely a piece of meticulous pedantry. It is a caution "not superfluous" for trained economic thinkers, and certainly very necessary for that far larger number who are not experts in the science but unavoidably concerned in the practice of which the science treats. The application of many sciences—as, for example, chemistry and electricity—can easily be carried on by specially trained persons, in whose hands we are more than content to leave it; but the subject matter of economics includes the everyday occupations of the whole of mankind, and it is neither possible nor desirable, for many reasons which may be taken for granted here, to put economic experts only into office, either as practical directors of industry

or—what is perhaps more important—as makers of the laws of State that affect industry. It is, therefore, the more desirable that the results of economic research and analysis should be assimilated by the general public, whose decisions select our law-makers and condition their policy, and whose practical handling of the problems of industry depends for success or failure upon a right or wrong use of economic forces. "Elliptical methods of speaking" certainly tend to confuse the non-expert mind, and, if they are unavoidable, it should be made abundantly clear that they are not to be argued from as if they were fully expressed.

In this connection the point raised by Prof. Marshall is deserving of especial consideration. There is a general and increasing recognition of the inevitableness of law, in the scientific sense of the word, and in itself this is all to the good. But it is evident that if this distinction is not clearly drawn between the law on the one hand, and the forces whose action the law indicates on the other, the inevitableness of the law may very easily be transferred in mind to the forces themselves. The truth that men cannot alter the law, will become the falsehood that men cannot alter the forces.

All law abides. If we have correctly apprehended the mode of action of given forces under given conditions, we are assured that whenever those forces are in action under those conditions the result will be invariably the same. This is the foundation of all science; it is the great assumption which we are bound to make, if we are to think and act reasonably at all. But this is a very different thing from the invariability of the forces and conditions themselves; men not only can, but habitually do alter these, and with them the results of their action.

For example, what is known as Gresham's Law, that bad money drives out good, must always be reckoned with. If bad money is allowed to come into circulation, with whatever motives, the good money will go into

the melting-pot or be exported to countries where they maintain the standard of currency. This law is so certain that a very little study of it will convince any reasonable person of its inevitableness. But it does not follow that we are condemned to the use of bad money. If the penal laws against coiners are so efficiently enforced as to keep bad money practically non-existent, the good money remains. The perfection of a system of distribution and exchange which did not need any money at all would more completely avoid the result. But the law would still hold good.

Or, again, the Law of Rent is a statement of the truth that "the excess of the value of the total returns which capital and labour applied to land do obtain, over those which they would have obtained under circumstances as unfavourable as those on the margin of cultivation" can be appropriated by the party in whom the ownership is vested. It is quite clear that there is a difference of yield between favourable land and land which is only just worth cultivating, and that this difference can, in competition for land, be secured by the owner. But it does not follow that this is the actual rent paid. For this, one has to assume that there is untrammelled competition, which is seldom the case. A man avoids the actual payment of rent if he farms his own land. This really means that he appropriates it himself; he has that advantage over and above the result of the capital and labour he applies to the land, and if he kept books properly, he would show it in his balance-sheet. But since he is in a position to negate all competition for his land, within certain limits, by refusing to sell, the excess of the produce value above what is the result of capital and labour may actually be very much less than the true economic rent. Yet he will not let his land, so as to get the full advantage of the economic rent, applying his capital to purposes more under the control of his particular ability, because he has an attachment to his inheritance, or because he fears to risk the change, or because

of many another reason which may easily be found in actual operation somewhere. Or, again, in many cases of land that is occupied under a landlord, the full play of competition is limited by many different considerations. Sometimes the landlord is unwilling to get rid of families that have been for generations on the land, sometimes he may limit the number of those who would compete for it by adding personal conditions which tenants must satisfy, and so forth. There have been periods in which custom has fixed the actual rents instead of competition. In all these cases the law of rent holds good, but the actual amount paid as rent does not correspond with economic rent, because the factors have been varied and the law becomes therefore only partially applicable.

It might even be possible for a social system to arise in which the Law of Rent, while remaining perfectly true in statement, and therefore inevitable whenever the factors which it assumes were operative, would become simply irrelevant. Whether that could be so or not would be determined, not by the inevitability of the law, but by the inevitability or the opposite of the factors. These factors are partly physical, partly of human determination. The latter are plainly variable, but analysis might show that however they might be varied, those factors to which the law applies were necessarily present; on the other hand, it might show that the law only applied to a system of competitive ownership and use. The physical factors are less variable, since land must always have a difference of location as regards its parts, and at first sight it seems inevitable that there must always be a difference of those qualities which make for productiveness. And this variation is all that is required to constitute the difference between the marginal conditions of cultivation and those that rise above it. So long as this difference exists economic rent would always have to be reckoned as an economic factor in the resulting produce. Even in a system from which

competition and private ownership have been eliminated, granting that such is otherwise possible, the surplus of advantage in position and in fertility would determine the use of different lands for any given purpose, and this surplus of advantage would correspond to economic rent. It might be a far more accurately determining factor under a scientific co-operative national administration than it is now under an imperfect competitive system, though it would not be recognisable by the man untrained in economics as the rent with which he is familiar. But there is still the possibility, however remote, that these differences of location and quality might conceivably disappear through the advance of scientific knowledge and use. For we might come to use artificially prepared soil so superior to the best that is found naturally that the place of its use would be immaterial, except for differences of accessibility and climate. The latter is already partially controlled, and might easily become altogether so, by the universal use of artificial protection and methods of heating. Differences of accessibility might yield to the twofold attack of improved means of transit and the equalising of the distribution of population. Granted that these differences could thus disappear, it is plain that economic rent would also disappear. But the law would continue to be inevitable.

The practical result that emerges from these apparently academic speculations is that while all properly verified law is constant, its relevance to practical politics is contingent upon the presence or absence of those forces and conditions to which it refers. If these factors are themselves constant, then practical politics must recognise the futility of aiming at any other results than are indicated by the law. But if these forces and conditions are variable, in such wise and to such a degree that the mode of action and the ensuing results are no longer within the scope of the law in question, that law, without losing any of its proper

inevitability, is simply irrelevant and should disappear from discussion.

The importance of this result becomes plain when we consider that the right application of economics is the only basis of successful practical reform. If we lived under an industrial system which was perfectly satisfactory, no one would want to alter the existing factors, except in detailed administration. But no one contends that this is so. One has only to consider the periodical recurrence of "bad times," the widespread misery through both chronic and fluctuating unemployment, the appalling number of commercial failures annually, the perpetual penalising of entire sections of industry through economic changes beyond the control of those penalised, the accretions of "unearned increment," the distribution of unearned profits and other glaring anomalies, to find such optimism impossible. But there does seem to be in many minds a feeling that no adequate change is possible, because all these deplorable results are due to "the action of economic laws" and therefore inevitable. It is just here that the value of Professor Marshall's footnote caution becomes apparent. The clear distinction between the inevitableness of law and the inevitableness of the forces and conditions would do much to dispel such pessimism.

No one is seriously either completely optimist or completely pessimist, for just as the considerations mentioned above forbid the former, so the latter is seen to lead direct to the logical conclusion that not only are the advocates of drastic change, such as Land Nationalisers and Socialists of every kind, vainly beating the air, but that Parliament itself and all our local bodies are merely expensive futilities, a view which is indeed sometimes expressed in rhetorical indignation, but immediately negatived by the attempt of the rhetorician grumblers themselves to get power in those bodies.

What very many people do believe, however, is that those who legislate for us do so mostly in the dark, and that the greater part of the action taken is of the

nature of shortsighted experiment. Herbert Spencer had much to support him when he pointed to the enormous number of Acts of Parliament which are solely concerned with repealing or amending previous Acts, which have failed to carry out the intentions of their promoters. In one way the facts prove too much for his main contention, which was altogether against Parliamentary action, for these repealing and amending Acts were necessary not only because some measures had proved ineffective, but because many more had produced very powerful effects, but in the wrong direction. This latter consideration suggests that if changes can be made at all, beneficent changes are equally possible with those that are disastrous or disappointing, and that it is lack of proper knowledge rather than something in the nature of things in general which has caused failure. But, on the other hand, the facts also show that some of our legislation is truly futile, as witnessed by Acts which become just "dead letters." There is at least a presumption here that part of the futility arises from the endeavour to legislate out of existence factors which really are constant, or at least too nearly so to be negated by anything less than a radical change more drastic than the timidity of legislators will permit.

Again, if we turn from the failures of Acts of Parliament to the suggested reforms of those who are prepared to adopt deep-cutting measures, we find that the most powerful opposition to them is based on the objection that they would not work, because they run counter to the well-known Laws of Economics, which really means, if it means anything, that the factors whose action is described by those laws are unchangeable.

It is therefore the thesis of this paper that what is most needed in economic achievement at the present time is a careful research with a view to demonstrating clearly which are the Constant Factors of industry, and which are only Contingent. The analysis of the existing system has been of incalculable value, but it has already been carried to such an extent that little fresh

light has been thrown upon it of late years, and the energy which has been expended in some directions, such as showing that economic laws can be translated into mathematical formulæ and back again without much loss of intelligibility, would seem to have been largely wasted. Much greater service has been done by those who have left the formulation of laws for the gathering of actual economic facts, as well from the records of the past as from the experience of the present. This should be of great value for the further step which should now be taken.

Our own greatest economist, Professor Marshall, has probably done his best work in showing that economic processes are much more elastic and dependent upon the variable human factor than they are commonly supposed to be. Let us now go on from that to discover *how* elastic they are. Let our economists tell us what are the factors which have always been present in the various systems of which history preserves an account, which are in force to-day throughout the world and which, so far as human reason can see, must always be reckoned with. Let them tell us what results must therefore always follow from the presence of these Constants. From this we shall not only know what suggested reforms it will be sheer waste of time to dream about, but we may discover that many of the evil results which have appeared in all our civilisations hitherto have been due to the persistent attempt to ignore these factors. On the other hand, it will be of the greatest value to know which factors are not necessarily constant, the forces which may be either allowed to become latent instead of active, or so combined with others as to produce different results. For the "scientific imagination" is not highly developed in many people, and it is probably weakest in regard to economic and political matters. The ordinary man cannot form in his mind a clear and coherent conception of any suggested change. The things that are, the conditions with which he has become familiar, persist

in his mental images of these changes, even though they should, *ex hypothesi*, disappear, and in the absence of authority to the contrary he will in most cases draw the unwarrantable but common conclusion that they must be constant. A study of political speeches, even of the accredited leaders, will furnish abundant material for the illustration of this point.

It is not, of course, pretended that this distinction of the Constant and the Contingent has been altogether ignored by economists. Most of the classical treatises begin by reference to the "Requisites of Production" and "Fundamental Notions," which phrases carry with them an implication of constancy, but no clear line of demarcation is offered to the student, and the discussion insensibly glides into description of illustrative examples drawn from the complex conditions of industrial activities which contain much that obviously is not constant, because it is only modern. It is also true that Land Reformers like Henry George, and Socio-Idealists like Edward Bellamy—in "Looking Backward" and "Equality"—have attempted to forecast the results of withdrawing certain economic factors now active and introducing others, and in this way have caused a good deal of incidental discussion as to whether these factors are constant or contingent. But it has been discussion of political rather than of economic import, a discussion in which the disputants have sought to find economic justification for the side they have adopted from other motives rather than a scientific inquiry into the real nature of the factors involved, the results of which would become common ground for the contending parties, and outside which no informed advocate would attempt to stray.

Is it too much to say that this neglect to distinguish clearly between the factors that cannot be displaced and those that are subject to selection has been the cause of the waning influence of economists in practical politics? In the last century such influence was exceedingly great, although social questions did not

absorb political interest to anything like the degree that they do to-day. One would have expected to find the economic expert taking much the same place in politics that the scientific expert is taking in manufactures, in which a parallel development has taken place. But the professional economists are only invoked if the politician knows that they agree with him beforehand, and then with a feeling that the invocation will not carry much weight. Among the working classes there arose very early the feeling which was crystallised into the cry, "If Political Economy is against us, we must be against Political Economy," and practical experience has gone far to justify them. The explosion of the old Wages Fund Theory, and the abandonment of the grounds on which rigorous Malthusianism was built, clearly demonstrated that the economists had overestimated the persistency of some at least of the factors. This has led to the vague idea that any doctrine which appeals to us in other respects may prove to be economically workable, whatever the exponents of Economics may say.

It is certainly good that we should not make a High Priest of the expert, but should subject his teaching to whatever sane criticism is in our power, and it is well to remember that some results which he may correctly point out as inevitable may need to be accepted in spite of what may be from the purely economic outlook of a disadvantageous character, because they are outweighed by higher considerations. It is quite possible that a line of policy may tend to produce better though less wealthy men and women. But it is surely not good that there should be no body of trained men to whom we can turn from the dust and confusion arising from the clash of class interests and party prejudices for a clear and decisive statement as to what is and what is not possible, just as we go to engineers on points of mechanical construction. Whether a bridge shall or shall not be built may fitly be a question for a Council or a Board of Directors, but every sensible man knows

that no vote can determine whether the bridge can or cannot be constructed in a certain way. Conversely, the trained expert who is consulted gives a clear judgment on this one point, unmixed with any considerations as to the right of the Directors to spend the money on the bridge or the contravention of the local byelaws or anything else. In the same way it should be possible to obtain from economic experts decisive information as to what is economically possible under present conditions, what might be possible under changed conditions, and what the necessary changes would be. At present the judgments we get are not clear on these points, and they are confused with considerations which the ordinary man not only can but must weigh for himself. It is not unnatural then that the ordinary man also confuses the issues, and believes himself capable of judging the whole matter for himself, including the economics, although his notions as to the latter have been gathered through the greatly distorting medium of the modern newspaper.

How great is the need of expert investigation into this question of Constancy and Contingency is shown by a consideration of one point that has already been mentioned. It has been said above that the failure of many Acts of Parliament may have arisen either because the factors concerned were constant, and therefore could not be removed by legislation at all, or that they were too nearly so to be negated by anything less than a radical change. Now, let it be granted that what the Acts have aimed at is on other grounds of the highest importance for the well-being of the nation, so that if it were at all possible it would be worth while to make any change. It becomes at once a matter of the greatest moment that we should know whether the obstructing factors are unquestionably constant or removable only at great cost. What appears on the surface to be a slight distinction of degree becomes one of polar significance. If they are constant it is folly to spend

any time, money, labour, or passion upon the attempt, and the folly increases with the amount that is expended. But if they are contingent, while the desired change can only be achieved by drastic measures, wisdom consists in putting forth every ounce of the effort needed, and folly in doing anything less.

This is so far from being a fanciful supposition that it accurately represents the character of most of the measures of reform that people are really concerned about to-day. Over against the terrible social sores from which the community suffers in sorry fact there are visions of social health which are steadily spreading from mind to mind. Soon the majority of people will understand that Socialism is a vision of this kind, and not the malignant endeavour of the unsuccessful to involve the successful in a common ruin. Right or wrong, it is a dream of the community using in co-operative labour of brain and muscle the wealth of natural resources which the land affords and the capital resulting therefrom, for the direct satisfaction of the needs of its members. In this dream there is no army of unemployed, because *ex hypothesi* they are all to contribute their labour to the common result. There are no starved, uneducated, and neglected children, for the needs of the child are not to be limited by the supposed merits of other people or the amount its individual parents could get for themselves in competition. The community takes the children in hand to develop them into the best possible men and women, for its own sake as well as theirs. There are no trade depressions and bankruptcies in this dream, because it is believed that the causes of these are seated wholly in the system of individual ownership of land and capital, and the resulting competition. In this dream the resulting produce is much greater in the total amount than to-day, because the three necessary factors of pro-

duction—land, labour, and capital—will be used continuously, and not restricted in times of "bad trade," while all discoveries and inventions will be worked to their full effect. There are many other elements in this dream, but these are sufficient for the present purpose.

Obviously this is a case that comes exactly within the terms of the description given above. If there are economic factors which are constant and which by their necessary action make this dream impossible, it is of the highest importance to the nation that this should be demonstrated, for in that case every endeavour to turn the dream into accomplished fact is what some of its opponents roundly call it, mad folly. Unfortunately we do not get this demonstration. The grounds on which the impossibility is usually alleged are not economic in nature, but psychological, namely, that human nature will have to suffer an impossible change before the dream could become true. Even so, there is no demonstration forthcoming from the expert psychologists themselves.

If there really is no ground for declaring the economic impossibility of the dream, the next point to be noted is that changes which are slight in degree and restricted in extent of application will be just as futile with respect to attainment as if the opposing factors were constant. The essence of the suggested remedy is the completeness of the co-operation in ownership and industry, and the entire elimination of all that negates this integrity. There may have to be many stages passed in the actual accomplishment, but it must be clearly recognised that the results aimed at cannot be reaped until the whole effort has been put forth, just as there may have to be a successive piling of many weights on the scale, but the beam will not turn until the full weight is there. Once more then the importance of the task of the economist appears; for just as the demonstra-

tion of the impossibility is imperative, if the nation is to be saved from an enormous waste of endeavour, equally imperative is the demonstration of the possibility, if the nation is to be saved from entering upon the task and failing to persist until the end is achieved. For in this case the fruitless dissipation of energy, wealth, and passion might be almost as great as in the former.

Of course the verdict of the country to embark on such an enterprise, or to refuse, would have to be given on other grounds besides the economic possibility or impossibility, but this must be determined before the other grounds can be usefully considered, and such determination would save a great deal of the struggle which is in any case inevitable before a final decision is reached, a struggle which is bound to be a costly and only too probably a bitter one. If analysis discloses really constant factors which are hostile to the formation of a Socialist state, this can at least be demonstrated to the intelligent leaders of the movement, and with these turning their powers in other directions, the whole movement would soon become negligible. But if it were clearly shown that Nature allows it, the grounds for refusing to consider it have become limited to the psychological argument that there is something in human nature that stands in the way. Whatever validity there may be in this, which does not fall within our present scope, once again a great step will have been taken towards ending the conflict.

The same considerations hold good for other reforms of a far-reaching character, designed to cure evils that are deep-seated. For all these we want to know what elements of the situation are permanent and what we can re-dispose at will. We know that there are some permanent elements and some laws, therefore, which are not merely constant in validity, but also constant in action. We know that Land and Labour are constant elements, and that for all climates where

there is not a perpetual supply of self-grown foodstuffs to be had for the gathering, Capital is essential. There are characteristics of these which are permanent, and therefore there are some laws concerning the interaction of Land, Labour, and Capital which must be relevant to every imaginable industrial system or lack of system. But which are they? And have these found the expression which describes the constant action, or does the statement include elements which refer only to the mode of action under alterable conditions?

We can see at once that labour is inherent in labourers, either of body or mind, so that the three permanent elements may be restated as natural resources, human workers, and the stored results of the interaction of these. What are the inevitable modes of interaction? Does ownership rank among them? That is to say, are the Landlord and the Capitalist permanent elements of industrial organisation? If it appear that there must be a Landlord, even though it be a community and not an individual that exercises the functions, which are the permanent characteristics of these functions, and which are due merely to statutes and custom? Have we reached a statement of the laws that apply to the use of natural resources, such as the law of diminishing returns and the law of rent, which must be true under all conditions? Similar questions arise with regard to Capital, and it appears probable that there are some permanently true statements with regard to Labour which would be all the better for clear expression.

All these questions, and many more that are consequent upon them, seem to be of the highest importance, and also capable of clear solution. Such solution would, as contended above, not only be of incalculable service to practical social politics, but would go far to set the science of Economics in its rightful place as the lawful helpmeet of statesman-

ship instead of the courtesan of party politics. Having delimited the frontier between the Constant and the Contingent, it would be in a position to advise upon further questions submitted to its judgment. We could go to it and say, "Given such and such conditions, which we lay down on ethical considerations, which are nothing to do with you, but which we have ascertained are consistent with economic constants, what will be the necessary results?"

This is the path which all the other reputable sciences have followed, and not until Economics treads it can she hope to enjoy the esteem which they have won, nor to confer the benefits which they have conferred.

THE CELTS OF GALATIA

E. ANWYL

THE CELTS OF GALATIA

GALATIA derives its name from Γαλάτης (Galates), one of the Greek names for a Gaul. For the name Γαλάτης several derivations have been suggested, but none of them is entirely satisfactory. Possibly the most probable is that which connects the name with the Welsh *gal*, "an enemy," better known in its derivative *gelyn*, of the same meaning. The Greeks also knew the Celts by another name Κελτοί, but the precise difference in meaning between the two names has never been made clear. Sir John Rhŷs is of opinion that the Κελτοί were an older stratum of Celts, who spoke dialects of the same linguistic type as Irish, while the Γαλάται were, he thinks, Celts of a later stratum, who spoke a type of Celtic more akin to the Brythonic languages, Welsh, Breton, and Cornish. It is certainly the case that the Celtic dialects of the greater part of Transalpine as well as Cisalpine Gaul, spoken in the time of Cæsar, were much more akin to the Brythonic than to the Goidelic forms of Celtic, and there are, moreover, archæological reasons for thinking that Gaul was invaded about 600 B.C. from the East by men who were in close touch with the Iron Age civilisation of Central Europe, and who laid the foundations in Gaul of the late Celtic civilisation. Some of the chief remains of this stage of civilisation in Gaul have been discovered in the ancient cemeteries of the Marne valley, and hence this period of Gallic civilisation is sometimes known as the Marnian epoch. It is especially well represented

in the prehistoric collections of the great French museum of national antiquities in the Musée de St. Germain near Paris, and the British Museum collection also is one which will well repay study. To students of the classics especially it is a revelation to discover that so much genuine progress had been made in the arts of war and peace in Europe outside the immediate zone of classical culture.

The Celtic Galatians were known by the Romans as Gallogræci, and sometimes Galli, as in the well-known line of Horace:

"Galli canentes Cæsarem,"

and their kinship with the Gauls of the West was long remembered.

In thinking of the ancient world our attention is naturally drawn first of all to the brilliant developments of civilisation in the zone of the Mediterranean, to Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, Palestine, Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy. Here we have a world of early human life, whose achievements will never cease to all time to fascinate the mind of man. At the same time, the civilisation of districts in Europe further inland and westward did not remain stationary. The culture of the great Mediterranean centres irradiated far beyond the lands where it rose to the highest æsthetic and literary expression. The investigation of ancient trade-routes has shown that, by means of intertribal barter, objects bearing the stamp of Mediterranean culture penetrated to such districts as the amber grounds of the Baltic and even further afield. The men of Indo-European speech who lived in the neighbourhood of the Danube and the Rhine, and who in the Bronze and the early Iron Age were largely of Celtic speech, did not fail, though in the background of the Mediterranean zone, to make considerable headway in the arts of peace and war. We are led to a similar conclusion, too, when we survey

the ancient remains that have come to light in the lake dwellings of Switzerland, in the cemeteries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and elsewhere. Even Britain had made real progress along certain lines, notably in the working of metals and enamelling, before the Romans ever set foot in these islands. One of the greatest achievements of prehistoric archæology in our time has been its illumination of the course of human progress in the darker zones of the ancient world, which lie outside the brilliant sunshine of the Mediterranean area. It was in these darker zones that the Celts of antiquity for the most part lived, but occasionally we find them penetrating, as their earlier kinsmen of Indo-European speech had done before them, into the Mediterranean basin itself, and becoming ultimately fused with its civilisation.

Owing to the pressure of population, the Celts of Central Europe had penetrated in prehistoric times into Gaul, into Britain, and afterwards into Ireland, into Spain, where they formed the mixed race of the Celtiberi, into Cisalpine Gaul, and into the Ager Gallicus of the north-east of Italy. The conflict between the Romans and the Gauls in Italy itself is familiar to every student of Roman history. At first it might be thought that the relations between the Celts and the Romans were purely those of war, but it is highly probable, to judge by a number of Celtic words connected with horses and means of transit, which were adopted into Latin, that the Romans, who were always very apt learners from their neighbours, adopted certain kinds of vehicles from the Gauls, as is shown by the naturalisation in Latin of such purely Celtic words as *carpentum*, *raeda*, *essedum*, *covinnus*, *petorritum*, and the like. The necessities of travel had evidently forced upon the Celts the constant study of the problem of locomotion, and it was apparently in this direction that they made some of their chief contributions to the civilisation of the ancient world. Their use of chariots in war is attested

not merely by the evidence of ancient writers, but also by actual archæological discoveries, some of which have been made in Britain. Aided no doubt by their skill in transit, colonies of Celts had spread at some time or other, as is conclusively shown by the evidence of place-names ending in -dunum (*fortress*), to such districts as that of Belgrade (*Singidunum*), and as far almost as the mouth of the Danube, where there existed a Noviodunum (Newtown). Before they crossed into Asia we know that they had reached Thrace.

It might at first be imagined that the settlement of Celts in Asia Minor, if it existed at all, was some prehistoric settlement, of which nothing is known. As a matter of fact, it is one of the best attested events of history. The Galatæ had already penetrated to the Bosphorus in the course of their restless search for new territory, and the king of Bithynia, who was in need of auxiliaries, invited them over (in 278 B.C.) to assist him in his wars. The narrative of their entrance into Asia Minor is given by Pausanias (x. 239), Livy (xxxviii. 16), and Justin (xxv. 2). According to Strabo (Didot, p. 485) their leader was Leonnorios. An account of these events is also given in Polybius v. 71, and there can be no doubt as to its historicity. The irruption of the Gauls into Asia Minor was like the bursting of a storm-cloud. The artistic but enervated inhabitants of that region were smitten with panic. It appeared at first as if the achievements of Greek civilisation in Western Asia Minor were to be entirely obliterated. The importance of these inroads in the history of Asia Minor has been well brought out by Professor Mahaffy in his history of Greece after the death of Alexander. Fortunately, after a time, the severity of the Celtic irruption into Asia abated, and Antiochus Soter in 276 B.C. was able to make some headway against them. They received from him a severe check in Cataonia, and this probably prevented them from advancing into Syria. Had they entered that region they might have profoundly

modified the course of history. As it was, they spent fifty years in establishing themselves firmly in Asia Minor and in winning for themselves the whole of the centre of the country between the Halys and the Sangarios.

By means of their depredations in Asia and their own ability to profit in some degree by the arts of civilisation, the Celts of Galatia amassed great wealth, and Livy (xxxviii. 16) tells us that the whole country west of Mt. Taurus paid tribute to them. As the kings of Pergamus and of Syria grew stronger, and were able to keep them in check, they developed a more settled life, and we find them divided into three tribes, the Trocmi, the Tolistoboii, and the Tectosages, each divided into four divisions. The Trocmi appear to have occupied part of the sea-board of the Hellespont, the Tolistoboii held portions of Æolis and Ionia, while the Tectosages settled in the centre of Asia Minor. According to Strabo (xii. 5) the Tolistoboii dwelt on the bank of the river Sangarios and to the west of it, with Pessinus as their capital town; the Tectosages dwelt between the Sangarios and the Halys, with Ancyra as their chief city; while the Trocmi were to the south of the Halys, having as their capital Tavion, now Jusgat. In order to make their position secure, the Galatians made treaties with the kings of Syria, Pergamus, and Bithynia (Strabo xii. 5), but their life was still a restless one, owing to the part which they took as mercenaries in the petty wars of Asia Minor. We find, for example, that they helped Ptolemy II. (Philadelphus) against his brother, Magas, and also Antiochus I. (Soter) in 262 B.C. against his brother Tiboetes, when he tried to put Zeilas on the throne of Bithynia. Similarly their aid was given to Antiochus Hierax in the war between him and Seleucus Callinicus, and it was their support that procured victory for Antiochus in the battle of Ancyra in 241 B.C. Their strongest opponent was Attalus, king of Pergamus, who began to fight against them in 229 B.C.

According to Polybius (v. 10) Attalus appears to have, on the whole, gained the upper hand over his restless neighbours, and thus restored for a time a degree of order and stability to the political life of Asia Minor.

It is clear from these facts that the Galatians were no hordes of mere barbarians, and their subsequent progress in Græco-Roman civilisation confirms this view. They appear to play their part in Asia Minor, after a brief interval of time, in a manner very like that of the existing races of that region. In the second half of the third century before Christ they were victorious over King Zelas II., and made themselves masters of Pontus, but about 218 B.C. they suffered severe defeats from the inhabitants of Alexandria Troas and from Prusias I. (Polybius v. 21).

In the petty wars of Asia Minor their aid was eagerly sought. The kings of Syria used their help against the kings of Pergamus, and, on one occasion, Attalus king of Pergamus was defeated by Achæus, the general of Antiochus the Great, with their aid. It was this that caused Attalus to call on Rome for help, so that indirectly we see the course even of world-history influenced by the Celts of Galatia. According to Polybius (xxii. p. 1) Rome was at this time eager to obtain aid against Hannibal and Philip, and sought especially for an ally that could cope with Macedonia and Syria. The battle of Magnesia (190 B.C.) gave a mortal blow to the Seleucidæ, and the Roman general Gnæus Manlius Vulso was extremely anxious to avenge himself upon the Galatians. This fact alone is clear evidence of their power.

We learn from Polybius that the Celts of Galatia, like those of the Celtic world generally, were organised in tribes. The centre of government in each tribe was a fortress, in which the tribal prince lived and kept his treasures. The land was tilled on the *métayer* system, and the older inhabitants of the country had to make annual contributions from the produce to their conquerors. Apparently the life of the Galatians, as described by Strabo, was very largely pastoral, and

the practice prevailed, as in other Celtic countries, of changing the pasture in summer and winter. Græco-Roman civilisation does not seem to have penetrated into the very centre of the country; beyond the Sangarios and the Halys there were found small fortresses, shepherds' huts, and the other accompaniments of somewhat primitive agriculture. As for the language, it is remarkable that so few remnants of the Celtic speech of the Galatians have come down to us, but Strabo gives us an undoubtedly Celtic word—Drunemeton—as the name of their chief court and centre of government. The second part of the word meant "a sacred clearing in a grove," and the first part probably meant "oak;" hence the name appears to mean, "The clearing in the oak-grove." The chief difficulty in the way of this explanation appears to be, that oak-trees are now very rare in Asia Minor. According to Strabo, each of the tribes formed a tetrarchy, and the twelve governors met as a Senate at Drunemeton. It was this Senate, he tells us, that tried all cases of murder, while all other cases were decided by the tetrarchs and the judges (Strabo xii. 5).

The relation in which the Galatians stood to the worship of Dindymene, whose priests were called Galli, is a very difficult and obscure subject. Whatever may have been the reason for calling these priests "Galli," it is certain that the worship of Dindymene in Asia Minor was far older than the coming of the Celts. This ancient religion appears to have put itself under the protection of the kings of Pergamus, and, at a later date, it came to terms with Rome. It is not improbable that there was also some mutual adjustment between it and the Galatians, on the basis of non-interference on the one hand and the payment of tribute on the other. There were certain features of the Celtic religion, such as the worship of goddesses called Matres, which presented points of contact with the worship of Dindymene, and this may have rendered easier an approximation between the two faiths.

Like their kinsmen in Gaul and Italy, and, we may add, Britain—on the testimony of Tacitus, in his "Agricola"—Galatia took very kindly to the Græco-Roman civilisation, and the researches of MM. Perrot, Guillaume, Waddington, and the distinguished explorers from Britain, all confirm the view that Galatia was rapidly penetrated by the civilisation of the Mediterranean area. The reason for this, undoubtedly, was that the curve of Celtic development, as archæology has shown, was already turned in this direction, except that in literature and in the zoomorphic side of art they were far behind the Greeks. On the decorative side and in the art of enamelling, their remains—especially in Britain—show them to have reached a remarkably high level. This side of Celtic art was developed even during Roman times, and one feature of its ultimate development is shown in the splendid illumination of such Irish MSS. as the Book of Kells, now in the library of Trinity College, Dublin. (See J. Romilly Allen, F.S.A., "Celtic Art in Pagan and Christian Times." Methuen, 1904.)

The adoption of some of the local religions of Asia Minor by certain of the Galatians is shown by the statement of Strabo (xii. 3), that a Galatian was high priest of the goddess Mâ at Comana. Cicero (De Harusp. respons., 26, 56, and also in his Pro Sestio) informs us that the Galatian Brogitaros became high priest of Cybele at Pessinus. In a letter from one of the kings of Pergamus to a priest of Pessinus we learn that the brother of a high priest of Cybele bore the undoubtedly Celtic name of Adiorix, so that a fusion of religions in this region, at least in part, is highly probable.

The question of the continuance of Celtic speech in Galatia is one of great difficulty. St. Jerome states that a language other than Greek or Latin and resembling that of the Treviri was spoken in his day; but the absence of traces of this language on inscriptions has been regarded by M. Perrot as conclusive proof to the contrary. It cannot be said that in this connec-

tion the evidence of inscriptions is convincing, since in Britain itself, where Celtic undoubtedly flourished, there are no inscriptions in the tongue of the Briton, and in Gaul inscriptions in Celtic speech are not very numerous. In Wales, in early post-Roman times, the inscriptions are in Latin, though the names of the persons commemorated are, as a rule, clearly Welsh. Probably a similar condition of things prevailed in Galatia, where the Celtic tongue of the Galatian settlers may well have lingered for centuries in the remoter districts, while the main centres remained bilingual or adopted Greek.

As a race the Galatians appear to have been tall and of large build, and of a terrifying aspect. In art, the type (as seen in the statue of "The Dying Gaul") was perpetuated through the school of Pergamus. From all indications, the Gauls and Germans of antiquity were striking specimens of European man of the fair race, and presented, by the fairness of their hair and complexions, a marked contrast to the darker races of the Mediterranean basin. At the same time, it is not improbable that, even in antiquity, the physical types of the Galatians and other Celtic tribes were much more varied than the statements of ancient ethnographers would lead us to suppose.

It is unfortunate that the references to the Galatians in classical writers are so scanty, especially in view of the important part which they played in the history of Asia Minor. One notable feature of Celtic life was the prominent place given therein to women, and it would be of great interest to discover how far the prominence of women in the work of the early Church was (if at all) connected with the ideas which the Celts introduced into Asiatic life. In spite of the splendid researches of Sir Wm. Ramsay, Mr. D. G. Hogarth, and others, in Asia Minor, there still remains much that is obscure, especially in relation to the life of those who lived at a distance from the urban centres. It is true that the Christian communities were at first largely

confined to such centres, but the men who lived in the towns were doubtless in many cases, then as now, men of country origin, and contributed something by their temperament and early associations to the dominant tone of the towns where they lived. Occasionally, a writer like Pausanias (book vii.) makes a statement which whets our curiosity, as, for example, when he says that the inhabitants of Pessinus did not eat swine's flesh; but whether this was an older practice of the earlier inhabitants, or a Celtic innovation, we are not told. Athenæus (book iv.), quoting Sopater of Paphos, says that it was the custom of the Galatians, after victory, to sacrifice the captives taken in battle. In another passage the same author, quoting Phylarchus, says that whenever a king was present at a meal no food was eaten until he himself had first tasted what was before him.

It is to be hoped that further researches in Asia Minor will throw fresh light on this obscure subject; but in any case the adaptability of the Galatians to their new surroundings is most remarkable, in that it enabled them, in so short a time, to conform to the life of one of the oldest civilisations in the world in such a way that their own remains seem indistinguishable from those of the ancient civilisations around them; and this makes it all the more probable that they already possessed in a high degree the instinct, if not the opportunity, for civilisation before they entered into Asia. Whether the Epistle to the Galatians was written to them or not, there is no evidence that, in the Apostolic age, they were conspicuously more backward than the inhabitants of other parts of Asia Minor.

[For further information concerning the Galatians the reader is referred to Felix Stahelin's "Geschichte der Kleinasiatischen Galater" (2nd edition): Teubner, Leipzig, 1907.]

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND THE CERTAINTY OF CHRISTIAN FAITH

A. E. GARVIE

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND THE CERTAINTY OF CHRISTIAN FAITH

"We have but faith: we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see,
And yet we trust it comes from Thee:
A beam in darkness; let it grow.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul according well,
May make one music as before,

But vaster. We are fools and slight,
We mock Thee when we do not fear;
But help Thy foolish ones to bear;
Help Thy vain world to bear Thy light."

THE words of the poet state the problem with which this essay is intended to deal, although the solution offered is one that cannot without correction as regards the terms used be accepted. That there is a distinction between the apprehension of the things seen and of the things unseen is the proposition which is to be proved here; but the restriction of the term "knowledge" to the former and the description of the latter by the term "faith" cannot be accepted. It must be insisted that man has knowledge in both realms, although it differs in each in character and conditions. In adopting these terms, however, the poet is the voice of his age. It is the current assumption that only physical science can properly claim to be knowledge; and that an ignorance relieved by faith is all that can be claimed regarding the realities which

belong to the moral and religious life of man. Not only in regard to God "we have but faith," as regards freedom, too, the poet confesses:

> "Our wills are ours, we know not how;
> Our wills are ours to make them Thine."

Of immortality man thinks and trusts.

> "He thinks he was not made to die:
> And Thou hast made him. Thou art just."

While it does not do to press pedantically what is involved in a poet's words, yet this thought is repeated in so many varied phrases in the poem, that we cannot escape the impression that at the time, at least, the poet's mind was deeply affected by the prevailing agnosticism.

His qualification of that agnosticism in his recognition of the function of faith, and the terms in which he expresses it, "trust," "reverence," "soul," make a positive contribution to our discussion. The apprehension of moral and spiritual reality is not exclusively, nay, not even primarily, intellectual; the emotions and the volitions as well as the reasoning of man are necessary to it. In vindicating the claim of religion to possess knowledge, we must concede that it is knowledge different in kind from the knowledge of science.

I

It is the failure to recognise the possibility of such a difference in the kind of knowledge that explains much of the agnosticism of last century. Herbert Spencer assumes that only that deserves to be called knowledge which conforms to the standards of physical science. What can be observed; what can be tested by experiment; what can be accurately calculated; what can be confidently predicted; what can be correlated to other

data in the same way obtained—that and that only can be known. The calculable, ponderable, measurable is the knowable. The new agnosticism is but the old sensationalism. The data of the senses manipulated by the understanding are the sole contents of knowledge. What in opposition to this attitude has to be proved is that there is another kind of knowledge, different because the reality it apprehends is so different, conditioned morally and religiously, owing to its very purpose, as the common knowledge of the world around is not conditioned. The telescope and the microscope cannot perceive God, or freedom, or immortality. The evidence of these does not appeal to the senses or even understanding common to all men; there must be some moral and religious interest, if this reality is to be recognised.

Another test of knowledge is often applied in philosophy. Things are to be thought together. The consistency of a speculative system is the criterion of truth for many thinkers. If the real can be represented as throughout rational, then the principle of interpretation applied is held to be valid. But growing knowledge and deepening insight is showing that reality is somewhat refractory to such manipulation by reason. Probably Hegelianism is the boldest attempt yet made completely to catch the universe in a network of logical categories; but to-day we marvel more at its audacity than we recognise its adequacy. As Höffding, in his "Problems of Philosophy," has shown, not one of these can be completely solved; our equation always contains an irreducible surd. If our moral and religious convictions cannot be given even the apparent consistency of such a speculative system, their claim to be regarded as valid knowledge need not on that account be abandoned; for such perfection of thought is not now possible to us who know only in part, who see not yet face to face, but only as through a glass darkly. The content of these convictions itself forbids such a consistency. The universe itself is still an unsolved

problem; God's purpose in the universe is still awaiting its fulfilment; man's moral development is not yet completed: "it doth not yet appear what we shall be"; "we are saved by hope and not sight."

II

Three methods of religious knowledge have at different times contended with one another. As a survival of the Platonic doctrine of ideas, intuitionalism claimed that man as rational by the constitution of his mind possessed certain religious ideas. Empiricism, rejecting this doctrine, maintained that from certain data of experience the existence, attributes, character, and purpose of God could be inferred. While Christian theology did not deny the doctrine of innate ideas, and did not altogether reject the proofs for the existence of God; yet what it insisted on was that the Christian Church was in possession of an extensive system of truths given to man by Divine revelation. The difference between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism as regards the authority of the Bible and of the Church need not now be taken into account, except in so far as the Protestant doctrine of the testimonium Spiritus Sancti qualified the intellectualism of these views, and recognised moral and religious conditions in the knowledge the Bible gives.

The doctrine of revelation implies a contact of the soul with God. This element is isolated in *mysticism*, which in less or greater degree seeks to detach religious knowledge from knowledge in other spheres. It may be regarded as a dangerous bypath of religious knowledge. This contact need not be spoken of, as it often is, as *mystical*; the term *spiritual* should be used.

Regarding the theory of innate ideas, all that need be said is that the study of comparative religion does not confirm, but contradicts the assumption that man by nature is possessed of these ideas, and that psychology and epistemology alike give an entirely different repre-

sentation of the process of knowledge. It is by a very gradual development that mankind has reached these moral and religious ideas.

The inferential method is now very generally in disrepute; but within limits its value should be recognised. It may be frankly admitted that the existence, character, and purpose of God cannot be *logically demonstrated*, as, for instance, a geometrical proposition can. The proofs for the existence of God will not convince a man who feels no religious necessities and cherishes no religious aspirations. It is not by the evidences of theism that mankind gained or keeps its faith in God. The criticism of Kant and of Ritschl would be justified if it were claimed that these proofs could change unbelief to faith. Their significance lies elsewhere. By them the idea of God is so related to the data of experience as to show that the universe gains a unity, rationality, value for human thought and life, if man believes in God, which otherwise cannot be assigned to it. Faith which has been made to waver by intellectual difficulties may be confirmed by the logical demonstration of these proofs that more problems are solved than raised by faith in God. They show that religion is not unrelated to science or morals, but in its faith in God brings a contribution to the completeness and harmony of human thought and life. These proofs as the connecting link between religious faith and current knowledge must always be stated in the language of each age; it is no argument against their validity, but results from their very nature, that they must be restated for each generation.

The claim made by Christian theology in opposition to deism that there is a religious knowledge of revelation is one that may be maintained, although it is impossible now to state it as the opponents of the deists did. There must be an extension of the scope of revelation, and a modification of the conception of it. Wherever there is religion, there is also revelation; wherever man approaches God, there God is present to

man. The study of comparative religion compels us to recognise in religious beliefs, however crude, the beginnings of man's discovery of God, and God's disclosures to man.

The knowledge of God is as inadequate and imperfect as is the knowledge of self and the world; but it is as valid relatively to the stage of human development reached, as is the knowledge of the highest stages. We must admit degradation as well as development in human history; we must recognise that the religions of many peoples become customary and traditional. All we can insist on now is that wherever there is genuine religious life, there is a real contact with God.

The revelation should be conceived less as a communication of knowledge, the common view, and more as a stimulation of the whole life. In the Old Testament, inspiration is represented as stimulating emotion and invigorating the will, and in other religions the intellectual element is often the least in the state regarded as inspired. In the higher stages of religious development the religious consciousness has intellectual clarity and certainty; but it must not be overlooked that this enlightenment of the mind is not detached from quickened emotion and strengthened volition. The whole personality is brought into contact with God, and becomes the channel of His revelation.

III

Religious knowledge is not *intuitional*, and it is not primarily *inferential*. It is due to the contact of the soul with God, and the communication of life, inclusive of truth, from God. This is our provisional conclusion from the previous discussion. Can we, in the light of modern thought, justify that conclusion further? No such question can be adequately discussed to-day without reference to Kant. Had Kant not been singularly defective in his spiritual capacity, so that for him the belief in God could be justified only as a postulate of

the practical reason, and religion was but the view of moral duties as Divine commands, he would have added a *Critique of the Spiritual Reason* to his *Critiques of the Pure* and *the Practical Reason.*

The study of comparative religions shows not only the universality of religion, but sufficient similarity in its development in various races of mankind not only to justify, but even to demand an inquiry similar to that which Kant undertook in regard to science and morality. The place it has filled and the part it has played in human history is such that it is impossible, with Kant, to subordinate it to morality, or, with Hegel, to treat its intellectual content as a less adequate mode of apprehending reality than philosophy offers. Kant recognised that the idea of God was a necessity for the pure as for the practical reason. The scepticism that made him describe the idea as *regulative* and not *constitutive* for the pure reason need not arrest our steps. In thinking things together, even by the categories of the understanding, we *postulate* such an ultimate unity, and the doubt of its existence is the suicide of thought itself. The pure reason is as entitled to its postulates as the practical reason. There is surely a survival of the "faculty" psychology in this separation of the pure and the practical reason. Man as rational is one, whether he seeks truth or strives for duty. The idea of the pure reason cannot be distrusted, and the postulate of the practical reason be trusted as a clue to ultimate reality. Kant's scepticism should have been either greater or less. It is now generally recognised that the argument by which God is proved to be a postulate of the practical reason is an example of perverse ingenuity. Butler surely points the more excellent way. The categorical imperative is not less but more august if uttered not by a human but a Divine voice. Yet justice is not done to the fact of religion if it be regarded as dependent either on the pure or the practical reason. We should be perpetrating Kant's error if we added a spiritual reason. What

we insist on is that man as rational is not complete in the search for truth or the struggle for duty. Religion is as essential and original an element in the nature, and has proved itself as universal and potent a factor in the history of mankind, as knowledge of the world or morality in society. World, self, and God are correlated in human consciousness. This is the truth of the ontological argument, although the statement of it by Anselm and Descartes is unconvincing. In all man's knowledge of himself and of the world there is implicit, although reflexion is necessary to make it explicit, the ultimate unity which embraces, accounts for, and explains the relation to one another of both. The intelligibility of self and world alike involves the cognisable reality of God. To be consistent, agnosticism should not limit itself to the one object of knowledge—God.

IV

Of this object religion claims to have more direct knowledge than is gained by this *transcendental deduction.* In religion God is not only known implicitly in the knowledge of self and the world, but explicitly in Himself. Man's consciousness has developed gradually through what now appears error to what we now hold as truth. In the primitive man's knowledge of self and the world there was the same imperfection as in his knowledge of God. When the world was to him not a unity, but a confusion and conflict of many forces, he thought of the Divine as manifold. His own life lacked the unity of a moral purpose controlling the appetites and passions, and the Divine was conceived by him in his own likeness. Mankind did not begin as the intuitionalists taught, with a complete, perfect idea of God, but with a capacity to gain a knowledge of God in the course of its development. Just as little as modern science or contemporary morality is discredited by the views of the savage regarding nature,

or by barbarian moral customs, is theism disproved by the crude religious beliefs of the early age. That man everywhere has believed in the Divine, and that his conception has depended always on the stage of his mental and moral development, is surely convincing evidence that religion is not illusion, but is the response to reality. That much in religious belief and custom is traditional and conventional, the individual reproducing and repeating what is common to the society of which he is a member, must be admitted. Here we cannot claim any immediate contact of the soul of man with God. The knowledge is not in the strict sense religious knowledge. But the dependence of the higher religions on prophetic personalities, men conscious of a Divine inspiration to fit them to be the agents of a Divine revelation, suggests that behind the traditional beliefs and the conventional customs of these less developed societies, there also lies the creative influence of men who were genuinely religious, who had personal contact with the Divine. The belief in inspiration is so widespread in the religions of the world that it may be assumed to correspond to some fact.

When we speak of *immediate contact* of the soul with the Divine, we do not, of course, mean what a strict mysticism would mean, that there is no mediation. All we mean is that just as we may speak of an immediate perception of the world around us, even although, as the physiologist and psychologist will tell us, there is a complex process involved, so the soul can be aware of being in the Divine presence. God is as really the spiritual as the world is the physical environment of man, and just as the bodily senses are to be trusted in making us aware of the one, so may the spiritual sense, which in an extended meaning of the term we may call faith. To press the analogy a little further, our perceptions are our response to the action of the environment upon us; movements in the ether are for us sights and movements of the air sounds.

Can faith, then, be ought else than the response to the spiritual environment which is not passive, but active? Where God is known He makes Himself known; He is found of those who seek Him, because their search responds to His approach.

This extended use of the word "revelation" must be distinguished from the more restricted, which is more common. Revelation is often used of the impartation to man of *new* truths. The prophets speak something that men have not before heard. There has been a development of man's religious knowledge, and the stages of it are connected with such personalities as rose above, or (should we not rather say?) were drawn above the common faith. It is very important for us to trace this process step by step, and to mark the unfolding of the mind and will of God in the history of man. But we should not so concentrate our attention on this progress as to ignore what lies in the background, the genuine religion implying the authentic revelation, which may make no fresh discoveries and get no new disclosures, but which abides in contact with God. The prophet appeals to and is appreciated by the piety of other souls. If the knowledge of such piety shows no marks of originality it is vivified by personal experience.

There is an objection which may be made to this line of thought, and the answer to which will bring us to the very core of our problem. It may be asked, Why is this religious knowledge not universal? Why are there so many who are indifferent, who have never experienced this contact with God, and do not even feel the need of it? We might reply, Are all interested in science, devoted to art, or even dominated by morality? What belongs to man's bodily senses and needs is common to all. Men see and hear, hunger and thirst together; "one touch of nature makes the whole world kin." Society in its own interests compels the observance of certain moral customs, but can it be said that all men are moral in disposition, purpose,

aspiration? Because morality is so essential to society, the men who do not possess the minimum required are judged abnormal. However necessary for the highest life of mankind religion may be, yet it is not so immediate a necessity for the existence of human society that it can be made matter of constraint. Were morality and religion on the same footing as regards social necessity, the irreligious would also be reckoned abnormal. We need not contend that all men are religious, but only that religion belongs to the full development of human personality.

Why, then, are some men not religious? And why, consequently, does religious knowledge not appear equally true to all? It may be admitted that there are differences of disposition and temperament, so that one man lives in the unseen as his fellow cannot. But no man is doomed by his nature to irreligion. There is an absorption in secular ambitions, artistic pursuits, intellectual interests that results in spiritual atrophy. There is a moral superficiality which imagines man to be sufficient unto himself for duty, and, therefore, never feels the moral need that drives many men to God. The evidences and the arguments for religious truth cannot be even intellectually apprehended unless they are spiritually appropriated. You cannot make a man religious by logical demonstration or authoritative declaration. Accordingly, religious knowledge, which involves not only certain objects to be intellectually apprehended, but also a mode of apprehending them which is not merely intellectual, cannot be a common possession. To have religious knowledge a man must be religious. A man does not know God even if he has followed step by step with intellectual acceptance all the proofs of the existence of God. God's reality must be experienced; the testimony and the persuasion of others may induce us to seek that experience, but cannot be a substitute for it. We must feel needs that God alone can meet and must find these needs met in God, and then we know that God is real. As the litera-

ture of the religions of the ancient world shows us, it was man's sense of natural weakness, his dread of physical evil, that often drove him to seek refuge in the Divine. The succour, the comfort, the joy experienced showed the reality of God. To-day it is probably moral need, either the sense of moral depravity or the feeling of moral incompleteness, that leads men to seek God; the moral deliverance and invigoration they experience make God real to them. As this convincing proof of God's existence is so intimately personal, it is never completely communicable. The faith thus begun, inclusive of moral submission to God, finds increasingly its experimental verification. God becomes more real the more He is trusted. But how can such a knowledge be imparted to those who are indifferent? The personal value of the soul's vision of God is not dependent on its universal validity for the apprehension of all, pious and irreligious alike. This religious life is, however, reproductive; the individual usually finds himself in a religious community which shares his faith; his religious knowledge is not a private opinion —it comes to be a communal confession. The faith of each is strengthened by the faith of all; still, there is religious knowledge only where there is the personal experience.

This is, as I apprehend it, the essential intention of Ritschl's theory of value judgments. Spiritual truth is not merely intellectually apprehended; there must be a personal appreciation; the object of knowledge has value for the individual experience, and the knowledge is conditioned by the value. What God does for us and in us is what God is for our religious knowledge. That the knowledge of God is thus conditioned by personal experience, character, purpose, is surely a truth very plainly and often taught in the Holy Scriptures. "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him" (Psa. xxv. 14). "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Prov. ix. 10). "He revealeth His secret unto His servants the prophets" (Amos iii. 7). "The

pure in heart shall see God" (Matt. v. 8). "If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself" (John vii. 17). "The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him: and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged" (1 Cor. ii. 14). This must, of course, not be misunderstood; man's personal experience does not make the objects of his religious knowledge; these objects are real, and it is the mode of their apprehension by man alone which is thus conditioned. In morality it is an ideal which is realised; in religion it is a reality that is recognised. God (as every other object of religious faith) has an objective reality which can, on the fulfilment of the necessary conditions, be subjectively recognised, but this subjective recognition is not universal. Just because all men do not feel their need of God all men do not seek and find God. They who possess the secret will not less confidently claim knowledge because so many of their fellows are content with ignorance.

V

The application of this conclusion regarding religious knowledge is beset by a special difficulty in regard to the object of the Christian faith. Here we are concerned not merely with the soul and God in immediate contact, but with a process of historical mediation. The object of Christian faith is God in Christ, the eternal reality in a historical personality. There is a historical process of Divine revelation leading up to and finding fulfilment in Him; there is a historical society that claims to be the recipient and the transmitter of the truth and grace that are in Him. There are many who are quite prepared to recognise a universal revelation of God to the soul in the individual reason and conscience, but cannot admit this approach of the eternal through the temporal. In the first place,

attention may be called to the fact that this historical mediation is characteristic of all God's dealings with man. Man lives and thinks and labours in history. Not only is he dependent on his physical heredity, but who can estimate the debt of each man to his social heredity in his environment? The knowledge, industry, art, morality, and religion that enrich each life are an inheritance. Why should religion be an exception? Why in the relation of the soul to God even should there not be dependence on others?

Secondly, it may be pointed out that in human progress there is evident a law of Divine election. Different races and peoples are differently endowed, and are, therefore, fitted, and that surely for theism means intended, by God for different functions in the history of the family of mankind. How varied are the gifts that the modern world owes to Israel, Greece, Rome, Germany? Will not the future show that India and China, so long out of the main stream of the world's life, will each have some distinctive contribution to make to the world that is yet to be?

Thirdly, when we compare the history of the Hebrew nation with the history of its neighbours, and often its conquerors, can it be doubted that religion was the speciality of this people? The slow yet sure advance from the common Semitic heathenism with which its religion began to the ethical monotheism of the prophets with which it ended is absolutely unique in the religious records of mankind. Even if you say that it had the genius for religion you have not solved the problem.

For, fourthly, as has been insisted on, where there is religion there is revelation, and, therefore, a genius for religion involves an immediacy of relation and intimacy of communion with God as a genius for philosophy or statecraft does not. Where the religion is genuine the revelation will be real, and surely the measure of the religion is also the measure of the revelation. There seems to be, therefore, no

assumption contradicting the general principles of the interpretation of human history in the conclusion that the revelation was as unique as was the religion. God's disclosure of Himself explains man's discovery of Him.

Fifthly, this progressive revelation did not stop with the ethical monotheism of the prophets; if Judaism cannot be described as an advance it must not be condemned as a retreat; in this hard husk was preserved the kernel of the Hebrew faith till the fulness of the times. Jesus the Christ was the consummation of this progressive revelation. The conception of God was completed in His consciousness of Divine Fatherhood; the standard for man was perfected in His teaching and example; the expectation of human deliverance by Divine grace was fulfilled in the salvation He offered men in His sacrifice unto death and His victory over the grave. It cannot be affirmed that any one has excelled Jesus the Christ in the things of God. So immeasurably wiser and better has the revelation of God and the redemption of man in Him appeared to most thinkers that they have not hesitated in affirming the absoluteness of the Christian religion.

Sixthly, the attempt made in the name of historical science to reduce Jesus to the measure of a man, to bring Him within the bounds of the natural, of the common human experience, has failed. The Gospel story is being admitted to be not "a cunningly devised fable." Criticism may point out here and there misconceptions and misrepresentations due to the evangelist's religious standpoint or the general mental condition of the age to which the Gospels belong; but the Person of Christ in all its essential features remains a historical reality. Even the miraculous in the setting of His life and work does not appear incredible and irrational. But granted even that the miracles had to be given up, His religious consciousness, His moral character, His mediatorial function in bringing men to God justify our maintaining His absoluteness. His

originality has not been disproved by the endeavours to show in other religions similarities in word and deed or even to derive much of the contents of the Gospels from the scriptures of other faiths. Comparison of Christ with other masters makes His supremacy only the more manifest.

Seventhly, through nearly twenty centuries the community of believers in Him has not only transmitted His teaching, perpetuated His example, preserved His influence among men, but has lived, suffered, and toiled in the certainty of faith that He still lives in, suffers with, and toils by His Church. The distinctive feature of the Christian Church is that it believes itself to be the living body of the living Head. Whatever errors and wrongs, failures and infidelities have stained and marred the ecclesiastical institution, yet there has always been a remnant according to the election of grace, which has lived consciously in communion with the Saviour and Lord. Again and again has there been religious revival and moral reform by return to Him. The Church to-day is strengthened and encouraged in its stupendous task of spreading the gospel and hastening the Kingdom by His Presence. Can so widespread and age-long an experience be all an illusion? Surely it is convincing evidence that Christ lives in and for His community.

Lastly, is it unreasonable or incredible that God, having revealed Himself as He did in the historical Jesus, should continue to reveal Himself in the same living Christ? If in this earthly life He mediated unto men the Divine truth and grace, surely by His heavenly reign He is carrying to its completion that mediation till God shall be all in all. The worth of the revelation of God in the historical Jesus is so absolute that one cannot but believe that it is made permanent and universal, not through the uncertain channels of human tradition, but through the efficacious activity of Him who, having begun the work of God, is appointed to carry it on to the end.

VI

This outline of the argument by which the modern objection to the claim of the Christian believer that Christ lives in him and he in Christ may be met, is intended to lead up to what seems to me the convincing evidence. It is the Christian experience itself. Let us briefly sketch the progress of that experience. Some, by their physical as well as social heredity, are brought into relation to the truth and grace of Christ from their earliest years. As their moral conscience and their religious consciousness develop they experience their unworthiness and weakness, and the pardon and power from God that comes to them in Christ. For them God and Christ are one reality. It may be they do not doubt or question, and, therefore they do not inquire and discover, what is involved in their experience. If the worth and truth of their experience were challenged, some possibly would find themselves involved in intellectual difficulties which for a time might shake the certainty of their faith; but if they fully appreciated the reality of their moral and religious experience, they would not allow these difficulties to rob them of that reality. One cannot but feel the tenderest sympathy for any who, when their experience is thus challenged, succumb and lose the certainty of their faith. Their failure does not, however, disprove the success of those who have faced and fought these difficulties, and have emerged with not a less, but a greater, certainty of faith. Others there are to whom, for one reason or another, there comes such an experience, as Dr. Dale confessed in regard to himself. What is implicit in their Christian thought and life becomes explicit. It comes as a new revelation to them, in the light of which they gladly go all their days, "Jesus lives." Henceforth God in Christ is the most certain reality of their consciousness. If it be said to them, it is God who by His Spirit enlightens, strengthens, renews you, then they answer, "We cannot separate God from

Christ, or think of God apart from Christ. The Father came to us, and abides with us in the Son; we know no God apart from the truth and grace of Christ." This Christian experience does not substitute Christ for God: but for it God's revelation of Himself and God's redemption of man are inseparable from the life and sacrifice of Christ. Does any man know so much about the conditions of that spiritual realm in which God is, and into which Christ Himself expected to pass, and assured His disciples that He had passed, as to be entitled to affirm that it is impossible, or even incredible and unintelligible, that God should ever be present to, and work in the Christian believer in Christ? There is no knowledge of the laws of the spiritual realm that contradicts the distinctive Christian experience.

A few have at the very beginning of their Christian experience a very vivid consciousness of the presence and power of Christ. Through Him they have passed "out of darkness into God's marvellous light." Fettered by sin, oppressed with guilt, despairing of self, they have heard the Gospel, which made real to them an all-sufficient and all-potent Saviour. They have cast themselves on Him and have been rescued by Him. To them the suggestion that Jesus no longer lives, and that it was God apart from Christ who did this wonderful deed for them will appear an impertinence, or a mockery, or even a blasphemy. They know not God as Saviour apart from Christ; and their subsequent Christian life confirms this identification.

This Christian experience is evidence, not only to those who possess it, but to others also. Those who approach it in a sceptical attitude, who do not know the extent and the urgency of the moral and religious problem that is solved in it, will not be convinced; for its reality is incommunicable. Words can never express all that Christ is to those who trust, love, and serve Him. A little modesty would put a bound to this scepticism. Is saintliness insanity? Are those who in Christ triumph over sin, and sorrow, and death likely

to be the victims of delusion? Because a man does not share, and, therefore, does not understand this experience, is his ignorance of greater intellectual value than the Christian's knowledge? Where, however, there is an appreciation of moral and religious values, or where the needs of the soul are keenly felt, this certainty of faith is contagious. The believer's confidence inspires others to make the venture of faith, which their subsequent experience justifies, but which merely intellectual reasonings would not have persuaded them to make. The certainty of faith is not merely intellectual, although distinct vision of truth is an essential element in it; but that vision is conditioned by the love of the heart, and the obedience of the will. It is a practical need that Christ meets, and the knowledge of Him depends on feeling that need. If a man does not know himself a sinner, he will never know Christ as Saviour. The satisfaction Christ gives is far wider than the solution of intellectual problems; and, therefore, the evidence of His reality and sufficiency embraces the whole personality. Faith is not less, but more than knowledge. It apprehends an object which meets the needs of the whole man as well as answers the questions of his mind.

VII

One more question remains to be answered before this discussion can be closed. Can faith meet criticism without losing its certainty? It may be frankly admitted that if criticism of the Gospel records resulted in the inevitable conclusion that Jesus was not what He is there represented as having been, that He was but one among men, a little wiser, better, kinder, but not free of illusions about Himself and His work, and not able to save those whom He taught and who followed Him from still greater illusions, then the certainty of Christian faith would for ever go, and the Christian religion would appear as one

of the most pitiful and miserable mistakes that man has ever made. Religion has not been without its disciplinary and preparatory illusions, its imperfect and inadequate beliefs which have led the way to truth, as Robertson of Brighton has urged; but these illusions have given place to something better, meeting more fully man's need. But this mistake of Christianity would not be such an illusion, for what is offered to us instead cannot be deemed an advance, but must be regarded as a retreat of the mind and heart of man in face of the mystery of the universe. It would be a delusion which would justify the epithet of this "mad world." But we need not dread so tragic a conclusion to Christian history. As has already been indicated, the results of criticism do not favour unbelief rather than faith. It is strange to understand how some who claim to be Christian teachers eagerly accept every negative hypothesis, and hurriedly adjust their creed to it, while they ignore the less sensational, much more solid work that is being done by Christian scholars in establishing the trustworthiness of the New Testament report and representation of Christ. The decision of many of the questions depends on a weighing of probabilities; and surely that representation of the historical Jesus has the greater probability which is not contradictory of, but consistent with, the living Christ who is the object of the Christian faith. For be it observed that the Christian experience assumes the identity of the historical Jesus and the living Christ. It is Jesus' welcome of, and assurance of pardon to, the sinful in the days of His flesh that encourages the soul, oppressed with guilt, to draw near the living Christ in the confident expectation of the same grace. The power that He displayed over disease and death confirms the assurance that He can now save to the uttermost. That He rose again from the dead, and liveth for evermore with God, is a fact essential to the certainty of faith that He is present and potent here and now as Saviour and Lord, and that He will give a like victory

over death to those who trust in Him. There are, of course, single sayings and doings of Jesus which might fall out of the Gospel record without endangering Christian faith; but it is the whole Jesus the Christ, in word and deed, life, death, and rising again, as the Gospels represent Him, who is the object of Christian faith. If the historical Jesus is not a reality, then Christian faith loses not only some of its contents, but changes its whole character. With His religious consciousness, and moral character, and mediatorial function, as historically presented, are bound up His revelation of God to us, and our redemption to God in Him. The Christian reads the Gospels, and, in reading, realises more fully what the living Christ with Him is. The reality of what Jesus was is for him again and again confirmed by what His Saviour and Lord is to Him now. From this fact of Christian experience an important conclusion can be drawn. The criticism of the Gospels cannot ignore the certainty of Christian faith; the unbeliever is less qualified to study the Gospels than the saint. Here is a world-wide and age-long effect: where the Gospels are known and believed, this is the type of experience produced. Must not the cause be adequate to the effect? Are we to believe in reason or unreason in human history? Has a fable produced such faith? or is not the fact as faith testifies? If, as the object of faith, Christ now makes men sure of God as Father, it is likely that He lived as Son of God; if He brings men the assurance of pardon, it is likely that He claimed the authority on earth to forgive sins; if out of moral weakness He can make men strong, more than conquerors, it is likely that He was endowed with power in the outward as the promise and the pledge of His might in the inner realm; if in time men live the eternal life in God through Him, it is likely that He ever liveth with God. The certainty of Christian faith has not been undermined by criticism, but it may even set limits to the criticism that is credible and intelligible.

The answer to the question proposed at the beginning

of this discussion, then, is that religion generally, and Christian faith pre-eminently, knows things unseen, eternal, Divine, with the certainty that the knowledge of things seen, temporal, finite, can neither give nor take away. With more courage and confidence than the poet shows, the believer can affirm, "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him."

FINAL CHRISTIANITY

AN ESSAY IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE HISTORICAL METHOD

D. MACFADYEN

FINAL CHRISTIANITY

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THE arrival of the historical method in the study of religion has conferred a measure of detachment on the student and made it possible for him, without modifying his personal adhesion to one religion as uniquely true and personally authoritative, to study religion in a scientific spirit, both in its parts and as an organic whole. Among the applications, influences, and effects of the historical method we may reckon the preference for fact over theory, literary criticism, scientific comparison, the process of following a belief through all its stages to its results and criticising it by its fruits. These have added important departments to the area of religious study such as psychology, higher criticism, comparative religion, evolution as a method of creation, and historico-criticism. The fact that each of them is absorbing in itself and requires a lifetime for specialisation has, at least in part, prevented them from having their desired effect on the public mind. Occasionally specialists, pursuing a study regardless of any one else, bring back results which have the effect of disintegrating belief, and which give an impression of destructive rather than constructive collaboration. There is, consequently, no greater need at the moment than that of continuous and careful collection of the constructive results of different spheres of religious study; and for this purpose the comparative historical method has special

fitness. Criticism must heal the wounds which criticism has made and comparative criticism on the large scale of the world's history promises to remedy some of the confusions wrought by criticism on the minute scale of literature.

The work of scholars, archæologists, and literary critics is not in itself constructive, but it is the collection of material for construction. It is like the work of the coral insect in building a reef, where every inch of valid work is valuable and becomes the basis for something else; but it is not till the total result emerges into the sphere of life and religious thought and action that its value is seen. This is the stage at which we are now arriving. We are, consciously or unconsciously, greatly in need of an interpretation of life to which religion is a necessity instead of an otiose superfluity, and we can only get it by thorough, informed, theological construction in the attitude and atmosphere of faith. The sources of power and of service in our churches are running dry because heroic action must rest on assured conviction, and assured conviction is just what is lacking. Faith has now to estimate the values of the historian's work for its own purposes, and act on the basis of that valuation. The task of the past fifty years has been to provide materials for reconstruction; the problem of the present is to find the builders. The edifice of faith rests on two pillars. One is supplied by experience, the other must be given by history. Critics have weakened the historic pillar, and it is right that they should rebuild it, taking as its basis not revelation in the sphere of a nation's but in the sphere of a world's history; not religion in Israel alone, but religion in mankind. We have had history used to undermine faith, and we have had faith criticising and defying historical study. The future belongs to those who can see that history is the mightiest of all the instruments in the hands of faith, that it is only half understood till we find God in it, and that God is less than half unveiled till we find Him in

history. Faith and history are not rivals, for if history is needed to mediate the content of faith, faith is needed to assess the religious values of history. They are fellow workers in the great task of supplying our time with a genuine religious interpretation of life. From this standpoint we may look to the historical method to bring out (1) the *differentia* of religion, which distinguish it from other parts of human experience; and (2) the *differentia* of Christianity among the religions of the world.

Before the application of scientific method to the study of religion, it was liable to a form of attack which was particularly difficult to meet. A mind trained in philosophy or science came to the study of religion furnished with the categories of philosophy or science. It put religion on its own particular bed of Procrustes, cutting off what exceeded and stretching out what fell short of its own particular standard. The student was a Hegelian or a Comtist, or a Spencerian, or a Darwinian before he came to the study of religion. His mind was already full of the forms into which he was going to force his new study, and the result was not a new study of religion, but a new department of some philosophy—Hegelian or Darwinian, as the case might be.

The first task of the historical method was to liberate religion from this burden of subjection to many masters, tracing its history from the earliest records and showing that, as a continuous human experience, it has its own sphere of reality to deal with, and is, like every other human experience, entitled to hypotheses, postulates and categories of its own.

In its own sphere it is autonomous. The facts with which it deals belong to the deepest sphere of reality which comes within our knowledge. The assumption on which the study of religion proceeds is that the seat of feeling, consciousness, and will in man is in conscious and developing relation with an unseen but ultimate Spiritual Reality, however imperfectly apprehended

The sphere of religion is man's conscious relation to God, God's positive relation to man. This is a fact so central, fundamental, and predominant, that every orderly scheme of dealing with reality (Eucken's word is *syntagma*)* must take stock of it. It is a fact for metaphysics, though metaphysics has no categories large enough to hold all its meaning. It is a fact for philosophy, though philosophy stops short at the threshold where religion begins. It is a fact for science, though it overlaps the scientific categories in a hundred directions. It may be approached from the side of æsthetics or economics. But for adequate statement it must be allowed to supply categories and postulates from its own history.

The claim that religion is properly autonomous and is to be judged by its own standards has limits which should be recognised. It is legitimately liable to two kinds of criticism: (i) from without when it goes beyond its own sphere; (ii) from within when it is diverted from its main purpose. Even to note the present position of the discussion between science and religion, or religion and economics, would carry this paper beyond its proper subject, but it may properly concern itself with (iii) the internal criticism of religion.

§

The normal criticism of religion is from within. It is bound to meet the criticism of its methods in the light of its ends, and of its objects in the light of its results. There are critics of religion for the sake of religion, and it is their criticism which is of permanent worth. An excellent example of such criticism is the work of all reverent and understanding Biblical critics.

* A "syntagma" is a systematised organisation of life, not a mere organisation of theory. Eucken uses the word to mean "world forces rooted in definite historical movements," each of them arriving at a thorough reconstruction of life in the light of some simple specific conviction.

The constructive result of their criticism is to make clear what the methods of operation of religion in history have been, how its powers and resources acted and re-acted in two thousand years of a nation's history; its products, ethical, institutional, legal, national, personal; its powers in producing literatures, histories, policies, prophecies, and in making men. The distinction which separates believing from unbelieving criticism is not in the handling of documents, but in the recognition that the basis on which this history as a whole proceeds is, that it is the real historic record of reciprocal relations between God and man; and that the reconstructed history has this character as much as the history in its more conventional form. It is not to be explained away. It is not to be reduced to lower terms. It is an experience to be classed and recognised by itself. It has a right to the terms, conceptions, categories, and ideals which belong to its special type. God is God even when He works through imperfect conceptions of Himself in the minds of men, and Divine powers enter history and work there, even though they work through rock-hewn, but not chisel-fashioned, personalities. Every genuine religious personality is a gift of God to the race.

The history of a religion begins with a conscious personal relation between God and man, and valid criticism must keep within the recognition of the reality of the two terms of the relation. Any system of thought which denies to God power to deal with men, or denies to man the ability to know the leading and guidance of God, to obey or disobey the Divine will, falls over the boundary line between religion and philosophy. If God be not recognised as at least personal, if He has no will and no power to accomplish what He wills, if He cannot reveal Himself in human history, or inspire religious personalities, religion, in the proper sense, ceases to be possible. It is indeed singular that writers who are clearly anxious to find a certain knowledge of God mediated in nature should

not recognise that a much fuller and more adequate knowledge of God is mediated in history. The revelation of God in nature is revelation through a so-called material order of being; and it is obviously illogical to affirm that a God, who can reveal Himself in the so-called material order, cannot reveal Himself in a moral order, making use of the much higher orders of powers which meet in human nature and find expression in human history. The claim for a historical revelation is a strictly logical and reasonable one. The basis of the claim that we have the history of a special revelation is the fact of universal revelation, and that rests historically on the experience of the race. Man has always claimed that he has received help in the task of living, from powers supernatural and spiritual. The help thus derived has touched all sides of his nature—physical, mental, moral, spiritual. It has appealed to his whole personality so as to justify him in believing that he is dealing with a Power as fully personal as himself.

An adequate religion cannot, therefore, be made independent of historic fact, for history is one of the channels by which the knowledge of God is mediated to us. We have the right to use, assess, value, utilise whatever in history really serves this supreme purpose. On the other hand, criticism of historic fact does not touch the foundations of religion, for religion itself cannot rest on facts which essentially get their meaning and interpretation from religion. The bedrock of certainty is experience, and the experience of the consciousness of God, of the possibility of revelation, of sin and forgiveness, of religious peace, hope, and victory, are among the most widely verified, and securely attested experiences of mankind. They are at least as surely attested as any experiences which come through sight and taste, touch and smell; and to many they have a far higher order of verity. No serious student doubts that in the records of Israel we have a great historical experience of God.

§

When we know the characteristic features of religion, we are in a fair way to discover whether there is or can be anything like finality in any of its forms.

Perhaps the greatest service comparative religion can render us is in training the judgment to form this conclusion ; for relative religion is an interest for *dilettanti*, but a final revelation of a saving relationship to the living God is another matter altogether. It has the right not to beg for admission but to command attention ; it is one of the things men must know and experience ; it holds the secrets of all fundamental human happiness, temporal and eternal.

These, then, are the steps of the argument which follows :—

1. The negative movement of criticism in dealing with historical Christianity has failed because it has applied to Christian facts the categories of science and philosophy, and has forgotten the categories of religion. *Cuique sua arte credendum.* You must at least know by experience the needs of religion before you criticise one who offers to meet them. Jesus Christ can only be truly estimated historically in the terms in which He offers Himself, as a Saviour coming to save a people from their sins.

2. The categories of religion are not subjective, dependent on arbitrary selection, or on imaginative piety, or on the subjectivity of each theoriser in turn. They are to be gathered from the history of religion,

3. Given the categories of religion, Christianity is its final and absolute form. It is the revelation of God as redeemer ; the life, death, and rising of Christ being the Divine redemptive act, and the issue of it a redeemed community owning Christ as Saviour.

§

The Failure of the Negative Critical Movement in dealing with the History of Christianity.

The ideas which determine the position of Jesus Christ in religion lie beyond the frontiers of historical discussions, in the religious mind of man. They can, like all other great things, neither be proved nor disproved; they are postulates of human history. This gives a starting-point for criticising the historical critics.

The breakdown of Calvinism came *pari passu* with the rise of the historical sense. The cry was, "No more doctrine, let us get at the facts. Let Jesus Christ speak for Himself and all will be well. Let us get back to Christ." The movement towards religious realism, which is linked in the popular mind with "Essays and Reviews," and especially with Jowett's "Essay on the Interpretation of Scripture," has gone to great lengths. It has ended in offering religion without revelation, Christianity without a Christ, a cross without a reason for it, prayers without answers, rewards without penalties, immortality without eternal life. This is a heavy price to pay for getting rid of doctrinal Christianity. And when we ask what we have got for it, we are told that we have got at the facts.

Having got the facts, another process began. First, there was the sifting and criticism of the records. Then the attack was, and is now concentrated, on the acts, words, and person of Jesus Christ; and it has gone far enough to make clear that if historical considerations are the only considerations involved, there is not enough material left for doctrinal re-construction. If we have nothing in our hands with which to meet thoroughgoing scepticism but the seven sayings of Schmiedel, or the Tacitean biography of Dr. Bruce, these also will have to be thrown to the insatiable wolf of philosophic doubt.

But it is now the turn of faith to turn round on its critics. Our criticism of the historical critic is that he is not historian enough. Any historical life must be judged in its proper setting. Owing to the neglect of this simple axiom, much of the writing about Jesus Christ is historically as vicious as a life of Charlemagne which had never discovered the existence of a Holy Roman Empire, or a life of Socrates which had never heard of any other Greek philosopher.

The fact of Christ belongs not only to the history of man, but fundamentally to a history of religion; and not only to the history of religion in Israel, for the history of religion in Israel is part of a much larger history of religion in mankind. So that before the historian has the right to touch the history of Jesus Christ, he must show his passport to deal with a question so vital, universal, and essential to the life of man as religion. Once this fundamental question is raised we clear away the *débris* of many unsound estimates of the worth and work of Jesus Christ.

For while the historical materials on which the Christian faith was held to rest have seemed to melt under the touch of the critic, like snow in the sun, the materials for dealing with religion have been growing under the hand of the historian of religion, the scientific observer, and the anthropologist.

Religion has emerged as a great fundamental human experience, dealing in all peoples with the same permanent realities—creation, revelation, sin, sacrifice, atonement, the hope of a Saviour, the experience of salvation, the creation of a society of the saved, rules of initiation and communion, inspiration, sacred writings, and the preparation for a future life. These are real, permanent, universal human interests. They are the things men want to know about, and Jesus Christ belongs to their history in the world as much as Charlemagne belonged to the history of the Holy Roman Empire. He is first and foremost a fact in religion, and He is not rightly approached except with the cate-

gories of religion already in the mind. Jesus does not offer Himself historically as a character; He offers Himself in history as a Saviour, or, more completely, what we know of Him as a character is that He has consistently throughout the character of a Saviour. Criticism of His teaching as incomplete, or of His ethics as insufficient, is irrelevant. His teaching had the same object as His life and death. He offers His teaching as a means of saving men from sin. It is as an offer of salvation that His life, teaching, death, rising, claim to be God-given. The test of such an offer is not supplied by criticising the Person who makes it, but by accepting it, and so testing its validity. The verification of religion, like the verification of science, is in the sphere of experience. We turn the flank of the critic when we ask the straight question, "Do men still come into a saving relation to the living God when they accept Christ as Saviour?" Many of the lesser criticisms are both answered and obviated in the same way. When, for instance, we are told that the teaching of Jesus is incomplete because it does not deal with Art, our reply is that the limitation is a self-limitation. No one who reads the parables sympathetically, need doubt that Jesus had appreciation of beauty, the sense of form and proportion, and even the love of colour and contrast which belong to the artist. But Art takes a second place where the object in view is salvation from sin, and Jesus put everything in the second place which challenged interference with His main object.

If religion implies a relation between God and man —and it has no meaning otherwise—we cannot confine the relation wholly to the side of man's activity. Once recognise the relation as two-sided, fully allowing a Divine activity as well as a human, revelation as well as worship, redemption as well as aspiration, and we are at once on relatively solid ground for the defence of religion, and the appreciation of Jesus; and we must take this step, for we cannot meet a cosmo-centric

science with a merely anthropocentric Christology; or if we make the attempt we must be prepared to end in the camp of those who clothe the findings of science in the terms of religion, and offer us the amalgam as a modernised Christianity. We need to get back the category of revelation, as a real, positive and valid communication from God, not so much of doctrinal religious truth, as of a saving relationship to Himself, achieved and illustrated in Jesus Christ. Religion is not a younger brother of philosophy. It is essentially an offer of a way of salvation. It is not as a philosophy that it claims finality, though it may carry more than one philosophy in its womb. Philosophies have their day and cease to be. The finality of religion is as a redemption. Its measure is not relative truth, but adequacy to the object in view. It is either adequate or inadequate; and if it is adequate it can be final.

§

The judgment of finality as to one religion must rest on a comparison. The eye must be trained by the study of religions to recognise their normative type, and in the light of that type to estimate how far any religion conforms to it. There are many possible forms of classification and terms of comparison by which the relative positions of religions may be assigned, but only one which can yield the judgment of finality—that is, the comparison of religions in the light of the object of religion. Nor can the essentials of religion be determined or selected arbitrarily from any single experience; a single personal experience, though valid for the person who has it, is too narrow a foundation. For a judgment of finality we must make use of racial experience. An adequate treatment of the argument would show: (1) that the offer which the founder of a religion makes is an offer of salvation; (2) that comparing these offers together many of them are clearly inadequate to their task; (3) that Jesus Christ offers

Himself as a Saviour; and (4) that His way of salvation is adequate in the terms of thought, sufficient in the terms of practical life, and abundantly verified in the terms of spiritual experience. In an essay of restricted limits it is only possible to give one illustration of the effect of comparison.

§

India is in a special sense the land of religion. The history of Hinduism covers almost every phase of religion except the highest. In its thirty centuries of history it has had time to try many experiments and find whither they lead. This makes it an ideal sphere for the critico-historical method. The whole pendulum movement of the human mind within the sphere of religion, from metaphysics to ritualism, and from ethics to mysticism, is illustrated in the history of Hinduism. In its earliest period we stand with our Aryan forefathers awed into reverence before the wonder-working powers of nature, rejoicing in the majesty of the Creator, and in the privilege of living among the works of His hands.

The poems rise to a level which is properly described as inspired, in the sense that in them we recognise that God has spoken to and in the poet. Then thought begins, observation, introspection, dealing not with the original influences from which religion sprang, but with the thought of men about these influences. A thousand years of religious speculation on man's relation to the universe leave us with the logical theory of Upanishadic Pantheism.

"*Brahma in sooth is this All. It hath therein its beginning, end, and breath: so one should worship it in stillness. Made of mind, bodied of breath, revealed in radiance, true of purpose, ethereal of soul, all working, all loving, all smelling, all tasting, grasping this All, speaking naught, heeding naught, this my self within my heart is tinier than a rice corn or a barley corn, or a*

*mustard seed, or a canary seed, or the pulp of a canary seed. This my Self within my heart is greater than earth, greater than sky, greater than heaven, greater than these worlds . . . this is Brahma, to Him shall I win in going hence. He that hath this thought hath no doubt."**

The process of abstract meditation can go no further and do no more; and it is significant to mark whither it led. In proportion as metaphysical theory was elaborated, personal worship diminished. The Absolute absorbed thought but ceased to excite worship or influence action. No one was better or worse for knowing of the existence of Brahma. Brahmanic Pantheism accounts for evil as naturally as for good, and makes it harder to remove by setting a Divine stamp upon it. The esoteric theory ceased to serve the purpose of a religion for the people, and religion became the otiose secret of a superior and exclusive class. By way of compensating the people for the loss of direct access to a purposeful God, an elaborate system of ritualism was developed. As the worshipper could not personally deal with God, and as God could not individually help him, he was taught to be satisfied with a share in a general ritual determined by traditional and accidental circumstances. Brahmanism is a finished illustration of what intellectualism can make of religion, how it freezes its life-blood, destroys its moral significance, deprives it of redemptive power, transforms it into a sanctified naturalism.

The refinement of Brahmanic theory provoked a reaction in a direction the direct opposite of itself. When religion becomes pantheistic, theoretic, philosophic, offering no real help in the battle of life, the mind turns elsewhere for help. Finding no help in God it turns back on the resources of human nature, and systems arise such as Buddhism and Jainism—one pessimistic, ethical, and ascetic in type; the other mystical and quietist. The moral side of these systems

* Chhāndogya Upanishad, iii. § 14, quoted in Barnet's "Hinduism," p. 15.

is so much superior to Brahmanism, that nothing could have stayed their progress or prevented their victory, had they been religious. They failed because they were deficient in the crucial point. Brahmanism with all its defects had something to say about God. The ethicists had not.

This whole chapter of religious development may be illustrated by the ease with which pantheism in England passes into socialism. When the practical and theoretic rejection of the sovereignty, personality, and holiness of God has made Him neither the ruler nor the helper of men, the mind then looks for substitutes, and turns to ethics, politics, and economics for the help which the pressure of life compels it to find somewhere. But the materialism of socialism and its characteristic provincialism of mind, born of dealing with one highly artificial set of conditions of life, make it impossible for it either to take the place of religion, or seriously to threaten the hold of any religious system on the human mind. The moral superiority which it claims, and in part really possesses, is as yet counter-balanced by its religious meagreness and insufficiency. The social use of property is coming, and it will largely displace the private use, which is so often gross abuse; but when it has come it will leave us as much in need of a religion as we were before.

The limitations which Buddhism embodied in its programme show themselves in its history. The object of Siddartha is explicitly stated, and is in harmony with the whole character of the historic narrative. He surrendered his place in his father's palace and sought the woods in meditation, in order to find a way of salvation from the blight, misery, and suffering which rest on human life. In disease and suffering, in the transitory nature of human joys, and in death, he saw nothing but evil. The only good was to escape from them. It is from these that he seeks a way of salvation.

This purpose governs the answer which he gives to the problem of life. After six years in the forest and the conflict with Mara's host of sins, the four noble truths open a way of salvation, not from evil but from existence itself. They declare that: (1) In all existence there is sorrow; (or perhaps individual or separate existence is a misery). (2) The cause of existence (or of individual life) is desire. (3) The extinction of desire is the only escape from life. Thus Nirvana, or the extinction of desire, is salvation. (4) Nirvana, or the extinction of desire, is reached by the eight-fold path of self-denial. Furnished with these truths Buddha sent forth his disciples to proclaim them as a way of salvation, His offer was to liberate men from a bondage; to rescue them from *evil;* but the evil from which he rescues them proves to be existence itself. He cures the disease by killing the patient.

If sections dealing with Islam, Confucianism, and some early types of religion were inserted here they would supply the historical basis of the generalisations which follow. On the strength of evidence the greater part of which must be taken for granted in a brief essay, some of the postulates of a final religion suggested by the history of religions may be indicated thus:—

(1) It must provide within its terms a relation between God and man, both conceived as fully personal, both free to do whatever is in accordance with their nature, and each capable of being influenced by the act and character of the other.

(2) This relation must include, on the side of God power to make Himself known and loved, to reveal Himself, to inspire man by the knowledge of Himself, and to assist him in the whole course of human life by guidance, moral quickening, or spiritual relief.

(3) The salvation offered must be adequate to the needs of human life. It must be the seal of ethical

perfection. The saved life must be a complete, lovable, fruitful type of sainthood. In the broad judgment of humanity religion is known by its fruits, and is always insecure unless these fruits commend themselves to the general conscience.

(4) Religion should offer the consecration of the higher and spiritual side of human nature by hallowing the whole of the moral life, and by making life an open communion with God. It must find room among the operations of the Spirit of God for impulses like the love of beauty, the sense of dignity in worship, the passion for truth and the zeal for justice, the sense of mystery, the instinct and hope of immortality. It will recognise the immanence of God in Nature all the more when it has recognised the moral transcendence of God in personality. It must hold the moral and spiritual powers in man in their place of dominion through the disturbance of sex, regulate the relations of men in social fellowship, make egotism a disgrace and altruism an honour, consecrate to the individual his place in the family, the nation, and the race, and enlist him in the co-operative movement of human brotherhood; and it must do this, appealing only to internal motives, opening out the paths of duty as leadings of the Spirit of God.

(5) On the human side the religious relation postulates freedom of spiritual access to God. One of its functions is to open to men comfort, strength, guidance, encouragement in the whole task of life. Another is to explain to them the meaning of those mystic experiences and visitations of the Spirit which, though they come as they list, are sufficiently regular to create a recognised type—the mystics. For both functions access to God must be free, simple, personal. Religion loses one element of vitality if it cease to recognise that "the spirit bloweth where it listeth." It is injured by everything which makes it the special privilege of a caste.

(6) The reality of prayer. Prayer must be a real approach to God, and must be recognised as having positive effect on the relation of God to man. It is essentially the channel by which the help religion offers enters into life.

(7) It must recognise the mediating function of religious personality. If God be conceived as the home of all moral and spiritual powers and forces, personality is clearly the medium through which these forces get entrance into human history. This is the mediating function of personality. It stands like a Matterhorn, with its head in the clouds and its feet in the valleys, the cloud-clad head collecting the fresh waters which fertilise the valleys at its foot. Personality runs through all the phases of being, communicating with the Spirit supreme, and acting as the channel for all ideals and influences that carry inspiration, order, movement, moral cleansing, and spiritual helpfulness into the history of the race.

Religious personalities mediate God to the world, but they do not all mediate the same powers or truths. The eye may be trained to see in a personality what particular spiritual power or grace he mediates. There is something specially repellent in the attempt made by many modern writers to deal with religious personalities as a horse-dealer deals with horses, estimating one against another in the terms of their height from the ground. Every genuine religious personality is a special, solitary, and original gift of God to the world. But they do not all mediate things equally vital and important. It is when we ask ourselves about religious personalities, "What enters human history through this person?" that Jesus Christ takes His unique and solitary pre-eminence. We find in Him a Son with a full knowledge of a Father-God, a sinless person proclaiming the forgiveness of sin, a King of conscience creating a kingdom of conscience, an immortal personality guaranteeing immortality.

§

If the object of religion is the redemption of human life, that object can only be achieved by a redeeming personality, acting for and in the name of a Redeeming God whom He reveals at work in the history of the race. The real significance of the historic Person depends on the God He reveals. For the purpose of religious certainty and finality, revelation is the all-important category. It is true that all sorts of categories have been used in the endeavour to estimate the place and work of Jesus, and we may recognise that they serve a purpose even when we insist that they are inadequate. A fact so tremendous and outstanding as the fact of Christ may be rightly viewed from many standpoints. What we criticise is not the use, but the adequacy of categories taken from systems of thought and experience less fundamental than religion; an inadequate and one-sided category like evolution cannot possibly yield the same result as the higher category of revelation, which implies from the first the two terms of the religious relation — God and man. Historically, all sorts of sources have been laid under contribution for categories in which to set the Christ. The Jew brought to Him those supplied by the history of His people, and named Him Messiah, Christ, Son of God; and on one conspicuous occasion Jesus Himself accepted these as adequate (Matt. xvi. 16, 17). The Greek Fathers brought the categories of their philosophy and named Him the Logos, the Eternal Word, immanent and creative. The Schoolmen allowed the redemptive function of Christ to escape while they were finding philosophic categories into which they could fit Him. The Reformation re-discovered Him as Saviour, thanks to Luther, and gave Him the central place in a redemptive scheme; but in the subsequent development of Protestant scholasticism it lost the human Christ, the friend, the brother, and physician of human ills.

The Victorians, being themselves humanists rather than theologians, gave us innumerable lives of Christ, in which He is the great Humanitarian. The most characteristic product of that whole order of thought is "Ecce Homo." The Hebrew category of Deity in these presentations is otiose. It is introduced occasionally from motives of propriety, and to satisfy orthodoxy; but the essential presentation of the life would not be different if it were omitted. And this is quite natural, for Deity as a category for Jesus Christ is relative to the function of a Redeemer in a world's history. Its meaning is that redemption is as entirely a work of God as creation. It requires the whole of God to redeem a soul, as it requires the whole of God to create a universe. The entire appreciation of the human soul as against the material universe, and the whole conception of the cosmic God as caring supremely for the moral and spiritual creation of personality is wrapped up with the affirmation of the Deity and atonement of Jesus Christ. It is more an affirmation of what God is to man, and what man is to God, than an affirmation about historical incidents which took place in Palestine. If God be not a Redeemer planning the redemption of a race, and effecting the Divine purpose in Christ, there is no real reason for using the term of Deity in connection with a historic life. Deity cannot be revealed by any microscopic examination of human acts. The growth, speech, act, thought, suffering, and death of Jesus appear to be fully human. It is true that the consciousness of a Divine function comes out on reflection on that life, and is preserved for us in the Fourth Gospel, but the verdict was the result of reflection rather than observation. The consciousness that He was God-sent to do a God-work was clearly in Him, but it was not this quality which first attracted the attention of men. It is when we bring to the life of Christ the conviction that behind all history there is revealed a God, holy in character and spiritual in His

modes of action, striving to accomplish man's redemption from sin, and in man a compulsion towards righteousness which he knows as his destiny, but which always evades him as achievement, that we discover, in Christ, God fully and entirely active, and man fully and perfectly redeemed in His life, death, and rising. And we feel that a God who so reveals Himself in redeeming a race, deserves to be fully owned, perfectly trusted, and reverently worshipped.

The judgment of finality in religion does not mean a claim for the rigidity of any of its forms. The claim made is for the adequacy of the Person and work of the Founder to all the needs of religion, and the completeness of the salvation achieved and offered in Him. Christianity as a faith is distinguished from other faiths not by the problems with which it deals, but by the way it deals with them. Its problems are common and universal. They are presented by the fact that man everywhere finds himself a being dependent on a Power other and greater than his own, finding by experience that in his relation to God some acts and influences hinder and confound him, so becoming sin; and other acts and influences help and sustain, coming into his life and becoming means of grace. He turns to religion for the conquest of sin, and the supply of grace. It has to deal with man as subject to a thousand ills, accidental, hereditary, circumstantial, sometimes apparently the sport of events, sometimes their master and lord. It has to face the misery of life, its broken hearts and disappointed hopes, its moral failures and its unsatisfied affections. It has to arm man against circumstance, give him a faith to make him more than conqueror, and supply an interpretation to the ills of the human lot which shall take the bitterness out of them, and give them a noble meaning.

The distinction of the method of Christianity in dealing with these problems is that: (1) The life of the Founder is throughout represented as the redemptive act of God. The Creator being Himself the great

deliverer. (2) The Person and work of the Founder have adequate saving power in the racial soul. (3) The quality of the Christian redemption is unique in its range and depth. (4) The redeemed personality affects its human environment with a contagion of regenerated life.

(1) *The coming of Jesus is the redemptive act of God*, or in the terms of the historic revelation, He is God in history actively redeeming man. He claims life for God in all its parts, its highest and lowest, its suffering and loss as well as its triumph and gain. He takes our humanity and perfectly gives that to God. His whole life is a redemption of the race. He is Saviour, but a Saviour of a new type in the history of religion, for He not only redeems from suffering, He redeems suffering by turning it God-wards and making it a part of the redemption of life, in which all experiences work together for good to them that love God. When He cannot save men out of their troubles, He saves them in them. He endured the Cross, but those who saw it and experienced what followed, instead of having their faith shattered to the dust, came through with an invincible confidence in the justice and love, the power and grace of God. When they experienced the consequences of the Cross, they justified God even in the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. The Christian Faith rests on and rises out of these events. It is a faith that the whole substance and experience of human life has been changed by them; that we live in a world redeemed by and into the grace of God; a world which is reconciled to its God in the life, death, and rising again of Jesus Christ, in whom man is justified with God, and God is justified to man.

* * * * * *

Behind the miracle of the personality is the relation to God on which it rests. It is a sonship which removes the remoteness of God, sets Him in vital relation to His world, but gives that relation a personal, moral,

healing, and redemptive purpose, and so saves it from the otiose metaphysics of pantheism.

Owing to the gracious interpretation of the Divine purpose in His life, Jesus Christ is the one mediator who can safely be trusted to unveil the face of the Almighty. God in His absoluteness and sovereignty is too overwhelming a companion for human life. Humanity in that great light is dwarfed into nothingness, so that no act of will or purpose of man seems to be of any value. As the sun would destroy all life if it were allowed to beat on the earth unmodified, so a transcendent God, unmediated, withers human initiative and takes the motive out of effort. The sun needs an atmosphere, lambent but diffusive, clear but moderating, through which to do its work. In some such way the person of Jesus Christ holds for us Deity in active solution in the life of humanity. Through Him God works, and His work is morally constructive, spiritually redemptive, and personally regenerating. Yet though Jesus Christ reveals God and makes Him ours, we never lose in the unveiling the sense of mystery and awe. He is no scholastic theologian offering to systematise and label for common human use powers and resources of Deity, which language cannot contain. It is God in His relation to man as man may know Him, and deal with Him, that the Christ reveals, and the revelation reaches us through a personality which is its complement. The perfect medium for the Father's work in humanity is the Son.

§

The founder's person has saving power in the human soul.—The personality of the founder of a religion sets a permanent mark on all its adherents and products. Every adherent is linked with him by faith; for him the white radiance of the Eternal is coloured by the medium through which it reaches him. Through the Founder, the spiritual resources, the moral dynamic,

and the mental ideas of the religion, act on men so long as his religion endures. Any kind of imperfection in the Founder multiplies and aggravates itself in the adherents. Thus the religious negations of Buddha have issued in the passive pessimism of Buddhism. The most saintly Buddhist is not a philanthropist. He is a cloistered recluse running away from the evils of the world; never a convinced reformer grappling with evil for the victory of the good. The moral defects of Mohammed, his want of humanity, his appeal to the sword, the defect of sexual restraint in his own ideals of conduct, his refusal of full personality to womanhood, and his fatalism, have been the parents of a long train of evils in his religion.

In the person of Jesus the spirit of religion finds its perfect and final expression. The religion of Jesus is kept from decay by its perennial contact with the original source of religion, by the continuous operation of the Spirit which first caused religion to spring into being in the heart of man. Wherever men are capable of being touched with the sense of the presence of God, with the love of God or the love of man, the hope of a better world here, or the expectation of a blessed immortality hereafter, they find a path to Jesus Christ, and He becomes creator of a new life born in the soul. The life He creates He also interprets, and in interpreting He forms it. The man who is alive in Christ lives in a redeemed world. It is no exaggeration to speak of this influence as creative. The impress of Jesus Christ on the soul summons it to be, calls it out of the mass of sense-bound existence, and endows it with full personality for life in the Kingdom of God. He charges life for those who are linked with Him, with a purpose and destiny, which make it a new order of being. The old contention that there is a final difference between those who have faith in Christ and those who have not, never rested on a difference in the men themselves. The difference was in the power at work on them. It

implied that faith is and establishes a true connection between persons, that through that connection a real moral power operates, and that out of it may come as much moral uplifting as there is in the object of faith. This also is the moral justification of doctrinal discussions which seem to indulge in superfluous hair-splitting. The theologian is strenuously concerned lest anything should block the channel along which the divine saint-making power reaches men. The Christian saint is so much the finest human product in the world's history that no genius is too fine, and no industry too great, to be devoted to the high work of keeping the race in touch with the spiritual dynamic by which the saint is made.

§

The quality of the Christian redemption is unique in its range and depth.—If all religions do their work as offers of salvation, the final victory must be with the religion which offers a salvation most adequate to the whole circle of human need.

Morality rejects Hinduism, philanthropy rejects Buddhism, progressive optimism and humanitarian sympathy reject Islam, religion rejects Confucianism. If it can be shown that Christ is sufficient for all needs, the whole world must at last turn to Him for a salvation which is personal, spiritual, social, communal, and racial in its range.

Much of the early ministry of Jesus Christ was devoted largely, though not exclusively, to dealing with physical needs. He heals the sick and feeds the hungry, He shows Himself able to understand and relieve the physical sufferings which are among the first conscious wants of men. The Galilean ministry gives a permanent place in Christianity to the work of philanthropy, and no interpretation of Christianity which undervalues that work can permanently satisfy.

Many of the secondary products of Christianity—

hospitals, dispensaries, almshouses, institutions for caring for the sick, owe their origin to this side of the ministry of Jesus Christ. As these have been found inadequate in scope and result, larger schemes of preventive social effort have taken their place, and the larger schemes, no less than the smaller and more personal, are rightly claimed as streams from the same Fount.

It is now evident that the healing ministry of Jesus Christ is to have a late blossoming after a long period of comparative unfruitfulness. The mysteries o mental or psychic healing are not yet reduced to scientific order, but it is clear that there is an art of healing by acts of prayer, and powers of will, which may be practised; that the secrets of health are not wholly physical; and that Jesus Christ had and used a power which may still be available for the conquest of many of the evils of life by the spiritual man. Nevertheless, the characteristic feature of the Christian salvation is not its dealing with the physical evils of human life. It is adequate only because Jesus diagnosed more deeply the need which has to be met in bringing salvation to men. He knew that the hidden wound through which human happiness and well-being ebbed away was in the wounded conscience and the mystery of guilt. When the soul is severed from God by sin, no happiness reaching it from any outside source, no health of body, or perfection of social well-being offers any help.

> "Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood
> Clean from my hand? No, this my hand will rather
> The multitudinous seas incarnadine
> Making the green one red."

The mind diseased demands its own ministry, the soul's breach with God must first be healed.

The adequacy of the Christian redemption lies in its power to meet this primal need by removing the misery and guilt of sin. A sinless Saviour suffering for sin brings assurance of God's forgiveness, and no

other can. To the mutual relations of God and man, man contributes an infinite breach, and God contributes an infinite reconciliation. The breach is healed, not by the omission of sin's penalty but by bearing it, and the bearer is provided not by the race, though within the race, but by God out of His resources. This gives the specific character to the regenerated personality in the Christian salvation. It is not the blossom on a beautiful stem as the Greek conceived goodness; it is an engrafted grace, coming down into character rather than rising from it, and often so much the more wonderful because of the roughness of the stock on which it grows.

§

The regenerated personality infects its human environment with new powers of life.—Regeneration is the liberation of a whole range of faculties for service, and the regenerated personality must by its nature set to work to make a social environment in harmony with its own instincts. Its first product is a Church. The second step is taken when redeeming activities which at first had their whole root in Christ are engrafted on the racial stock, and carried on by appealing to our "common humanity." Beyond that lies the task of bringing every civilisation which rests on any principle less than Christian, into harmony with Christian principle, and beyond that again the hope of an integration of the life of the race into Christ. When His name is above every name, every name finds its place in a true order of being. We have the right conferred by the history of our faith to claim that we are in the midst of an age-long process of world redemption in which the redeeming Power is the holy love of the Father, and the redeeming act is effected in the Person of Christ; and we may look forward to a time when the kingdoms of the world will become the kingdom of our God and of His Christ.

THE "FORTY TRADITIONS" IN ISLAM

G. W. THATCHER

THE "FORTY TRADITIONS" IN ISLAM

THE theology and religious practice of orthodox Islam are founded on (1) the Koran; (2) the Tradition; (3) the unanimous agreement of the Community, or of the Learned; (4) Analogy.

The Tradition (hadīth) tells of the manner of life (sunna) of Mohammed, and is contained in stories of how he acted on different occasions, or in speeches of his, reported by those who heard them. That a tradition should be considered sound, it is necessary that there should be a complete chain of narrators from the time of the writer, back to the time when the event occurred or the utterance was made. The orthodox (Sunnī) Moslems acknowledge as authoritative six collections of traditions, all made in the third century of Islam (ninth century A.D.). Of these the most esteemed is the work of Bukhārī (810–870 A.D.) But in the centuries between Mohammed and Bukhārī, traditions had multiplied to an alarming extent. We are told by Bukhārī himself that he travelled through the Moslem world to collect his material, and that he reaped a harvest of sixty thousand traditions, of these he accepted four thousand as genuine, and piety rather than criticism helped him in his choice. Numerous traditions were forged during these centuries to justify legal or theological pronouncements, or individual and national practices. Moslem theologians and historians acknowledge this fully.

But even the six canonical collections are too long for the lay Moslem and the average theological student. At the present time as centuries earlier, the

books of tradition studied are shorter collections compiled for the most part from the six works. One of these manuals, the work of Baghawī (beginning of twelfth century A.D.), called "The Lamps of the Tradition," was translated into English from a fourteenth-century edition, in 1809, by Captain Matthews, and published in two folio volumes at Calcutta. Such handbooks as these are simpler than the canonical works, and omit the long tedious "chains" of relaters, on whom the strength of the tradition depends. Their aim is practical, not academical.

In addition to the two classes of works mentioned above, there is a third consisting of shorter collections made for a special purpose. An early tradition ascribed to Mohammed says, "If any one preserves for (or teaches) my people forty traditions, God counts him among the lawyers and learned men," or, according to another version of the latter half, "I will intercede and testify for him on the day of Resurrection." In accordance with this saying, the smaller collections are usually made to comprise forty traditions (sometimes with an extra two or three), and take the general title "Book of the Forty." According to Nawāwī, the first to write such a work was Ibn al-Mubārak, who lived in 119–181 A.H. (*i.e.* 737–797 A.D.) Since then scores of such works have been compiled. An Eastern writer of the seventeenth century mentions about seventy such, and manuscripts abound in every large library.

The principles that determined the selection of the traditions were as various as the compilers. Some selected those which were concerned with the unity of God, or His attributes; some gathered practical precepts; others confined themselves to those dealing with the rites of worship. Some paid attention to those traditions which were best authenticated, others chose those which were longest and most edifying.

The author of the collection, of which a translation is given here, was a scholar named Nawāwī, who was born

at Nawā near Damascus in 1233 A.D. In Damascus he studied theology, lived for some time as a private scholar, later as Professor of Tradition. He died at his native place in 1278. He was not strong in health and is said to have died of over-work. His grave is regarded as that of a saint. Of his other works his manual of Moslem jurisprudence is very popular, more than twenty commentaries having been written on it. It has also been published with a French translation in Holland.

Twenty-one commentaries on his "Forty Traditions" are known to exist in the great libraries of the East and West. The edition used here is that published in Cairo 1887, with the commentaries of al-Fashnī (1570 A.D.) and Shabrakhītī (d. 1694 A.D.).

Nawāwī has a very short introduction in which, after the usual ascriptions, he mentions the tradition given above, then gives the names of thirteen earlier writers who had compiled similar works. He closes by saying that the learned agree that one may act according to a tradition that is not well authenticated, if the action is good; but that he himself depends on sound traditions.

In the following translation the names of the narrators are omitted.

1. The value of actions lies only in intentions, and to every man is reckoned only what he intends. If any man fled (to Medina) to God and His Apostle, then his flight is reckoned to be to God and His Apostle. And if any man fled to attain this world's advantage or to espouse a wife, then his flight is reckoned in accordance with that which determined it.

2. While we were sitting with the Apostle one day, there appeared before us a man in very white clothing, with very black hair, bearing no trace of travelling and quite unknown to any of us. And he sat down knee to knee by the Prophet, and placed his hands on his loins and said: O Mohammed, tell me about Islam. And the Apostle said: Islam means that one testify that there is no god but God (Allah) and that Mohammed is

God's apostle; and that he offer prayer, and give alms, and fast in the month of Ramadhān, and perform the pilgrimage to the House if he is able to do so. He said: You have spoken truth. And we were astonished at his asking him and confirming him. He said: And tell me about the faith. He said: The faith is that one believe in God and His angels, and His books, and His apostles, and the last day; and that he believe in fore-ordination. He said: You have spoken truth. Tell me about right-doing. He said: It is that you serve God as if you saw Him, for if you do not see Him, He sees you. He said: And tell me about the hour. He said: He who is asked knows no more of it than the asker. He said: Then tell me about the signs of it. He said: The slave maid shall bear her mistress, and you will see the barefooted, naked, needy shepherds exalting themselves in palaces. Then he went away, but I stayed. Then the Prophet said: O Omar, do you know who the questioner was? I said: God and His Apostle know better than I. He said: That was Gabriel; he came to you to teach you your religion.

3. I heard the Apostle say: Islam consists of five things; the testimony that there is no god but God (Allah) and that Mohammed is His servant, and the offering of prayer, and the giving of alms, and the pilgrimage to the House, and the fasting in Ramadhān.

4. The Apostle told us: Every one of you exists in the womb of his mother for forty days as a drop of water, then for another forty as a clot of blood, then another forty as a piece of flesh. Then the angel is sent and he breathes into it the spirit; and the angel is charged with four injunctions—the writing of his portion (whether he is to be rich or poor), the term of his life, his course of action (righteous or otherwise), and his misfortune or happiness (in the future life). For by Him beside whom there is no other god, a man may do the works of Paradise until he is within an ell of it, then the writing (God's decree) prevails, and he does the works of Hell and enters it. And a man may

do the works of Hell until he is within an ell of it, then he does the works of Paradise and enters it.

5. The Apostle said: He who introduces a new teaching into our religion, which is not of it, is rejected.

Another version is: He who does a deed, which is not commanded by us, is rejected.

6. I heard the Apostle say: That which is permitted is clear, and that which is forbidden is clear, and between these are matters of doubt, which many men do not know. Then let him who fears the doubtful matters abstain for his religion and his honour. He who falls into doubtful matters falls into danger like the shepherd who pastures round the reserved place, he very nearly enters it. Has not every king a reserve? And the reserve of God is those things which He has forbidden. In the body there is a piece of flesh, which being sound, all the body is sound, but if it is corrupt, the whole body is corrupt. This is the heart.

7. The Prophet said: Religion is sincerity. We said: To whom? He said: To God, and His book and His Apostle, and the imāms of the Moslems and their people in general.

8. The Apostle said: I have been commanded to fight men until they testify that there is no god but Allah, and that Mohammed is the Apostle of Allah, and they offer the prayers and give the alms. And when they do these things, they save their life and their property from me except when Islam claims them. And their account is with God.

9. I heard the Apostle say: What I have forbidden you, avoid; and of what I have commanded you, bring as much as you can. Verily your people, who were before you, only multiplied their questions and disputes with their prophets.

10. The Apostle said: God is good, He receives only what is good. He commands the believers what He commanded the apostles and said: O apostles, eat of the good things and do what is right; and He said: O

you who believe, eat of the good things which we have given you as bounty.

11. I received from the Apostle the saying: Leave that of which you are doubtful for that of which you have no doubt.

12. The Apostle said: A part of the excellence of a man's surrender to God (*i.e.* Islām) is his leaving what does not disquiet him.

13. The Apostle said: No one of you is a believer until he loves his brother as he loves himself.

14. The Apostle said: The life of a Moslem is not to be taken except in one of these three cases: where a person has had intercourse in marriage and then commits fornication; life for life; when one leaves his religion forsaking the community.

15. The Apostle said: Let him who believes in God and the last day speak good or let him be silent. Let him who believes in God and the last day honour his neighbour. Let him who believes in God and the last day honour his guest.

16. A man said to the Prophet: Give me a charge. He said: Be not angry. And he repeated it several times saying: Be not angry.

17. The Prophet said: God has commanded that every action should be well done, so when you kill, do it well; and when you slay, do it well, and sharpen your knife and accomplish your sacrifice.

18. The Apostle said: Fear God, wherever you are, and make evil to be followed by good which will cancel it.

19. I was (riding) behind the Apostle one day and he said: O young man, guard (the religion of) God, He will guard thee. Guard (the religion of) God; thou wilt find Him before thee. When thou askest for anything, ask God. When thou seekest help, seek help of God. And know that if men agreed to profit thee in some way, they could not profit thee with anything that God had not decreed for thee. And if men agreed to injure thee, they could not injure thee unless God had decreed

it against thee. The reeds are taken away and the pages are dry.

20. The Apostle said: Among the sayings that have come from the earliest prophets is: When thou art not ashamed, then do what thou willst.

21. I said: O Apostle, tell me some saying concerning Islam, about which I need ask none save thee. He said, Say "I believe in God," and act rightly.

22. A man asked the Apostle: Dost thou think that, if I pray the prescribed (prayers), and fast in Ramadhān, and do what is lawful and avoid the unlawful and do nothing beside that, I shall enter Paradise? He said: Yes.

23. The Apostle said: The water of purification is a half of the faith, and the "Praise be to God" fills the balance. And, "Glory to God," and "Praise to God" fill the space between heaven and earth. And prayer is a light, and alms are an evidence, and patience is an illumination. And the Koran is an argument for thee or against thee. Every man each morning contracts for his soul and frees it or destroys it.

24. The Prophet said: God has said: O my servants, I have made oppression unlawful to myself, and have made it unlawful among you, so do not oppress one another. O my servants, each of you would go astray if he were not guided, so seek guidance from me, I will guide you. O my servants, each of you would hunger but for his food, so ask food from me, I will feed you. O my servants, each of you would be naked but for his clothing, so ask me for clothing, I will clothe you. O my servants, you sin night and day and I will forgive the sins altogether, so ask forgiveness of me, I will forgive you. O my servants, you cannot really injure me, and you cannot profit me. O my servants, if you all, first and last, men and genii, were unanimous in piety, that would not increase my dominion; and if you were unanimous in impiety that would not decrease my dominion; and if you united in asking the extent of an earth for yourselves and I gave each man what he

asked, that would only decrease what I have as the needle decreases the view of the ocean. O my servants, I only take account of your actions to recompense you, so if any one finds good, let him praise God, and if any one finds other than that, let him not blame any but himself.

25. Some of the Companions of the Apostle said to the Prophet: O Apostle of God, the people of wealth take the rewards (of the future life), and they give alms of the excess of their possessions. He said: Has not God given you that with which you can give alms? In every "Praise to God" there is an alms; and every "God is great" is an alms; and every "Glory to God" is an alms; and every "There is no god but God" is an alms; and a command to do right is an alms; and a forbidding of the prohibited is an alms.

26. The Apostle said: Every joint of a man owes an alms every day the sun rises. To be just is an alms. To help a man on his beast or to load his baggage is an alms. A good word is an alms, and in every step one takes to prayer is an alms, and the removal of harmful things from the way is an alms.

27. The Prophet said: Righteousness is goodness of moral character, and sin is that which makes an impression on the soul and which thou art unwilling that men should notice.

Another tradition of similar teaching is:

I came to the Apostle, and he said: Thou hast come to ask concerning righteousness? I said: Yes. He said: Ask thine own soul. Righteousness is that on which the soul rests and in which the heart is secure. And sin is what makes an impression on the soul and agitates the breast even if men (*i.e.*, the learned) give thee a decision and acquit thee.

28. The Apostle gave us an exhortation, at which our hearts trembled and our tears flowed. We said: O Apostle, this is as the exhortation of one saying farewell. Then he charged us, saying: I charge you to fear God, to hear and to obey.

29. I said: O Apostle, tell me of some great action that will lead me to Paradise and remove me from Hell. He said: Thou hast asked me concerning a great matter, but it is easy to him to whom God makes it easy (by His help). Thou shalt serve God, thou shalt not associate any with Him, and thou shalt offer prayer and give alms and fast in Ramadhān and make the pilgrimage to the House. Then he said: Shall I guide thee to the gates of good? Fasting (of one's free will) is a protection, and the giving of voluntary alms extinguishes sin as water extinguishes fire; so does the prayer of a man in the middle of the night. Then he recited the words "As their sides forsake their beds, they call upon their Lord with fear and hope; and of what we have bestowed upon them do they give alms. No soul knows what is reserved for them of cheerfulness for eye, as a reward for that which they have done." (Koran, Sura, 32, vv. 16–17). Then he said: Shall I tell you of the head of the matter and its columns and its highest summit? I said: Certainly, O Apostle. He said: The head of the matter is Islam, and its pillars are the prayers and its highest summit is zeal. Then he said: Shall I tell you what controls all that? I said: Certainly, O Apostle. Then he took hold of his tongue and said: Restrain this. I said: O Apostle of God, shall we lay hold of that by which we speak? He said: Will he cast men into Hell on their faces except when their words are not good?

30. The Apostle said: God has made ordinances, so do not destroy them; and has made decrees, so do not transgress them; and has made unlawful some things, so do not weaken them; and is silent concerning some things as a mercy to you, not from forgetfulness, so do not inquire concerning them.

31. A man came to the Prophet and said: O Apostle, show me some course of action in the following of which God will love me and men will love me. And he said: Be abstinent in this world, God will love thee: be abstinent in what is with men, men will love thee.

32. The Apostle said: (In our religion) there shall be no injuring or returning an injury.

33. The Apostle said: If men were given what they claim, men would claim other people's wealth and life, but proof must be given by the claimant, and the oath must be taken by him who denies the claim.

34. I heard the Apostle say: If any of you see a thing disgraceful, then let him change it with his hand; but if he cannot do this, then by his tongue, or if he cannot do this then in his heart. This is the weakest of faith.

35. The Apostle said: Do not outbid one another, and do not hate one another, and do not speak evil of one another, and let none of you buy in opposition to the buying of another, and be servants of God, brothers. The Moslem is brother of the Moslem. Let him not wrong him or deprive him or lie to him or despise him. Piety is here (and the Prophet pointed three times to his breast). That a man should despise his brother Moslem is counted as evil. The life, the wealth and the honour of a Moslem are sacred to a Moslem.

36. The Prophet said: If any one takes away from a believer one of the anxieties of this world, God will take away from him one of the anxieties of the day of resurrection. And if any one makes easy a difficulty, God will make easy for him a difficulty in this world and the next. And if any one covers a Moslem, God will cover him in this world and the next. And God will help the worshipper, so long as the worshipper helps his brother. And if any one enters a path in which he seeks knowledge, God will make plain in it a path to Paradise. And whenever people gather in one of God's houses to recite God's book and to study it together, the Shekina descends on them and mercy veils them and the angels guard them and God mentions them among those who are with Him; and if any one diminishes in them their knowledge his genealogy will not profit him.

37. The Apostle said: Verily God has written (*i.e.* decreed) good things and evil things. And if any one

meditates on a good thing and does not do it, God writes it according to him a good thing, perfect. And if he meditates on it and does it, God writes it according to him ten good things and to seven-hundred-fold and more. And if he meditates on an evil thing and does not do it, God writes it according to him a good thing, perfect; and if he meditates on it and does it, God writes according to him one evil thing.

38. The Apostle said: God has said: If any one treat as an enemy a friend of mine, I inform him that I fight against him. And my worshipper does not bring me anything dearer to me than what I have bidden him. And he does not cease bringing me things beyond what is ordained so that I may love him. And when I love him I am his hearing by which he hears, and his sight by which he sees, and his hand by which he seizes, and his foot by which he walks. And if he asks me, I give him; and if he seeks refuge in me, I surely give him refuge.

39. The Apostle said: God forgives for my sake, my people (their) sin and forgetfulness and what they dislike.

40. Ibn Omar said: The Apostle took me by the shoulder and said: "Be in this world as a stranger or a wayfarer." And Ibn Omar used to say: When thou enterest on the evening time, do not await the dawn (in doing deeds of righteousness); and when thou enterest on the dawn, do not await the evening: and take of thy health for thy sickness, and of thy life for thy death.

41. The Apostle said: None of you believes until his inclination follows what I have brought.

42. I heard the Apostle say: God has said: O son of Adam, verily so long as thou prayest to me and hopest in me, I forgive what comes from thee, and I will take no heed though thy iniquities reach the uppermost part of the heavens, but if thou askest forgiveness of me, I will forgive thee. O son of Adam, if thou bringest me an earthful of sins and castest them on me without associating anything with me (*i.e.*, committing idolatry), I will bring thee as much forgiveness.

The collection of traditions translated above may be accepted as a fair representation of Islam as a religion of everyday life. No. 1, which demands sincerity of motive as well as good action, is regarded as one of the most important of the traditions of Islam. Its teaching is supported by Nos. 7 and 41. In Nos. 3, 22, and 23 is contained a compendium of religion in its beliefs, worship, and practice. The cardinal doctrine of Predestination in its most absolute form is contained in Nos. 4 and 19. The close relation of God to the believer is the subject of Nos. 24 and 38; His great compassion and kindness are emphasised in 36, 37, 39, and 42, as well as in 10. The dislike of Islam for inquiring into the doubtful or mysterious is expressed in 6, 9, 11, and 30. The light of conscience is recognised in 20. Ethical traditions are numerous as in 13, 14, 15, 16, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35. The value of voluntary good actions above those that are prescribed is shown in 12 and 29, while 25 and 26 teach that even the weakest are capable of performing these. The teaching of 40 is familiar to Christians. No. 18 is ethical, expressed in the form of a maxim of jurisprudence. In Moslem law a claimant is bound to bring proof of his claim, while the respondent needs only to deny the claim on oath. In Nos. 5 and 8 are seen two characteristics of Islam that have prevented its advance. The opposition to innovation has done more than anything else to prevent Islam from adapting the expression of itself to the changing needs of its adherents. The propagation of religion by the sword has always proved irreligious.

THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY IN THEOLOGY

A. N. ROWLAND

THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY IN THEOLOGY

1. *The relation of personality to Theology.* It is the fact of personality that gives a footing to Theology in the comity of Sciences. With its phenomena Theology has to do, as the chemist deals with the properties of the atom and the biologist with the functions of the organism. Even if Science refused to admit the records of Scripture as well as the formularies of the Church the ground of Theology would still remain, though its landscape would have disappeared.

For personality is the one mystery that eludes the grasp of natural Science. And it does so because it distinguishes Humanity from the rest of creation. All that humanity shares with lower orders of being comes within the range of human knowledge, but the rock on which human knowledge itself either rests or splits is personality. If knowledge is not an illusion but a reality, it is because personality is a foundation on which it can rest. Science is the knowledge that is established on human personality.* But although personality is a sufficient basis for the structure of knowledge, it is itself, so far as we know it in human experience, in need of a principle of interpretation.

The two essential constituents of human personality are self-consciousness and self-determination.† They

* "Personality is the gateway through which all knowledge must inevitably pass" (Illingworth, "Personality Human and Divine," p. 25).

† "Whenever we are awake we are judging; whenever we are awake we are willing" (Bosanquet, "The Essentials of Logic," p. 40).

speak of liberty and mastery in relation to our natural faculties, but equally of poverty and limitation in regard to the spirit that is within us. For self-consciousness is the mind brought up against itself by the pressure of that which is not self, and self-determination is the will reacting upon the conditions of existence to which it is tethered. They exist as a prophecy rather than a performance. And in the name of evolution, which calls for the filling in of all imperfect outlines, the rounding off of all broken arcs, self-consciousness is a pledge of the great "I am," self-determination is a witness to the purpose of the ages.* Personality is thus the alphabet of Theology; the last word on man, it is the first word on God. "All that we believe without us," says Martineau,† "we first feel within us." God is at least the Tree of which we are the seed. And if so, then, on the principle of Aristotle that beginnings are explicable by their end or fruition, we come at last to understand what personality means through the light cast upon it by theology.‡ For personality is used philosophically in two senses, or, rather, has two philosophic aspects.§ On the one hand, it clasps and secures the beads on the thread of knowledge, because it is the ultimate fact in consciousness. On the other hand, it is a complex of experiences which requires explanation as part of a new order of being. Personality, therefore, stands at the junction of two spiritual worlds, the world of knowledge which it integrates, and the world of being of which it is a fraction.‖ And as life in every order of being is a bundle of needs, which on certain conditions can be satisfied,

* "In point of fact," says Lotze ("Microcosm,") ix. 44, "we have little ground for speaking of the personality of finite beings; it is an ideal, and, like all that is ideal, belongs unconditionally to the infinite."

† "Endeavours after the Christian Life," First Discourse.

‡ "Il y a d'insondables forces au fond de l'âme humaine, parce qu'au fond il y a Dieu lui-même" (Sabatier, "Vie de S. François," p. 214).

§ Cf. W. R hmond, "Personality," p. 196.

‖ "Cogito, ergo sum."

so personality is a capacity for ordered relationships, and by receiving from above comes to fulness of stature. The investigation of this ordered world is the task of Theology.

This argument is supported by the testimony of literature and art. From "the Preacher" to Faust it is admitted that the paths of knowledge lead to the consciousness of loneliness and unrest. The more individuality is emphasised by depth of emotion or range of knowledge, the more it cries out for communion. "Life," says the author of "Natural Religion," "becomes more intolerable the more we know and discover, so long as everything widens and deepens except our own duration, and that remains as pitiful as ever. The affections die away in a world where everything great and enduring is cold; they die of their own feebleness and bootlessness." *

And there is equal desire for the barriers to disappear that keep us from our kind as well as from our God.

> "Yea, in the sea of life enisled,
> With echoing straits between us thrown,
> Dotting the shoreless, watery wild,
> We mortal millions live alone.
> . . . . . .
> A God, a God their severance ruled,
> And bade between their shores to be
> The unplumbed, vast, estranging sea." †

"There shall be no more sea," wrote John, in the Apocalypse. And no less familiar are the words of Augustine, who also set his hope on the City of God: "Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te."

But for final answer of consolation we have the words of Christ to the disciples at a time when they were conscious of having left all for His sake, "I will not leave you orphans; I will come to you. And where I

* Quoted by Myers, "Modern Essays," p. 305.
† M. Arnold, "To Marguerite."

am, there shall ye be also. . . . If any man keep My words, My Father will love him and we will come and make our abode with him." And the fulfilment of personality in Christian experience is described in the words, "Truly our fellowship is with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ."*

There is a famous picture by G. F. Watts which conveys far more than its bare title of "Hope" suggests.† The woman that feels the globe beneath her, yet finds it only a throne of sadness, typifies the soul drooping in solitude, which is the more complete because of her comprehension of the lower creation.‡ Though she has not yet within the range of her knowledge the entire universe of Nature, yet all phenomena are unified within her consciousness and so in principle subdued. But to subdue the world only emphasises the more her essential loneliness. She sighs, not for another world to conquer, but for a world in which she shall be governed for her eternal good. Though she knows all mysteries it is nothing, unless she can be satisfied with that environment of Love by which alone the world of true being as distinguished from knowing can be ordered.

The music that bids her hope on is the experience of faith which she already enjoys—music by which a new world is summoned about her. And although it may begin like every other world in mist and cloud, she longs to be ensphered instead of excluded. And soon she shall stand, aided by the Almighty Love, triumphant over Time and Death, knowing as she is known, with a Face to greet her face. For "the glory of God is the living man, and the life of man is the vision of God."§

* John xiv. 18, 3, 23 (abbreviated); 1 John i. 3.

† The thought of this paragraph is represented even more clearly by Albert Dürer's picture of "Melencolia." Cf. "Christ in Modern Life," S. Brooke, p. 232 ff.

‡ King Numa, the Roman mystic, had his Egeria of the grove, but when Pan is dead One is wanted that is nearer the soul than Nature is.

§ Irenæus, "C. Hær," iv. 20. 7, quoted in Gore's "Bampton Lectures," p. 121.

2. *The treatment of personality in Theology.* Theology is the architect of this world of the inner life. And the foundation of the building is the Incarnation of the Λόγος Θεοῦ in Jesus the Christ, wherein He discovered God to man and revealed man to himself. He is the interpreter of the new world. What apart from Him was chaos becomes in the light of His person a cosmos. What was before a land of shadows is now the home of spirits made perfect.

It is because the key of personality thus discovered was not fully used that Christian theology has been so slow to unlock the secret of God. It was handicapped as well as equipped from the first by the language of Greek philosophy. True, it was only the terminology, not the substance, of the creed that the Church borrowed from the Greek schools; true also that the terminology itself has been informed and modified by the ideas it was given to hold. But if, as Bishop Gore says,* Christianity laid all stress on personality in God and man, how could her creed express her faith when personality had not been treated or even grasped by Greek thinkers at all? †

The failure was at the critical point. The whole battle raged over words that did not correspond with the "language of the Holy Ghost." Phrases were made standard for the kingdom although they had not the king's sign. Words like "homoousion" and "hypostasis," which were meant to give sight to the ignorant, were themselves blind words. They belonged to a school of thought that was not yet awake to personality as the key to the universe, but brought all things, including the soul of man, under the categories of substance.‡ In this respect Plato's idealism was scarcely

* "Bampton Lectures," p. 101.

† "The classical Greek writers have simply no word for expressing the will" (H. Rashdall, "Doctrine and Development," p. 268). Cf. Illingworth, "Personality Human and Divine," p. 7.

‡ "The Nicene theology failed here because it interpreted God and articulated its doctrine in the terms of the schools rather than in the

any nearer the Christian standpoint than the inductive method of Aristotle. With Plato man was a microcosm of the universe. It was Aristotle, however, who carried to the farthest possible point of logical analysis the delineation of man as a fragment of Nature and of society. His work is the culmination of the classical view of the earth. But the Christian thinker begins where he ends, with a finished world beneath his feet, but also with an unfathomable world calling to his heart.

It was because this *Weltanschauung* ("world view") dawned through the person of Christ in all its original glory upon the consciousness of the Apostle Paul that his thoughts were thrilled continually with such an ecstasy of joy. Christianity was more to him than the fulfilment of prophecy, or the contemplation of a truth, or even the experience of salvation.

It was the *revelation of an age-long mystery*, the opening up of the deep of personality as the key to existence, human and divine, a view of life hitherto undiscovered by the wise and learned; seen through the Incarnation, reached through the Atonement, realised through the gift of the Holy Spirit; opening up a vista of barriers overthrown, appearances discredited, adversaries annihilated by the power of life that flows from and sets towards God, until His sons shall be manifested in glory. The new creature in Christ, born not of the will of the flesh, but by the will of God, triumphant over the confederates of death, and enabled to walk by the power of faith, in the paths of love, under the rays of hope—this was the mystery at last revealed that must find expression in doxologies.

The arguments by which Paul established his viewpoint have often been discussed, but deeper than these lies his ecstasy at discovering it. The thinkers of Greece had swept the field with their intellectual

terms of the consciousness of Christ" (A. M. Fairbairn, "Christ in Modern Theology," p. 91).

wisdom. There was nothing left but for gleaners. And so the Athenians on a first hearing twitted Paul with being a "picker up of learning's crumbs." But for all that his psychology was of a new order in the history of thought, starting as it did from the experience of a saving and fruitful power in the depths of his consciousness. But it passed over the heads of the fathers of the early Church who, as students of Cicero and Seneca, still thought in the terms of Greek philosophy.* "All Christian Hellenistic thinkers before Augustine were still refined polytheists, seeing that they preserved a part of Nature-religion." †

The classic bondage was broken by Augustine. In the intimacies of his own Christian consciousness he found, under the guidance of Paul, the constructive ideas of a theology which was worthy to correspond with the ineffable experience of those who are born again. So, in the words of Harnack, "he built up a new world in his own heart and mind," and "became the true Aristotle of a new science, which seems, indeed, to have forgotten that as a theory of perception, and as inner observation, it originated in the monotheistic faith of the life of prayer."

The view-point then of Personality—the mystery discovered by Paul—was recovered for theology by Augustine; but it had still to leave room for the Græco-Latin fixtures of ethical standards and metaphysical standpoints, which have always remained in the Catholic Church and often obscured its vision of the gospel. "A disposition to eliminate, to minimise, or to explain away the will has descended to some of the modern thinkers who owe the best that is in them to Plato and Aristotle." ‡

Once more the outlook of the Christian Church was baptised, when Francis of Assisi confronted the scorn of the ecclesiastic and the worldling in the power of

* Harnack, "History of Dogma," vol. v. p. 109.

† Idem, p. 106.

‡ H. Rashdall, "Doctrine and Development," p. 168.

the weakness that is confident in God, and the wisdom that knows nothing but Christ and Him crucified. Christendom received a new inspiration from Francis as one of those "qui prêchent au nom de la parole intérieure." *

But theology still waited for its renewer, and at last there came in Luther the true successor of Paul and Augustine, refounding Theology on the facts of the Christian consciousness.

"The beginnings of the Reformation were not doctrinal but experimental." † "If thou holdest faith,' said Luther, "to be simply a thought concerning God, then that thought is as little able to give eternal life as ever a monkish cowl could give it." ‡ Luther did for modern Christianity what Augustine did for the mediæval; only after the lapse of a thousand years he had much to destroy as well as to ignore.

But once again the scholastic vocabulary descended in controversy and devoured the young life and tender piety of the Church so far as these were intellectually exposed. In the meantime, however, there have always been souls who could lead others to the wells of refreshment, and among them two who were able in a measure to do in this land what the other four effected for Christendom at large. George Fox and John Wesley, in the midst of a conventional but controversial religiousness, uttered the truths that come from the breaking up of deep fountains, and out of their experience of light and joy and power led the churches into a larger life. But there is no finality to this task. There will always be a call to the prophets of every generation to throw off, in the name of the personality that knows itself in knowing God, the accumulated traditions and professions that have grown out of

* Sabatier, "Vie de S. François," p. 82.

† Lindsay, "History of the Reformation," vol. i. p. 434; cf. Gwatkin "The Kingdom of God," vol. ii. p. 222.

‡ Luther's "Works," xxii., 15.

touch with the Christian consciousness. The dissatisfaction and even wrath which characterise many serious minds to-day as they contemplate a divided Church that talks of unity, a distracted Church that preaches power and peace, are at bottom due to the growing sense that Christian professors are too much cumbered by the externals of their organisation and tradition to follow the lead of that inward light which is reflected in the signs of the times, and is the supreme director in things of the Spirit.

Meantime the theology of the Church has moved slowly onward in the explication of a theology centred in the experience of the ego. In the days of Augustine the pivot of theology was the *Incarnation*: and the creeds stand for the instinctive outcry of the Christian consciousness against any view of our Lord's person which would tend to mar the immediacy of communion between the personality that is human and that which is divine. "In four words, ἀληθῶς, τελέως, ἀδιαρέτως, ἀσυγχύτως, truly, perfectly, indivisibly, distinctly—the first applied to His being God, the second to His being man, the third to His being of both One, and the fourth to His still continuing of that one Both—we may fully, by way of abridgment, comprise whatever antiquity hath at large handled, either in declaration of Christian belief, or in refutation of the four chief heresies."* Beneath all the strange forces that on the surface brought these things to pass at the Councils there was the assertion of the redeemed man that God and himself were brought into vital and ineffable union through receiving Christ as Lord.

In the days of Luther the emphasis of theology was on the *Atonement*, and the Protestant Churches are monuments as notable as the Catholic creeds, to the invincible resistance of a child of God to any sacerdotal system which, in effect, stands between the sinful, yet trustful, soul and the Lord through whom it is recon-

* Hooker, "Eccl. Pol.," v. 54. 10.

ciled and at rest.* Whether it was the imposition of penance and payments, or the interposition of a priestly order, with its accompaniments of ritual and sacrifice, the Christian soul would not rest till in the urgency of its needs and the claims of its dignity it could come with its own voice and plea into the Father's home.

The *Catholic* Church was occupied with the *meaning* of the Divine life, asking, How can God be expressed in human form? The question was, What shall bridge the antithesis which instinctively forms itself in our minds between the holy and eternal God and mortal and sinful man? The answer was found in God's revelation through a personality, and was worked out in the theology of the *Incarnation.*

The *Reformation* Church was occupied with the *gift* of the Divine life. The question was, How can the blessed gift be transferred as a matter of fact and personal experience to the erring and evil sons of men? Again the answer was found in God's revelation through a personality, and was worked out in the theology of the *Atonement.*

The *modern* Church is not concerned much with working out these matters because it is preoccupied with another, which has rather to do with human *Consecration.* Christ's identification with our nature and with our sin is accepted as the old music of the gospel, but men have moved on to seek in the gospel an answer to another urgent question. How can the Divine life, which is the property of God, and our inheritance through Christ, become our working capital? How shall it be expressed in terms of time and the secular world, and prove equal to the demands of business and the development of society? This is at heart a question of *consecration,* as to how personality on earth may arise to fulness of stature in the name and in the power of God.

* "By the use of the words 'priest,' 'clergy,' 'spiritual person,' 'ecclesiastic,' an injustice has been done" (Luther in "Christian Liberty").

3. *The Christian Implications of Personality.*

If the standpoint of personality, discovered and restored, is to help us in the matter of consecration, so that the personal life may be brought to its true issue in contributing to the social ideal, viz., the Kingdom of God, the true meaning of personality must be understood. The word that is roughly used as its synonym is individuality. And in truth we could find little more in it were it not for the help of theology and the light that falls on human nature from above. According to Professor Seth, "each self is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious to other selves." * No doubt the element of mutual independence between souls is vital to our actual consciousness, and Dr. Rashdall may be right also in insisting that even God must be excluded from the human self, for we cannot otherwise conceive of Him as a person. † But we must beware of applying a footrule to a mountain. In these measurements we are like the inhabitants of Flatland in the presence of a third dimension. If Dr. Rashdall's point were pressed there would be less of God in the souls of men than in a purely animal consciousness, which is, from an evolutionary point of view, absurd. After all, Christianity is the revelation that individuality is only the first word on personality; the last word is fellowship. ‡ Personality finds its true self by the power it has of entering into the personality of others through the sympathy and understanding of love.

There are many testimonies to the fact that although we are separate from one another as leaves upon the tree of life, we only exist at all as spiritual beings by virtue of the inflowing spirit of God which, like the sap,

* "Hegelianism and Personality," p. 216.

† Cf. Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 532: "To me a person is finite or is meaningless."

‡ Cf. "Personality is a capacity for fellowship" (W. Richmond, p. 33). "Personality is the possibility of mirroring God" (Moberly, "Atonement and Personality," p. 254).

is in all and through all. But in one essential respect any physical analogy falls short of illustrating the relationship between our spirit and God's, and it is by noting this that we are saved from the errors of Pantheism. In all the outpourings of the supreme Personality into the creatures of His thought, and even the sons of His love, there remains over and above the giving of self the power of giving it still,

> "For-ever shared, for-ever whole
> A never ebbing sea."

Physical energy exhausts itself in one form as it communicates itself to another. The body, *e.g.*, loses animal heat as the brain is working. But in the spiritual realm there is yet a greater law than the conservation of energy; it is the power that comes through serving, the wealth that results from giving. God is all He is because He has given so much: by all He has spent He is the more Himself, "above all," as well as "in and through all." The highest conception of the Almighty Personality is that He "so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son."

And on the same principle we find ourselves by giving ourselves up to God and His children. First to God we have to say:—

> "Our wills are ours we know not how:
> Our wills are ours to make them Thine."

How our personality comes to its true realisation by its real surrender may be beyond a man's conception as a philosopher, but it is the heart of his experience as a Christian. Truths which "in manhood darkly join" are clearly focussed in Jesus Christ, and out of His consciousness of oneness with the Father we may draw the truth that the upper side of personality is fellowship. Moreover, our personality is something shared more truly that it is something separate as between ourselves and our fellow-men as well as

between ourselves and God. In our behaviour towards them it is when we are least self-centred that we are at our best, when we lose our life that we find it. "Mercy is twice blessed; it blesseth him that gives and him that takes." The fruit of loving is the power to love more truly.

> "Measure thy life by loss instead of gain,
> Not by the wine drunk, but the wine poured forth;
> For love's strength standeth in love's sacrifice,
> And whoso spendeth most hath most to give." *

The pursuit of these truths may tend to mysticism on the one side and socialism on the other. But in themselves they are the essence of the Christian consciousness, as may be seen on a closer examination. Individuality, the lower hemisphere of our personality, is in abundant evidence in commercial competition, in class consciousness, in all insistence on our rights and all departure from the beatitudes. But there are many gold threads crossing the grey weft of our ordinary life: our nature involves far more than self-assertion, and can only find its true pasture through the outgoings and incomings of fellowship.

If we look kindly on our fellows as they hurry down some city street, unknown though they may be by face or name, the thought may flash upon our mind that they share the same inheritance with us in all the constituents of essential manhood. Their standard of truth, their wells of emotion, their tower of self-defence, their inward parts are as ours. Could our spirits wander there we should be in a place more familiar than we guess. And the more we love our fellows and seek their good, the more this truth becomes evident to us, that we are fed by the same bread from heaven and are thirsting for the same springs of life.

Or again when we are part of a crowd we can under-

* Mrs. Hamilton King in "The Disciples."

stand why it is so often called a "mob"; it is so *mobile*, it is so evidently under the sway of one common spirit, so evidently the expression of one shared Personality. The barriers of individuality are submerged by the tides of a larger self; a Will that would not have sufficed to move us when we were alone, succeeds, now that we are in conjunction with our fellows, in capturing the latent responsiveness of our being. The highest exemplification of this Personality-in-fellowship is when the soul of an orator is fired by a truth or a cause that has a claim on all, and lo, through the lowly doors of what we call his individuality one august Spirit enters in and unifies the whole congregation.

But it is when we look within that the testimony is clearest that self-consciousness and self-determination do not finally summarise our true personality. Even in regard to intellectual achievement we are somehow made aware in all creative work that we are not alone, that Another than ourself is ordering our thoughts, so that we see in any intellectual accomplishment a sum-total greater than can be accounted for by the exercise of faculties which we are at any time conscious of possessing. "Our thoughts come to us," as Goethe said, "as free children of God, saying 'Here we are.'" It is perhaps impossible to analyse the decisive constituents of genius. But if, as George Eliot said, it is the longing and loving of past generations that look out of the beautiful eyes of a woman like Hetty Sorrel, it cannot be less true that the voices of predecessors find utterance in the men of genius, the men of all time. Though we need not go to Bacon as a *deus ex machina* to account for the plays of Shakespeare, it is profoundly true that they were not exclusively the work of the playwright of that name as an individual.

And so it is even in the region of holy desire. From his experience of Christian fellowship in the communal life Perreyve uttered these beautiful words, "In that home where we were gathered together in heart,

thought, hope, how often was one positively invaded by conditions of mind emanating from another, pursued by heart-stirrings and thoughts which were the offspring of another brain!" This is the communion of saints when the Spirit of one dwells in all, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ!"

This great truth which only comes to light in Christian Theology must be read into the facts of the subconscious mind with which science deals. Our self-consciousness lies like the path of moonlight upon the ocean. But the mystic communion of souls which permits will and thought to travel from one to another, beyond the range of self-consciousness and above the reach of self-determination, suggests that the dark sea which Matthew Arnold thought of as the sunderer, is even more truly (after the analogy of our Empire which is unified by the ocean which we rule) a means for the One to assert himself in final dominion over all the islets of self-consciousness. "God is love, and he that abideth in love abideth in God and God abideth in him." *

Finally, if we more closely analyse the moral elements of our being we shall find they are touched to their finest issues when engaged in the fellowship of spirit with spirit. It is this which gives tenderness to our conscience of sin, depth to our habits of virtue, and urgency to our perceptions of duty.

To begin with matters of *conscience*. Christian Theology has to deal, on the one hand, with a fact of Religion, viz.: Penitence; on the other hand, with a fact of Revelation, viz., Forgiveness. Now these are like the hemispheres of one orb, two complementary states of mind that have neither meaning nor existence except as they reflect the attitude of one personality to another. From the point of view of individuality there may be a consciousness of failure to play one's

* 1 John iv. 16; cf. 1 Cor. xv. 24, 25; Heb. ii. 8 ff.

part or to realise one's ideal. But penitence presupposes infinitely more than that. It is the soul's attitude towards One who is above us—a holy God. But it means more than a sense of affronting the Divine Majesty. Penitence is not a vital motion of the soul until the soul views itself as the property, the child of God, whose righteous love it has offended. And even that does not exhaust the presuppositions of penitence. It includes a peculiar sense of shame at having injured a Personality that is our true and proper self, into which at our best we fain would grow. Penitence, then, is not simply the attitude of a soul towards One that is not self, it contains a grief at its suicidal folly in hindering the fellowship with the all holy One which is its true self-realisation. And it is that fellowship which Forgiveness restores.

Forgiveness also is a state of mind that implies more than an exchange between individuals. "The sense of guilt," says Illingworth, "is the awful guardian of our personal identity." It is equally true that the sense of forgiveness corresponds with the realisation of the larger personality. In the Epistle to the Romans (ch. vii.) Paul carves out a higher self that refuses to be identified with the sin which would individualise it, and knows it is not under condemnation, because of its restored intercourse through Christ in the Spirit with the Holy Father. "It is no more I that sin," he says, "but sin that dwelleth in me." And, as an obverse statement of the same underlying truth, "it is no longer I that live but Christ liveth in me." And as he leaves his sin with the body of Christ on the tree he joins his soul to Christ in the Spirit. The negative and positive sides of the Atonement are thus symbolised respectively by the cross and the resurrection.*

Forgiveness, then, is the word of the all-pervading personality to the individual conscience, faintly whispered within, clearly spoken through Christ, by which

* Rom. vii. 17, viii. 10, 11; Gal. ii. 19, 21.

we know that the soul may still come to itself and to its Father.

Again in regard to the *habits of virtue* the twice-born comes to occupy a new standpoint altogether, because of the awaking of the soul to the life of fellowship. On the side of its individuality character is well protected by the four cardinal virtues in which the Spirit of God instructs His children in their self-conscious years, so that manhood should stand four-square in its outer walls for the Temple of God. But within the four bulwarks of Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, and Prudence, there is to be the palace of the great King.

> "So Faith shall build the boundary wall,
> And Hope shall plant the magic bower,
> That both may show magnifical
> With gem and flower.
> While over all a dome must spread,
> And Love shall be the dome above
> And deep foundations must be laid,
> And these are Love." *

These three Christian graces move in a wholly different element from the four "cardinal" virtues, and represent our personality in its fellowship with One who holds us by the hand, who lights our path with His lamp and pours His Spirit into our heart.

It has often been noticed that the specifically Christian virtues, such as humility, reverence, purity, and peaceableness, shine with little lustre when placed in the company and in comparison with the positive attainments of pagan ethics. They seem passive and even paltry until the true standpoint is reached, from which they are seen to correspond naturally with those finer sensibilities by which the soul feels itself in touch with the over-soul.

Finally, the Christian consciousness is marked by the urgency of its *perception of duty*, in the name of the

* Christina Rossetti.

larger fellowship. There is laid upon the heart of a Christian as an authentic seal of his redemption, a sense of obligation that is ever present and never satisfied. To fit in with the requirements of the State, to fill a place in the gradations of society, and so maintain the harmony of things from an external point of view, can never define duty for a Christian. He requires not a static but a dynamic view of duty. Under the law a man wants to know the limits of forgiving and of serving: * in Christ he seeks for their opportunities.† And why, but because it is only the outgoing of love that can promote the welfare of that larger whole of which the awakened personality knows itself to be part?

To say that Christian morality is distinguished from pagan, because it is regarded as the will of a Law-giver,‡ who has power to punish and reward, is to give a ludicrously inadequate account of the Christian sense of obligation. The Christian who has been truly baptized by the Spirit knows no such external compulsion. When he found God in Christ, he found himself and his brothers too, and, with every barrier down that would keep him self-conscious and selfish, he gives himself in love to the service of the only Personality, who is first of all God, but is also the soul of his neighbour, and finally his own truer self.

And as from the Christian standpoint blunders are turned into sins, and virtues transfigured into graces, so duty and sacrifice are swallowed up in love. Christian ethics presumes the solidarity of men with each other and with God. The ancient categories of virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance—all that was built up by the effort of the Pharisees and the education of the Greeks is transcended. Law is lost in Love, in the passion for more complete identification with that all-embracing Personality, which has been revealed in

* Matt. v. 20, xii. 10, xv. 5, xviii. 21, xxv. 44, 45; Luke x. 29.

† Matt. vii. 12, x. 8, xxv. 40; Luke xvii. 4, 10, x. 37; Rom. xiii. 10.

‡ Cf. Sidgwick, "History of Ethics," p. 108.

our Lord Jesus Christ. Here is the long-sought reconciliation between Religion and Morality, in a "philosophy of loyalty," the key to which is found in personality within, around, and above.*

* Cf. the words of Prof. Royce in "The Philosophy of Loyalty": "From the whole circle of the heavens of the entire self-conscious life, which is the Truth, there come always, and to all the loyal the words 'Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.'"

THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE EASTERN CHURCH: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

R. S. FRANKS

THE IDEA OF SALVATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE EASTERN CHURCH: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

IT is a well-ascertained fact, and one that is recognised in all modern histories of Christian doctrine, that the idea of salvation takes a very characteristic shape in the theology of the Eastern Church. There are, of course, in the writings of the Greek Fathers, beside the presentations of the doctrine of salvation that are specially their own, many things bearing on the subject which are drawn straight from the New Testament; and in certain of the Fathers, such as Irenæus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and Cyril of Alexandria, the influence of distinctively New Testament points of view is strongly marked. But in spite of this, Greek theology as a whole has its own peculiar way of stating the doctrine of salvation, a way moreover, which, while not without points of contact in the New Testament, yet markedly differs from any New Testament form of teaching.

The first point to be observed in connection with this specifically Greek statement of the doctrine of salvation, is that there is a great hiatus between the natural theology characteristic of the Greek Fathers, and their doctrine of redemption.

On the one hand, they tend so to state the doctrines of God and man and their mutual relations, as to make it appear that man requires little assistance in order to be able to earn for himself his salvation at the hands of God. The retributive justice of God is strongly emphasised. Man is then regarded as morally free—even his admitted fall involves no loss of his moral

freedom—and he has it in his own hands so to live as to deserve the gift of immortality which God awards to virtue. According to this way of looking at things, the only thing man requires from Christ is knowledge. He is, indeed, regarded as by the fall having passed under the power of the demons; in so far as his intellect is darkened, and thereby his naturally clear view of God, duty, and immortality is beclouded. Christ, however, the Incarnate Logos or Reason of God, brings the needful illumination; and when this is brought, man can then, as previously stated, do the rest that is needful for salvation himself.*

On the other hand, in spite of this moralistic view of things and its firm hold upon them, the Greek Fathers realised in man a deeper need of Divine redemption; and this they expressed in two specially characteristic ways. In the first place, we find a further sense of the power of the devil over humanity. The fall does not mean simply that man has become intellectually darkened; he has actually fallen under the power of the devil to the extent that he has become the devil's property, who has therefore a just claim upon him which God must recognise. He does this by giving Christ to die, His death being paid as a price to the devil to ransom his captives.† This, then, is the first way in which the confident moralism of the Greek Fathers is broken across by a distinctively redemptive idea. The power of the demons is the dark spot in the clear rational scheme of thought previously sketched. We saw how, even in the moralistic doctrine itself, it had to be reckoned with. Here we see that the idea of demonic power has a still deeper hold on the Greek Christian, and compels him to the doctrine, so repulsive to later thought, of Christ's death as a price paid to the devil.

* See Harnack, "Dogmengeschichte," [3] ii. pp. 114–155.

† Idem, [3] ii. pp. 172, 173. An additional idea, occurring in some forms of the doctrine, is that the devil was deceived in the transaction, as he could not hold the soul of Christ.

In the second place, however, we have a redemptive idea of yet greater reach and even more startling character, still further breaking the outlines of the moralistic scheme. It appears, after all, that, instead of man winning immortality for himself by virtue, God has given it to him in the Incarnation. By the union of the Logos with human nature, the latter has been deified. This is the central doctrine of Greek theology, to which all else is subservient. Athanasius puts it in the famous sentence: "He became man that we might be made divine." *

We have, then, altogether, as the characteristic elements in the Greek doctrine of salvation: (1) the rationalistic moral scheme, which hardly allows a place for a doctrine of redemption at all; (2) the breaking through of this by the doctrine of redemption from the devil; and (3) still more by the doctrine of deification.†

* "De Incarnatione," c. 54; see further Harnack, "Dogmengeschichte," [3] ii. pp. 155–170.

† The above statement of the chief lines of the Greek doctrine of salvation, as *three* in number, differs somewhat from the classic presentation of Harnack, who recognises only *two* main lines, viz., the moral scheme and the doctrine of deification. It is undoubtedly true that, as regards the "dogma," the doctrine of redemption from the devil falls into the background. The whole doctrine of the death of Christ, indeed, is remitted by Gregory of Nazianzus, to free speculation in a well-known passage: "You may philosophise freely about the universe and the different worlds, about matter, about the soul, about reasonable natures, better and worse, about the resurrection, the judgment, retribution, and the sufferings of Christ, for in these things success is not unprofitable, and error is free from danger" (see Baur, "Die Lehre von der Versöhnung," 1838, p. 109). Harnack therefore naturally, as a historian of "dogma," treats the doctrine of redemption from the devil in an appendix. Yet, though never reckoned to the dogma by the Greek Fathers, this doctrine was a very real part of Greek theology in the wider sense. Kaftan speaks of it as a parallel or a complement (*Ergänzung*) of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and says: "It is not to be regarded as an accident, that it originated in the ancient Greek theology." He continues: "The general historical background of this doctrine is formed by the heathen environment of the ancient Church, in which it saw the reign of Satan and his demons. *It was therefore also for the ancient Church more than a doctrine: it was a living view*" ("Dogmatik," p. 490, italics mine).

The connections between these points and various data with which the Greek mind, on account of its past history, came to the subject of Christian theology, have, as is well known, been abundantly illustrated, in proof of the thesis that Greek theology represents a Hellenisation of Christianity.

To begin with the moral scheme, it is one of the characteristic doctrines of Ritschl that this was directly derived by the Greek Apologists from Greek religion: its adoption by them, says he, "implies that the chief idea of Hellenic religion is being preserved for Christianity." * He has been followed by Harnack, who says that the Apologists regarded the Christian revelation as assuring "a theistic and moral view of the world which they already possessed." † Hatch and Kaftan follow the same line. The total result of their investigations on the subject amounts to this. The idea of the gods as rulers like the human rulers of a state is fundamental to Greek religion. Originally this was the case, because in the Greek religion the state itself constitutes the chief good: the gods therefore must promote the good of the state in the way its human rulers do, *i.e.*, by rewarding the good and punishing the bad.‡ Plato, however, gave this doctrine of twofold Divine retribution an eschatological reference.§ Finally, the Stoics regarded the world itself as a great state, of which the gods were the rulers and men the citizens.‖ In all this we have the exact counterpart of the moralism of the Greek Fathers. *Mutatis mutandis*, they have adopted it bodily, and represented it as "a leading feature of Christianity." ¶

With regard to the doctrine of redemption from the devil, this, as we shall presently see more fully, is con-

* Ritschl, "Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung," [3] iii. p. 249; see the whole passage beginning p. 248.

† Harnack, "D. G.," [3] i. p. 458.

‡ Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 248. § Idem, p. 249.

‖ Hatch, "The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church," p. 212.

¶ Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

nected in the theology of Origen (its principal source) with the idea of expiation; and of Origen's doctrine of the work of Christ as a whole Harnack says as follows: "In general, it must be said, that Origen has helped to trail into the Church a whole wealth of ancient (heathen) ideas with regard to expiation and redemption, wherever he found a passage in the Bible, with which to connect them." *

Then, finally, with regard to the doctrine of deification, Harnack has pointed out the essential connection of the way in which it is formulated with the Platonic philosophy. Human "nature" is deified by the union with it of the Divine "nature" in the Incarnation: the whole form of conception here rests upon a Platonic background. He says further with regard to the basal Greek conception of salvation as immortality, as follows: "The thought of the Greek Fathers to which all else is subordinated, that Christianity is the religion which delivers from corruptibility and death, . . . is a specific limitation of primitive Christian hopes under the influence of ancient points of view." † He has further called attention to the close association of the idea of deification with the rites of the Church, conceived as "mysteries" in the sense of antiquity, in particular with the Eucharist. ‡ And once more, he has observed the connection of the doctrine with the monastic form of piety, in which asceticism (especially virginity) and ecstasy are cultivated as a direct preparation for the reception of the Divine salvation: the point is that, since salvation is essentially redemption from corruptible humanity, asceticism or the negation of this nature, and ecstasy or a rising above it, are along the same line as the ultimately hoped-for deification, which, indeed, so far is by them immediately anticipated

* "D. G.," [3] iii. p. 636 (continuation of note [1], p. 635).

† Idem, [3] ii. p. 57; Zusatz 1.

‡ "D. G.," ii. pp. 39, 40. In Ignatius, Eph. xx. 2, the Eucharist is already called *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας*.

here and now.* Harnack has further commented upon the parallelism of the whole point of view with that of contemporary Greek paganism, *i.e.*, Neo-platonism.†

It requires, however, yet further to be specified, in order that its exact meaning may be made clear. The particular point in which the idea of deification is focussed for the Greeks, is that of immortality. This is the element of divinity which is so earnestly desired, and in the attainment of which all seems to culminate. "Beyond the thought of incorruptibility the Greeks have in general connected no clear idea with the thought of salvation (or blessedness), and this is just the characteristic thing." ‡ It is, in fact, the fear of death and corruption through which the need of salvation is most keenly felt by the Greek Fathers. It is not an ethical so much as a physical redemption that is desired. Religion and ethics are in the Greek theology only mechanically joined together: there is no really intimate union between them.

From this position now a light is thrown back upon the whole Greek doctrine of redemption, and we see the point where it most closely connects itself with the moral scheme previously sketched. The two doctrines of redemption from the devil and of deification correspond to the two Pauline doctrines of justification and sanctification, or redemption from the guilt and power of sin respectively. But they differ in that for the ethical redemption of these latter doctrines a physical redemption is substituted, a redemption from the power of the devil for redemption from guilt, and a redemption from death for redemption from sin itself. The key to the situation is in the separation of man's religious needs from his ethical nature. According to the Greek theology man, even fallen man, remains morally free. He does not therefore need an ethical redemption; it is from the side of his physical nature that the need of redemption is felt, and hence

* "D. G.," ii. p. 54. † Idem, i. p. 121.

‡ Harnack, ii. p. 45, note.

from this side that the doctrine of redemption is approached.*

So much, then, in illustration of the thesis that Greek theology is Hellenised Christianity, already exists to hand in the pages of Harnack and elsewhere. The question now is, Along what line can the historical criticism of Greek theology be further developed? It is the aim of the present essay to show that it is possible to go considerably further along the line thus already successfully travelled so far, and to establish, at least as concerns the doctrine of salvation, in place of so many different illustrations of the connection between the theology of the Greek Fathers and Greek paganism, a single comprehensive thesis, constituting at once a simplification and a considerable amplification also of the results already obtained. This thesis is, that the three characteristic lines of the Greek Christian doctrine of salvation correspond exactly to the three principal lines along which the subject of salvation was regarded in ancient Greek religion. Passing beyond all immediate influences exercised upon Greek Christianity by contemporary and recent forms of Greek pagan thought, we can go right back to the religion of the classical age of Greece and draw straight lines from it to the Greek Christian doctrine of salvation. These lines will of course pass through the more recent developments of Greek paganism, both religious and philosophical; it is naturally through these that the connection between Greek Christianity and the classical forms of Greek religion is made. But the thesis laid down means that the essential spirit of Greek religion

* Cf. Harnack, ii. pp. 52–56. Kaftan, "Dogmatik," pp. 488–490. In the above analysis only the *characteristic* ideas of Greek theology are considered, with a view to discerning its fundamental tendency. It is, of course, recognised that the need of *intellectual* redemption was felt by the Greeks, as the previous statement on page 252 makes clear. The idea of forgiveness also was from the first connected with baptism; but the connection between this and the work of Christ was not clearly conceived.

preserved itself intact through all these changes, and that it survived in such strength in the mind of the Eastern Church, that it has cast precisely into its own moulds the characteristic Greek Christian doctrine of salvation; *i.e.*, it has had strength to influence Greek Christianity at its central point; for the doctrine of salvation is the heart and soul of any and every religion.

It is in view of the more recent developments in the study of ancient Greek religion that it is possible to state the above broad and sweeping theses. Of late years an ever-increasing flood of light has been pouring upon Greek religion through the study of it along the lines of comparative anthropology, as a result of which there has become manifest the importance to the Greeks of elements in their religion other than that which used in older books to be regarded almost as the whole of the Hellenic religion, viz., the worship of the Olympian gods. The new study, in fact, distinguishes *three* elements in Greek religion of, we may say, equal importance.

We have first indeed the Olympian stratum, above mentioned. This is the *rational* element, in the religion, which especially dominates Greek classical literature from Homer onwards. But witnessed to also in literature, and powerfully entrenched in the actual cultus, was a second element, viz., the *Chthonian*, the worship of the gods of the underworld and of the dead. Finally, we have as the third element in Greek religion, of Thracian origin, but well established in Greece in classical times, a third type, the *Dionysian*. The latter two strata constitute, in opposition to the Olympian element, an irrational ferment in Greek religion. In the Chthonian stratum, in particular, highly primitive religious views survive on into the classical age of Greece; and in the Dionysian element again, though in its Greek form modified from its primitive savagery, a strong anti-rational element is still manifest.

We proceed to describe further these three types of religion, and especially their respective treatment of the notion of salvation.* Within the space at command it is not possible to distinguish the different stages of development in the history of each type, and we must be content with broad outlines." †

The Olympian religion is just that described above by Ritschl and Hatch, when they say that the Greeks regarded the gods after the pattern of human rulers, who reward the good and punish the bad. The only point to be noticed is that instead of identifying this type of religion with Greek religion, as does Ritschl (Hatch not so distinctly), we now recognise it simply as one element in Greek religion. Otherwise all that is said above here applies. The subject may, however, be further elucidated by a reference to Miss Harrison's recent "Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion." She refers to the Olympian religion as the orthodox religion of the fifth century B.C., and says: "Its formula is *do ut des*." ‡ Its fundamental conception, in fact, is that man renders to the gods their due in sacrifice and prayer, also in such conduct as they

* Besides the particular references in the text, general reference is made for the Olympian religion to Naegelsbach, "Homerische Theologie," [2] 1861, and "Nachhomerische Theologie," 1857, and for the Chthonian and Dionysian religions to Rohde, "Psyche," [3] 1903, as the principal authorities.

† It is still less possible, of course, to discuss the difficult question of the superposition of the different strata. But this is not needful for our purpose. Nor are we concerned with the relative prominence of the different elements at different times. Again in the actual religion the different elements are often fused together in the closest way. But for our purpose we can distinguish the types irrespective of the difficult historical questions raised thereby.

‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 3. Dr. Farnell criticises this statement as an inadequate representation of the Olympian religion ("Hibbert Journal," July, 1904, p. 826). It may be freely recognised that the formula does not describe the whole of the Olympian religion, and indeed there are many other ideas connected with the Olympian gods, not taken account of in the above brief description, such as the notion of caprice in connection with them. But all that is necessary for us is to describe the main tendency of the Olympian religion in its completest development.

approve, and they in return reward him with their salvation. As Zeller remarks (he speaks of Greek religion, but means the Olympian type), there is connected with this view of things the view that man is morally quite free to do what the gods will. "The essential thing in the religious fulfilment of duty is, that man does to God's honour, what agrees with his own nature."*

We turn to the second or Chthonian element in Greek religion, and find a complete contrast to the preceding ideas. We pass from the worship of the bright, anthropomorphic gods of Olympus, to that of the dark deities of the underworld and the spirits of the dead. Miss Harrison has stated the formula of this religion as "*do ut abeas.*" It is 'apotropaic,' a religion of fear and riddance. It comes to its most characteristic expression in the ideas connected with murder. The curse of the ghost of the dead or of his avenging Erinnyes,† cleaves to his slayer as "miasma," it infects him, so as to bring all evil upon himself and upon others with whom he may come into contact. This is, however, only a special type of a general belief in malign demonic influence which acts as "miasma," and entails all manner of harm, sickness, delusion, and evil of every kind.‡ Purification from this miasma is, of course, the object of the ritual. The means of purification are in part, indeed, simple ceremonies of primitive magic, which attempt to get rid of the miasma by washing, rubbing, or censing it off.§ In part, however, they consist of sacrifices intended to placate the dark powers.‖ It seems to be clear that the sacrifice was conceived as substitutionary. The clearest case seems to be that of the purification of the

* Zeller, "Philosophie der Griechen," ² i. p. 37.

† The Erinnyes, afterwards distinguished as the dark avengers of the dead, seem originally to have been identical with the avenging ghost itself. See Rohde, "Psyche," i. p. 270.

‡ Rohde, "Psyche," ii. p. 75.

§ Idem, ii. p. 75. ‖ Idem, p. 77 f.

murderer. Euripides speaks of the blood of sacrifice poured over the hands of the polluted man as "washing away murder by murder." *

We come last to the Dionysian religion. The root idea of this in its original Thracian form was the deification of the worshippers, who in the ecstasy of the Bacchic dance believed themselves to become god-possessed (ἔνθεοι), and also practised the mystic eating of the god as incarnate in the sacrifice of a bull, his sacred animal, thus in the closest way identifying themselves with him. The Thracians also believed that those thus united with Dionysus would enter into immortality with him at death; the present union was in fact regarded as a foretaste of this immortality.†

Such is the gist of the original religion of Dionysus. We have, however, to consider further the form which it took in the Orphic mysteries, which, be it noted, united it with the purifications of the Chthonian religion. Here we find the addition to the original religion of Dionysus of a theosophic myth, explaining the notion of deification in ecstasy, by the recognition in man of a higher or Dionysian element, the soul. This is essentially divine and craves to return to its source, but is in union, however, with a lower or Titanic element, the body, whence it seeks deliverance. Along with ecstasy, therefore, the Orphic teachers recognised asceticism as a means of promoting the return of the soul to God.‡

We have gone far enough now to observe the correspondence of the three types of Greek religion, as regards the doctrine of salvation, with the three characteristic elements in the Greek Christian doctrine of salvation. In particular there is the same hiatus

* "Iph. Taur.," 1197. See further Rohde, "Psyche," ii. 77. Rohde also regards as substitutionary sacrifices the scapegoats (φαρμακοί) sacrificed in times of calamity, and in the Ionic cities and at altars even at ordinary times (annually at the Thargelia). Miss Harrison has a different view, *op. cit.*, p. 95 f.

† Rohde, ii. p. 1–37.

‡ Idem, pp. 115–131.

in Greek religion between the rationalistic Olympian religion, with its comparatively small place for the idea of salvation, and the types of religion which centre in the notice of redemption, as has already been observed in Greek Christian theology between its moral scheme and its redemptive ideas. The mind of the Greek Fathers was divided against itself in the matter of religion just in the same way as that of the Hellenes of the classical period. Then, next, the agreement between the Olympian religion and the moral scheme, with their common ideas of Divine retribution and human freedom, is evident; and equally that between the religion of Dionysus and the idea of deification, with its special stress on the acquisition of immortality and its method of ecstasy (also, in its Orphic version, of asceticism), and the corresponding Christian ideas. With regard to the parallel between the Chthonian religion and the doctrine of redemption from the devil, yet more remains to be said. First of all, some passages in Origen show how naturally he tended to interpret the sacrifice of Christ along the lines of the old Chthonian religion. The death of Jesus, he says, was analogous to that of those "who have died for their country to remove pestilence or barrenness or tempest. For it is probable that there is in the nature of things, for certain mysterious reasons which are difficult to be understood by the multitude, a natural tendency (*φύσιν*) such that one just man, dying a voluntary death for the common good, might avert the influence of (*ἀποτροπιασμοὺς ἐμποιεῖν*) wicked spirits, when causing plagues of barrenness, or tempests, or similar calamities."* Compare with this what was said above (p. 261) as to the *φαρμακοί* sacrificed by the Greeks in times of calamity.

But, further, it can be shown that in the ancient Greek religion we have a close anticipation of Origen's idea of the death of Christ as a price paid to the devil

* c. Celsum. i. 31. See further "Commentary on John," vi. 35, 36, 37.

in which his just claim is recognised. As previously mentioned, in actual Greek religion the various elements did not remain apart, but were fused together in various ways. Dionysus, for example, though not so in Homer, became later an inhabitant of Olympus: the name of Zeus, again, was frequently connected with distinctively Chthonian rites, no doubt originally those of a differently named deity. Above all, Delphi was the centre of this fusion; as it was the centre of Greek religion in general. Here Apollo not only succeeded to a seat of Chthonian worship, but also accommodated Dionysus as his partner. What interests us, however, is the legitimation by the religion of Apollo of the Chthonian purificatory rites, in particular of the expiatory sacrifice necessary in cases of bloodshed.* Just because of this Apollo was regarded as the Redeemer or Saviour: the idea was that he redeemed men from the powers of the underworld by showing the rites of purification.† The way from this idea to the idea of Origen is not long. An intermediate stage is the Gnostic doctrine of the death of Jesus as a price paid by the good God to the Demiurge.‡

This brings us, in conclusion, to say something of the historical lines of connection between the ancient Greek and the Christian ideas we have been comparing. Here, of course, we come largely on to the ground already explored. For the sake of completeness, however, we note that the connections between the Olympian religion and the moral scheme of Christian theology lie through Orphism,§ and then through the religiously-minded philosophers in general.‖ The broad way between the Chthonian type of religion and

* Rohde, i. p. 274.

† De la Saussaye, "Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte," [3] ii. p. 342.

‡ Harnack, "D.G.," [3] i. p. 259.

§ The Orphic teachers already extended the doctrine of rewards and punishments to the life after death. See Rohde, ii. pp. 127, 128.

‖ Compare Ritschl's reference to Plato, and Hatch's to the Stoics, as already mentioned, p. 254.

the doctrine of redemption from the devil (or the Demiurge) lies through the belief in demons, which could manifest itself even after the development of philosophy as a fundamental element of the Greek view of the universe, as Plutarch is witness.* The line between the religion of Dionysus and the Christian doctrine of deification lies, as above indicated, through Orphism, and then, as Harnack has stated, through Plato and Neoplatonism. An important point, however, brought out by Rohde, is the dependence of Plato here on the Orphic teachers; he derives his ideas directly from them, not from philosophic speculation.†

It remains now only to sum up our results. They may be stated in the form of two well-known lines of poetry. On the one hand:

> "The old order changeth, giving place to new."

Yet on the other:

> "New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large."

In a word, the Greek Christian doctrine of salvation, while a Christian doctrine of salvation, for it testifies with no uncertain voice that salvation is in Christ, is yet shaped through and through by the spirit of the ancient Greek religion. "The eye brings with it what it sees"; and the Greeks found in Christ that for which their former religion had trained them to look.

* Zeller, "Philosophie der Griechen," ² iii. pp. 156–161.
† "Psyche," ii. p. 278.

HEBREW PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO PAULINE ANTHROPOLOGY

H. W. ROBINSON

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IT is impossible to study any ancient literature seriously without recognition of the gulf that separates ancient from modern thought. There is a something, elusive and difficult to define, that compels us to keep our distance. The atmosphere is not that we breathe, the men who speak are not those we meet daily in the street, the angle at which life is viewed is not the same for them as for us. This elusive element is found to lie somewhere midway between the thoughts and feelings common to men in all ages and those external accompaniments of life, its work and worship, art and architecture, whose differences are fully recognised by the historic sense of to-day. The central characteristic of this intermediate element is the conception of personality current in a particular generation. How did the man whose words we read interpret his own nature? What was the instinctive attitude towards life and death, God and other men, and Nature, implied in his idea of himself? In proportion as the literature in question is personal and introspective we see more clearly the dependence of practical philosophy on popular psychology. The attempt, however, to include the psychological data of the Bible within a single formula has created many of the problems and vitiated most of the conclusions of those who have written on "Biblical Psychology." There is, indeed, an underlying logic in the use of the psychological terms, but it is the logic of genetic growth and living development.

Here, as along so many other lines of Biblical study, criticism has assisted in solving the old problems by placing the documents before us in their proper historical order. But the lines of development thus revealed may be traced back beyond even the earliest documents of the Old Testament by means of comparative anthropology; the Old Testament is seen to be rooted in the ground of general primitive life and culture, and its psychology is but a specialisation of what we can trace almost universally amongst primitive peoples. Similarly, the lines of development run on through the post-canonical literature of Judaism into the pages of the New Testament. The speech we hear in that new world is Greek, the cities we enter are no longer those of Palestine alone, the national horizon is expanding to the universal. Yet, as in some ghetto of to-day, the fundamental things are Hebrew—the obedience of the Sabbath, the worship of the synagogue, the aspiration that has availed to make the graveyard "the house of life." If we could recall the mental features of New Testament thought as vividly as the physical features of the dwellers in some Jewish quarter through which we have passed, would Hebrew descent be less legibly written upon them? The aim of this essay is to show that Paul, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, is primarily and characteristically Hebrew in his anthropology, and that even where his ideas (in this realm) come nearest to a Greek form or are clothed in a Greek terminology, they are a legitimate outcome of Old Testament conceptions. The argument will lie in the exhibition of three main lines of development from the anthropology of the anthropologist to that of Paul.

2. Amongst the ideas generally grouped as "Animism"* three are of particular importance. (*a*) The central conception of Animism is that of the personal soul or spirit, frequently connected with the breath. "The act of breathing, so characteristic of the higher animals during life, and coinciding so closely with life

* Cf. Tylor, "Primitive Culture," Cc. xi. and xiv.

in its departure, has been repeatedly and naturally identified with the life or soul itself."* (*b*) In marked contrast with what may be called our normal idea of "closed" † personality, accessible only through the different senses, primitive thought conceives man to be open to all kinds of external influences of a quasi-spiritual sort; whence comes the theory of demonic possession, witchcraft, &c., to explain anything abnormal in human life. (*c*) Finally, ignorance of physiology made not only possible, but natural, a psychical theory of the physical organs. The existence of the nervous system and the fact of the circulation of the blood were unknown; each organ consequently stood in comparative detachment from the rest, self-contained not only in its physiological, but also in its psychical and ethical aspects. This is clearly seen in the well-known savage practice of eating a particular organ or part of the body in order to obtain its inherent quality, *e.g.*, the lion's heart to become brave or the bird's tongue to become eloquent.‡ These three (*a*, *b*, *c*) primary and characteristic conceptions will be traced through Hebrew psychology into their spiritualised forms in the Pauline anthropology.

3. The terms employed by Hebrew psychology fall into two main classes according as they denote on the one hand the principle of life and its conscious activities, and on the other the physical organs to which psychical functions are ascribed. To the former class belong the terms employed for the breath-soul (*nephesh*, *ruach*, *neshāmāh*), and also the term for blood (*dām*). To the latter class belong the terms for the central organs, viz., heart (*lēb*, *lēbab*), liver (*kābēd*), kidneys (*kelāyoth*),

* *Op. cit.*, ed. 3, vol. i. p. 432.

† The term is certainly true to the idea of Locke and of the subsequent development of psychology. It does not, of course, apply where there is acceptance of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit with any intensity of conviction on the one hand, or of telepathy on the other.

‡ Examples will be found in Frazer's "The Golden Bough" (ed. 2), vol. ii. p. 354 f.

bowels (*me'im*), those for the more general bodily parts, *e.g.*, flesh (*bāsār*), bone (*'eṣem*), and belly (*beṭen*), and those for the peripheral organs, the eye, ear, tongue, &c. Of the terms for the breath-soul, two only, viz., *nephesh* and *ruach*, are of present importance;* they will be found to continue respectively the ideas of the personal soul and the invading spirit noted as (*a*) and (*b*) above. The fundamental term is *nephesh*, occurring 754 times.† It does not appear to retain the original meaning, "breath," as does *neshāmāh*,‡ but in 282 cases it denotes the breath-soul as the principle of life in man, and is sometimes approximately a synonym of "life" (*e.g.*, 1 Sam. xx. 1). It "goes out" at death (Gen. xxxv. 18) or unconsciousness (Song v. 6); it returns (1 Kings xvii. 21) at recovery of life. In the earlier literature at least, the *nephesh* dies with its owner (Judg. xvi. 30, Heb.; Num. xxiii. 10; cf. Job xxxvi. 14); "the inhabitants of the nether-world (*sheol*) are not *souls*, but shades (*refaīm*, *eidōla*)."§ Earlier Hebrew thought probably did not raise the question either of the origin‖ or of the future

* The term *neshāmāh*, occurring twenty-four times in the Old Testament, denotes "breath" as the principle of moral and spiritual life in three cases (Job xxvi. 4, xxxii. 8; Prov. xx. 27), and man as a breathing creature, a person, in seven (*e.g.*, Deut. xx. 16). The term *dām* is of importance for the psychology of sacrifice rather than for the present discussion.

† Briggs ("Journal of Biblical Literature," 1897, p. 17 f., cf. B. D. B. Heb. Lex., s.v.), claims to give seven hundred and fifty-six; but he omits Gen. xiv. 21, and apparently classifies (and counts) twice cases in Job xiv. 22, Deut. xii. 23, 1 Sam. xviii. 1. The numbers given above in connection with the *classification* of terms are, of course, only approximate; the different connotations shade off into each other, so that it is frequently difficult to decide as to a particular usage.

‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

§ Moore, "Judges," p. 362.

‖ The earliest trace of a theory as to origin is found in Gen. ii. 7 (ninth century?), but the passage stands alone at this period. The term *nephesh* is here applicable to animal life as well as human (cf. verse 19), though Yahweh's special activity in regard to man should be noted. The term *neshāmāh*, also used here, must not be identified with the later term *ruach* of P (vi. 17, vii. 15), as is done by Charles (Encyc. Biblica, c. 1342), to obtain an erroneous "trichotomy."

of the *nephesh* in any distinct form; it was simply taken for granted as the essential condition of life. As such, it forms the basis for a second main group of usages, including 249 cases, which can be classed as psychical. *Nephesh* is made the subject of appetite (1 Sam. ii. 16), desire (xx. 4), love and affection (xviii. 1), hate and loathing (2 Sam. v. 8), patience and impatience (Judg. xvi. 16), anger (xviii. 25), sorrow and distress (Gen. xlii. 21), terror (Isa. xv. 4), contempt and scorn (Ez. xxv. 6), delight (Isa. lxi. 10), peace (Psa. lxii. 1), hope (Psa. xxxiii. 20), compassion (Ez. xxiv. 21), the emotional nature in general (1 Kings ii. 4), personality as a whole (Gen. xliv. 30), the inner life of thought and feeling (Job xvi. 4), purpose (Gen. xxiii. 8), memory (Lam. iii. 20). It will be seen that in the wide range of usage of this originally quite general term the emotional predominates; the term is, in fact, largely appropriated to the emotional side of consciousness, especially to the sensation of appetite or strong desire. In a third remaining group, with 223 cases, the term *nephesh* is employed as a strong personal or reflexive pronoun (Ezek. iv. 14), or it is used as equivalent to "person" (Gen. xii. 5; note the similar development of *neshāmāh*).*

4. The term *ruach* is something more than a mere synonym of *nephesh*, as its usage clearly shows. It occurs 378 times, denoting (*a*) the wind, natural or figurative (131 times); (*b*) supernatural influences acting on man from without, rarely on inanimate objects (134 times); (*c*) the principle of life (like *nephesh*), or of its energies (39 times); (*d*) the resultant psychical life (74 times). The key to this extended usage seems to be given by the fact that *ruach* is not used of the breath-soul in man in any pre-exilic document, though it occurs in the sense of "life-energy" in the early passages, Gen. xlv. 27 (JE), Judg. xv. 19, 1 Sam. xxx. 12, 1 Kings x. 5. Similarly,

* Here, apparently, belongs the curious use of *nephesh* (in thirteen late cases) to denote "corpse" (*e.g.*, Lev. xix. 28), *i.e.*, a dead "person"; a Syriac cognate denotes "tombstone." For another view see Stade, "Biblische Theologie des A. T.," p. 139.

ruach is not used with psychical predicates * in any pre-exilic passage, though from the exile onwards this usage becomes frequent, whilst in Psalms and Proverbs the term is practically employed as a synonym of *nephesh* and "heart," to denote the inner life in general. Further, we find a marked use of *ruach* to denote the stronger emotions of anger (Judg. viii. 3), grief (Gen. xxvi. 35), zeal (Haggai i. 14); whilst *ruach* in the sense of "breath" seems to be specially connected with the nostrils (2 Sam. xxii. 16, Psa. xviii. 15, Exod. xv. 8, Job iv. 9; cf. Job xxvii. 3, Lam. iv. 20, Gen. vii. 22),† and the term for "smell" is etymologically connected with *ruach*, both in the cognate languages and in Hebrew. From these facts, it is natural to infer that the term *ruach* was applied originally both to the "blowing" of the wind, and to the "blowing," or panting, of men and animals in distress or excitement. This inference would explain the actual use of *ruach* in the pre-exilic period for the wind, caused by God (Exod. x. 13); for the passion of anger, &c., in man (Judg. viii. 3), or the stronger energies of life (Gen. xlv. 27, Judg. xv. 19, 1 Sam. xxx. 12, 1 Kings x. 5); and for the external influence (ascribed to Yahweh) causing certain abnormal actions in men (*e.g.*, insanity, 1 Sam. xvi. 14, prophesying, x. 5, 6, extraordinary display of strength, Judg. xiv. 6). In this earlier period, then, *ruach* is confined to the stormier and wind-like breathing of excited feeling, and the accompanying physical or mental condition; the contemporary term for the quieter breathing of normal life is *neshāmāh* (Gen. ii. 7).

* *E.g.*, as in Gen. xxvi. 35 (P) "bitterness of *ruach*." The only apparent exceptions are Gen. xli. 8 (cf. Dan. ii. 3) where the phrase, as a whole, is possibly late; and Micah ii. 7 (of Yahweh, not of man) where the immediate context is admittedly in disorder, on quite other grounds It is conceivable that the term *ruach* was applied both to the "breath" and the "spirit" in Yahweh earlier than to those of man (cf. Exod. xv. 8, Isa. xxx. 28), though similar *ideas*, expressed through *nephesh*, must have existed already in regard to human psychology.

† The word for "nostril" in Hebrew is found very frequently in the sense of "anger" (*e.g.*, Gen. xxvii. 45).

The wind may have been conceived already in poetry as the strong "breath" of God (2 Sam. xxii. 16, Psa. xviii. 15, Exod. xv. 8, if all these are pre-exilic; cf. the post-exilic passages, Isa. xxx. 28, lix. 19; Job iv. 9). But, by the time of Ezekiel, we find that *ruach* has come to denote the normal breath-soul, as the principle of life in man (Ezek. xxxvii. 5, 6, 8),* which is directly derived from the wind at the bidding of God (cf. Isa. xlii. 5, Zech. xii. 1, Job xxvii. 3, Psa. civ. 29, Eccles. xii. 7); from this point onwards, we find *ruach* following a line of development similar to that of *nephesh*, with which it is used in parallelism (*e.g.*, the post-exilic Isa. xxvi. 9). But the earlier emotional use for strong passion (anger, zeal, impatience) is still represented (Job xv. 13, Eccles. x. 4), whilst the term is kept at a higher level than *nephesh* through its associations with "the *ruach* of Yahweh." In this conception of a supernatural *ruach* as the source of the highest spiritual equipment and consciousness (*e.g.*, Isa. lxi. 1), we recognise the development of the animistic conception of an influence from without, noted above (*b*), just as in the conception of *nephesh* we have the normal breath-soul of animism (*a*). A fact of deep significance in regard to the use of *ruach* is that normal human nature is held to be animated by the same Divine *ruach* to which its highest inspiration is due (Job xxvii. 3, xxxiii. 4; cf. Joel ii. 28); the development of this conception is a central feature in Pauline anthropology.

5. In continuation of the third line of animistic thought (*c*), *i.e.*, its physiological psychology, there is an extensive use in the Old Testament of organs or parts of the human body with a psychical connotation. This is instinctively treated by the modern reader as merely metaphorical; but it really reflects the current degree of actual or supposed knowledge of physiology and psy-

* It is possible that the "supernaturalism" exemplified in Ezekiel may have contributed to this development; a higher anthropology came to conceive man's breath-soul to be the very *ruach* of God (Job xxvii. 3). Thus the idea of Gen. ii. 7 would meet us in a new terminology.

chology. The distinction of these two sciences is modern; for early thought, the psychical attributes of an organ are correlatives of its physiological function. Thus the heart was regarded by the Hebrews, in common with many ancient peoples, as the centre of conscious life,* because it is obviously an important centre of physical life. Apart from 29 cases in which "heart" is used in the Old Testament in a purely physical or in a figurative sense (= "midst"), there are four main groups of its usage (851 instances in all); (1) to denote personality, inner life, or character in general (Exod. ix. 14, 1 Sam. xvi. 7, Gen. xx. 5), in 257 cases; (2) of emotional states of consciousness in widest range, *e.g.*, intoxication (1 Sam. xxv. 36), joy or sorrow (Judg. xviii. 20, 1 Sam. i. 8), anxiety (1 Sam. iv. 13), courage or fear (Gen. xlii. 28), love (2 Sam. xiv. 1), in 166 cases; (3) of intellectual activities, viz., attention (Exod. vii. 23), reflection (Deut. vii. 17), memory (Deut. iv. 9), understanding (1 Kings iii. 9), technical skill (Exod. xxviii. 3), in 204 cases; (4) of volition, especially in the sense of purpose (1 Sam. ii. 35), in 195 cases, this being one of the most characteristic of the Old Testament usages of "heart." It will be seen that the psychical connotation is quite general; specialisation comes only through the appropriation of part of its content to other terms, as when *nephesh* has come to be employed specially of emotional, and *ruach* of spiritual or religious consciousness.† Each

* The Hebrews appear to have had no term for "brain," which may have been called by them, as it is in Syriac, "the marrow of the head."

† The other central organs are less important. "Liver," so frequent a parallel to "heart" in Babylonian literature, is used psychically twice only, viz., as the life-centre of consciousness (Lam. ii. 11, Prov. vii. 23), though it should probably be read for "glory," by re-punctuation of the Hebrew, in Gen. xlix. 6, Psa. vii. 5, xvi. 9. "Kidneys" are named as a general emotional centre in 10 instances, *e.g.*, of joy (Prov. xxiii. 16), discontent (Psa. lxxiii. 21), impulse (Psa. xvi. 7), desire (Job xix. 27). "Bowels" are named with psychical reference in 9 instances, as the seat of sexual love (Song v. 4), religious affection (Psa. xl. 8), compassion and pity (Isa. xvi. 11, lxiii. 15; Jer. xxxi. 20), distress (Lam. i. 20, ii. 11; Jer. iv. 19, *bis*). The psychical connotation of "kidneys" and "bowels" is doubtless due to the observed effect of emotion on these organs.

of these three principal terms, it should be carefully noticed, has developed in a parallel, and more or less independent line of growth; the absence of system, and the overlapping of usage is due to the fact that there never was a clear demarcation of their respective territories, apart from the actual "occupation" of usage; yet each preserves, as we shall see, a characteristic core of meaning, which supplies the nucleus for further development.

But psychical function is ascribed to the peripheral, as well as to the central organs, in accordance with the animistic idea of each organ as a self-contained element with its own qualities. When we read, *e.g.*, "Yahweh shall give thee there an agitated heart, and failing of eyes, and faintness of *nephesh*" (Deut. xxviii. 65), what we are apt to call vivid writing is really primitive psychology. The eye is an entity, with a moral and psychical life of its own, as when it is said to be unsatisfied (Prov. xxvii. 20), expectant (Psa. cxlv. 15), asking (Eccles. ii. 10), desiring (Ezek. xxiv. 16), taking pleasure in vengeance (Mic. iv. 11), mocking (Prov. xxx. 17), testifying (Job xxix. 11), covenanting (Job xxxi. 1); to the eye are ascribed the qualities of pride (Psa. cxxxi. 1), humility (Job xxii. 29 R.V. *marg.*), purity (Hab. i. 13), pitilessness (Isa. xiii. 18); note especially the "evil eye" (Prov. xxiii. 6, xxviii. 22; cf. Deut. xv. 9, xxviii. 54, 56). It is significant that Elisha, when restoring the dead child (2 Kings iv. 34), places his mouth on the child's mouth, his eyes on the child's eyes, his hands on the child's hands—which must be due to the belief that the life of the separate organs was thus imparted by local contact. Similar references to those above might be given for other peripheral organs, viz., the ear, the tongue, or the hand. The importance of realising this point of view, *which has become to us no more than metaphor*, lies not only in the greater intensity of meaning given to particular passages, but in the help it affords in understanding the Hebrew idea of personality, as a psycho-physical unity.

What has been said of the central and peripheral organs applies also to the "flesh" as a whole,* of which they are specialised forms. Hebrew has no proper term for "body," just because physical and psychical life were not dualistically separated by Hebrew thought. It is the substance, flesh, as an essential element in the unity of life, of which the Hebrew thinks—not the organic form. The term "flesh" occurs 266 times; with more or less psychical reference in 45 cases, including 14 of kinship (Gen. ii. 23, 24). It is contrasted with stone (Ezek. xi. 19, xxxvi. 26), or bronze (Job vi. 12), as being sensitive (Job ii. 5), and warm with life (2 Kings iv. 34); it suffers (Eccles. xi. 10) like the heart, shudders in fear (Psa. cxix. 120, Job iv. 15, cf. xxi. 6), is weary (Eccles. xii. 12), dwells in confidence (Psa. xvi. 9), longs (Psa. lxiii. 1), enjoys wine (Eccles. ii. 3), rejoices (Psa. lxxxiv. 2), sins (Eccles. v. 6), is influenced by the mental state (Prov. xiv. 30), and retains a certain sensitiveness, even after death (Job xiv. 22). The corruption and dissolution of the body after death suggest the idea of Gen. iii. 19, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." In an important group of cases, "flesh" is used of man, or of man's essential nature, in contrast to God, or "Spirit," to emphasize man's frailty, dependence, or incapacity (Isa. xxxi. 3, xl. 6; Psa. lvi. 4, lxxviii. 39; Job x. 4, xxxiv. 15; Jer. xvii. 5; cf. Psa. ciii. 14, Job iv. 17f., xxv. 4f.). The contrast

* So also to the bones and the "belly." The bones have so much life inherent in them, that some of it remains even after death, as is seen from the story of the dead man revived by contact with the bones of Elisha (2 Kings xiii. 21). They shake in fear (Job iv. 14, Jer. xxiii. 9), they even acknowledge God's power (Psa. xxxv. 10); they are burned by the heat of disease (Job xxx. 30, Psa. cii. 3, Lam. i. 13), or pierced with pain (Job xxx. 17). "Bone and flesh" may express the idea "body" (Job ii. 5), or that of kinship (Gen. xxix. 14, cf. ii. 23). The "belly" or trunk (*beṭen*) may also serve to express the idea "body" (Psa. xliv. 25, xxxi. 9; Hab. iii. 16, Prov. xx. 27, 30). In Prov. xviii. 8 (xxvi. 22), the reference is to physical appetite; this fairly frequent usage prepares for the use of *koilia* in the New Testament; so in Job xx. 15, 20 R.V. *marg.*, 23, the belly has the idea of greed associated with it.

does not occur before Isa. xxxi. 3, and must not be read into the earlier Hebrew thought; its importance lies in forming the departure for the development of the Pauline doctrine of "flesh," with distinct ethical reference. In some cases in the Old Testament (*e.g.*, Job iv. 17–19, xxv. 4–6), physical frailty is used to explain or to exculpate ethical imperfection, a usage which would be inconceivable, if the "flesh" had been conceived as essentially evil. But the Hebrew did conceive the flesh and the fleshly organs to have a psychical (and therefore moral) life of their own; consequently the way was open for Hebrew thought, developing its ethical experience, to separate the life of the flesh from the life of the *ruach*, the lower from the higher; and this is Paul's characteristic line of thought.

6. From the above review of Hebrew psychology, it will be seen that the general animistic point of view has given rise to three principal developments in the special field of Hebrew life and religion, viz. (*a*) the term *nephesh*, denoting the subject of personal life and consciousness, particularly on its emotional side; (*b*) the term *ruach*, employed to denote either the supernatural and external source of personal activity and conscious states, or (later, and like *nephesh*) the subject of these; but usually suggesting the higher and more energetic aspect of personality, and its relation to supernatural influences; (*c*) a group of terms denoting physiological organs, with more or less psychical activity ascribed to them, and including the term for "flesh." In the resultant conception of man, none of these three elements must be isolated and identified with the essential personality; moreover, there is neither a "trichotomy" nor a "dichotomy." Man's life consists in the interaction of all three elements—(1) a body with psychical attributes; (2) a breath-soul (identified with the blood-soul, Gen. ix. 4, Deut. xii. 23, Lev. xvii. 14, cf. 11) animating that body, and nothing apart from it; (3) energies, physical or spiritual, originated from without. Each element makes its characteristic con-

tribution to the Hebrew idea of man, as limited in life and achievement by his physical nature, yet capable of much, ethically and spiritually, through the unlimited energies of God, when these are imparted to him.

What were the influences likely to modify the above conceptions in the case of Paul? In the first place, he uses Greek terms, most of which lay ready to his hand in the Septuagint, with which he was familiar.* The usual equivalents in the Septuagint for the Hebrew terms above are respectively (*a*) *psuche*, (*b*) *pneuma*, (*c*) *kardia* (heart) and *sarx* (flesh). The connotation is Hebrew, rather than Greek; thus *pneuma*, which meant only "wind" or "breath" in classical or contemporary Greek, is employed also for the whole psychical range of *ruach* in the Septuagint.† In general, as Hatch has shown, ‡ there is a lack of sharp distinction between the terms *psuche*, *pneuma*, and *kardia*, though *kardia* continues to have will and intention for its dominant usage, and *psuche* has appetite and desire. In the second place, Paul was, as we know, trained in the Palestinian theology of Judaism. Here two developments of the Old Testament ideas may be noted.§ The emphasis within the idea of personality now falls on the inner and spiritual side (soul and spirit are hardly to be distinguished); the older eschatology of a shadowy Sheol is displaced by the logic of a higher anthropology; the souls or spirits of the dead continue the real person-

* Cf. Swete, "Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek," pp. 400 453.

† Schoemaker ("Journal of Biblical Literature," 1904, p. 36) points out that "wind and breath continued to be the only meanings of *pneuma* in common use among Greek-speaking Gentiles up to the first century, A.D.," and that "Philo and Josephus (Jewish authors who wrote for Gentile readers) customarily use the term only in these two senses." Deissmann's remark ("Bible Studies," p. 77, n. 3) of Philo that "he felt himself to be a Greek," corresponds with the marked differences of Philonic psychology from that of the Apostle who felt himself to be a Hebrew.

‡ "Essays in Biblical Greek," pp. 94 f.

§ Bousset, "Die Religion des Judentums im nt. Zeitalter," ch. xx.

ality of the living, though the doctrine of resurrection, as held by Palestinian Judaism, shows retention of the older Hebrew conception that both soul (spirit) and body together are needed to constitute man's full life. There is further in this field an important ethical development. It has sometimes been assumed, on the ground of Weber's discussion * of the "evil impulse," that this was conceived as essentially present in the body, forming a virtual dualism; but a more recent and thorough examination of this point † has shown that no such dualistic conclusion is admissible; the term in question denotes simply the evil disposition in general, and gives no metaphysical explanation of the problem of evil. So far, then, as Paul's statement of the problem of moral evil is influenced by Palestinian Judaism, it can be regarded as a natural development of Old Testament ideas through deepened ethical thought and experience. There remains, however, in the third place, the influence of that Hellenistic world in which a Jew of Tarsus would live; as to the extent of this influence there has been much controversy. Holtzmann, for example, finds a fundamental dualism of the inner and outer man in the anthropology of Paul, "which shows itself to be the result of Hellenistic influence on an originally Jewish consciousness, though the emphasis falls already on the Hellenistic factor." ‡ The present argument seeks to show that Paul's undoubted emphasis on the inner life is due to his ethical experience, psychological insight, and mystical relation to Christ, rather than to any direct influence of Hellenistic dualism.

7. The most significant point in regard to *psuche* (continuing *nephesh*) is the very limited use of the term

* "Jüdische Theologie," pp. 209 f.

† "The Yeçer Hara," by F. C. Porter, in "Biblical and Semitic Studies" (Yale Bicentennial Publications), 1901.

‡ "Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie," vol. ii. pp. 14, 15. Cf. also Lüdemann, "Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus" (1872), and Sokolowski, "Die Begriffe Geist und Leben bei Paulus" (1903), who both ascribe this distinction of the inner and outer man to Hellenistic influence.

made by Paul; it occurs only 13 times in his epistles.* In six cases, it denotes "life," without any psychological content; thus Epaphroditus "for the work of Christ came nigh unto death, hazarding his *life*" (Phil. ii. 30; cf. Rom. xvi. 4, 2 Cor. i. 23, 1 Thess. ii. 8; in quotation from the Old Testament, Rom. xi. 3, 1 Cor. xv. 45). In three cases, *psuche* denotes the "individual" (*pasa psuche* =*kol nephesh*, Rom. ii. 9, xiii. 1), or the strong personal pronoun (2 Cor. xii. 15) exactly like *nephesh*. In three of the four psychical instances of the term, the special Old Testament sense of "desire" re-appears (Eph. vi. 6, R.V. marg.; Phil. i. 27, Col. iii. 23, R.V. marg.). The fourth case occurs in the well-known passage, 1 Thess. v. 23: "And the God of peace Himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit (*pneuma*), and soul (*psuche*), and body (*soma*), be preserved entire, without blame, at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." Here the enumeration is not systematic, but hortatory, to emphasize the completeness of the preservation; it should be compared with the somewhat similar enumeration of Deut. vi. 5 (cf. iv. 29, x. 12, &c.): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart (*lēb*), and with all thy soul (*nephesh*), and with all thy might." In both cases, *psuche* brings forward the emotional, in contrast with the intellectual or volitional aspects of conscious life. This use of *psuche* for the lower side of consciousness, which directly continues the similar use of *nephesh*, also underlies Paul's use of the adjective *psuchikos*, occurring four times in two contexts. In 1 Cor. ii. 14, 15, the "psychic" man is contrasted with the "pneumatic" as without knowledge of the contents of the Divine *pneuma;* in 1 Cor. xv. 44–46, the present "psychic" body of man is contrasted with the future "pneumatic" body of the resurrection. The common element in these two contrasts is the present body of flesh, which is animated

* For the sake of completeness in statement, all the epistles ascribed to Paul in the New Testament (except Hebrews) are included in this and similar enumerations.

by the *psuche*, the principle of life and the basis of its emotional aspect. Thus noun and adjective continue the Old Testament usage of *nephesh*, in which the appropriation to the emotional side of conscious life explains Paul's use of the adjective in contrast with the higher life of man, and his infrequent use of the noun. The life of the "breath-soul" is destined to pass away; his concern is with the higher life which develops within it.

8. The key-word of this higher life is *pneuma*, occurring 146 times, and continuing our second line of development through *ruach*. In the natural sense of "wind," it is not used by Paul, who employs *anemos* (Eph. iv. 14). The majority of instances (116 cases) fall into the second class (see *ruach*, above) of "supernatural influences"; we read of the *pneuma* of God or Christ (Rom. viii. 9, cf. 1 Cor. vi. 19) as dwelling in the believer, and as the source of Christian experience and activity (*e.g.*, Rom. viii. 23); *pneuma* is set in contrast to *sarx* (flesh) in numerous cases (Rom. viii. 4, 5, *bis*, 6, 9; Gal. iii. 3, iv. 29, v. 17, *bis*, vi. 8, *bis*), as life to death, power to weakness, peace with God to enmity against Him, supernatural to natural, good to evil, eternal life to corruption; or it is contrasted with the "letter" of the former covenant (Rom. ii. 29, vii. 6; 2 Cor. iii. 6); or it denotes influences, good or evil, entering human life from without, viz., those of adoption (Rom. viii. 15), power (1 Cor. ii. 4), faith (2 Cor. iv. 13), wisdom and revelation (Eph. i. 17), meekness or gentleness (1 Cor. iv. 21, Gal. vi. 1), or those of slavery (Rom. viii. 15), stupor (Rom. xi. 8), the world (1 Cor. ii. 12), seduction (1 Tim. iv. 1), disobedience (Eph. ii. 2), cowardice (2 Tim. i. 7); cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 12; 2 Cor. xi. 4.* The third group of the usages of *ruach* to denote the principle of life, or breath (in man), is hardly represented amongst these of *pneuma*.† There remain 30 cases of the psychical use of *pneuma* in the narrower sense, of which 14 refer to the higher nature

* Cf. the similar Old Testament usage, *e.g.*, "the spirit of grace and supplication" (Zech. xii. 10), "the spirit of whoredom" (Hos. iv. 12).

† 2 Thess. ii. 8 (cf. Isa. xi. 4) belongs really to the second group.

of a Christian man (*e.g.*, Rom. i. 9), and are hardly to be distinguished from the result of the Divine *pneuma* influencing him; the other 16 cases appear to denote a normal element in human nature. The latter usage is seen most clearly in Rom. viii. 16: "The Spirit Himself bears witness along with our spirit that we are God's children." This passage should now be conclusive against those who assert that Paul does not conceive a *pneuma* to be in any but "pneumatic" men; it is confirmed by 2 Cor. vii. 1: "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and *pneuma*," and numerous other passages.* That this use of *pneuma* as inherent in "psychic" men is a source of ambiguity is obvious; but the same ambiguity already exists in the Old Testament, in the double use of *ruach* (after the exile) for a supernatural influence, and for a natural element in human nature. So far as Paul made the inherited double use a matter of thought, it must have suggested in human nature a point of contact for the regenerative action of the Spirit of God.

9. Paul uses the term for "heart" (*kardia*) in 52 instances, none physical or figurative, viz. in regard to (*a*) personality, character, inner life in general (15 times), *e.g.*, 1 Cor. xiv. 25; (*b*) emotional states (13 times), *e.g.*, Rom. ix. 2; (*c*) intellectual (11 times), *e.g.*, Rom. i. 21; (*d*) volition (13 times), *e.g.*, Rom. ii. 5. This directly continues the general Old Testament usage; the proportionate decrease in the third group is due to the introduction of the wholly Greek term *nous*, in 21 cases (it occasionally translates *lēb* in the Septuagint). The term *nous* practically appropriates a section of the usages of "heart"; it is the intellectual faculty of the natural

* 1 Cor. xvi. 18, 2 Cor. ii. 13, vii. 13 (refreshed or relieved); 1 Cor. ii. 11 (the *pneuma* of the man), Eph. iv. 23 (of your *nous*); Gal. vi. 18, Phil. iv. 23, Philem. 25 (grace with); Rom. viii. 10, 1 Cor. v. 3, 4, Col. ii. 5 (contrast of *pneuma* and body or flesh); Phil. i. 27, 1 Thess. v. 23. Holtzmann (*op. cit.*, p. 16 f.) is no more convincing in his attempt to explain these cases away than when he arbitrarily makes the non-Hebraic *nous* fundamental in his exposition of Pauline psychology.

man (1 Cor. xiv. 14, Phil. iv. 7), applicable to God or Christ (Rom. xi. 34, 1 Cor. ii. 16), employed in practical judgment (Rom. xiv. 5, cf. verb in i. 20), capable of being good (Rom. vii. 23), or evil (Rom. i. 28), and of being regenerated (Rom. xii. 2). Here, also, as a further specialisation of *kardia*, belongs the Greek term *sun-eidesis* (consciousness, conscience), occurring in 20 cases (cf. Wisdom xvii. 11). Whilst the *term* is an innovation, the *idea* of conscience is already represented under the activity of *lēb* (1 Sam. xxiv. 5, xxv. 31; 2 Sam. xxiv. 10, Job xxvii. 6).*

Paul employs the term for "flesh" (*sarx*) 91 times, viz. (*a*) physical (12 times), *e.g.*, Rom. ii. 28; (*b*) kinship (11 times), *e.g.*, Rom. ix. 3; (*c*) the sphere of present existence (14 times), *e.g.*, 2 Cor. x. 3; (*d*) in reference to fleshly weakness (19 times); (*e*) ethical (35 times). The last two groups require detailed attention, in view of the controversy as to the Pauline idea of "flesh." The term implies physical weakness in 2 Cor. vii. 5, x. 3; Eph. vi. 12; cf. 2 Cor. iv. 11 (mortal), 1 Cor. xv. 50 (corruptible); intellectual weakness in Rom. vi. 19, Gal. i. 16, Col. ii. 18 (*nous* of flesh); some idea of limited value, in Phil. iii. 3, 4, *bis*, 2 Cor. xi. 18, Gal. vi. 12, 13 (confidence or glory in the temporary and external), iii. 3; cf. Rom. iii. 20, Gal. ii. 16, 1 Cor. i. 29 (cf. verse 26, "not many wise, mighty, noble, after the flesh"). The ethical references fall into two classes, according as they imply some general relation between the flesh and sin, or that the flesh is in some sense active in the production of evil. Of the former there are 15 cases, supplied by the phrases "in the flesh" (Rom.

* Of the other central organs, Paul uses *splanchna* (bowels) in eight cases, as the seat of deep emotion (*e.g.*, Philem. 7) and *koilia* (belly) once as "womb," and four times as the seat of appetite (Rom. xvi. 18, 1 Cor. vi. 13 *bis*, Phil. iii. 19). In the case of the former word, the classical usage of the Greek term for the higher viscera has been abandoned, and it is used, like the Hebrew *me'im*, for the lower viscera, though it never translates this term in the LXX.; this is a good example of the transference of a Hebrew connotation to a Greek term.

vii. 5, viii. 8, 9), "walk, live, be, be born, after the flesh" (2 Cor. x. 2, Rom. viii. 4, 5, 12, 13, Gal. iv. 29), "mind," or "mind of" the flesh (Rom. viii. 5, 6, 7), together with references to spiritual uncircumcision (Col. ii. 11, 13) and defilement (2 Cor. vii. 1). In the last passage, the Corinthians are bidden to cleanse the flesh as well as the spirit from all defilement; if Paul wrote these words (as there is no sufficient reason to deny, even if the paragraph from vi. 14 to vii. 1 be interpolated from a lost epistle), he could not have regarded the flesh as essentially evil. There are 20 instances of the second class, ten of them referring to the desires or "lusts" of the flesh as evil (Rom. xiii. 14, Gal. v. 16, 24, Eph. ii. 3, *bis*), to its claims, its want of restraint, its satisfaction (Rom. viii. 12, Gal. v. 13, Col. ii. 23), and to its evil "works" (Gal. v. 19, cf. 2 Cor. i. 17). The general principle underlying these cases is explicitly stated in Gal. v. 16 f., "the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary the one to the other." It is clear that Paul finds in man's physical nature * the immediate foe of the higher principle; but is it the ultimate enemy? The answer lies in the most important passage of all, Rom. vii. 7–25. Sin is represented as springing into life through the clash of "the law of sin" in the flesh, or the members of the body (v. 23, 25), with the law of God accepted by the *nous* or the inner man as its own true law (v. 22, 23). The conflict reveals its essential issues in v. 14: "We know that the law is spiritual (*pneumatikos*), but I am made of flesh (*sarkinos*), sold under sin." Because of the frailty of the *sarx* (a conception which Paul continues from the Old Testament) it has passed into slavery to Sin, which Paul conceives as an external power (cf. Gen. iv. 7). Once established

* In the catalogue of the "works of the flesh" (Gal. v. 19–21) five only of the fifteen examples are due to fleshly appetites; but Paul conceives the fleshly opposition to the Spirit to extend through the whole man, unless resisted; cf. the phrase, "the *nous* of his flesh" (Col. ii. 18, cf. Rom. i. 28 f.).

in the flesh (Rom. vii. 17, 18), it wages war, from this acquired territory, against the inner man (v. 23). Man has thus become its slave (Rom. vi. 6, 17) and prisoner (vii. 23, cf. Gal. iii. 22), so that the very members of man's body become weapons in the hand of Sin (Rom. vi. 13), who is king and lord over man (v. 21, vi. 12, 14), until he gives his slaves death as their pay (vi. 23, cf. 1 Cor. xv. 56). Man's real and ultimate foe is therefore "not flesh and blood" (cf. Eph. vi. 12), but "the spirit that now works in the sons of disobedience" (ii. 2). Deliverance from this slavery comes through the welcomed entrance into the inner man of "the Spirit of life in Jesus Christ" (Rom. viii. 2, etc.). The present victory over sin is potentially also a victory over death. In the later eschatology of Paul, his belief in the redemption of the body (Rom. viii. 23) implies the distinction between the body of frail flesh and the higher "pneumatic" body (1 Cor. xv. 44, etc.). The resurrection body is ascribed to the indwelling Spirit (Rom. viii. 11): "Christ shall transform the body of our humiliation (to make it) conformable to the body of His glory" (Phil. iii. 21).

10. We have now traced the triple branching of the familiar "body, soul, and spirit" through the Pauline anthropology, and have seen that whilst the trunk of the tree is formed by Hebrew psychology, the roots are deep in the soil of Animism. Paul transformed each of the three conceptions he received, yet without compelling us to resort to his own figure of "grafting" from another growth; *i.e.*, to explain the transformation by Hellenistic influences. His central emphasis falls on the conception of supernatural influence: the Christian is essentially the product of the Divine *pneuma* to which he has yielded himself. But Paul has brought together the Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit, and the Old Testament aspiration after mystic fellowship with God, and made them real, vital, personal, by his conception of Christ as the mediator of the Divine Spirit. On the

other hand, Paul has coupled the breath-soul (*nephesh-psuche*), the animating principle of the body of flesh and its life of feeling, with the physical organs themselves (as frail, perishable, open to the invasion of Sin); the resultant conception he has employed in his statement of the problem of moral evil. If the Old Testament contributes to this conception the idea of the frailty of man's present body of flesh, it also contributes (what has usually been overlooked) the idea of the characteristic psychical and ethical life of the physical organs, and of the flesh itself. This gives a sufficient point of departure in Hebrew thought for the elements in Pauline anthropology which have sometimes been ascribed to Hellenistic influence—the distinction between the inner and the outer man, and the intensity of their ethical conflict. Yet Paul shrinks from the idea of a disembodied spirit (2 Cor. v. 1–10), and insists on the resurrection of the body, though in a higher substance than its present frail flesh. Personality, though transformed within, and to be transformed without, is still for him a unity; thus his anthropology shows its essentially Hebrew character. What that is within the depths of personality which forms the nucleus of the transformation is beyond the analysis of Paul; can he, or any other, do much more than re-echo the wisdom of his Hebrew ancestor, that from the heart somehow flow the supreme issues of life? For terminology must confess its failure before the experience that "I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me."

THE HOLY SPIRIT AS WISDOM

T. REES

THE HOLY SPIRIT AS WISDOM

THE two ideas, of the Spirit of God and of Wisdom, make their appearance in Hebrew thought, in two spheres that are widely apart, if not in time, at least in temperament and in mental standpoint. The Spirit of God emerges on the field of history among those bands of prophets associated with Samuel, who presented religious worship to the Israelites as a violent exercise, calculated to produce a frenzied and ecstatic state of feeling, and it finds its congenial and permanent abode in the kindred, though calmer, atmosphere of the inspiration of the literary prophets.

Wisdom, on the other hand, appears in the circle of the sages whom tradition has associated with the more worldly atmosphere of Solomon's court, and it was always practised by men whose outlook ranged over the entire field of ordinary every-day life. And the more obvious connotations of the two terms differ as widely as the spheres of thought in which they acquired their meaning. The Spirit of God was a power whose activity was unusual, abnormal, supernatural, a light that flashed for a moment out of prevailing darkness, a messenger which came as an alien into a strange and hostile world. It endowed Samson with abnormal strength,* and might suddenly snatch Elijah out of the ken of his companions;† it filled Saul with prophetic frenzy,‡ and compelled Balaam to bless when he would have cursed;§ it gave the great prophets their

* Judg. xiv. 6, xv. 14.
† 1 Kings xviii. 12; 2 Kings ii. 16.
‡ 1 Sam. vi. 10, xix. 23.
§ Numb. xxiv. 2.

unwelcome message to a sinful people,* but in the last days it would uplift "all flesh" into the abnormal state known as yet only to the prophet.†

The Old Testament idea of Wisdom appears to be the very opposite of all this; she "ever rejoiced in God's habitable earth, and her delight was with the sons of men."‡

> "Wisdom crieth aloud in the street;
> She uttereth her voice in the broad places;
> She crieth in the chief place of concourse;
> At the entering in of the gates,
> In the city, she uttereth her words." §

Her concern is with the ordinary normal life of man and embraces all his affairs, "domestic, agricultural, urban, commercial, political, and military." To every phase and incident of life she applies the rules of common-sense morality and the maxims of ordinary prudence.

If these manifold differences are governed by any principle of distinction, it might be expressed by saying that while the Spirit of God appears as a concrete, individual entity, Wisdom on the whole remains an abstract quality; the activities of the Spirit are always characterised by the appearance of a spontaneity, and an incalculable suddenness, which recognise no law, and whose explanation has to be sought in a conscious purpose proceeding from individual freedom; and these are characteristics which enter as main factors into the modern conception of personality. Wisdom, on the other hand, is mainly a habit of thought, a quality of conduct, a principle of life which has no existence, except as an attribute of the life which it governs; it can be expressed as a law of prudence, as maxims of economy, as rules of common-sense morality which can be traced, calculated and anticipated throughout the entire texture of ordinary human life. It is, in the

* Mic. iii. 8; Ezek. ii. 2, etc.
† Joel ii. 28 ff.
‡ Prov. viii. 31.
§ Idem, i. 20, 21.

main, a system of impersonal and abstract principles, which cannot therefore overstep the limits of the ordinary, the regular, and expected, and which constitute the religion of the "natural man."

2. The antithesis thus exhibited expresses a familiar phase not only of Hebrew religion, but of all religion. The frenzy of the prophet, the vision of the seer, the inspiration of the apostle, and the ecstasies of the hermit, all appear so different in origin and content, and in the manner of their appeal, from the learning of the scholar, the wisdom of the sage, and the common-sense of mankind, that these two orders of psychical facts have frequently ranged themselves as rival claimants to the allegiance of man's mind and heart. But a closer examination both of the mental conditions and of the historical facts shows that the antithesis is neither essential nor ultimate, that the opposition is relative rather than absolute. The seer's vision, the philosopher's concept, and the popular opinion, all enter consciousness and dwell in it by the same cognitive process, are all subject to the same essential categories of human thought and amenable to the same psychological laws; the mystic's ecstasy, the lover's passion, and the reformer's practical enthusiasm, as states of feeling, easily merge into one another. The "once born" and the "twice-born soul," "the religion of healthy-mindedness," and "the sick soul,"* are useful abstract distinctions which indicate a certain general truth; but religious experiences cannot be separated into distinct species under such categories as these, for all these various states and opposing factors may and do occur in the same mind at different times, and even at the same time. Psychology knows no special faculty for the apprehension of supernatural experiences; and in the totality of religious experience, the inspirations of the Spirit of God and the counsels of Wisdom are not "cut off with a hatchet," but they are marked by certain common characteristics that lie deeper than

* William James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," Lectures iv.–vii.

their differences. How far this common basis in experience might necessarily involve the identity of an objective reality conditioning both, cannot here be considered. But if psychological analysis shows that the experiences corresponding to the idea of the Spirit of God and of Wisdom are not essentially disparate, it is safe to draw one negative ontological inference, which is sufficient for the present purpose, namely, that such kindred experiences are not necessarily (although they may be) conditioned by different objects or causes; experiences however varied, that may be gathered to the unity of one subject, may also be related to one object.

3. Returning, then, to the history of the two ideas, and their corresponding experiences, it will be found that there is in the Old Testament a residuary element which transcends the antithesis of the passages already quoted, wherein a community of attributes and functions is ascribed to the Spirit of God and Wisdom; and this recognition emanates from each of the two schools in which the respective ideas ruled—those of the prophet and of the sage—as well as from the neutral circle of the priests.

Several passages in the Pentateuch ascribe to the Spirit of God the kind of practical shrewdness and common-sense which the Wisdom literature attributes to Wisdom. God gives a Spirit of Wisdom to those who should make the priests' garments,* and Bezaleel, the builder of the tabernacle is "filled with the Spirit of God in wisdom, and in understanding, and in knowledge, and in all workmanship." † Joseph is sufficiently "discreet and wise" to rule over Egypt because the Spirit of God is in him;‡ and Joshua is qualified to succeed Moses as leader of the people, because he is "full of the Spirit of wisdom." § A similar combination of ideas is found in Isaiah: "The Lord of Hosts shall be for a Spirit of judgment to him that sitteth in judg-

* Exod. xxviii. 3. † Idem, xxxi. 3, xxxv. 31.
‡ Gen. xli. 38, 39. § Deut. xxxiv. 9, cf. Numb. xxvii. 18.

ment";* and another passage defines the Spirit of the Lord as the "Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord." † How far these passages betray the direct influence of the Wisdom literature is a question for literary criticism, but the relevant point here is that they show the fusion of the ideas of the Spirit and of Wisdom to be in process in the various literary circles. And there are other less direct, but no less significant, evidences of the growing kinship of the two ideas. As both man and God share the common characteristic of possessing a spirit, and as man derived his spirit from the Spirit of God,‡ so Wisdom dwelt originally with God, and from Him proceeded to endow man.§ And as the Spirit of God was "brooding upon the face of the waters" at Creation,‖ Wisdom too attended upon the Creator as a "master-workman." ¶

Nor does the element of personality remain a permanent difference between the two ideas. For although the prevailing conception of the Spirit involves personality, while wisdom generally appears as an abstract quality, yet it should not be overlooked that the personality of the Spirit is at all times vague, undefined, and often uncertain; and, on the other hand, the idea of wisdom developes from that of an abstract quality into an idea which it is difficult to distinguish from that of a person. It was first bodied forth in the form of popular aphorisms, then incorporated as a system of practical instruction,** and finally presented as a figure endowed with initiative, freedom, purpose, and all the essential qualities of a person.†† The much disputed question whether this figure is a *personification* or a *hypostasis* is probably irrelevant, because it may be doubted whether such a distinction ever presented itself

* Isa. xxviii. 6, cf. 1 Sam. xvi. 13. † Isa. xi. 2, cf. Prov. viii. 14, 15.
‡ Gen. ii. 7; Job xxvii. 3, xxxii. 8, xxxiii. 4.
§ Prov. viii. 22 ff., cf. Ecclus. i. 1, xxiv. 3, 8, 25.
‖ Gen. i. 2. ¶ Prov. viii. 30.
** Idem, i. 1–7. †† Idem, viii. 12–36.

to the mind of any ancient Hebrew thinker. But the description resembles so much that of a person that it would be a short step to identify it with an individual being. While the prophet has endowed the Spirit with all the intellectual and moral qualities of Wisdom, the sage has so conceived Wisdom that it may embrace the essential attribute of Spirit, namely, personality.

4. These two trains of religious thought, growing more alike, and drawing closer together, never fully coalesce on purely Hebrew ground; on the contrary, the Spirit again recedes to the background of the transcendental, and Wisdom is lost in the traditional casuistry of the Scribes. But the unifying tendency was continued and completed on other soil; in the eclectic atmosphere of Alexandria, all great ideas clashed together, and all ruling principles tended to merge into one another. Here at last the Hebrew idea of the Spirit of God was identified with that of Wisdom, yet no longer the aphoristic, common-sense wisdom of the Hebrew sages, but a universal cosmic principle, bearing marks of the influence of the great unities of Greek philosophy.

In the Socratic schools, and among the Stoics, wisdom was the chief characteristic of the ideal man whose conduct was to be the ethical criterion. In the later philosophy, wisdom was also identified with reason (λόγος) and with spirit (πνεῦμα), as the principle of law and order which pervades the universe. This identification of wisdom and spirit in the Stoic philosophy, marked in Greek thought a process the reverse of that which has been noticed in Hebrew thought. In the Old Testament, spirit was the more concrete, and wisdom the more abstract term; but in Greek thought, spirit was the more abstract term, denoting only the hidden principle of physical life, until the Stoics identified the physical and the ideal principle. This elevation of the term πνεῦμα by the Stoics, to have an intellectual and ideal meaning, helped to make it

possible for Hebrew and Christian thought to express their idea of Spirit in the language of Greek philosophy; but the language never completely extricated itself from the bonds of its primitive materialism. In the philosophy of Plato, wisdom appears as the highest principle both of individual conduct and of social organisation; it is also occasionally identified with the ruling principle of the universe, which is more often designated as mind (νοῦς), reason (λόγος), or the idea of the good.* The Platonic and the Stoic philosophies, then, have this in common, that the Logos, mind, or Wisdom, which for each is the supreme principle of the universe and gives it its law and order, is also shared by man as his higher nature and law of conduct, and the Stoics have already given this principle the additional name of spirit. These common factors in the Platonic and Stoic philosophies represent the nearest approach of Greek thought to the Hebrew way of thinking of God and man, and of their relation to one another. It was these common elements in the two systems, therefore, that made it possible for the first Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria, to employ their first principles in the construction of his loosely-knit system of Græco-Jewish philosophy.

The term that appears most frequently to express this ruling principle of Philo's philosophy is Logos, by which he meant generally Reason or Thought; but he, like his master, Plato, occasionally, though irregularly, employs the term Wisdom to express the same idea;† yet, unlike Plato, he is not merely using two kindred Greek terms, to express one Greek idea, but he gives to a term which he recognises as Hebrew a thoroughly Greek connotation.

"At all events,"‡ he writes, "we shall speak with justice, if we say that the Creator of the universe is also the father of his creation; and that the mother

* Phileb. 30 c., Sophist 265 c., Timæus 38 c.

† See Drummond, "Philo Judæus," vol. ii. pp. 201–213.

‡ Ebriet, 8.

was the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of the creator, with whom God united, but not as man unites, and begat creation. This Knowledge, having received the seed of God, when the day of her travail arrived, brought forth her only and well-beloved son, perceptible by the senses, namely, this world. Therefore some one of the divine company introduces Wisdom as speaking of herself in this manner:* 'God possessed me as the first of his works and from eternity he established me.'"

Both Logos and Wisdom mean for him the reason and mind of God, His image impressed upon the universe, His agent of creation and providence, the mediator through which He communicates Himself to man and the world, and His law imposed upon both the moral and physical universe. It is important to mark this instance of the "acute Hellenising" of Hebrew thought by Philo, and its bearing upon the development of the idea of the Spirit of God. Philo only uses the term Spirit where his quotations from the Old Testament compel him to do so; but where he does, he identifies it in terms with Wisdom, and in essence, it may be inferred, with Logos. "The Spirit of God . . . is the pure knowledge in which every wise man participates . . . God called Bezaleel and filled him with divine Spirit, wisdom, understanding, knowledge; . . . so that the essence of divine Spirit is defined by these terms."† But the identification is not yet complete; the Spirit does not embrace the whole compass of the Hellenic Logos; it goes part of the way and stops; it is the divine Reason as communicated to man, but it does not appear in Philo as a cosmic principle.‡ That may have been due to the infrequent use of the term; but that fact itself is significant, as indicating that Philo's philosophy had no need and no room for the free individual Spirit of the Old Testament, but only for abstract reason as a great cosmic principle standing between God and the world. The connotation of

* Prov. viii. 22. † Gigant. 5. 11; cf. Quæst. in Gen. i. 90.

‡ See Drummond on Gigant. 6, vol. ii. pp. 215–16.

Logos, Wisdom, and Spirit, are the same, even though their denotation may be somewhat different.

5. But that which is left indistinct and fragmentary in Philo is cleared up and rounded off by another Alexandrian writer, in the Book of Wisdom. Though that book, in form and temper, is more Hebraic than Philo, its framework of thought is scarcely less Hellenic. Here Wisdom and Spirit are found clearly and consistently identified, and the double-named conception is developed into a cosmic principle that fills and rules the world, and fashions the whole history of mankind.

"Wisdom is a Spirit that loveth man." * "I called upon [God], and there came to me a Spirit of Wisdom." † "For there is in [Wisdom] a Spirit quick of understanding, holy." ‡ "And who ever gained knowledge of Thy counsel, except Thou gavest wisdom, and sentest Thy Holy Spirit from on high?" § The idea is more fully defined under the term Wisdom. She was present with God when He made the world, ‖ and sitteth by Him on His Throne.¶ She proceeds from God, "a breath of the power of God, and a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty. . . . An effulgence from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image of His goodness." ** The might and order of the universe are referred to both terms: "The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the world, and that which holdeth all things together hath knowledge of [every] voice." †† It is "an incorruptible Spirit in all things." ‡‡ Likewise Wisdom is "the artificer of all things," "all-powerful, all-surveying, and penetrating through all spirits. . . . She pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness." §§ The Spirit-wisdom is the author of knowledge, ‖‖ virtue, ¶¶ and piety,*** in the individual; and it has been the guide and arbiter of the world's destiny from the beginning.†††

* i. 6; Cf. parallelism in vers. 4 and 5. † vii. 7b.
‡ vii. 22b. § ix. 17. ‖ ix. 9. ¶ ix. 4.
** vii. 25, 26. †† i. 7. ‡‡ xii. 1. §§ vii. 22–24.
‖‖ ix. 17. ¶¶ viii. 7. *** vii. 27. ††† Chapters x.–xii.

Once, too, it is said that God's "all-powerful Logos leaped from heaven out of the royal throne," to perform a task already ascribed to Wisdom.* The three ideas of Logos, Wisdom, and Spirit, are merged into one, and the predominating character of that one is Logos, or reason. Thus at last the old Hebrew antithesis of supernatural Spirit, and natural world-Wisdom is overcome, but in a one-sided way; not by the synthesis of the two ideas into a higher conception, retaining the force of both, but by the absorption of the one into a more abstract form of the other. Nothing of Spirit remains save the name; and Wisdom is no longer a quality of the practical, concrete morality which the Hebrew sage knew, but a world-reason, a universal law whose point of contact with experience and reality is difficult to discover. It is true that God still remains a possible personal power, who in the Book of Wisdom steps down to assume the functions of the Spirit-wisdom itself,† but who in Philo recedes into incomprehensibility, and can communicate with man and act in the world of his experience only through his Logos and Powers.

6. The historical points of contact of this stream of thought with the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and of the Holy Spirit may be obscure, but their logical relations are indisputable. In the New Testament a new fact appeared which changes the whole character of the current. That Alexandrian thought influenced the New Testament writers can scarcely be doubted; certain formal affinities between the Book of Wisdom and the writings of Paul are obvious,‡ and the ruling principles of the theologies of Paul, *Hebrews*, and John, bear at least a close logical resemblance to Philo's doctrine of the Logos. But the contact of the ideas of Spirit, Wisdom, and Logos with Jesus Christ produces new combinations with different central principles. Nowhere in the New Testament

* xviii. 15; cf. x. 15, 16. † Chapter xii.

‡ See Sanday and Headlam, Romans, pp. 51 f., 267 ff.

does the Greek rationalistic system absorb or dominate the spiritualistic standpoint; the Logos doctrine associates itself with the person of Christ rather than with the idea of the Spirit, and does not so easily subordinate the former as it did the latter to itself. The idea of the Spirit revives in its Old Testament forms, but made more vivid and definite by its close association with the exalted Christ; and the experiences in which it is made manifest appear more than ever to be produced by the free, spontaneous actions of a personal, supernatural being. The idea of Wisdom also reappears in a form similar to that of the Old Testament, although accompanied with a deeper consciousness of the difference and even opposition between true wisdom and worldly prudence. It is a quality of God's mind, like His knowledge,* which He bestows upon His rational creatures;† it descends from above, and is contrasted with worldly and carnal wisdom;‡ it is an endowment of man's mind and a quality of His character.§ Jesus Christ grew in wisdom;‖ much of His teaching assumed the form of the parable-wisdom of the Hebrew sages, and his contempories recognised its content as wisdom.¶ A later generation saw in Him the whole wisdom of God,** and if the Greek conception of Logos-wisdom appears under the name of Wisdom at all in the New Testament, it is here, where Jesus Christ is conceived as the sum of Divine Wisdom incarnate. But it is a remarkable fact that where the Logos idea appears most clearly—in *Hebrews* and in John—the term Wisdom does not occur at all. Wisdom and the Holy Spirit are associated in a variety of ways, but not in the framework of an abstract conception like that of the Alexandrian philosophy. The Spirit gives the word of wisdom,†† the

* Rom. xi. 33; 1 Cor. i. 21. † Jas. i. 5; Eph. i. 17, iii. 10.
‡ 1 Cor. i. 21; 2 Cor. i. 12; Jas. iii. 15, 17.
§ Luke xxi. 15; Acts vi. 3, 10; Jas. iii. 13, 17. ‖ Luke ii. 40, 52.
¶ Mark vi. 2; Matt. xiii. 54. ** 1 Cor. i. 24; Col. ii. 3.
†† 1 Cor. xii. 8.

Spirit and wisdom are co-ordinate endowments of Christ's disciples,* but the Spirit's teaching is contrasted with the teaching of man's wisdom,† while the wisdom which Christ gives His disciples may be the same as the Spirit of the Father in them.‡ The Book of Acts contains records of certain appearances of the Spirit which are abnormal and extraordinary,§ and the Apostolic Church ascribed to the Spirit certain experiences which suggested the old antithesis between Spirit and wisdom,‖ but Paul urges the restriction of such experiences as far as possible within the limits of order and understanding.¶ In the main the accounts of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament represent its manifestation and operations as in harmony with the quality of wisdom; where wisdom and Spirit appear alike as endowments of the human mind, they might be regarded as the same abstract quality, but wisdom, except where it may be identified with Jesus Christ,** appears only as a quality of some mind, whereas the Holy Spirit more frequently manifests itself as a free, independent, individual being.

In this way, the religious experience recorded in the New Testament has overcome in fact, if not transcended in thought, the old antithesis between the free Spirit and the ordered and regulated course of Wisdom; the purpose and reason, the consistency and unity of life which were intimated in vague outline in the idea of Wisdom, are realised and fulfilled in every factor and function of the Spirit-filled life. Men of the apostolic age could feel nothing of the opposition of natural and supernatural, law and personal freedom, the uniformities of the universe and the Spirit of God working within it, not because they knew nothing of nature, law, and uniformity, but because they felt in their midst, both above and within them, the Holy Spirit, possessing and bestowing the highest wisdom, and

* Acts vi. 3, 10. † 1 Cor. ii. 13.
‡ Cf. Luke xxi. 15, with Matt. x. 20. § Acts ii. 4. 33, xix. 6, etc.
‖ 1 Cor. xiv. ¶ Idem, xiv. 15, 33. ** Idem, i. 24; Col. ii. 3.

working out in all things an order and a meaning which were at once the mind of the Spirit, the highest good of man, and the foreordained purpose of God, omniscient and all-wise.*

7. Why, then, has this antithesis recurred again and again in Christian thought? Because it was one thing to experience the reconciliation of apparent contradictories, and it has proved a different matter to represent it by a synthetic conception in thought. Yet this latter is an ineradicable demand of rational consciousness; and especially when the living unity of experience subsides, the necessity for an abstract unity of thought becomes more urgent. This law of thought asserted itself in the formative period of Christian dogma (as it always must) upon such materials and under such conditions as it found existent. Terms representing the rich complexity of the New Testament experience passed down to ages whose spiritual life was simpler and poorer, and it became easy to fuse into a few concepts ideas that had represented different elements of experience, as soon as the differences were no longer felt.

Certain thought equations, latent if not patent in New Testament theology, had already prepared the way for the later fusion. Paul identifies Wisdom with the person of Christ,† and behind both conceptions may be discerned the outline of the Logos doctrine; but he also identifies the exalted Christ with the Holy Spirit.‡ Likewise John identifies Christ both with the Logos and with the Paraclete.§ If the New Testament theologians did not draw the inference of these equations in its bearing upon the relation of the Logos to the Holy Spirit, it was easy for a subsequent age to do so. And, above all, the experiences, ideas, and terms of the apostolic age went forth to be refashioned into dogma in that other world, where the Hellenic rationalism which had already absorbed the life of

* Rom. viii. 26–28, xi. 33–36.
† 1 Cor. i. 24; Col. ii. 3.
‡ 2 Cor. iii. 17.
§ John i. 1, xiv. 17, 18, 26, 28.

every Hebrew reality still reigned supreme. The Logos-wisdom abstraction was still the master-concept of all thinking in Alexandria and in Asia Minor. What availed it, then, that a historical person had filled the Logos idea with the grace and truth of his life, or that the Spirit-life of the Apostolic Churches had shown the Holy Spirit to be the owner and not the slave of Wisdom? The framework of men's minds is nearer to them than the events of history, and will not change in one generation; if the historical person escapes becoming a pure abstraction, the less tangible experience of the Spirit fares worse. Once again the Holy Spirit is identified with Wisdom, and Wisdom with Logos, and the whole amalgam becomes the hard abstract dogma which repels Montanism, and excludes from the Church all "liberty of prophesying."

In the writings of the sub-apostolic age references to the Spirit are comparatively rare; but where they are found, they appear as echoes of Biblical ideas. Where the Trinitarian formula could naturally be expected, as in invocations and benedictions, a dual formula, addressing the Father and Son only, is often found.* In the Epistle of Polycarp, in the so-called Second Epistle of Clement, and in the Epistle to Diognetus, there is not a single reference to the Holy Spirit; and the functions elsewhere ascribed to it are referred to Jesus Christ. The Holy Spirit falls into the background in the theology, because it had not yet allied itself with any of the ruling ideas of the philosophy of the times; and that factor of Christian experience which assumed the form of the Logos doctrine takes the supreme place. But the threefold formula was still in daily use in church ritual, and the Holy Spirit held its place in the multitudinous hierarchy of spirits whose existence was a matter of common belief; therefore, the philosophical

* *E.g.*, Ep. Clem. 58; Ep. Polycarp, Address, and c. 12; Ign. "ad. Eph." Address and c. 21. In Hermas we have a rather different nomenclature, the Spirit being apparently regarded as the pre-incarnate nature of Christ, the Son of God: see "Similitudes," V. i. 7, v. 2, vi. 5, ix. 1.

system must find for it a place, and that was done by the adoption of the Hellenistic Spirit-wisdom conception.

In the Greek Apologists almost the only function ascribed to the Holy Spirit is that of prophecy and revelation, the impartation of knowledge and wisdom, and that is a function assigned more often to the Logos. The identification of Wisdom and Spirit is frequently verbal as well as essential; Theophilus affirms that God in the beginning begat His Logos and His Wisdom, and interprets the phrase, "Let us make man," as God speaking to His Logos and Wisdom; and he goes on to identify with the Logos the whole group of ideas here under notice: "He [the Logos], then, being Spirit of God, first Principle, and Wisdom, and Power of the Highest. . . ." * Irenæus states that God created all things through His Logos and His Wisdom; the Holy Spirit is identified with Wisdom, and together with the Logos becomes the ordering and conserving principle of the universe.† God's supreme ministers are "His offspring and His similitude, His Son and the Holy Spirit, the Logos and Wisdom." ‡ And the whole development reaches a natural climax in Clement of Alexandria, who had inherited the intellectual succession from Philo. He identifies the Spirit with Wisdom as the agent of revelation; § they have a common origin,‖ but Wisdom is the higher conception, because it embraces the Holy Spirit as one of its many qualities.¶ But in Clement and after him Wisdom is more frequently identified with the Son or Logos, and this whole cycle of ideas fuses into that one formative conception of theology which designates the agent of creation, the principle of the universe, and the organ of revelation, mediation, and salvation. "The good Instructor, the

* "Ad Autol.," ii. 10. 18.
† "Adv. Haer.," ii. 30. 9, iii. 24. 2, iv. 20. 1–4.
‡ Idem, iv. 7. 4.
§ "Cohort." c. 8.
‖ "Strom." vi. 16.
¶ Idem, vi. 17.

Wisdom, the Logos of the Father, who made man, cares for the whole of His creatures." * The new life and eternal youth of the gnostic Christian is the product alike of the Logos, Wisdom, and Spirit.† "The Son is Wisdom and Knowledge and Truth and all else that has affinity thereto . . . and all the powers of the Spirit, becoming collectively one thing, terminate in the same point, that is, in the Son." ‡ The amalgamation of ideas is complete,§ but the Holy Spirit in effect disappears from living thought.‖

The Greek theology is not really Trinitarian, but Dualitarian. It thinks only in terms of God and His Logos; and if the tradition and experience of the Holy Spirit still claim recognition, the system can only admit it as a shadowy repetition of the Logos, with no independent and effective function or principle of its own. The abstract dogma derived from Greek theology must, for its own self-preservation, for ever repress every movement of freedom, independence, and individuality, such as proceeds from a personal spirit; this limitation of the Catholic theology, inherent in the form imposed upon it by Greek philosophy, lies at the root of its inadequacy to give either theoretical or practical expression to the Christian life; and Christian theology has still to seek a synthesis of Spirit and Wisdom that will articulate a rational order, both physical and moral, issuing out of the activity of a free Spirit.

* "Paed." i. 2. † Idem, i. 5. ‡ "Strom." iv. 25.

§ The "Cohortatio ad Græcos," wrongly assigned to Justin but dating from not later than the third century, recognises (c. 32) a description of the Holy Spirit in Plato's account of virtue, whose highest element was wisdom.

‖ Thus in the Invocation prayer of the Egyptian bishop in Sarapion, it is not the Spirit but the Logos who is conceived to come upon the Eucharistic elements and make them body and blood of Christ: compare p. 64.

THE NEW APOLOGETIC IN INDIA

F. LENWOOD

THE NEW APOLOGETIC IN INDIA

IT is fitting enough, if any of the essays in this book is to deal with the work of the Church in the evangelisation of the great non-Christian peoples, that India should be the chosen representative of all the rest; for it is not yet ten years since the delivery of those lectures to educated Indians which embodied so much of Dr. Fairbairn's deepest thought and left so grateful a memory behind them in many of the great cities of Hindustan. It would be more fitting that such a subject should be handled by some one with a deeper knowledge of Indian thought and a longer experience of Indian life; but fortunately the subject is so large in its main outline that even the impressions of a passer-by may be of some slight value, and conditions are changing with such rapidity that it is perhaps not quite impossible to set certain well-worn ideas in a new aspect.

Imagine a second-storey verandah in Calcutta after sunset, where an Englishman, who has been lecturing on the meaning of the Incarnation, is talking to a couple of educated Indians. They have been isolated with some difficulty from the little crowd of eager disputants and their admiring listeners in order that serious discussion may be possible, but the attempt has apparently been vain, for after ranging widely through the broad paths of religious philosophy the spokesman, a tall Punjabi, remarks that Christianity does not seem able to give any satisfactory answer to the central questions of religion. The lecturer retorts by asking, "Why, then, do you come to talk to us about them?"

and is finally crushed by the reply, "Oh, we have solutions for all these problems in our religious books, but we come in curiosity to see whether you have anything to say worth listening to."

Such an experience, of daily frequency in the work of the missionary who lays himself out to reach educated men, is typical of much more than the individual rebuff. It represents the attitude of educated India to Christianity and the paralysis which now and then brings the missionary to the borders of despair. The Indian mind seems fortified with so peculiar a skill against the entrance of what to us are the most penetrating shafts of appeal, that victory seems indefinitely delayed or perhaps finally impossible. Yet at the end of all the question remains, "Is it really true that there is nothing more than curiosity? Is there not also a deep but inarticulate dissatisfaction with their ancestral faith which brings them thus to consult the foreigner?" This essay is an attempt to show that there are reasons for their coming, and that those reasons may be expected to count for more in the future than in the past.

We have been told recently that, if we are to be in any way worthy of the glorious task that lies before us in India, we must be willing to recast many of our methods and to modify the spirit which breathes through them. But Mr. Lucas makes it clear at the same time that, alter our methods as we will, there must yet remain much in any presentation of Christianity to which the Hindu, as he is now minded, cannot but take exception. In other words, the gulf will not be bridged merely by a more sympathetic understanding on the Christian side, and small progress can be made unless the Indian shows at least a tendency to reconsider some of his presuppositions. If there were no hints of the likelihood of such change, there would be little use in discussing such a subject as this, and probably even less use in the enormous sacrifices which are being, and will have to be, made in order that India may be won for Christ.

But before we can gauge the new forces which are at work to secure such a reconciliation, we must allow for the unique difficulties which have to be met at the very outset, and recognise the, at least apparent, ineffectiveness of missions in India. If we choose two typical observers, Mr. Meredith Townsend and Mr. Bernard Lucas, the one pessimistic and the other hopeful, but both essentially sympathetic, we shall find in each the same illuminating explanation of the conflicting reports as to the success of Indian missions. The rapidly swelling census returns of Christian population point to mass movements of present fruitfulness and of still greater future promise. These same returns in their introductions or abstracts tell how by Christianity the depressed classes are being turned from the lowest of the low into men capable of standing alongside the Brahmin himself. It is a work which has drawn much attention from leading Indian thinkers, and they have spoken boldly of the wonder of the transformation and the curious power of Christian love.

Yet we should never forget that these returns speak of future duty even more insistently than of present harvest. By the ingrained custom of Indian religious classification the offspring of Christians remain Christian in name whatever their belief or their life may be. Unless, therefore, we can maintain the pressure, unless we can keep these very primitive disciples moving towards an ever purer type of religion, we shall find ourselves responsible for a stagnant mass of barbarism and probably of open backsliding, which will be a poor testimonial to Christianity. But it is even more important to remember that in touching these classes we have not touched India at all. The caste people would admit these pariahs to be Indians only in the remotest sense and do not feel the equilibrium of Indian religion seriously disturbed by their conversion. The attitude to gipsies in England would not be an unfair parallel. However favourable, therefore, the census returns may be, they do not prove that

we have reached the real India or that to the real Hindu Christianity is anything but "an exotic." I shall try to speak later of lines of success other than those of the counting of baptisms, and of course it should never be forgotten that there are already thousands—probably hundreds of thousands—of Protestant and Roman converts from the four great caste divisions of Aryan society, but it must be admitted that, broadly speaking, we have not yet gained any notable adhesion among the real people of India.

It will be less difficult to understand this if we realise how mercilessly the forces of Western apologetic are annihilated at the outset of the invasion. They are shattered before they are even allowed to gain a foothold on the soil. Indeed, for Western arguments there seems to be no soil on which they may take foothold. All our attempts to present Christianity in a convincing way are baffled from their first inception.

One speedily learns from "comparative religion" that to the Indian theologian the satisfaction of the intellect is the all-absorbing aim, and when "comparative religion" confronts the student in the mission field—often enough with a countenance which the lecture-room has little prepared him to identify!—it is this interest in religion as a theory, preferably as a metaphysical theory, which will impress him first. In all civilised countries religion has some sort of philosophic base, but in India, wherever it rises above a primitive bargain with supernatural powers, religion *is* philosophy. It is said that, at the time when the revival of Brahminism drove out Buddhism from the territory which it had long held in undisturbed security, one of the features of the Buddhist rout was a series of solemn public discussions, at the end of which the defeated party left the field; it was impossible to hope for belief in a faith which had been worsted in philosophic argument! It is the importance of intellect which will strike any English reader as he takes up that reconciling textbook, the Bhagavad-Gita, and if he turns to the crude

but interesting catechism of Dayanand Sarasvati, the founder of the Arya Samaj,* the following will confront him on the first page of the chapter which deals with Christianity:—

"*Author.* Is this the first creation? Was the world never created before?

"*Christian.* We do not know whether it was created before or not. God alone knows that.

"*Author.* When you do not know that, why should you believe in this book (*i.e.*, the Bible), which cannot enlighten you on these points? . . . Why don't you embrace the Vedic religion, which is free from all doubts and enlightens one on all points? When you do not understand the world created by God, His handiwork, how can you then know God?"

In all probability we should most of us regard this answer put into the mouth of the Christian as a fair representation of what he would say, and, further, we should find in such an answer the proof of an eminently sensible attitude of mind; but most Hindus, reformed or unreformed, would share the author's amused contempt for any religion but that "which is free from all doubts and enlightens one on all points."

If there were nothing more to quarrel with than that the speculative side of religion received too exclusive an attention, the trouble would be less serious. Unfortunately, no other side receives any attention at all. The idea of a metaphysic broad and sane enough to take into account every sphere of existence is none too common in the West, but in the main current of Indian thought such a requirement would be in itself a proof of complete philosophical incapacity. Everything that might seem for a moment to dispute the lonely supremacy of the idea is ruled out of court as material and therefore as illusion. To "refer to the fact," to "put a theory to the test of experience," are plainly useless to the man who insists that spirit, and spirit

* "Satyarth Prakash," or "Light of Truth," published 1882, translated 1906. The Arya Samaj is the strongest, the most polemical, and the most Indian of modern reforming sects.

alone, is real. The material side of things, the concrete facts of daily life, receive a certain amount of attention when thought is in its less serious mood, but that is merely a concession to human weakness on the part of the writer or teacher. The things of sense exist at best as stepping-stones by which the man of enlightened understanding may rise to a sphere where he shall need neither steps to tread nor feet to tread with, where all matter is sloughed away and the spirit of man abides in union with the spirit of the Supreme. The outward beauty of Nature or music (though for the time being it is probably better than ugliness or discord), the activity and prowess of human life, the joy of family affection, the love of country, and a score of other noble things which surround life for us and enhance its glory, are for the Indian nothing more than the toys of a child's dream. And therefore his system is impregnable. You cannot bring facts to bear upon it, for it is securely founded in having no outward foundation. It is useless to bombard a castle in the air.

Human personality naturally shares the same fate as the external world. In a very interesting article published some five years ago in the "Hibbert Journal" by Dr. Josiah Oldfield, which represented the Hindu attitude to Christian missions with insight and faithfulness, one of the strongest passages turned on the contrast between the ideal of the Hindu saint and the life lived by the missionary. The Hindu "sadhu" renounces everything, he receives the food which the people gladly give, wears but one robe, sleeps upon the bare ground, and ever strains to win salvation by stern absorption in the things of spirit. Over against his picture Dr. Oldfield sets the story of the attempt to call on a young missionary, who was out at "the club" and betrayed his business there by returning the call shortly afterwards in flannels and with a tennis racquet! There is no doubt that from the aspect of mere propaganda the tennis-playing habits of the missionary are unfortunate. That

there may be, that almost certainly there is, a higher justification for his playing than even the call of health itself, will be suggested in a few pages, but, while present theories are undisputed, such practices must violate all Indian ideas of spiritual devotion. In the form of an interest in the body they are a crude instance of that attention to the demands of personality, which to the Hindu conception is the central error of a deluded mind. All our trouble comes from consciousness, individuality, personality: all that is noble in us comes from the light of the Divine fire; and it is our business to escape the pain of mortal life and enter into bliss by the mortification of all personality and the slow practice of those asceticisms which lead to union with the Divine. Could there be a sharper contrast with the Christian ideal, "that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly?" Without going to India any imaginative mind can sketch for itself the difficulty of putting the appeal of Christ before a people with such an estimate of existence. It is not merely that, as Meredith Townsend puts it, "Eternal consciousness! That to the Asiatic is not a promise but a threat!" It is that at every point the appeal of our Lord Himself is based on a high valuation of human personality and a belief in the consecration of all life, which to one side of Hindu thinking seems meaningless or even almost sensual.

We are so accustomed to hear that Christianity comes to us from the East that we are surprised to find Dr. Du Bose* saying, "Jesus took definite part with the West against the East in making the distinctive note of life not *apatheia* but *energeia*." Yet, though the statement ignores the immense difference between the thought of the varied Eastern peoples, the cleavage from Christianity here discerned is certainly true of India and of the faith she has sent forth to modify the religion of China and Japan.

* "Gospel in the Gospels," p. 19.

The presupposition of Jesus Christ that He came to bring abundant life is alien to all genuine Indian thought. It is this which paralyses the missionary and makes the campaign so laboriously slow.

The man who disbelieves in human personality will have few arguments with which to prove the personality of God, and the philosophic Hindu denies the personality of God as consistently as he deplores the personality of man. The idolatry of personal deities is conceded to the dulness of low spirits, but even they are enjoined to remember, while they use the symbols, that God is in reality quite other than these. The personality of God in our sense of the word is unknown to Hinduism, whose God is most truly described by saying that He is devoid of attributes. Even in the Bhagavad-Gita, which insists so uniquely on the "devotion" of the worshipper to the god Krishna, that some have traced the influence of a competing Christianity, the main impression of the Godhead is that of a chill and misty abstraction of the reason, to which a real devotion is well-nigh inconceivable. Salvation, being union with Godhead, and release from all human ties of personality, thus becomes what most Western minds would describe as an empty negation. Not only therefore are the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament a stumbling-block to Indian thinkers, but even the New Testament doctrine of God seems to them primitive, shallow, and superstitious.

Yet it is plain that we cannot in essential alter that central view of life which is the foundation of Christianity. Much as we may reconstruct our theology, much as we may learn from India of the folly of the merely active temperament, much as we may prepare ourselves by calm meditation on the secret of the universe, we cannot yet consent to decry the concrete manifestations of human life and outward nature as valueless and even lying, illusions; we cannot believe in any faith if it refuses

to minister to the raising of that human personality which to us is already the centre of this world below, and we cannot as Christians abandon that idea of the personality of God on which all our other Christian thinking is logically and spiritually based. We might feel compelled to give up the attempt to express Christian ideas to India, but we should emasculate those ideas of all that makes them Christian, if we were to try to gain the day with a theology at all points congruous with Indian philosophy. Some measure of conflict is neither to be evaded nor deplored. Unless we have something new enough to rouse antagonism, we shall probably have nothing new to give.

For Christianity is by no means so unnecessary to Indian living as it appears unsuited *a priori* to Indian thought. The beauty of Hindu philosophy and the peace of theoretic idealism do not compose the whole of the picture. Nor is there any need to go to the statements of foreigners for the darker side. It may be found quite honestly portrayed in much modern Indian literature, notably that of the various religious and political reform movements. Indeed, the very pessimism that runs throughout such writing reminds us strongly of the ineffective satires of Roman decay, and cries out for a new deliverer because "vain is the help of man."

There is no place in Indian thought for the theory of altruism. It is, of course, true that there is much actual kindliness and self-sacrifice for others among the Indian people, and even caste itself in one of its aspects is a friendly society, a freemasonry, in which the sympathy of the family receives a wider range. But the common practice, limited as it is in scope, must be quite clearly distinguished from the received theory. For the esoteric ideal of saintship begets a selfish other-worldliness, in which it is difficult to find a place for the claims of a brother's need. There are no doubt reactions on all sides against the inhuman

logic of the Hindu schools;* but in the main each soul is seeking to win heaven for itself and for itself alone. It is vain to enhance for others the interest of the very life which you yourself are striving by all means to escape.

In the same way there is little interest in morality or in the application of religion to outward life. The whole world lieth in the evil one, and degrees of more or less are of small moment. For the holy man good activity is better than bad, but to renounce activity is best of all. In India, as in the ascetic movements of other lands and other ages, the attempt to cast out the devil of self without putting a concrete loyalty into its place, has often issued in the return of seven other spirits worse than the first. On the one hand, many of the professional devotees are, by general Indian admission, persons of the lowest moral standard; and on the other hand, the ordinary folk of the countryside, regarding the sublimities of genuine asceticism as too high for attainment, frankly accept the facts of life like any other peasantry, and speak of, and live for, rupees and good harvests and all the other things that the Gentiles seek. But the result is an all-round accentuation of the tendency to treat religious theory as having no bearing on life, which is one of the most serious weaknesses of the moral situation in India.

It is to the same view of the religious life that the present political position of the country is due. In China the great names of antiquity are governors, viceroys, reformers, and wise councillors, and however gloomy be the present eclipse of her splendour, it is impossible to travel even for a short time in China without feeling the essential independence of the nation. In Hinduism, for the most part, the great names are thinkers and ascetics, and it was therefore left to the Moslem invaders to bring order out of the petty chaos

* A beautiful and pathetic example of this reaction is found in Kipling's "Kim," where the inconsistency of the old Lama's generous instincts with the theory of Buddhism is constantly brought out.

of Hindu misgovernment. The Moslems, too, have been responsible for most of the opportunities of rising in the social scale, which, before the advent of Christianity, were offered to the submerged classes. The good Hindu, at the age when in any other country ripe experience would have made him a power for righteousness, retired from the sordid cares of this illusory world and sought to escape from the bonds of personality. Government thus fell to the self-seeker and the materialist. It is scarcely necessary to go further in order to know why India is ruled by aliens to-day. Nor is this drain upon the purest elements of the nation's life in any way diminished at the present time. Something of the kind is prescribed even by the Arya Samaj, and it is said that there are in India to-day religious mendicants, good, bad, and indifferent, living lives for the most part useless, to the number of five million.

Evidently, then, there is room for some sort of new faith in that great home of many religions; and, so far at least, none but the faith of Jesus Christ seems likely to bring the new strength needed for the new conditions. Is there any indication that the message of the gospel will find a readier hearing in the days before us?

May I take another illustration from the evangelistic lecture? As a matter of actual practice it is usually better for the Englishman who has only a slight knowledge of the Indian classics and turn of mind, to prepare for an educated Indian audience very much the same sort of address which he would give to a similar audience in this country, paradoxical though this may seem in view of all that has been said in the foregoing paragraphs. If the speaker can gain the sympathy of his hearers, he can go on to use arguments depending on all the presuppositions (at least, those of a more spiritual kind) which would be granted by Western listeners. In many cases, indeed, he will find that they sit spellbound, more especially when any appeal is made

to those common affections which all the world over are the noblest elements in man's life. But, let a single questioner rise in his place at the close and by a word bring the subject into the most distant relation to the current philosophy of Hinduism, and the men who only a moment ago were drinking in the message of Christ as if they realised that there was salvation in none other, will throw all that to the winds and give themselves up to the keen joy of theologic duel. Every stick of the fabric you have so carefully reared is swept away by the whirlwind, and all your pains seem to go for naught. But few things are more certain than that it is only seeming. Even though your cherished framework may be shattered, there remain timbers lodged in the ground upon which, perhaps years hence, another will lay his foundations.

It is not merely for the joy of listening to philosophical gymnastic that educated men will come so readily to Christian meetings; nor is it only Eastern passivity which makes them seem so absorbed. There is a fire of need in many an Indian's heart, and many causes are working together to bank higher, day by day, the materials that feed the flame. All the centuries of a nihilistic creed have been too short to eradicate from the mind the common instincts and affections which are the true flower of humanity. It is true enough that East is East, and West is West, but in the end the subconscious longings of the normal Hindu are the same as those we ourselves know. It is to these deep-founded and Divine instincts that our appeal will be strongest, and I am anxious, before I close, to show that the most important aspect of the new apologetic consists in the attempt to evoke from the depths of the Indian nature that temperament to which it can make successful appeal.

The message of Jesus of Nazareth, as it is expounded by a life, has already a great influence among those of the educated men who feel that they too must live their life and not shirk its responsibilities. It is important to

realise how far-reaching are the qualifications which must be made in the earlier statement that as yet Christianity has failed to reach the real India. Though the outward results are small enough, the leavening of the thought of all the students educated on our Western system has gone forward apace, and it is impossible to resist the evidence of the widespread, though quiet, influence which has already been gained. There is first of all the attitude to the body, in itself only typical of all the material world. To the man who, like Dr. Oldfield's friends, is of opinion that the mortification of the body is necessary to any real saintliness, it is difficult to see what answer can be given. Abstract argument can do little to prove that "flesh helps soul." But there is one obvious proof of the value of the body; and that is to use it for the sake of its own peculiar activity and joy. The tennis of the missionary, in other words, if it be played to the glory of God, is one portion of that defence of the comprehensive optimism of Christianity, which finds that all nature is good because God gave it, and because it may be brought back in active devotion to the feet of the Giver. The tennis-racquet stands for a conviction that to the Christian matter is not evil, but an instrument for the service of the final good. Now one influence of missionary, and indeed of all English, education has been to give to a surprising number of Indian students a joy in open-air sports, to which it is difficult to do justice by mere imagination I saw in Benares, not two miles away from the Ghâts where the Hindu ascetics make their morning ablutions in the Ganges, great crowds of Indians watching a tournament in football and hockey between the high-schools of a large district. The players were certainly no less keen than those of the West. A sight of just the same import may be seen in most parts of the Indian Empire. And such boys can never be quite the same in later life, even though they do return to many of the superstitions of their country homes. It is the new ideal of the use of the body, on whose healing our

Master lavished such tender care, instead of the stern attempt to kill by atrophy its every desire. In this new ideal, as yet inarticulate, but none the less formative, the whole question of personality is involved.

In social matters educated Indians have made many a public protest against the immorality, the misdirection, and the cleavage in the life of their own people. Several papers are published in the interest of reform, and there is no doubt that the influence of the Christian missionary, and, above all of his home life, has been most influential at this point. It is true that the noble sentiments pronounced in the Debating Society of the provincial university are often forgotten when the student is reabsorbed into the family system. Yet many a man stands in pathetic isolation and makes an apparently hopeless sacrifice for ideals, lower indeed than those with which he left college, but far, far higher than those current in his ancestral village and the counsels of the caste. A few there are, names known up and down their province, who have stood forth for reform and have conquered. Hated by the ignorant and the superstitious, they are reverenced by all thoughtful Indians, and are bringing slowly nearer the prospect of freedom for the individual and reform for society.

Christian influence has proved itself also in the movement of religious reconstruction. The defences put forward for idolatry are nervous and artificial. The Brahmo Samaj and the Prarthna Samaj, though small and struggling, have an influence which must in the long run tell in favour of a new life. The much more popular Arya Samaj of the North cannot in the same way be connected with direct Christian influence, rather is it a reaction against Christianity, and a patriotic attempt to recall Indian loyalty to the Indian sacred books. But it is an attempt at reform, and it has gained a sway in the Punjab which must be the starting-point for future changes.

Still more important is the unconscious acceptance of

Christian coin into the currency of Indian religious expression. It is safe to say that in many of the more enlightened centres Christian thought has found its way into the higher life of the educated classes in such a way that its origin is forgotten. Many students from the missionary colleges have a close acquaintance with the New Testament, while not a few educated men are following closely the movements of Western religious thought, and buying up the literature of Biblical scholarship and devotion. The result is that the Vedas and the other sacred books are receiving an explanation to-day which is often very far from their original meaning, and ideas essentially foreign to Hindu philosophy are being woven into the fibre of Indian religious expression. One typical instance must be quoted here because it shows the degree to which the leavening of Indian thought has proceeded in certain centres, and because its cleavage with indigenous religion is so plain to see. It is a prayer offered at a meeting in the Town Hall, Calcutta, in April, 1908, to bid farewell to a number of young Indians who were just starting for Japan, Europe, and America to study various technical industries. Christians represented only a small minority of those present, who were in the main Hindus. The prayer ran as follows:

"Almighty and everlasting God, we bless Thy holy name for permitting us to meet once again to ask Thy blessing on the work of the Association for the Advancement of the Scientific and Industrial Education of our people and on the young men, to bid farewell to whom we are now assembled. We thank Thee for the spirit of self-help which has been awakened in the hearts of our people in all parts of our motherland, for the generous liberality with which our wealthy countrymen have supported our work, and most of all for the kind sympathy and valuable help our Association has received from all sections of the community. May we learn to depend more and more on Thy gracious help and blessing, and to pray to Thee constantly and fervently for the work we have undertaken to accomplish.

We commend to Thy fatherly care the young men who are preparing to go abroad for their studies. Bring them all safe to their respective destinations, protect them from all temptation and evil in the land of

their sojourn, and bring them back home crowned with success and filled with an earnest desire to serve Thee and their motherland in the positions to which Thou mayest be pleased to call them. Bless us all and utilise us to Thy own honour and glory, and to the benefit of our fellow men, now and ever. Amen." *

It needs no special knowledge of India to see that influences quite foreign to pure Hinduism have been at work here, and it is this permeation of Indian thought with a new leaven which gives hope to the work of the Christian Church; for it shows that though little result is seen upon the surface, changes are taking place in the subconscious mind of educated India which must in the end consolidate the soil enough to permit the foundation of an Indian Christianity.

The great triumph of our work in India is that, in the face of so subtle an opposition, we have begun to create a mental attitude which Christ alone can satisfy.

But the last three years have brought a new factor into the problem. The Nationalist Movement has arisen and has established itself. All India is ringing with its eloquence, recent events have proved that more may be doing below the surface than any of the officials know, and even England has been compelled to lend an ear. The education prescribed by a narrowly Western code has been in many respects sterile enough, but when we gave to the Indian students "Mill on Liberty" and "Burke on the American Revolution," we set seeds in the ground from which a harvest will surely grow. Many assure us that the whole agitation is superficial and only touches the educated classes, but it is probably a fatal mistake to discredit the depth of popular feeling. The situation is unquestionably critical. On the one hand is a government too busy to understand, too indolent to train, too insular to trust an Eastern people, and

* Another instance of the same kind will be found quoted in Mr. J. N. Farquhar's article in the *Contemporary Review* for May, 1908. It is specially important as being taken from the opening of the National Congress.

unable by virtue of its office to put forward its own defence. On the other hand a popular movement for a great end, in which many of the loudest speakers realise little the explosive power of the forces they handle so carelessly. In the end it may even result in the termination of our rule in India. But, as it will also mean the creation of an Indian people, the Christian conscience will not be very seriously disturbed by the prospect.

In the meantime, however, the movement may have a tremendous significance for Christianity. At the moment it is in many ways hindering active Christian work, and baptisms among the higher castes have probably been greatly decreased by the agitation. But in the long run the national enthusiasm must take deeper and more discriminating channels, and there is no reason why Christianity should not, in a few years, once more secure a fair hearing. If it so fall out, then we shall find in the Nationalist movement our strongest ally in the great work of the recreation of the Indian religious temperament. The acts of isolated violence have been a temporary excrescence, and in view of the unrepudiated insolence of the baser sort of Englishmen in India it is hard to condemn them as one would wish; but in almost every other aspect the new feeling is the contradiction of all that made it so difficult to give to the Hindu the good news of Jesus Christ.

The whole movement involves an attention to present fact and the conditions of outward life, which on any large scale is new to the country. Some of the leaders are dreamers, but not a few are the sanest and most practical among the people, the very men to whom concrete facts present their strongest appeal. Philosophy is shelved while men seek to live, and the dreams of a mystic severance from all that is material are replaced by a real interest in the conditions created by the present political and economic situation. There is much unreality, and probably no little actual fraud, in the Swadeshi movement, but it was necessitated by

the killing of native industries, and it can point to great results already accomplished by Indian enterprise. In any case it is a notable proof that the leaders of the people are touching actual life on another side, and that the new philosophy will have to find room for the true life of the market-place and the factory. Government is no longer a sordid thing to be left to those ambitious enough to soil their hands with it. Some of the agitators, no doubt, are anxious to gain positions of wealth and rank for themselves. But, on the whole, the impression is left that the campaign must serve to educate the masses and to dignify the whole idea of government. In the main the appeal to the Indians *as a people* is not unreal.

In the same way there is nothing more marked than the unconscious insistence upon personality. It is not only that the veneration for many of the leaders is given to men who have set themselves to use the world and not to renounce it, but that the esoteric contempt for the poor and degraded is noticeably giving way to an interest in humanity as such. The claim for independence is based upon the idea of human equality, and there are not wanting men who bravely apply the theory to their own pariah population. Many of the leaders have grasped the importance of training administrators, and are putting much strength into philanthropic and educational causes likely to secure that result. Many again, realising that India must be one brotherhood, have taken steps towards that greatest of liberations, the softening, if not the entire removal, of the rigidity of the caste system. Amid the forces at work to-day such are by no means unimportant, and the fact that, as in every political propaganda, there are influences for evil, does not destroy the immense significance of the nobler elements for the future of Indian life. It is men personalising these nobler elements to whom the new India gives its reverence, and an interest in human personality is the key to the whole situation. The Kingdom of Christ must in the long run gain by the change.

For us as Christians the problem is whether we can so sympathise with all that is best in such a moving of the waters as to secure the trust of the most truly progressive spirits. If the native Christian Church, from any mistaken idea of loyalty or any desire for influence in high places, should dissociate itself entirely from the aspirations of India, then her candle will be taken from her, for she will have failed to know the day of her visitation. Our attitude to the problem of Indian nationality is significant because it may, by God's grace, do much to help the Indian Church in the perilous course she will have to steer. But the main question is broader, and we cannot but set ourselves to discover whether to a people beginning to seek the secret of life, we can present evidence that we have found that secret in Him who is the Life itself. We are on the verge of an expansion of Christian opportunity of an entirely new kind. We shall need all the skill in philosophy that the West can offer and the East can evoke by her challenge; for in the long run our apologetic must present to the Hindu at least an attempt to construct a philosophy of the universe, an attempt which will serve till the Indian Church works out a philosophy of its own. But before all else it is by life that we must appeal to life. The apologetic of a life crucified with Christ and hid with Him in God, the sympathy of a love like that of our Master will be recognised as the essentials of our Indian work. Yet how little we can depend on the Church to supply them; how little any of us can expect to reveal them in ourselves!

To take one crucial instance from the sphere where we can see most easily that Christianity is superior to Hinduism, the sphere of the use of this world: when we tell the Indian that it is the Christian ideal to use the things of this world for the glory of God, and for that alone, when, in short, we place the Christian theory of detachment against the Indian theory, how many here in England can we point out, not compromised by

professional religion, who are putting that theory into practice? How many such are found among Englishmen who live their lives under the critical gaze of India? We talk again of the brotherhood of man in the great manhood of Jesus Christ, but meanwhile the youth of our wealthier classes as represented by our public schools (wherein, remember, is formed the type of our Indian administrators) is incapable of understanding our English working-men, let alone bridging the gulf between ourselves and a "subject race"! It is along such lines that, in this day of opportunity, we must test our fitness for the task.

When John the Baptist sent to Jesus his message of doubt and inquiry, the answer that was returned drew curiously little support from the realm of intellectual theory, but based itself upon triumphant compassion to the stricken and sorrowing, and on the preaching of good tidings to the poor. It is in the same region of reality that we must prove Christ to India, and it is here that the responsibility of the Church will mainly lie.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY IN THE GROUND-WORK OF A RELIGIOUS CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD

T. M. WATT

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY IN THE GROUND-WORK OF A RELIGIOUS CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD

THE religious consciousness of the individual and the race has been attracting, during recent years, the attention of psychologists, as well as undergoing the careful scrutiny of metaphysicians. The former have devoted volumes to the elucidation of its varieties, to the examination of incident phenomena, and to a comparative study of its kinship with other psychical facts. The latter have sought to draw out its immanent logic, and to weigh critically its claims to give a satisfactory account of the Supreme Reality.

Psychology has produced the conviction even in the minds of those who tended to discount the verdict of the religious man, that religious experiences have achieved notable results in the re-construction of characters, shattered and broken in life's struggle. The power of the religious certainties can no longer be neglected; their reality, their worth, have been amply established. The literature of religious experience has been ransacked, and what it has to give of help in this inquiry has been carefully examined and classified. The abnormal, as well as the normal, experiences have been brought to light, though the abnormal may have received more than their due. The psychologist has thus played his part in reinstating the waning interest in those mental states, which, however mixed with illusion they may be to the cold critic, are warm, throbbing realities to the individual who experiences

them. We are reassured by an investigation into the faith of the saints of history, for there is nothing more appealing than the response of heart to heart; yet we are glad of the larger view, whereby the development of faith, from age to age, is brought to light in its inner process of purification. It may be that the individual saint has received too ample treatment to the exaggeration of his peculiar physical and mental habits. While, however—and this is often forgotten—there is the experience of the saintly soul to be reckoned with, the more continuous witness of the Church must not be neglected. The Christian experience of a church as found in one generation, or viewed as continuous through many, has certain large features in common, the appeal of which to the single member is constant and profound.

Religion is thus real; real for the individual; real for the society. It is ethically fruitful. It is spiritually dominating. The new empiricism accepts the emotional uprushes, the religious quickening and impulse as part of its essential ground-work by which man's relation to the universe may be moulded and shaped. The mental units are no longer merely sensations or impressions. Along with these must be reckoned the verdict of conscience, the religious stirring and awakening, the over-beliefs. For these latter determine the purposes which the individual strives after, equally with the brute facts of sense. Recent writers have been eager to point out the part played in conscious life by such factors, round which, it would seem, the individual gathers the circle of his other interests. The "natural passions" and affections largely enter into the knowledge which we attain of the world, as well as the more insistent purposes which embody themselves as will, and urge us to seek knowledge in view of future action. Religion, too, has a practical outcome; it is subjectively efficient; it makes the sinner a saint, and charms the spirit of fear from the weak and defenceless. But what of its value as knowledge of the Reality on which

it professedly builds? What of its validity as Truth? This is the question which is asked by the philosopher and metaphysician.

It has been largely due to the influence of German philosophy on English thinkers that this question has attracted attention. The charm of this type of thought for many of the best minds of this and the last generation consists in its emphasis on the Divine character of the world; not in the clouds has God made His dwelling-place, escaping now and again from their mystery to direct the course of history; but here and now in the wonders of Nature, may we touch His garment, and feel the throb of His presence. Man was nearer God than he knew, for the framework and the fabric of the world were Divine. But with this philosophical outlook, there came the tendency to exalt the terms of the philosophical construction above those of the religious, as possessing a fuller apprehension of reality and truth. Philosophy gives to the symbolic forms of religious thought consistency and logical coherence. According to Hegel, "philosophy seeks to apprehend in reasoned knowledge the same truth which the religious mind has in its faith." These two stages are related to each other as is the pictorial myth of early thinking, to the scientific formulation of facts current in later times. But it is taken for granted that religion is first given in an intuitive, immediate form, and then re-cast under the eye and at the hands of reason. In this type of thought there is no difference between philosophy and theology; the contrast here is between two types of thinking, on the one hand, representative, symbolic, or picture-thought, and on the other hand pure thought, which employs terms less coloured by emotional and imaginative feeling than the former. It has been well pointed out in criticism of this point of view, that this advance from the one stage to the other is possible only where a uniform statement of the religious data is forthcoming, on which the reflective reason may do its work. Thus the Hegelian philosophy has been a

philosophy of the Christian religion, for it has built on the basis of the Christian religious consciousness as given in the "faith" of the Church. But what of this basis should it be urged that the contents of the Christian consciousness, much more of the religious consciousness in general, are extremely liable to variation, and that the irreducible minimum is something much more vague than the full-blooded faith of a Christian in a Divine revelation and redemption? Again, and this seems a more formidable objection to the Hegelian procedure, it must be noted that there is much reflective thought woven into the texture of even "representative religious knowledge" as it appears in the faith of the people. It might, indeed, be asked with thinkers who hold that the Infinite can be apprehended only when we escape from the relational type of thinking, and abandon ourselves to its great immensity, in moments of mystical experience, "Is one form any more symbolic than the other?" At any rate religion cannot give up the warmth and colour of its popular speech and its throbbing associations with the home, and the piety of Nature's relationships. And, on the other hand, the task of philosophy lies not in choosing one particular type of religious experience and defending it as an apologetic. It should rather seek to leave room within its borders for that central expression of personality, which we call religious experience; besides, it may find that the religious point of view yields insight which cannot otherwise be given.

In the first place, it will be well to discuss more closely the newer attitude of philosophy towards religion. Philosophy is an endeavour to connect and co-ordinate the facts of our experience—our knowledge of Nature, the data of our conscious life—and thereby to gain what consistency and harmony of view is possible. It is an attempt to state in terms of reason by means of concept and hypothesis, the meaning and ground of our experience. It should neglect no facts; it should accept no uncriticised hypothesis at the hands of the

special disciplines. It takes account of the world of mind, its ideals and aspirations, as well as of the world of Nature. It should not be untrue to its purpose, and substitute sentiment and feeling for reason. Scepticism does not finally quench its quest, for the task that Reason sets humanity cannot be abandoned. A thinker who despairs of attaining an adequate knowledge of Reality in terms of Reason, thereby gives up the essentially philosophical point of view.

There is a tendency at the present day to urge that life and the experiences that thereby accumulate are "richer" than any interpretation of them in terms of reason. Professor James, of Harvard, spends page after page of his books in insisting on this truth. Life is "thick"; thought is "thin." Life is the mountain-torrent in spring, a wild, throbbing stream, whose dark, plunging depths are full of mystery. Thought is the torrent-bed in the parched summer-time, beset with bare, naked boulders and dead tree-trunks. This is true of all kinds of experience when we compare it with the formulæ by which men of thought try to compass them. It is as if all the poetry went out of life and Nature, as soon as the modern scientist was born. Here, surely, is a Humanism that is one-sided, and a little bit wearied of all the scientific chatter of our learned coteries. Again, the modern man, so this school urges, must be stirring, for he lives in a world where men have multitudinous wants. He is driven to the pursuit of knowledge and the conquest of Nature by the practical interests of life; and the very knowledge he attains of the world in which he lives is infected with this purposiveness. That statement of things is true which brings us into "fruitful" contact with other equally valuable "truths." By seeking for any further definition of truth, there can be no practical purpose served; an inquiry into its character as expressing the inner meaning of the world, would lead to the age-long errors from which the newer method has delivered philosophy. We are thus saved from the scholasticism of philosophy

and the fustiness of philosophers, by our intense practicality!

We may conclude, then, that the newer movements in philosophy are directed towards a re-interpretation of experience in all its detail and concreteness. The recent advance in psychology has made this effort more imperative than ever. Of these movements Pragmatism or Humanism—two of whose principles we have briefly outlined—has been forward in its criticism of the Hegelian type of Idealism. Pragmatism recognises the religious attitude in its own right, as being as independent a function of the human spirit as the scientific; while it does not treat its content as the imperfect form of the full truth, to which philosophy alone attains. Further, Pragmatism attacks the problem rightly in its appeal to the moral and religious consciousness as expressing essential factors in an answer to the ultimate questions. But it fails to present an adequate treatment of the question as to the relationship of thought to the world of real being. According to it, the work of thought plays no constitutive part in the structure of our world of experience; it is scarcely interpretative, in the sense of Lotze; it is merely an aid to the manipulation of reality. Its value as a system is immensely superior to its value as an interpretation or reflection of reality. The order of reality is irrelevant to the order of thought. Now that ideational systems may be provisional, we admit; also that they are frequently erroneous; but we affirm that their intention is to develop the given data of experience in terms that would connect these with the larger whole of experience. As Dr. Galloway says:* "Thinking is experience in its most developed form and is not the mere excrescence of will, its tool in the endless struggle with fact." Such development as this into a thought expression the whole religious impulse seems to demand; and while

* "Studies in the Philosophy of Religion," G. Galloway, D.Phil., p. 237.

thought may misread what is given it in experience, it can also learn the error of its interpretation, and re-construe its data.

Humanism, in thus maintaining a guerilla warfare with the older Absolutism, will prompt a re-examination of the defences of the classical type of Idealism under the shadow of which for many minds the religious spirit has sought protection. The older theory has no doubt ceased to satisfy because it seems to lack the mobility which a living grasp of reality by thought would demand. Its formulæ had become stereotyped; its pomposities were a little overstrained. Though it may be condemned for seeking a too easy solution of the great problems, in its oft-repeated and wearisome phraseology, it has never shrunk from bringing the religious thought of our age into close connection with a wider philosophical view of the world of man and nature. It has thus followed in the endeavour of the more constructive periods of Christian theology.

This brings us to consider, in the second place, what part philosophy has played in the minds of religious men and in the interpretation of the religious spirit. We have seen that philosophy cannot neglect the phase of experience which we have called religious. Every great system of philosophy enshrines and preserves some phase or variety of such experience. The philosophy of Spinoza is never understood until its intense heart is felt to glow in that central vision of the "intellectual love of God." Christian theology has sought to do justice to the wealth of Christian experience, and to the Christian's loyalty to Him whose touch has awakened the slumbering soul, and re-established the troubled hearts of humanity in their manhood. The decisive point in history for the Christian, with its message of redemption, has become linked to the thought of the world as equally Divine in its source. Creation, Redemption, Providence or Guidance are the three grand expressions of the Divine will and purpose for man. To accomplish this large endeavour—the

co-ordination of the crucial Christian experience with a larger world-view—the Christian spirit sought the aid of the Greek genius and of Greek philosophy. The religious consciousness can never be satisfied with a purely intellectual attitude towards its essential objects; yet its assurance is so dominating that it seeks to find a place for the Source of its enlightenment in the spacious order of Divine things. If the ground of the Christian experience—the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ—have a racial significance, it is important to know what need in the heart of man it ministered to, and what purpose it fulfilled in the Divine intention. Whatever aspect of the life or death of Jesus awakens the soul of religion in a man, it is because that aspect has spoken in the authentic voice of God for him who apprehends. What it is that shall be thus decisive and crucial varies with the outlook or need of the individual. But such message as achieves the conquest of the soul, bears in its heart its own Divine authenticity. It has the last word in the soul; it possesses religious value; beside it, there is no rival to question its power and place. Once the Divine has been thus recognised and welcomed, the soul is not slow to trace the same power in other parts and corners of the world. It is evident that it may make haste too hastily; that it may gratify its mind, eager for traces of the Divine action, simply in the exceptional and unwonted; and that later correction in the progress of knowledge may cause it acute disturbance. But this at least remains necessitous, to bind together all the primal activities of the Divine Spirit, whether in the realm of nature or spirit. This demand gave the impulse that created our theologies; it is in this movement that religion has sought aid from the work of the philosophers.

The religious consciousness, then, is not a simple fact, for it involves the whole personality and the various sides of its psychical activity. It comes to us full of ideational or intellectual construction,

and this can be judged only by means of reflective thought. Thought is busy in all spheres of our conscious life, in the moral and religious, as much as in the purely scientific.

During the last century, since the time of Schleiermacher, theology has sought to re-build its fabric on the ground-work of religious experience. In his writings there is a searching of soul in order that the very inner secret of the religious experience might be laid bare. There is no doubt that he is following a tendency that has since borne fruit in theological thought. Religion's instinct of self-preservation here asserted itself. Experience is at the heart of even the seemingly most arid theology. If the theology which is current proves inadequate, such imperfection comes from the alteration of emphasis in the fundamental experience or in an enlargement of experience. Experience, then, is the starting-point, the consciousness of the pious man as he finds his soul apprehensive of God. How must he think of the God he thus finds in view of the experience that is his?

It has been laid to the charge of Schleiermacher that he over-emphasised the peculiarly individual element in the religious experience which he sought to analyse to the exclusion of those features that emerge more universally in the "faith" of the Church. But in this, from our point of view, we cannot but see elements of value. Pfleiderer says: "It must be pronounced really one of Schleiermacher's merits * that, by his example, he asserted the claims of individuality to a place in theology." It is true that the continuous witness of the Church, its faith, is the prime subject-matter which theology seeks to interpret; but it is well to remember the part which the great personalities of the Church have played in widening and deepening the religious experi-

* Pfleiderer, "Development of Theology in Germany since Kant," p. 104. English translation. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.

ence of their time. So it would seem to the Protestant mind. And does not history bear it out in this? It is the individual soul that dwells in the desert with God. Within it is the meeting-point with the great unseen Power; from it bourgeons and blossoms the tree of the religious life. To few souls, indeed, in the history of the world has it been given thus to enlarge the borders of the religious experience of the race and of the Church. The soul may be apprehensive of the Object of its faith in differing ways according to the practical needs which urge it to believe. In Christendom itself such differences are apparent in the great branches of the Church; they have each a distinct type of piety, and yet their speech is not altogether strange the one to the other. The Protestant world is rich in divisions, each church with its own genius and temper.

Of fundamental types of Christian experience which at the present day find utterance in the theological world two may be mentioned. They seem to sum up the tendencies of the time, if indeed they do not express more permanent religious moods. Though to some minds this classification may appear unduly hasty and rough, yet it will help to elucidate my meaning. The first type I would call the Illuminative or the Mystical, and the second the Moral or Evangelical, though the sub-title in this latter case may be open to the criticism that this usage unduly narrows the meaning of the word, and that its application to the second type denies it to the first. The discussion that follows will elucidate, if it does not justify, this use of the word evangelical.

1. The illuminative or mystical type of religious experience. The beauty of the life in Christ attracts because He is loved. For this view the life of Christ and the self-sacrifice of the Cross express the spirit of the highest manhood; the spirit of Him so enters into the soul that sympathetically approaches Him

that it is won to a life of like devotion. His was a life lived in perfect communion with God. The secret of His soul may become a power in all who seek that they may find. This view centres round an intimate experience of the power and presence of God. It may be associated with a theory as to the gradual perfecting of man through an increasing knowledge and love of God, a theory based for the most part on the evolutionary hypothesis that failure is a witness to the upward tendency involved in the ethical process. It is assured that the good is the ultimately decisive factor in human life and in the universe. This view crowns its theology with the doctrine of the Incarnation, and fails to do justice to the truth of the Atonement. The Universe is a republic of souls in which Christ's is the dominant voice. In its philosophical outlook this type of religious experience tends to ally itself with a view which in its bosom of reconciliation hushes the cry of the world's bruised and penitent child. It loves the poetry of a philosophy which cherishes harmony and harbours no dualism that it cannot solve. All forms of recent idealism are full of this message. At the last issue and outcome of things all the tangled skein of life will be unravelled. The promise of that future lies in the heart of the present. The world's perfect manhood will claim all for its own. How painfully and slowly do men learn what is their true good and how weary do they grow in the ascent towards the heights! But at the journey's end the jaded and broken souls will find shelter, rest, and comfort in the welcome of their Beloved's voice. Such a view, starting from the inner experience of the well-spring of goodness that issues from the soul when the supreme appeal is made in Christ, seeks, perhaps groping blindly, for a stronger authentication of its hope in a philosophy that does justice to its "faith." It has allied itself with Liberalism in theology and criticism: the truth which

is freedom, it has pursued unceasingly. The philosophy with which it has been associated has given full value to the importance of the spiritual and moral consciousness of man: its ultimate categories have been those of mind and spirit. I think it is desirable that such a type of thought should be regarded as enshrining in its secret heart, a valid and permanent type of Christian experience. It may be that of the novice; it may be in part temperamental; it may suit the genius of one church rather than another. But it is too valuable to be belittled; it has been the stay of strong, earnest, and beautiful souls; it is as gracious as the opening of the year or the early green on the larch.

On the general point of view two criticisms may be offered: (1) Its association with the philosophy from which it seeks help may embarrass and hinder the soul's development in religious experience. Thereby its outlook on the supreme Object of its Faith may be obscured. The philosophical construction, resting on the basis of a living experience, manifestly reacts on the spiritual perception of the believer, and determines the kind of religious experience which he will hold to be normal and desirable. He will tend to appreciate just that type of experience which agrees with his theoretical point of view. Reasons will be found for classing St. Paul and Luther among the abnormal and thereby discounting the verdict of their faith. The only safeguard against this danger lies in the caution that we hold the philosophy of our faith to be provisional in view of the deepening of, or alteration in, the fundamental experience which it endeavours to grasp. If our experience changes or grows—and this is the lesson of history and psychology—our philosophy and theology may require reconstruction; and that not only within the span of a few generations, but within the brief lifetime of a man.

(2) Again—though this criticism may apply only to

the extreme forms—this view may fail to do justice to individuality while claiming to express it perfectly. The moral endeavour, the spiritual task, is common to all; it may be expressed in terms of common spirit pervading the whole life. Yet, in truth, the task of each is his own; the achievement is the expression of his unique being. This achievement of his may affect the whole of history, demanding to be construed in terms of his own consciousness. This would seem to be true of Christ; and in this sense has the Church given a unique interpretation to His life and work. What He wrought no man else can do. The philosophy again does wrong to experience, in this case historical experience: the modern demand for reality can only be satisfied by paying heed to the witness of the soul's crucial experience.

II. Let us now turn to the other fundamental type of religious experience—the moral or evangelical. By using this term of the second type of religious experience, I do not mean that the verdict of the moral sense is ignored in the former type. I wish merely to emphasise the all-important and decisive experience, which finally colours the whole of the believer's outlook, and his interpretation of the phase of life which he knows best. All the higher religions make their approach to God through the avenue of the moral life. Of both the types already mentioned this is true. But the former is less occupied with the disruption in the soul which moral experience reveals than the latter. If the good and holy will of God, says the former, is really and significantly known, there is no choice for the individual but to follow its demands: sin is failure to understand, and really grasp, so as to make effective, this good and perfect will. What the soul needs is inward illumination; an illumination whch, when seen, is loved, and as loved, becomes a living deed. The type of which we are now speaking is less optimistic. There is a hesitancy in the soul, nay, more, a powerlessness in its effort to accomplish the good and to

achieve holiness. The soul is guilty in the sight of that good and holy will of God, as disclosed in the inner life which is conscious of the awful purity of the life of Jesus Christ. The very fibre of man's moral being must be re-instated and re-created. What the soul cannot do for itself, has been done for it by the very act of God, as read in the cross of Christ. In and through a knowledge that here the guilt of man has been cancelled (to express this there is a wealth of metaphor), the soul can take courage in its endeavour. This view conceives that redemption has been perfected in an historic act, rather than by an eternal process involved in the nature of things. The moral battle had been lost had it not been for the redemptive act of God. The sad plight of humanity demanded the desperate remedy of God.

In its philosophical outlook this point of view tends to remain dualistic in character. The religious and moral experience discloses such a dualism—holiness and sin; and no other type or kind of experience, even no phase of the religious experience, symbolises the solution or reduction of this dualism. At last, it can be bridged, this pitiless gulf, by the gracious and redeeming act of the Holy God. All this stands contrasted with the former type and scheme of thought, which was monistic in tendency, and according to which the world-process held the secret of its own mending in its hidden heart. The type which we are now considering gives a keener scrutiny to the historical facts and order; its philosophy is more dramatic in its scheme. We contemplate not so much an eternal process as an historical order. In the supreme crisis of history, the Divine hand did not falter. In general terms, we may say that, for this view, the personality of man has within it the seeds of enmity against its higher life. The cruciality of its plight creates an emergency to be met only by the Divine act of redeeming love on the Cross; and through that historic act all is now well.

In an analysis of these views we are brought back to one of the most insistent problems of philosophy and theology, the nature of God, and the character of His activity in the world. There is little doubt but that the difference in religious experience in the two views determines the variety in philosophical expression which they ultimately receive. The second view, abiding fast by the ethical consciousness, and the impotency of the will to fulfil its demands, yet affirms as its higher truth, the evangelical plea, that the demands of holiness have been met, in a classic achievement, and the sting of sin destroyed, in the very Person of the Incarnate God. On the other hand, it is in moments of mystical illumination that the first view perceives the unity which shall yet triumph over life's bitterest defeats and sinfulness, through the might of the indwelling life of God in all men.

The outcome of the moral or evangelical point of view will seem a disappointing result to minds trained in and influenced by the philosophical school that derives it impulse from Hegel. Its intention may be said to be anti-philosophical, though in its achievement it is as stubborn a philosophy as any other ultimate scheme. It will scorn the Hegelian for his high presumption in endeavouring "to think the thoughts of God after Him." On the contrary, it claims that no regard should be paid to theoretical motives not derived from the religious consciousness. It brooks no intrusion on its sphere from other reaches of experience and knowledge, and suspects any philosophical considerations offered by way of a preparation for theology. Now to all minds for whom such preparation is an essential avenue of approach to theology, the view we are now considering must fail to be satisfactory. On the other hand, it may prove to be the attitude accepted by many thinkers, who have turned with disappointment from the scheme of thought sketched in connection with the mystical or illuminative point of view. They may be said to revolt from a religious idealism in the name of an historic realism.

The grand question which emerges from the analysis of these two types of experience, and which they answer in different ways, consists in the problem as to the nature of God's immanence in the world, and His character as transcendent. It does not seem probable that on the basis of the religious consciousness alone this question can be adequately discussed; nor can the nature of God's action in the world be fully grasped, for it is only one, albeit the culminating, aspect of experience. This, nevertheless, seems to be the determined attitude of those who hold the second point of view; it claims to have no other motive in its theology than that directly grounded on the religious experience which is so crucial for it. It may further claim that it is essential for Christian theology to construct its own metaphysic, and employ its own categories, since any alien scheme, by importing terms from other spheres, does scant justice to the Christian standpoint. Theology, it says, has suffered violence from such intruding terms as, *e.g.*, the Absolute, the Infinite; it has been overburdened by a terminology which did nothing to express the real secret of Christian experience. With such terms there may be construed a philosophy with a religious colouring, but never can the inner logic of the Christian faith be so expressed.

The mystical view is less exclusive in the material which it uses to build up its final scheme of thought, or rather it so unites all spheres of experience under one formula that it is easy to pass from one to the other. Religious experience is part of the wide and varied experience of men. While its own characteristics as a unique type of experience cannot be neglected, yet it does not stand alone in human experience. The religious man's faith confronts, sooner or later, the wider world of culture and at this point there emerges a possible conflict of view between religion and scientific knowledge. The mystical view has doubtless been more successful in introducing harmony between faith and knowledge than has the evangelical. The tendencies

which we have been tracing in religious experience, find their differences re-appearing in the theoretical field. They may thus be stated : Either the religious spirit is autonomous, and can brook no interference from the side of science or metaphysic, but must shape its own world-view on its own terms, or it should modify its claims in view of the rest of human experience, of which it is a part.

Our conclusion may now be stated. We have seen reason to suspect that the first view which we have been discussing, by the reactive power of its own theoretical formulation, may obscure the soul's vision of the variety and individuality of religious experience. This failure demands that we should go back to the premises from which theology starts, and make sure that we duly appreciate the content of religious experience. Our theories may blind us to the facts of the religious life. On the other hand, the second view, while reading and understanding the religious experience with more insight, does not seem successful in bringing harmony into man's total outlook on the world. To a supporter of the first view we would say: "There are depths of the soul's experience which you have not sounded"; of the second: "There are realms of experience with which you have not come to terms." What is valuable in the first view is its endeavour to give full weight to the religious consciousness when a complete world-view is sought; to bind up all parts of man's spiritual life, and to find a standpoint which does injustice to none. In the second we see rather a tendency for the religious spirit to gather its robes around it, and withdraw from the larger life of man, for its own edification. The more fiercely, it claims, the religious spirit burns within a man, the more will it afford its own illumination. After all, the philosophers are hopelessly at variance, and when they enter the home of the religious spirit they bring their differences with them. The question that arises, then, in presence of this view, seems to be:

"Is the religious consciousness its own proof and authentication? Is its verdict to be trusted without further examination, however constant that verdict may prove to be?" The question which we now ask is the criticism which we would offer on this view. It does not give any satisfactory answer which validates the correctness of its view of man's place in the world, though it has much to say of the worth of that view for man and society. Inasmuch as the worth of a belief does not prove its truth, there are many who will desire such further examination.

Religion, and its expression in theology, cannot thus stand apart from the more general questions of philosophy. While its own life is not to be endangered by the categories of a philosophy which neglects the religious spirit, or threatens to dissolve it into illusion, its procedure raises such questions—of the nature and activity of God—as cannot be answered simply on its own terms. The contribution of the religious spirit to the knowledge of God, its definition of His Nature in terms of the moral and religious values, can be neglected, only when the whole religious attitude is ignored or defeated of its intention. Yet for such authentication of its claims in other departments of experience, the religious spirit longs. Philosophy is not the hand-maid and slave of religion and theology, but their forerunner.

PROGRESS IN THE TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF THE GOSPELS SINCE WESTCOTT AND HORT

A. SOUTER

PROGRESS IN THE TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF THE GOSPELS SINCE WESTCOTT AND HORT

NEARLY a generation has passed since the publication of Westcott and Hort's great edition of the New Testament in Greek, and it seems therefore not unfitting to attempt to indicate briefly the most important of the fresh materials for the constitution of the text of the Gospels which have come into our possession since 1881, and at the same time to try to estimate how far the theories of Westcott and Hort have stood the tests which the discovery of these materials and the criticism of other scholars have brought to bear upon them. If the inquiry is confined in the present instance to the Gospels, it is not because there is no textual problem elsewhere within the New Testament, but because the most prominent feature of recent theological thought has been the extent to which the Gospels, in contradistinction to the rest of the New Testament, have attracted the attention of students in all civilised countries. Whether they are the part of the New Testament most valuable for Christian progress, at least in Western countries, we are not at present concerned to inquire. It is undeniable, however, that the problems of the sources of our Gospels, and of their value, are tasks which have been forced upon the present age and to which we are devoting the most earnest study; and to these problems there is a textual problem of corresponding difficulty.

In other departments of life easier tasks are commonly allotted before more difficult, and we cannot

help thinking that from one point of view it would be a good thing to settle first the easier problem of the textual criticism, say, of the Epistles of Paul, because the training thus afforded would enable us to face the greater problem of the textual criticism of the Gospels with more confidence and with more certainty of a solution. But at present the investigator who troubles himself with textual problems outside the Gospels lives in a terrible loneliness and speaks for the most part to deaf ears. It is for this reason that our attempt is confined to the Gospels.

The present essay is divided into two main parts. The first part deals with materials, the second with theories. The first part is divided into two sections. In the first of these absolutely new materials are enumerated under three heads:—(*a*) Greek Manuscripts; (*b*) Manuscripts of Versions; (*c*) Sources of Quotations, newly discovered writings of the early centuries of the Church, in which the Gospels are quoted. In the second section are mentioned such better reports of materials previously inaccurately known as have been published in the period, under the same three heads of (*a*) Greek Manuscripts; (*b*) Manuscripts of Versions; (*c*) Sources of Quotations. It will perhaps be well at this point to remind the reader that collators of manuscripts differ much in ability and accuracy, and further that old editions of Fathers were generally printed from late and corrupt MSS., the texts of which their editors emended on a basis of more or less (often less) knowledge, and that the discovery of earlier and better MSS. may put the evidence of these Fathers on an entirely different footing for the investigator of the New Testament text, as will appear in the sequel.

I. (A)

(*a*) New Greek MSS. (in order of age):—

The oldest extant piece of New Testament MS. would appear to be a leaf belonging to the third century,

discovered by Grenfell and Hunt at Oxyrhynchus. It contains portions of Matthew i. in a text closely akin to that of B and ℵ, and is published in "Oxyrhynchus Papyri I." (London, 1897), No. 2. Other fragments of about the same age contain parts of John i. and xx. ("Oxyrhynchus Papyri II." (London 1899), No. 208. Further papyrus fragments are enumerated in Kenyon's article, "Papyri," in Hastings' "Dictionary of the Bible," vol. v., p. 354; see also C. Wessely in "Patrologia Orientalis," iv. 2 (Paris, 1907), cited by Deissmann, "Licht vom Osten" (Tübingen, 1908), p. 21. Gospel fragments also exist on potsherds (*ostraka*), cf. Deissmann, *op. cit.*, p. 29 ff.

W. Undoubtedly the greatest find in this department is a complete vellum *codex* of the Gospels, written in the fourth or fifth century, and formerly preserved in the library of the monastery of Schenute at Atripe (near Sohag), opposite Akhmim, in Egypt. It came into the possession of C. L. Freer, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A., early in 1906, and its text will be completely published by Prof. Sanders, the palæographical expert of the University of Michigan. Meantime all that is known of it is collected in Gregory's pamphlet, "Das Freer-Logion" (Leipzig, 1908). The most remarkable thing about the MS. is that it provides a third ending for the Gospel of Mark, hitherto unknown in Greek, and attested only by Jerome in his tract against the Pelagians. The MS. gives the Gospels in the usual Western order (Matthew, John, Luke, Mark), and, in spite of the fact that the text of Matthew i. is reported to be quite "Syrian" in character, we are justified in hoping that we shall have in it something like the Western text, which Clement of Alexandria and the translator (or translators) of the Sahidic Version employed. If this be so, we shall be provided with a valuable corrective to the eccentricities of the only other Greek MS. of the Western type, Codex Bezæ. The symbol W is to be used for this MS. by Gregory.

O. This MS., which consists of forty-three leaves of

purple vellum with gold writing, contains portions of Matthew, mainly from Chapters xiii. to xxiv. It was discovered at Sinope in Pontus, in 1899, and its text was published by M. Henri Omont, in "Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale," t. xxxvi. (1900). It belongs to the sixth century, and in text is closely akin to the other purple manuscripts N and Σ (see below). The symbol O is due to Gregory.

Ψ. This MS., numbered 172(β 52) in the Laura monastery on Mt. Athos, is an uncial of the eighth or ninth century. It lacks Matthew, and Mark down to ix. 5. The text of Mark's Gospel is alone interesting, where this manuscript preserves both the short and long endings; full particulars will be found in Lake's edition in "Studia Biblica," vol. v. (Oxford, 1903), pp. 97–131.

(*b*) NEW MSS. OF VERSIONS:—

S^{s}, *The Sinaitic Syriac.*—Undoubtedly the greatest acquisition in the sphere of the versions is the Sinaitic (or Lewis) Syriac manuscript, discovered in 1892 in the monastery of St. Catherine on Mt. Sinai, the former home of the other "Sinaiticus," the Greek MS. discovered by Tischendorf there about half a century before. It is of the fourth (or early fifth) century, and is the older and better representative of the Old Syriac Version, otherwise represented only by the earlier discovered Curetonian from the Nitrian Desert in Egypt. The Old Syriac Version is a translation of the Greek text current at Antioch about 200 A.D., a text of which otherwise we know nothing. The text of both MSS., neither of which is absolutely complete, can be best studied in Burkitt's "Evangelion da-Mepharreshe" (Cambridge, 1904), which is provided with an exact English translation, so that even those not conversant with Syriac can inform themselves accurately of the readings of both manuscripts. Burkitt's introduction is the most valuable work on the early textual history of the Gospels which the period has brought.

Egypt has yielded up a good many more fragments of the *Sahidic* or South-Egyptian Version, some in company with the Greek text. These have been published by Balestri ("Sacrorum Bibliorum Fragmenta Copto-Sahidica Musei Borgiani," vol. iii. [Rome, 1904]) and others; and it is a pleasure to learn that the Clarendon Press is far advanced with the printing of Rev. G. Horner's edition of all the Sahidic fragments with an English translation. Of no version have we greater hopes than of the Sahidic.

The Latin Vulgate.—The oldest fragment of Vulgate extant (John vii. 27–28 and 30–31) is a tiny bit of parchment discovered in the Egyptian Museum in the University of Aberdeen. Published by E. O. Winstedt, the discoverer of the missing lines of Juvenal's sixth satire, in the *Classical Quarterly*, vol. i. (1907), p. 266, it shows by the presence of the Eusebian Canons that it is Vulgate. As it is written in good capitals, which can hardly be later than the fourth century, we possess in it a leaf written within seventeen or eighteen years of the original issue of the Vulgate Gospels.

Hardly so early, but in the judgment of experts as old as the fifth century, are the remaining leaves of a *codex* in half-uncial writing, which once contained the whole of the four Gospels. Most of the surviving leaves are in a portofolio at the St. Gall *Stiftsbibliothek*, and their text has already been printed at the Clarendon Press, under the editorship of Mr. C. H. Turner. It is probable that this MS., as far as it goes, is the best extant of the Vulgate Gospels, and the publication of its text is likely to have some influence on the textual criticism of the Vulgate.

(*c*) New Sources of Quotations:—

The discovery of two copies of an Arabic translation of Tatian's "Diatessaron," the text of which was published by Ciasca in 1888, was an event of the utmost importance. The Arabic is, of course, not the original, but a translation of the Syriac, which may have been, and likely was, in its turn a translation from the

Greek. The history of the Arabic version makes it a poor witness to the text of the work as Tatian compiled it, but some of the characteristics of the original can be elicited from this version. The work is intimately connected with the history of the Western text, and Von Soden, in his "Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments," Bd. I. (Berlin, 1902 ff.), pp. 1536 ff., 1632 ff., attributes to it a *rôle* of the very highest importance. The English reader can study it in Hamlyn Hill's "Earliest Life of Christ" (Edinburgh, 1894).

The publication of an Armenian translation of the lost work of Irenaeus, Εἰς Ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ Ἀποστολικοῦ Κηρύγματος (Leipzig, 1907, (2nd edition) 1908) has contributed almost nothing to the textual criticism of the New Testament, as its quotations are rather meagre, and are generally represented already in his greater and better preserved work.

It is otherwise with Schepss' discovery in 1885 of eleven tractates of the martyred heretic Priscillian in a superb sixth-century uncial manuscript at Würzburg. These were published at Vienna in 1889, and the Gospel quotations give welcome information as to the Spanish form of pre-Vulgate Latin text, supplementing what we had learnt from *m* (the pseudo-Augustinian "Speculum"), which is generally supposed to represent a Spanish Latin text.

In 1900 Batiffol and Wilmart aroused great interest by publishing a collection of Latin homilies on passages of the Old Testament, preserved in two manuscripts of French origin, under the title "Tractatus Origenis de Libris SS. Scripturarum." It is quite certain that they are an original Latin work, not a translation, and that they were written not earlier than the fourth century. Their style is distinguished by rhetorical elegance, and they show no knowledge of the Vulgate text. Dom Morin and Dom Wilmart would attribute them, with great probability, to Gregory of Elvira, known as author of a work on the Creed and of some homilies on the Canticles. They certainly witness to an interesting

(probably Spanish) Old Latin text of the Gospels, as may be seen from the fact that they twice rightly support the omission of the words τῆς ἁμαρτίας in John viii. 34. Their important biblical text has not yet, however, been investigated as it deserves.

The scholia, commentaries and homilies of Jerome, which Dom Morin has published in "Anecdota Maredsolana," vol. iii. (Maredsous, 1895–1903), have many citations, and it is well known that the text of Jerome's quotations is frequently in no close relationship with the Vulgate.

These instances may suffice to show that the period has not been altogether barren of patristic discoveries with a bearing on the textual history of the Gospels.

I (B)

(*a*) GREEK MANUSCRIPTS now better known:—

ℵ During the present year (1908) the New Testament portion of "Codex Sinaiticus" has at last been photographed in the most satisfactory manner by Professor and Mrs. Lake, of Leiden, every facility having been granted them by the authorities at St. Petersburg. The Clarendon Press will shortly issue the complete photographs and thus help greatly towards the final settlement of various questions of interest and importance connected with the *codex*.

B. The sister MS., the Codex Vaticanus, has been twice photographed within the period, the first photographs by Cozza-Luzi (Rome, 1889) having been succeeded by the much better photographs of Hœpli (Milan, 1904). The solution of the question of the connexion between ℵ and B may be much aided now that the critic can have photographs of both in front of him at the same time.

N. Only forty-five leaves of this sixth-century MS. were known to Westcott and Hort, containing portions of each of the four Gospels. Their number was increased to 227 in 1896, in which year the 182 new

leaves were acquired by the Tsar of Russia. The whole of the text of N ("Codex Purpureus Petropolitanus") was published by H. S. Cronin at Cambridge in 1899. Rather more than half the original MS. still remains undiscovered. Von Soden has argued that this and the other Greek MSS. on purple vellum represent the text used by the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus, towards the end of the fourth century ("Die Schr. des N. T.," Bd. i. p. 1466 ff.).

1, 118, 131, 209. Professor Lake has published the text of 1 completely ("Codex 1 of the Gospels and its Allies" [Cambridge, 1902]), with all the variants of the others of the same family in footnotes and a full discussion of the text, thus following the example of Ferrar and advancing what must be a task of the present or succeeding generations—the collation and classification of the cursive MSS. This service, it appears, will be largely accomplished in the textual apparatus which Von Soden will shortly publish, based on the collations of his numerous collaborators. (Lake indicates this group by "fam^{1}," Burkitt by "1 &c.").

The Ferrar group has received accessions through the labours of various scholars, and now includes 13, 69, 124, 230, 346, 543, 788, 826, 828, 983, 1689, 1709, The first three and the fifth were alone known to Ferrar. The archetype of these MSS. has been located either in Calabria or in Sicily in the Middle Ages. (Lake indicates this group by "fam^{13}," Burkitt by "13 &c.").

(*b*) MSS. OF VERSIONS now better known:—

Old Latin, k. The most precious of all Old Latin MSS., the *Bobiensis*, which Burkitt and Traube have shown to have been written in North Africa about 400 A.D., and which represents the text of the Gospels as used by Cyprian of Carthage about the middle of the third century, has been accurately published by Wordsworth, Sanday, and White in "Old Latin Biblical Texts," No. II. (Oxford, 1886). Some valuable gleanings by Burkitt and Turner appeared in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. v. (1903–1904), pp. 88–107. (See also a

palæographical study in the posthumous "Nomina Sacra," of Ludwig Traube [Munich, 1907], p. 138 ff.).

ff^2. We owe to the enthusiasm of E. S. Buchanan an accurate edition of the Old Latin MS. "Corbeiensis" (in the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, No. 17225), which some palæographers now raise from the seventh to the fifth century ("Old Latin Biblical Texts," No. V. [Oxford, 1907]). It had been previously but imperfectly known. For others see the series "Old Latin Biblical Texts," and *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. X., p. 120 ff.

Vulgate. Enumeration of MSS. is saved by reference to the great edition of the Bishop of Salisbury and Professor White, "Nouum Testamentum Domini Nostri Iesu Christi Latine" (Oxford, 1889–1898), which not only contains more accurate collations of MSS. used by Lachmann and Tischendorf, but collations of a large number never before employed. The text they have constituted on the basis of their collations of these MSS. undoubtedly confers upon us practically the *ipsissima verba* of St. Jerome, even if it be really rather Cassiodorus's accurate edition of the Vulgate produced in the middle of the sixth century than the original of Jerome himself. This is a point which will shortly be discussed by the critics. With rare generosity permission was given to Professor Nestle to record the variations between the official Vulgate of the Roman Church and the scientific Oxford edition in the footnotes to his handy edition of the Vulgate New Testament (Stuttgart, 1906; second edition, 1907), as far as that work had appeared, namely, to the end of *Acts*.

Similarly, a reference to the *Peshitta* Gospels of Pusey and Gwilliam (Oxford, 1901) will save detailed mention of the MSS. in which they are contained. As the version itself is now known, thanks to Burkitt's researches, to date from the rule of Rabbula, Bishop of Edessa from 411 to 435 A.D., and as there are a good many early MSS. accurately written, we may now be sure that we have the actual words of the Peshitta. The editors have added a Latin translation.

To turn to Egypt. The *Bohairic* Version, a powerful support of B and ℵ, which was very imperfectly known, through Lagarde, to Tischendorf and thus to Westcott and Hort, has been edited with a copious apparatus and a close English translation by Rev. G. Horner (Oxford, 1898).

(*c*) SOURCES OF QUOTATIONS more accurately known :—

As it is on this department that the whole of the history of the text depends, it is gratifying to know that our period has seen unparalleled progress in it. Previous to 1881 there were few editions of Fathers worthy to be called scientific. Since that time many volumes have appeared in the "Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum" (begun in 1866), most of which can be safely employed for critical purposes, such as the edition of Lucifer of Cagliari by Hartel (1886). There is now also a Berlin series of Ante-Nicene Greek Fathers, which since its start in 1897 has grown to some seventeen volumes, about a third of the whole. Except in rare cases, the manuscripts of Greek Fathers are so late and bad that we can never hope to recover their texts (and with them the texts of their quotations) with anything like the accuracy which is possible in the case of most of the Latin writers, but nevertheless many important alterations will have to be made in Tischendorf's reports (used by Westcott and Hort) by any one who works through his critical apparatus to bring it into harmony with the new results. A few notes on detailed cases may be welcome.

Irenæus. An admirable illustration of the truth of Hort's masterly summing up ("Introd." § 220) on the question of the Irenæus Gospel text, in the course of which he stated that the Latin Version and the original Irenæus sometimes go different ways, is afforded by the discovery of a papyrus fragment of the Greek Irenæus by Drs. Grenfell and Hunt, which the Dean of Westminster identified. In this fragment Matt. iii. 17 is quoted in the form *σύ εἶ ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητὸς* κτλ, a form otherwise unknown in Greek except in Codex Bezæ,

but the Latin translation goes the ordinary way ("Oxyrhynchus Papyri," vol. iii. [London, 1903], No. 405; see vol. iv. [London, 1904], Appendix II.). The quotations have been subjected to a close examination by Dr. Sanday and Mr. C. H. Turner in a work which it is hoped will not be long delayed.

Clement of Alexandria. One of the most notable discoveries of the period has been that of the real character of Clement of Alexandria's citations. Barnard has shown in detail ("Clement of Alexandria's Biblical Text," Cambridge, 1899) by a fresh collation of Clement's MSS. that he used a Western text.

Origen. The task of the collection, arrangement, and study of the Gospel quotations in the extant Greek works of Origen, in the light of the recent scientific editions, commended to a member of Mansfield College a year or two ago as a good subject for a thesis, has been undertaken by Dr. E. F. Hautsch, who has shown real critical ability in his already published dissertation, "De Quattuor Evangeliorum Codicibus Origenianis" (Göttingen, 1907), and promises further work on the subject in "Texte und Untersuchungen." There appear to be no certain traces of the B ℵ text anywhere before Origen.

Nemesianus of Tubunæ's text has been elicited by C. H. Turner from the "Sententiæ Episcoporum," printed in editions of Cyprian and of Augustine "De Baptismo," and has revealed the interesting fact that even in those early days two forms of biblical text could co-exist at no great distance from one another; it is in great part a distinct text from Cyprian's (*Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. ii. [1900–1901], p. 602 ff.).

Hilary of Poitiers. When Hilary's commentary on Matthew is critically edited, some interesting results will doubtless accrue, if we may infer this from the important changes which some quotations in the Vienna edition of his "Homilies on the Psalms" have shown. Meantime, Bonnassieux, in his "Les Evangiles Synoptiques de Saint Hilaire de Poitiers" (Lyons, 1906),

has pointed out some resemblances between his Gospel text and that of the Old Latin Codex Usserianus (*r*), which would seem to suggest that the "Insular" form of Old-Latin Gospel text was obtained from Gaul, as we might expect it to have been.

Lucifer of Cagliari. The publication of a scientific edition of this author by Hartel (Vienna, 1886), has revealed to Burkitt that in St. John his text is the same as that in Codex Vercellensis (*a*).

Ephraem Syrus. Ephraem's quotations from the Gospel have been proved by Burkitt, on the examination of the MSS. of his works, to show no knowledge of the Peshitta, but to have been derived from the *Diatessaron* (Cambridge, 1901).

Tyconius, the Donatist, uses a later form of Cyprian's text, as we learn from Burkitt's introduction to his edition, in which the author has for the first time been made readable in print (Cambridge, 1894).

"Ambrosiaster." The quotations in this writer, who is now generally identified with Isaac, a converted Jew, have, as might be expected, considerable affinity with Codex Veronensis (*b*), but at times there appear traces of a still older form of text.

Niceta of Remesiana. The quotations in this writer, the real author of the "Te Deum," can now be studied in A. E. Burn's edition, in which, for the first time, all his known works have been published together (Cambridge, 1905). His Gospel text was of the same sort as Ambrosiaster's (cf. Burkitt in Burn's edition, p. cxlix).

At this point our very imperfect sketch may conclude. There is much still to be done, for which research the primary requisites are enthusiasm and accuracy. Much more might be done if scholars would be satisfied with the attainment of useful knowledge, and resist the temptation to write what is merely clever and striking. To the requisites mentioned we might, in fact, add humility and patience. The present century will see a signal advance made in the editing of patristic citations, in which it may be hoped that members of our college will play an honourable part.

II.

The successors of Westcott and Hort have learnt well the importance of studying the history of the text in order to restore the words of the original autographs. From what has been already said it will be seen that not a little has been done in this direction since 1881. A fresh study of various elements of the problem, based on purer evidence than was accessible to the Cambridge scholars, has contributed most valuable results.

In the first place there is now no trace visible of any type of text but a "Western" down to and including the early part of the third century. In the second place, the testimony to the B ℵ type of text has been found to be practically restricted to Egypt, with the exception of the use of it made by Jerome in Rome, to whom as Damasus' right hand and an experienced traveller in the East Greek documents of value were accessible. Critics would now generally regard that text as Alexandrian of good quality.

The criticism of Burkitt, the frequent mention of whose name in this paper is the inevitable result of the epoch-making services he has rendered to the textual criticism of the New Testament, would remove Hort's "Italian" class ("Introduction," § 108 ff.) of Latin MSS. altogether, and consider that this class, of which *f* (Brixianus), and *q* (Monacensis), were the only specimens he could produce, is really confined to *f*, which is a Vulgate text (with a very few genuine Old Latin readings inserted into it), harmonised in part with the Gothic, which is itself "Syrian" in character. The Vulgate would then be a revision of an European MS. like *b* (Veronensis) (see *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. i. [1899–1900] pp. 129–134). With this view the present writer emphatically agrees. Jerome did a good deal of work in the Gospels, both to improve the language according to the standard of a pupil of Donatus, and to correct the text according to the B ℵ type, which he evidently regarded as the best (see Words-

worth and White's valuable "Epilogus," p. 657 ff.). Burkitt adds the corollary that by "Itala" Augustine really meant the Vulgate of Jerome, and shows how Augustine's practice harmonises with this view ("The Old Latin and the Itala," Cambridge, 1896). This brilliant discovery has been widely acclaimed, and until a few months ago has not been seriously disputed (but see J. Denk, in the *Biblische Zeitschrift* for 1908, pp. 225–244). The Vienna critical edition of Augustine, "De Consensu Evangelistarum," published in 1904, an admirable piece of work fitted with notes illustrating the Biblical text, favours Burkitt's view, especially by its agreement with the oldest Vulgate MSS. we possess, sometimes against Wordsworth and White's reconstruction.

The Syriac versions would now be thus dated. The earliest, Tatian's "Diatessaron," a "Western" text, about 170 A.D.; the Old Syriac, represented by the Curetonian and Sinaitic MSS., also "Western," though seemingly independent of the "Diatessaron," about 200 A.D.; and the Peshitta, which used to be regarded as a second-century product, a revision of the Old Syriac on the basis of a Greek "Syrian" text, which superseded both the others in the Syrian Church, between 411 and 435 A.D. These rearrangements are also due to Burkitt ("St. Ephraem's Quotations from the Gospel," Cambridge, 1901; "Evangelion da-Mepharreshe," Cambridge, 1904).

The Sahidic Version is certainly earlier than the Bohairic. It is not later than the beginning of the fourth century, while the latter is not likely to be earlier than the sixth (Burkitt in the "Encyclopædia Biblica," col. 5,007 ff.)

The Armenian Version was based on the Old Syriac, but in the middle of the fifth century was revised from the Greek, namely, MSS. of the type B ℵ.

Westcott and Hort's masterly differentiation of the four types of text has not been seriously challenged,

and is not likely to be. The boundaries of the use of the "Western" and "Neutral" texts have been somewhat more sharply defined. The question of "Western Non-Interpolations" (W-H § 240 ff., § 383) has entered on a new stage with the discovery of the Sinaitic Syriac. They have been shown not to be homogeneous. Let me quote the conclusions to which Burkitt has come in regard to them ("Evangelion da-Mepharreshe," vol. ii. p. 232):—"(1) the Old Syriac, like the Old Latin, was free from these extraneous additions to the text; (2) in a few cases the Syriac evidence helps us to revise the list furnished by Westcott and Hort, by establishing the genuineness of some readings omitted on Western evidence only; (3) some of the "Western Non-Interpolations," which were originally passed over by the Old Syriac, are now found in *C*, and in a few cases even in *S*; (4) these insertions in our Old Syriac MSS. appear to have been ultimately based on Greek MSS. nearer akin to the "Textus Receptus" than to the type represented by ℵ and B." It will be of interest to mention the cases which fall under (2); they are Mark ii. 22, xiv. 39; Luke (v. 39?) xii. 19 and 21.

The combination of Syr^{sin} and *k* would now generally be regarded as sufficient to upset the combination B ℵ or, in other words, the versions may sometimes have retained the correct text, where all known Greek MSS. have lost it. This is a principle of the highest importance, and likely to be increasingly fruitful. It is especially useful, where the problem of the relation between the Synoptists is thus helped (cf. Burkitt, "The Gospel History and its Transmission" [Edinburgh, 1906], chap. ii.; Harnack, "Sayings of Jesus" [London, 1908].)

It may be asked, in conclusion, how far the text of the Gospels, as printed by Westcott and Hort, would now in all probability be altered by them. The real extent of alteration would doubtless be small. This *résumé* may properly end with one or two instances. It has been made almost certain that in Matthew xi. 5, *καὶ πτωχοὶ εὐαγγελίζονται* is an interpolation from the parallel

passage in Luke (vii. 22), as it is wanting in *k*, "Diatessaron" (seemingly), Syr^{sin} and Clement of Alexandria (Burkitt in "St. Margaret's Lectures, 1902," London, 1902, p. 91 ff.) In Matthew xxv. 1 the words καὶ τῆς νύμφης would almost certainly be transferred from the margin to the text in view of the evidence DX* 1* 209* 124* al^5 Syr^{sin} Latt Vulg Arm (*op. cit.* p. 90 ff., "Evang. da-Meph." ii. 247). In John xi. 25, the words καὶ ἡ ζωή are certainly an interpolation; they do not appear in Syr^{sin} or Cyprian, or *a** (?) *l**. John xii. 8 must go out, as an interpolation from the Synoptists; it is wanting from both Syr^{sin} and Codex Bezæ ("St. Margaret's Lectures," p. 94, cf. "Evang." ii. 238). Such are some of the instances where it would appear not only safe but even necessary to depart from the conclusions of the great Cambridge editors, on whose secure foundations all investigators must continue to build.

[NOTE.—I have purposely refrained from discussing the first volume of Von Soden's "Die Scriften des Neuen Testaments" (Berlin, 1902–1907, pp. 1648), both because of its great size and my consequent inability as yet to do justice to it, and also because no part of his text has hitherto appeared, by which alone his work can be rightly judged. Meantime, Professor Lake has written a long and valuable review of the book in "The Review of Theology and Philosophy" for October and November, 1908.]

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